dissenting:
Were this an ordinary case amenable to orthodox principles of standing and ripeness, I might have been comfortable in sharing the position advocated by the majority of my colleagues. Perhaps with equal confidence I could also have joined in Judge Leventhal’s separate opinion and its exposition of principles that normally might lead judges to a discretionary withholding of any declaration on the far-reaching issues tendered for decision. But this is not nearly the usual case; indeed, it is extraor*665dinary in the sense that it arises under a statute summoning the court’s adjudicative powers to the constitutional maximum. Because the majority denies the case that measure of consideration, I must respectfully dissent.
Ramsey Clark, a registered voter then a candidate for the United States Senate, brought this constitutional challenge to the unicameral veto provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act.1 These provisions require every prospective action of any substance by the Federal Election Commission to lie before Congress for 30 legislative days, during which either House by majority vote may unilaterally forestall it.2 Clark asserted that this procedure visited harm upon him qua candidate,3 and caused him as well “to suffer unconstitutional impairment of his rights to vote, [and] to participate effectively in the political process. . . ”4
In the District Court proceedings leading to certification of constitutional questions to this court,5 defendants raised a flurry of objections to our power, under statute6 and Article III of the Constitution, to entertain this suit. Their briefs and oral arguments here, discussing questions of justiciability alone, at once declined to illuminate the issues on the merits and complained that too little light had been shed upon them. While I disagree with the majority’s determination that this case is not presently cog*666nizable because unripe, I do agree with defendants in their insistence that the merits deserve additional elucidation. Thus, unlike Judge MacKinnon, I do not think it mete to proceed immediately to the substance of Clark’s claims. Instead, I would defer consideration of the merits until defendants have generated the light they have previously elected not to provide.
I
Four days after oral argument in this court, Clark failed of the Democratic nomination for the senatorial seat he sought. That happenstance moots his case insofar as it depends on his status as a candidate.7 But, as noted above,8 Clark also alleges impairment of his rights as a voter and participant in the political process, and those injuries the majority deems not yet ripe for judicial redress. That judgment seems9 to hinge solely on the fact that Congress has yet to exercise its prerogative to disapprove regulations of the Commission as reconstituted.10 This is the upshot of a double misconception, first as to the import of Clark’s allegations of injury,11 and additionally as to the standard for determining “ripeness” under Article III.12
While Clark’s injuries have not been given detailed exposition, one may glean from a fair reading of the complaint that his is a challenge not to the statute as applied to any particular situation but to the inevitable effects of its operation in any context. He notes that by July, 1976, the reconstituted Commission had agreed on certain regulations representing its “present thinking,” but did not even propose them to Congress until it had allowed key legislative aides additional time to make substantial revisions.13 Then, in early August, the regulations as approved by the Commission were submitted to Congress for its blessing,14 but by the time Congress adjourned sine die on October 2 only 28 legislative days had elapsed. Consequently, as we know, our recent national elections had to be conducted without the benefit of regulations promulgated by the Commission. These facts are cited not as evidence of constitutional transgression but to illustrate the defects inhering in the statutory scheme. The presence of the congressional oversight provision, by pretermitting all prospective Commission action, has deprived Clark of *667the value he would have derived from regulations formulated by a truly independent Commission. As a second and distinct type of injury, Clark alleges that “[bjecause of the necessity of avoiding a vote of disapproval by a body of Congress, the COMMISSION has and will continue to modify proposed rules and regulations to correspond with what its members perceived to be the desires and wishes of Congress . . . ,”15 thereby creating an imbalance otherwise avoidable in the regulations submitted to Congress.16
The majority’s approach, keyed as it is to actual recourse to the veto provision by Congress, neglects the inevitable two-edged effect attributed to it by Clark. It can hardly be gainsaid that delays of the sort heretofore encountered, no less than actual vetoes, deprive voters pro tanto of the protections of the Act. And it could be, as Clark asserts, that any regulations emerging from Congress will be “tainted” by the influence that body has on the Commission’s decision-making processes. One or the other claimed injury is visited on voters whether Congress approves, disapproves, or owing to circumstances takes no action at all.
That is the nature of the harm that Clark charges. To repeat, it is not dependent upon exercise of the congressional veto. On the contrary, it allegedly is inflicted irrespective of the veto. In sum, by Clark’s estimate, it is suffered as much now as it will be later. In addressing the question whether this case is ripe for judicial consideration, we should take the litigant’s claim as he advances it. That, I fear, my colleagues in the majority have failed to do, and resultantly have decided a case that is not before us.
II
This analysis of Clark’s claims leads naturally to an examination of the standard by which the propriety of judicial consideration must be measured. The starting point, of course, is the provision governing judicial resolution of constitutional challenges to the Act, 2 U.S.C. § 437h.17 The section is explicit: designated parties may institute district court actions appropriate for the purpose, whereupon the constitutional questions must be certified to the court of appeals for the circuit, which “shall hear the matter sitting en banc.”18 A prominent feature of Section 437h is the specification of expedited procedures,19 effectuating the congressional view that “if, in fact, there is a serious question as to the constitutionality of this legislation, it is in the interest of everyone to have the question determined by the Supreme Court at the earliest possible time.”20
The first occasion to construe Section 437h arose in Buckley v. Valeo.21 When that case was here, we acknowledged that Congress envisioned full compliance with the requirements of Article III,22 and noted that actions under Section 437h
are not to be decided unless the inhibitory effects of the challenged provisions are “definite and concrete,” “touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests,” and “admitting of specif*668ic relief through a decree of'a conclusive character.”23
Nonetheless, we felt that more was necessary to decision of the question whether, in light of the methodology by which members of the Commission were then appointed,24 it could constitutionally exercise the powers that Congress had conferred upon it. We concluded that while the efficacy of two powers of the Commission was ripe for decision, the validity of others was not because “[i]n its present stance, this litigation does not present the court with the concrete facts that are necessary to an informed decision.”25 We thus refrained as well from any decision on the constitutional questions with which we are presented today.26
On review of our decision in Buckley, the Supreme Court likewise found no blinking the constitutional need for a case or controversy,27 but the Court discovered — in the contentions grounded on the Appointments Clause — a broader controversy than we had perceived.28 Central to its finding on that score was the “distinction between jurisdictional limitations imposed by Art. Ill and ‘[pjroblems of prematurity and abstractness’ " that invoke the conventional judicial doctrine of ripeness.29 The Court pointed out that by adoption of Section 437h Congress had manifested that it “was . most concerned with obtaining a final adjudication of as many issues as possible litigated pursuant to [its] provisions . . .”30 The congressional directives incorporated into Section 437h were seen as imposing constraints on judicial recourse to the ripeness doctrine so long as there was a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III.31
To some extent, then, the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley was consistent with our own views. Where the Court parted company was in the test it applied to determine whether the temporal dimension of Article III was present. “Where the inevitability of the operation of a statute against certain individuals is patent,” the Court said, “it is irrelevant to the existence of the justiciable controversy that there will be a time delay before the disputed provisions will come into effect.”32 And since “ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing,”33 the Court held that where parties “raise constitutional questions of separation of powers with respect to an agency designated to adjudicate their rights,” the fact that the “claim is of impending future rulings and determinations by the Commission [poses] a question of ripeness, rather than lack of case or controversy un*669der Art. Ill,” and as such is judicially cognizable.34
Thus the important inquiry in terms of Section 437h is not whether the impact of the challenged statutory provisions is imminent or has already occurred but whether sooner or later it necessarily will, as the Court’s Buckley treatment so vividly demonstrates. By the time the Court reached its decision, the Commission had exerted another of its theretofore unused powers but “many of its other functions remain[ed] as yet unexercised.”.35 Their “all but certain exercise”, however, was held to warrant consideration, on the constitutionality of the appointive scheme, of “all of those aspects of the Commission’s authority which have been presented by the certified questions.”36
This exploration into the purpose and potency of Section 437h, as I believe the Supreme Court ascertained them in Buckley, guides me to a dispositional premise I find inescapable. Section 437h is both an endowment of exceptional judicial power and a command to use it in litigation attacking the constitutionality of any provision of the Act. The grant is coextensive with the constitutional maximum of adjudicative authority, observing no limit save the existence of a case or controversy. The mandate to the judiciary is equally apparent: constitutional questions emerging are to be decided if only their determination is possible in the constitutional sense. Prudential considerations, so viable in ordinary cases, have no role in disputes cognizable under Section 437h. That is because Congress deemed those disputes extraordinary in terms of need for prompt resolution, and deserving of extraordinary treatment by the courts.
With all due respect, I submit that my colleagues in the majority, while acknowledging that the proper test is that required by Article III,37 have not applied the Article III standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Buckley. Here, as there, we have an “agency” — this time the combination of the Commission and Congress — with a statutory duty38 to adopt rules and regulations implementing the Act.39 If and when that duty is discharged — and, as noted earlier, even for as long as it is not40 — the consequences of an allegedly impermissible commingling of legislative and executive functions will operate on Clark in the manner charged.41 To be sure, the time at which regulations may be forthcoming is uncertain, but I cannot believe that it will never arrive. And even if perchance that day never comes, the inevitability of the harm Clark complains of is not affected in the least. By its very nature, his injury arose on passage of the Act and will subsist as long as congressional approval of Commission rulemaking remains a legislative feature.42 The future will not alter Clark’s dilemma as a voter; for him the future is now.
The majority opinion notes that the question before us today was not resolved by the Supreme Court in Buckley,43 although the constitutionality of the unicameral veto was a certified question.44 From this it is sought to be inferred that the Court found *670the question unripe.45 I cannot accept this inference, for it is plain to me that the Court declined to decide the veto question because its disposition eliminated, for the time being at least, the possibility of any such veto.46 As the Court carefully explained, “[bjecause of our holding that the manner of appointment of the members of the Commission precludes them from exercising the rulemaking powers in question, we have no occasion to address”47 the veto issue. Since the Court held that the Commission as originally constituted could not, consistently with the Constitution, promulgate regulations, there was nothing upon which Congress might then exercise the veto. And the Court’s consideration of that issue was truncated not only by the evanescence of the Commission’s power, but by its realization- that in response to its decision Congress “might choose not to confer” rule-making powers on a hypothetical successor Commission.48 Therefore the Court merely adhered to ancient but wholesome policy in avoiding constitutional questions unnecessary to its decision. Seen in this light, I cannot endorse the majority’s theory that the Court either deferred review of the veto questions on prudential grounds or implicitly decided that the Buckley plaintiffs lacked an Article III case or controversy as to that question.49
Nor, unlike the majority, can I attach significance to the wording of the Supreme Court’s time-limited stay of its mandate in Buckley “insofar as it affects the authority of the [improperly constituted] Commission to exercise the duties and powers granted it under the Act.”50 The argument is that the mere existence of the stay51 indicates that the Supreme Court felt that the challenge to the unicameral veto provisions was unripe at the time of that decision since, according to the majority, it allowed the Commission to continue to utilize powers it had no constitutional ability to exercise.52 That this is an erroneous reading of the stay is sufficiently demonstrated by the next sentence in the Court’s Buckley opinion, which explains that the purpose of the stay was to “afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the Commission . without interrupting enforcement of the provisions the Court sustains . . . .”53 In relation to the Appointments Clause question, the rulemaking powers of the Commission were invalidated, not sustained; and only a peculiar reading of the stay could have given the Commission a period within which it might unconstitutionally promulgate all the regulations it could manage to process. This reading, moreover, is fundamentally at odds with everything the Court had to say on the subject of ripeness in Section 437h cases.54 The more reasonable interpretation is that during the stay period the Commission, although de jure unconstitutional, could continue to exert such powers as it would be *671constitutional for it to exercise, while Congress decided whether it wanted to resurrect the Commission at all.
Ill
The majority’s treatment of the timeliness question, barren as it is of precedential authority, neglects also the significant body of case law supporting cognizance of litigation similar to Clark’s. Perhaps the closest example is that of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,55 upon which the Supreme Court’s justiciability decision in Buckley chiefly relied.56 A question there was whether unconstitutional deficiencies in compensation for a statutory taking of rail properties might, if necessary, be redressed by a suit under the Tucker Act.57 No plan for conveyance of the properties had been finally formulated, nor had any plan been proposed for judicial approval, a prerequisite to adoption.58 Whether an unconstitutional taking would or would not result was unknowable, because it was dependent on a huge number of variables; only one thing was certain: that plans were to be submitted until ultimately one was approved.59 The ineluctable operation of that statutory scheme was deemed sufficient to imbue the remedies question with sufficient timeliness to satisfy Article III.60
Other cases support a similar test for determining whether at the time of adjudication there is an Article III “case or controversy.” In Times Film Corporation v. Chicago,61 for instance, at issue was the ripeness of a challenge to a city ordinance establishing a licensing procedure for motion picture exhibitions, and requiring distributors to submit films for “approval” before they could be licensed. One distributor’s challenge, not to a censor’s decision, but to the prescribed procedure — to the “censor’s basic authority”62 — was held ripe *672for resolution before he had submitted to the ordinance in any way, because so long as he desired to exhibit his films within the city it would inexorably operate on him.63
Such a test of justiciability is wholly consistent with the concerns inherent in the ripeness doctrine as enunciated by the Supreme Court and by us. The “basic rationale” of that doctrine is
to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way. . . .64
There is, in the instant case, no unavoidable danger of the courts “entangling themselves in abstract disagreements”;65 there is to be decided only a “purely legal issue.”66 And I, for one, cannot imagine any facts which would place “judicial appraisal” in this case “on a much surer footing.”67 It may be that we would have more factual “stuff” for decision68 if and when Congress either votes to disapprove Commission-proposed regulations or allows them to become law, but deferring judicial resolution of Clark’s claim to that point would raise as many problems as it would solve. If Congress lets the regulations go into effect, it will not have exercised the power of which Clark complains, and the result will be much the same as that obtaining in the absence of the lie-over provision. The “taint” of this Damoclean congressional purview will inhere in the regulations, however, and that taint will form the nub of any injury suffered by the voter at large. If such a taint would render Clark’s case justiciable then, and if — as no one can doubt — the facts establishing that taint are all present at this moment,69 why is the case unripe now?70 If, on the other hand, Con*673gress should vote to disapprove, no tainted regulations will pass into effect, but such injury as devolves upon the voter by recourse to the veto will obtain, just as it does now, for from the date of its establishment to the date Congress reconvenes the Commission will have been prevented by Congress from promulgating binding regulations.
Thus the impact on voters like Clark, such as it is, emanating from the claimed constitutional defects in the statute is inevitable. That impact will not become any more or less susceptible to judicial disposition by congressional allowance or non-allowance of any particular regulation. If Clark’s allegations are correct — a matter upon which I intimate no view — Congress will continue to look at proposed regulations with an eye to favoring its own incumbency, and the Commission will continue to yield to congressional pressure in proposing action for approval. So, “because of the structure of the Act there is no better time to decide”71 Clark’s case. That there may be others whose contentions may later be more easily adjudicated is beside the point.
Beyond these considerations, we would not, by entertaining this action, interpose ourselves in any agency decision-making process. Ours is not a question as to whether agency proposals would, if they became the predicate for agency action, transgress legal limits on such action. We have before us nothing which by administrative interpretation might elide the constitutional controversies presented,72 and no *674policy decisions remain to be formalized. In sum, the questions stand in stark relief.
Lastly, to the extent that the timing of our decision affects the activity of the parties, an early decision would be salutary as to each. At present, neither Congress nor the Commission stands in jeopardy of any disruption by our cognizance of Clark’s case. Indeed, the sooner we decide the constitutional questions he tenders the sooner all can know whether the Act must be recast to withstand scrutiny. The hardship to Clark may pale in significance to that found in other ripeness cases involving millions of dollars or the prospect of criminal sanctions,73 but that does not make it vanish.74
IV
The majority opinion purports not to address the question of Clark’s standing to maintain this action.75 The fact is, however, that its discussion of ripeness is largely cast in language traditionally employed to test standing76 So deeply is standing thus implicated that I feel compelled briefly to indicate my views on that score.
Clark’s standing now rests on his status as a voter. Section 437h, our jurisdictional grant, expressly purports to confer voter-standing to litigate constitutional attacks on provisions of the Act. As, on standing, the Supreme Court said in Buckley, “Congress, in enacting 2 U.S.C. § 437h, intended to provide judicial review to the extent permitted by Art. III.”77
All agree that Article III requires that the plaintiff have a “personal stake”78 in the determination of the questions he brings into court. It is clear also that the Supreme Court has recently applied prudential considerations79 which have substantially limited the scope of some prior decisions 80 that might be viewed as more generously allowing access to the courts.81 More relevantly, the holding in United States v. Richardson82 denying standing to a taxpayer who alleged constitutional transgressions, has cut back on expectations *675from Flast v. Cohen83 that the “public action” 84 might move from concept to reality. Yet Richardson, by refusing to overrule Flast85 merely expressed what was implicit in Flast:86 taxpayers may have a sufficient “personal stake” or “injury in fact” to raise a case or controversy within the ken of Article III87 but taxpayer-standing must prudentially be restricted to avoid inundating the courts with ideological challenges to every conceivable governmental action.
If taxpayer suits like Flast’s involve sufficient injury to generate an Article III case, it is difficult to see how Clark’s does less. The challenged expenditure of federal funds in Flast could in no way be said to affect Flast’s tax bill, or in any other manner to injure her than to outrage her sensibilities and deprive her of an “aesthetic interest in good government.”88 At the very least, Clark may lay claim to that much.
The one recent case to test congressional power to impart standing, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,89 also buttresses Clark’s standing. There two tenants in an apartment complex challenged activities of the owner that allegedly discriminated against third parties. They were deemed to have been given standing by a statute providing a judicial forum to “[a]ny person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice.”90 A finding that “the alleged injury to existing tenants by exclusion of minority persons from the apartment complex is the loss of important benefits from inter-racial associations”91 satisfied Article Ill’s demand for a personal stake. Perhaps more importantly, the entire Court agreed that Congress may, within the boundaries of Article III, extend standing so as to foreclose the court from recourse to any self-imposed constraints on their power to decide.92
As Buckley held, Congress has mandated judicial cognizance of any constitutional challenge to the Act that presents an Article III case or controversy.93 Clark’s suit may not be dismissed on standing grounds so long as he presents a “personal stake” equal to that presented in Flast or Trafficante. That, I think, he has done.
V
There seems to be no demurrer to my view that Clark’s complaint mirrors a “person stake” endowed with sufficient immedi*676acy to satisfy the dictates of Article III. In the opinion of Judge Leventhal,94 however, arid of the majority of the court as well,95 the existence of a case or controversy is not enough to compel our cognizance of' the case at bar, on grounds that it lies within our discretion under the Declaratory Judgments Act96 to decline to hear it.97 Judge Leventhal would dismiss the case in the hope — the fulfillment of which is in no way foreshadowed by this record — that Congress may at some later date confine or structure its power to veto regulations proposed by the Commission.98
As a preliminary matter, this position may overstate somewhat the breadth of the discretion bestowed by the Declaratory Judgments Act. Its permissive language confers some discretion,99 yet discretion has historically been exercised in but a relatively few discrete situations.100 These categories are analogous to, though not coextensive with, the various prudential doctrines asserted under other heads of federal jurisdiction.101 Moreover, whatever their breadth, they do not countenance refusal of jurisdiction merely because “the dispute relates to the existence of a ‘mutable fact’ *677[or] a ‘changeable condition . . . ’ ”102 such as the possibility that Congress may voluntarily restrict the ambit of its own actions.103 Even in the ordinary case, “where the only question is whether it is constitutional to fasten the administrative procedure onto the litigant, the administrative agency may be defied” and declaratory judgment had.104
In any event, we are not here presented with the usual case. I do not undertake a precise survey of the bounds of our discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act because I cannot agree that we are permitted by Section 437h to avail ourselves of any such discretion. That section authorizes the institution of “such actions . including actions for declaratory judgment, as may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any provision of” the Act.105 Judge Leventhal reads this as importing prudential and discretionary restrictions on justiciability into the special and expedited procedure that Section 437h prescribes.106 The end result of that interpretation, as he acknowledges, is merely “that whatever the Court’s ruling, it be announced earlier rather than later.”107 If, however, we are required by Section 437h, as construed in Buckley, to decide cases arising thereunder without prudential considerations of ripeness and standing,108 it seems anomalous to arrogate to ourselves a discretion to withhold decision on still other grounds.
In my view, the quoted language defines, not the prudential prerogatives, but the jurisdiction of the court functioning as the extraordinary Section 437h tribunal: it may hear only cases that raise constitutional questions as to provisions of the Act. This may be done, as the Section specifies, in “actions for declaratory judgment;”109 if any other form of action is employed, it must be “appropriate” for the purpose.110 I cannot infer from the statute congressional intent to indulge with the one hand the same leeway to refuse cases that Section 437h, according to Buckley, takes away with the other. This conviction is reinforced by the variously-stated rationales advanced for discretionary dismissals under the Declaratory Judgments Act, which are so similar to the very prudential grounds we are adjured to forego.111 I do not see here the free hand claimed by my brethren.
VI
I would, therefore, hold that Clark’s case is justiciable. Accordingly, I dissent from the disposition chosen by the majority. As noted at the outset, however, I do not reach the merits at this time.
*678The rationale for this forebearance is twofold. Given the grave consequences of any resolution of the issues this case presents, it bespeaks no excess of caution to venture no opinion thereon until one is needed. As no judge in the majority touches the merits, any examination on my part would constitute the sheerest of dicta, and it goes without saying that I am chary of any such utterance in this large matter. The second and more important reason is that the Commission’s argumentative presentation in this court neglected entirely the merits of the claims Clark asserts. Thus there has been no vigorous, full-bodied development of the complex issues involved.
Not the least of the critical problems lurking behind any disposition on the merits is the difficulty of framing a decision with sufficient precision to avoid sub silentio invalidation of the numerous statutes containing various sorts of congressional oversight provisions.112 In this, however, we are not unlearned. To be sure, all parties to this litigation should give the issues emerging their just due, and a call for the assistance of knowledgeable amici curiae is singularly appropriate. But these aids are for the asking, and can be promptly summoned to enable us to confront the task. Already our ability to avoid the shoals of broad dicta113 is enhanced by our knowledge of the construction of other oversight provisions.114
The purpose of the expedited review provision 115 that brings this case before us is to expedite decision of the constitutional issues it raises so that the Commission can get on with the important business of regulating federal elections. For as long as the decision is postponed, injury to Clark and all other voters — clear beneficiaries of the Act — must be endured. I would retain this case on the docket, have counsel for the Commission and amici curiae address the merits, and give the issues the resolution they deserve.
. 2 U.S.C. § 438(c) et seq. (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of May 11, 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 486, set out in note 1 of the majority opinion.
. See 2 U.S.C. § 438(c)(5) (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of May 11, 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 486. Not only rules and regulations proposed by the Commission but also such advisory opinions as may state “a general rule of law” must be submitted to Congress for its approval. 2 U.S.C. § 437f (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of May 11, 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 482.
. Clark’s constitutional claims fall into two categories. Treating the rulemaking process first as an executive function, he argues (1) that giving Congress the final say on the Commission’s regulations allows the legislature to exercise an executive function and violates the principle of separation of powers; (2) that incumbent legislators, as administrators, have built-in biases and thus cannot, consistently with due process, exercise power to promulgate regulations, cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) — a claim also of a denial of equal protection insofar as electoral challengers are disabled from similarly affecting the Commission’s actions; and (3) that the delegation from Congress qua legislators to Congress qua administrators is unconstitutional because it contains no meaningful standards. Styling rule-making by the Commission in concert with Congress as legislative action, Clark then argues in the alternative, as it.were, that the action infringes Art. I, § 7 of the Constitution because (1) it is not bicameral and (2) it deprives the President of the opportunity granted him by that article to veto any “Bill” before it becomes law. Most of these allegations are applicable to Clark both as a candidate and as a voter, while some — for instance, the Fifth Amendment “equal protection” claim — appear cognizable only in his candidate’s guise. In view of the majority’s disposition — and mine— these questions need not now be reached.
. Complaint fl 23 at 8.
. See Maj.Op. at note 2.
. 2 U.S.C. § 437h (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of May 11, 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 496, set out in full in note 2 of the majority opinion, is the only source of our jurisdiction. As detailed in the majority opinion at note 4, cf. Tamm, J., concurring, the United States was granted intervention pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(2) over the strenuous objections of all defendants. Since the unique jurisdictional grant of § 437h omits the United States from the designation of its beneficiaries, the continuing vitality of Clark’s action is a necessary predicate to the United States’ presence as a litigant. In this respect Judge Leventhal and I agree. Yet even in that event we could tolerate intervention by the United States only as an exercise of some sort of ancillary jurisdiction. That would pose complex problems, not the least of which, as Judge Tamm notes, is the question whether the Attorney General has the requisite authority to appear. Because of the majority’s dismissal of Clark’s suit and of the novelty of the United States’ undertaking, this is hardly the appropriate occasion for any expressions on the propriety of the United States’ intervention. Mayhap either the United States or the President himself may bring this suit in District Court, cf. Leventhal J., concurring, at note 13. 1 intimate no view concerning such a course, which would necessitate deciding whether § 437h is the exclusive vehicle for constitutional challenges to the Act.
. In this respect the majority and I are in accord. See Maj.Op. following note 30. It does not, at present, appear that Clark should be permitted to press his claims on the ground they are “capable of repetition, yet evade review.” It does not seem to me unlikely that someone may remain a candidate long enough to secure judicial redress of such grievances. But see Moore v. Oglivie, 394 U.S. 814, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969).
. See text supra at note 4.
. The gist of the majority’s explication of its holding concerning Clark is as follows:
As a voter Clark protested no specific veto action taken by Congress and identified no proposed regulations tainted by the threat of veto on review. Nor does he suggest that facial provisions of the Act inhibit his political activities as a voter in any way. It may well be that the facial provisions of the Act, if and when implemented, might in some way inhibit his rights as a voter. On this record, however, we must dismiss his present claim as unripe.
Maj.Op. at-of-U.S.App.D.C., at 647 of 559 F.2d.
. Congress had twice exercised the veto power on Commission regulations when the Supreme Court decided in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 135, 96 S.Ct. 612, 690, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, 754 (1976), that the statutorily prescribed mode of choosing Commission members violated Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution, and that a Commission so chosen could exercise no rule-making powers at all, no matter what means it adopted. . See notes 43-54 infra. On May 11, 1976, Congress amended the Act to excise the obnoxious appointments mechanism. Act of May 11, 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475-476. It retained intact the veto provision in controversy, and in fact extended its scope to encompass advisory opinions as well. See note 2 supra.
. Discussed in this part of my opinion.
. “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution [and] the Laws of the United States . . . U.S.Const., art. Ill, § 2. See Part II infra.
. Stips. MI 63-76.
. Stip. fl 79.
. Complaint t 19 at 7.
. It is noteworthy in this regard that the Commission has expressed its intention “to administer the Act in a fashion which implements the interpretations set forth in the proposed regulations,” Statement of the Federal Elections Commission, October 5, 1976, so that any “taint” inhering in the regulations inheres also in the Commission’s present thinking by which it will perform its other statutory functions.
. See Maj.Op. at note 2.
. See Maj.Op. at note 2.
. See Maj.Op. at note 2.
. 120 Cong.Rec. 10562 (1974) (remarks of Senator Buckley, sponsor of the amendment adding § 437h). See note 30 infra and accompanying text.
. 171 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 519 F.2d 821 (1975) aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976).
. Id. at 201-202, 519 F.2d at 850-851.
. Id. at 202, 519 F.2d at 851, quoting Aetna Life Ins Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617, 621-622 (1937).
. See note 10 supra.
. 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 244, 519 F.2d at 893.
. Id. at 247, 519 F.2d at 896.
. Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 10, 424 U.S. at 114, 117, 96 S.Ct. at 680-681, 46 L.Ed.2d at 742, 744.
. Id. at 117-118, 96 S.Ct. at 681-682, 46 L.Ed.2d 744.
. Id. at 114, 96 S.Ct. at 680, 46 L.Ed.2d at 742, quoting Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588, 92 S.Ct. 1716, 1719, 32 L.Ed.2d 317, 322 (1972).
. Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 10, 424 U.S. at 117, 96 S.Ct. at 681, 46 L.Ed.2d at 743. We ourselves had noted that “Congress was concerned with the inhibitory effect of a massive rearrangement of regulations operating upon federal campaigns and elections, and wanted election participants to be permitted expeditiously to test the facial validity of limitations and requirements imposed by the challenged Acts.” Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 21, 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 201-202, 519 F.2d at 850-851 (footnote omitted).
. Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 10, 424 U.S. at 117, 96 S.Ct. at 681, 46 L.Ed.2d at 744.
. Id. at 114, 96 S.Ct. at 680, 46 L.Ed.2d at 742, quoting Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143, 95 S.Ct. 335, 358, 42 L.Ed.2d 320, 353 (1974).
. Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 10, 424 U.S. at 114, 96 S.Ct. at 680, 46 L.Ed.2d at 742, quoting Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra note 32, 419 U.S. at 140, 95 S.Ct. at 357, 42 L.Ed.2d at 351.
. Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 10, 424 U.S. at 117, 96 S.Ct. at 681, 46 L.Ed.2d at 743-744.
. Id. at 116-117, 96 S.Ct. at 681, 46 L.Ed.2d at 744.
. Id.
. See Maj.Op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. at-, 559 F.2d at 646-647.
. See 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(10) (Supp. V 1975).
. It may be argued that since the Commission will not “adjudicate” as to voters, the Buckley test is somehow misplaced. This, however, is a question of standing, not ripeness, and Clark seems also to have standing to prosecute this action. See Part IV infra.
. See text supra following note 16.
. See note 3 supra.
. See Part I supra.
. Maj.Op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. at-, 559 F.2d at 651-652.
. Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 10, 424 U.S. at 137 n.175, 140 n.176, 96 S.Ct. at 690 n.175, 692 n.176, 46 L.Ed.2d at 755 n.175, 757 n.176.
. Maj.Op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. at-, 559 F.2d at 652.
. The majority disputes this seemingly indisputable proposition, relying entirely on the less than pellucid language of the Supreme Court’s stay of its mandate in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143, 96 S.Ct. at 693, 46 L.Ed.2d at 758. As hereinafter noted, see text infra at notes 50-54, this reliance is misplaced.
. Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 10, 424 U.S. at 140 n.176, 96 S.Ct. at 692 n.176, 46 L.Ed.2d at 757 n.176.
. Id. at 137 n.175, 96 S.Ct. at 690 n.175, 46 L.Ed.2d at 755 n.175.
. Maj.Op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. at-, 559 F.2d at 652.
. 424 U.S. at 143, 96 S.Ct. at 693, 46 L.Ed.2d at 758, quoted in Maj.Op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. at -, 559 F.2d at 653.
. The stay was predicated on voting rights cases wherein elections conducted in accordance with a district court plan are accorded de facto validity even though the plan is overturned on appeal. See, e.g., Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 541, 93 S.Ct. 1702, 1711, 36 L.Ed.2d 472, 485 (1973); Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 550-551, 92 S.Ct. 656, 658, 30 L.Ed.2d 704, 706 (1972).
. Maj.Op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. at-, 559 F.2d at 653.
. 424 U.S. at 143, 96 S.Ct. at 693, 46 L.Ed.2d at 758 (emphasis added).
. See text supra at notes 29-34.
. Supra note 32.
. See Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 10, 424 U.S. at 114-117, 96 S.Ct. at 680-682, 46 L.Ed.2d at 742-744.
. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra note 32, 419 U.S. at 147, 95 S.Ct. at 360-361, 42 L.Ed.2d at 356.
. Id. at 140, 95 S.Ct. at 357, 42 L.Ed.2d at 351-352.
. Id. at 140-142, 95 S.Ct. at 357-358, 42 L.Ed.2d at 351-353.
. Id. at 143, 95 S.Ct. at 358, 42 L.Ed.2d at 353. Compare text supra at notes 32-34. The “inexorability” component of Article III ripeness may also be seen as decisive in cases challenging the operation of criminal statutes before actual invocation against the plaintiffs. Compare, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1215-1216, 39 L.Ed.2d 505, 514-515 (1974), with Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41, 91 S.Ct. 746, 749, 27 L.Ed.2d 669, 674 (1971). See also California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 56, 73, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 1513, 1523, 39 L.Ed.2d 812, 837-838, 847 (1974); K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies §§ 21.05-21.06 (1976). Another series of cases with logical underpinnings supporting the “inevitability” standard epitomized by Buckley and the Rail Reorganization Act Cases is that establishing the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine. See, e.g., Super Tire Eng’r Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 121-127, 94 S.Ct. 1694, 1698-1700, 40 L.Ed.2d 1, 7-10 (1947), where, although circumstances meriting injunctive relief had ceased to exist, a declaratory judgment action was held to satisfy both Article III and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1970), because the challenged governmental action “does not rest on . . distant contingencies” but on a “fixed and definite” governmental policy that, “by its continuous and brooding presence, cast[s] what may well be a substantial adverse effect on the interests of the petitioning parties.” Id. at 121-122, 94 S.Ct. at 1698, 40 L.Ed.2d at 8.
. 365 U.S. 43, 81 S.Ct. 391, 5 L.Ed.2d 403 (1961).
. Id. at 47, 81 S.Ct. at 393, 5 L.Ed.2d at 406. The same sort of challenge was entertained in Public Utils. Comm'n of California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 78 S.Ct. 446, 2 L.Ed.2d 470 (1958). There California’s scheme of common carrier regulation gave the state commission jurisdiction to set rates for intrastate shipments by the United States. The federal government brought an action challenging any such assertion of jurisdiction without first undertaking negotiation with haulers or initiating any action before the state commission. The state defended on justiciability grounds, but since it had “plainly indicated an intent” to exercise the challenged jurisdiction, 355 U.S. at 538, 78 S.Ct. at 450, 2 L.Ed.2d at 474, and the only question was the purely legal one whether such jurisdiction could be exercised, the case *672was held to satisfy Art. Ill and declaratory judgment was held available. Cf. Railroad Transfer Serv. v. Chicago, 386 U.S. 351, 358, 87 S.Ct. 1095, 1099, 18 L.Ed.2d 143, 148 (1967), where the Court noted that where the challenge was to the constitutionality of a statute, and its operation on the plaintiff was inescapable, it was not obligated to wait until the administrative procedures had run their full course before bringing suit. See also cases cited supra note 60.
. 365 U.S. at 45, 81 S.Ct. at 392, 5 L.Ed.2d at 405.
. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681, 691 (1967). Cf. Independent Bankers Ass’n v. Smith, 175 U.S.App.D.C. 184, 190-192, 534 F.2d 921, 927-929 (1976); National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 280, 443 F.2d 689, 695 (1971), both stating the rule in terms of “fitness for judicial resolution” and “hardship” resulting from delay in such a resolution.
. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra note 64, 387 U.S. at 148, 87 S.Ct. at 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d at 691. Cf. Duke City Lumber Co. v. Butz, 176 U.S.App.D.C. 218, 219, 539 F.2d 220, 221 (1976) (parties must show that injury alleged “is more than an abstract possibility at this time”). See also Flemming v. Florida Citrus Exchange, 358 U.S. 153, 167-168, 79 S.Ct. 160, 168-169, 3 L.Ed.2d 188, 196-197 (1958).
. Independent Bankers Ass’n v. Smith, supra note 64, 175 U.S.App.D.C. at 190, 534 F.2d at 927. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra note 64, 387 U.S. at 150, 87 S.Ct. at 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d at 691; Wilderness Soc’y v. Morton, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 121, 127 n.1, 479 F.2d 842, 848 n.1, cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917, 93 S.Ct. 1550, 36 L.Ed.2d 309 (1973); Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 32, 36, 447 F.2d 1201, 1205 (1971); National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, supra note 64, 143 U.S.App.D.C. at 280, 443 F.2d at 695. It is of note that here, as in Independent Bankers, supra note 64, a stipulation of facts eliminates any dispute as to the specifics of the underlying controversy, thus sharpening the legal issue. See 175 U.S.App.D.C. at 190, 534 F.2d at 927.
. Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 1524, 18 L.Ed.2d 697, 702 (1967). Cf. Davis v. Ichord, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 183, 196, 442 F.2d 1207, 1220 (1970) (Leventhal, J. concurring).
. Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv.L.Rev. 1002, 1003 (1924).
. See Stips. MI 63-76; Partial Transcript, July 8, 1976, Meeting of Federal Election Commission 1-3, 6.
. Even though the regulations that expired when Congress adjourned are not binding on the Commission, the latter has announced its intention to administer the Act in accordance with them, thus giving them substantial effect. *673See note 16 supra. This court has often found such “interpretative rulings” to have the requisite concreteness to justify judicial purview, provided that a purely legal issue is presented for judicial resolution, and the balance of hardship on the parties tips in favor of immediate review. See, e.g., Independent Bankers Ass’n v. Smith, supra note 64, 175 U.S.App.D.C. at 190-192, 534 F.2d at 927-929; Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, supra note 66, 145 U.S.App.D.C. at 36, 447 F.2d at 1205. Indeed, in National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, supra note 64, we permitted review of an administrator’s interpretation of a statutory standard couched in a letter to affected parties, because it presented a purely legal question and the costs of delay might have been great. Cf. National Student Ass’n v. Hershey, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 56, 412 F.2d 1103 (1969); K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies, § 21.08 (1976) (approving the Automatic Laundry holding, which is “almost surely the present law”). See also Comment, A Functional Approach to the Applicability of Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act to Agency Statements of Policy, 43 U.Chi.L.Rev. 430, 444-451 (1976). Thus the majority is in the anomalous position of denying review to procedures resulting in formal action whereas, if someone had challenged the informal adoption of the regulations, he might have secured review.
. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra note 32, 419 U.S. at 144, 95 S.Ct. at 359, 42 L.Ed.2d at 354.
. One of Clark’s objections to the operation of the veto schema is that it represents an unconstitutional delegation without proper standards from Congress to Congress. See note 3 supra. Congress qua agency might conceivably formulate standards to guide the exercise of its statutory prerogative; if we assume the proper standard for deciding the legality of such a “delegation” to be the present standard for judging more commonplace delegations, see Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F.Supp. 737, 758 (D.D.C.1971); K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies, § 2.00 (1976), then we might find ourselves disposed to await the possibility of such self-imposed curbs on Congress’ authority. Putting aside for the moment the possibility that such an internal structuring of congressional power would be unreviewable, cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939), in which event a different situation might obtain, see H. Leventhal, Principled Fairness and Regulatory Urgency, 25 Case W.Res.L.Rev. 66, 70 (1974), we need not and should not defer cognizance of this litigation on that basis for two reasons. First, Clark presents a host of challenges to the Act that in no way depend upon a lack of standards, and thus there is no reason to defer those claims. Only if they do not suffice to invalidate the veto provision would we have need to pass on the “delegation” claim. Second, even if we got that far, we would encounter a discrete question: is any delegation of this sort valid, no matter what standards are employed? Cf. National Cable Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 94 S.Ct. 1146, 39 L.Ed.2d 370 (1974). Only if we could conceive of some valid delegation need we worry about the possibility that it can be saved by administrative self-restraint. Thus our situation is analogous to that faced in Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, supra note 63. There the Supreme Court found ripe for adjudication the broad claim that any prior restraint on speech was *674invalid; it decided that some such restraints might be constitutionally supportable. Since more specific challenges to the regulatory apparatus in question were deemed unripe, it then left them for another day. 365 U.S. at 50, 81 S.Ct. at 395, 5 L.Ed.2d at 408. See also Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 459-460, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 1388-1389, 89 L.Ed. 1725, 1733-1734 (1945); Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 438-439, 58 S.Ct. 678, 685, 82 L.Ed. 936, 946 (1938). I see no reason why the numerous claims raised by Clark must all be deferred because one of them might not be ripe.
. Cf. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra note 64; Independent Bankers Ass’n v. Smith, supra note 64; National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, supra note 64.
. Cf., e.g., Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 226, 234, 432 F.2d 659, 667 (1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403, 92 S.Ct. 577, 30 L.Ed.2d 560 (1972). See also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 83 S.Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963).
. Maj.Op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. at-, 559 F.2d at 647. Cf. Leventhal, J., concurring 182 U.S. App.D.C.-, 559 F.2d-662-663.
. E. g., Maj.Op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. at-, 559 F.2d at 647. “we are hard pressed to find any ripe injury or present ‘personal stake’ . . .”
. 424 U.S. at 11-12, 96 S.Ct. at 631, 46 L.Ed.2d at 683.
. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 93 S.Ct. 364, 367, 34 L.Ed.2d 415, 419 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, 20 L.Ed.2d 947, 961 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 678 (1962). Cf. K. Davis Administrative Law of the Seventies, § 22.01 at 487-488, § 22.21 at 524 (1976).
. See, e. g., Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974).
. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973); Flast v. Cohen, supra note 78.
. See K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies, §§ 22.02-3 to 22.02-10 (1976).
. Supra note 79. See also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to End the War, 418 U.S. 208, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974).
. Supra note 78.
. See Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeidian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1033 (1968); Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 1265 (1961). Cf. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court — A Functional Analysis, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 645, 692 (1973).
. Compare the majority’s reliance on Flast, 418 U.S. at 175, 94 S.Ct. at 2945-2946, 41 L.Ed.2d at 687, with Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, id., at 180-181, 94 S.Ct. at 2948-2949, 41 L.Ed.2d 690-691, calling for discard of the Flast test but reaffirming that the injury required there “is now the controlling definition of the irreducible Art. Ill case-or-controversy requirements for standing.” Id. at 181, 94 S.Ct. at 2949, 41 L.Ed.2d at 691.
. And what precipitated Justice Harlan’s dissent in Flast; see 392 U.S. at 119-120, 88 S.Ct. at 1962-1963, 20 L.Ed.2d at 973.
. Flast v. Cohen, supra note 78, 392 U.S. at 101, 88 S.Ct. at 1953, 20 L.Ed.2d at 962; compare United States v. Richardson, supra note 79, 418 U.S. at 173, 94 S.Ct. at 2944-2945, 41 L.Ed.2d at 686 (Burger, C. J.) with id., at 195, 94 S.Ct. at 2955-2956, 41 L.Ed.2d at 698-699 (Powell, J., concurring).
. See K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies, § 22.02-10 at 508 (1976).
. Supra note 78.
. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
. 409 U.S. at 209-210, 93 S.Ct. at 367, 34 L.Ed.2d at 419.
. Compare id. at 211-212, 93 S.Ct. at 367-368, 34 L.Ed.2d at 420 (Douglas, J.) with id. at 212, 93 S.Ct. at 368, 34 L.Ed.2d at 421 (White, J., concurring). See also Flast v. Cohen, supra note 78, 392 U.S. at 132, 88 S.Ct. at 1969, 20 L.Ed.2d at 980 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Gray v. Greyhound Lines East Div., 178 U.S.App.D.C. 91 at 97, 545 F.2d 169 at 175 (1976); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466 at 469-470 (9th Cir. 1976).
. See text supra at notes 33, 77.
. See Leventhal, J., concurring, 182 U.S.App. D.C. at-, 559 F.2d at 659-662. .
. Maj.Op. at note 10.
. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1970).
. Clark requests injunctive as well as declaratory relief. See Complaint at 9. Like Judge Leventhal, see Leventhal, J., concurring, 182 U.S.App.D.C. at-n.6, 559 F.2d at 660 n.6, I perceive no irreparable harm that might justify injunctive relief. At all events, the effect of relief of either stripe will be virtually indistinguishable. Cf. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 602 n. 16, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 1207 n. 16, 43 L.Ed.2d 482, 491 n. 16 (1975).
. See note 72 supra.
. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970), provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.
Cf. e. g., Public Affairs Press v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 112, 82 S.Ct. 580, 582, 7 L.Ed.2d 604, 606 (1962); Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 432, 68 S.Ct. 641, 645, 92 L.Ed. 784, 789 (1948); Lampkin v. O’Connor, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 375, 360 F.2d 505, 509 (1966).
. Declaratory relief may be inappropriate when proceedings elsewhere pending must reach the question presented; Samuels v. Mackel, 401 U.S. 66, 73, 91 S.Ct. 764, 768, 27 L.Ed.2d 688, 693-694 (1971); Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 1175, 86 L.Ed. 1620, 1625 (1942); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 512, 85 L.Ed. 826, 829 (1941); Newport News Co. v. Schauffler, 303 U.S. 54, 56, 58 S.Ct. 466, 467, 82 L.Ed. 646, 648 (1938). Cf. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299-300, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 1073-1074, 87 L.Ed. 1407, 1411-1412 (1943); when that question implicates a statute construction of which is the task of another tribunal; Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242, 73 S.Ct. 600, 97 L.Ed. 983 (1953); Federation of Labor v. McAdory, supra note 72, 325 U.S. at 460, 65 S.Ct. at 1389, 89 L.Ed. at 1733-1734; Newport News Co. v. Schauffler, supra; when, though the legal issue remains, occurrences since the filing of the suit dictate reevaluation of the necessity for decision; Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 434-435, 95 S.Ct. 1691, 1696, 44 L.Ed.2d 274, 282-283 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, supra note 60, 415 U.S. at 459 n. 10, 94 S.Ct. at 1216 n. 10, 39 L.Ed.2d at 515 n. 10; Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108-110, 89 S.Ct. 956, 959-960, 22 L.Ed.2d 113, 117-119 (1969); Mechling Barge Lines, Inc. v. United States, 368 U.S. 324, 330-331, 82 S.Ct. 337, 341-342, 7 L.Ed.2d 317, 322-323 (1961); when “administrative intention is expressed but has not come to fruition or . that intention is unknown”; Eccles v. Peoples Bank, supra note 99, 333 U.S. at 434, 68 S.Ct. at 646, 92 L.Ed. at 790; cf. Public Serv. Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 237, 245, 73 S.Ct. 236, 241, 97 L.Ed. 291, 296 (1952); or when courts are asked to assume the existence of facts neither present nor apparently incipient; e. g., California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, supra note 60, 416 U.S. at 56, 73, 94 S.Ct. at 1515, 1523, 39 L.Ed.2d at 837-838, 847; Public Serv. Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., Inc., supra, 344 U.S. at 242, 73 S.Ct. at 240, 97 L.Ed. at 295; cf. Public Affairs Press v. Rickover, supra note 99, 369 U.S. at 113-114, 82 S.Ct. at 582, 7 L.Ed.2d at 607, where the sweeping claims of plaintiff admitted of no answer, since they hinged on the presentation of facts unknowable on the record presented.
. Justice Douglas has observed that decisions have often “brigaded” dispositions on ripeness or mootness grounds with expressions on the impropriety of declaratory relief. Public Affairs Press v. Rickover, supra note 99, 369 U.S. at 115, 82 S.Ct. at 583, 92 L.Ed. at 607 (Douglas, J., concurring).
. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, supra note 23, 300 U.S. at 242, 57 S.Ct. at 465, 81 L.Ed. at 622.
. See note 72 supra.
. Public Utilis. Comm’n of California v. United States, supra note 62, 355 U.S. at 539-540, 78 S.Ct. at 451, 2 L.Ed.2d at 475, distinguishing Public Serv. Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., Inc., supra note 100.
. See 2. U.S.C. § 437h (Supp. V 1975), quoted in the Maj.Op. at note 2.
. Leventhal, J., concurring, 182 U.S.App.D.C. at-, 559 F.2d at 660; Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754 (1944), though indicative of judicial reluctance to surrender historic discretion in framing injunctive relief, cannot be invoked for the proposition that courts should begrudge congressional grants of jurisdiction. Indeed, the distinction between hearing a case and granting relief is drawn in Hecht itself, id. at 329, 64 S.Ct. at 591, 88 L.Ed. at 760. Cf. id. at 331, 64 S.Ct. at 592, 88 L.Ed. at 761 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The citation of our remand for factfinding in Buckley, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 168, 169, 519 F.2d 817, 818 (1975), is similarly inapposite. That procedural decision is more in the nature of a reference to a special master — an analogue of the Supreme Court’s practice in cases within its original jurisdiction — than of a prudential refusal to decide the case on the merits.
. Id. 182 U.S.App.D.C., at-, 559 F.2d at 661.
. See Part II supra.
. See text supra at note 105.
. See text supra at note 105.
. See note 100 supra. Recognition of this similarity is implicit in Judge Leventhal’s enumeration of the factors guiding the discretionary decision. Leventhal, J., concurring, following note 10.
. See Maj.Op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. at-, 559 F.2d at 649-650.
. It seems certain that some congressional oversight provisions are constitutional. See Maj.Op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. at — n.5, 559 F.2d at 648 n.5, citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 61 S.Ct. 422, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941). It may be that all such provisions, which occur in bewildering variety, are valid. In any event, since neither we nor any other court will be called upon to review simultaneously the entire lot, the necessity for decisional precision is no more peculiar to this case than to any other.
. See Congressional Research Service, Congressional Review, Deferral and Disapproval of Executive Actions: A Summary and Inventory of Statutory Authority (1976) (collecting several hundred such provisions).
. 2 U.S.C. § 473h (Supp. V 1975); see Maj.Op. at n. 2.