This case was argued initially before a panel of the court and the late Judge Craven prepared an opinion in which Judge Hall concurred. Judge Winter prepared a dissenting opinion. Both opinions are annexed hereto as an appendix to this opinion. Before the panel opinions were filed, a motion was made within the court to rehear the case in banc and the motion carried. Before reargument in banc was heard, Judge Craven died.
After reargument in banc, Chief Judge Haynsworth, Judge Winter, Judge Butzner, Judge Russell and Judge Widener vote to deny enforcement of the Board’s order for the reasons set forth in Judge Winter’s panel opinion, which they adopt, and the additional statement which follows. Judge Hall would grant enforcement of the Board’s order for the reasons set forth in Judge Craven’s panel opinion, which Judge Hall adopts as his dissenting opinion from the decision of the in banc court.
In addition to the issues discussed in Judge Winter’s opinion, we must deal with another argument advanced by the Board to the in banc court. In its closing oral argument the Board asserted, for the first time, that, because of the employer’s failure to comply with § 10(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160, the court was foreclosed from considering the legality of the Board’s order certifying MNA as the employees’ collective bargaining representative on condition that MNA not do the collective bargaining. This argument was not advanced in the Board’s initial brief, or in its supplemental brief on rehearing in banc, or in its oral arguments to the original panel, or in its opening argument to the in banc court. The Board was not unaware of § 10(e) because it did invoke § 10(e) throughout the proceedings and the briefs with respect to other arguments made by MNA that we think it unnecessary to consider. The argument was, indeed, late, especially as counsel had received the advice set forth in the extract of letter appearing in the margin.1
Section 10(e) provides:
No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.
If we assume that the Board is not foreclosed by its own tardiness in invoking § 10(e), we nevertheless think that § 10(e) is not a bar to our consideration of the merits of the issue because (1) its purpose was fully served, (2) the hospital sufficiently raised the issue in the administrative proceedings, and (3) in any event, the Board’s error was a purely legal one, so basic in its nature that § 10(e) has no application. We elaborate on these reasons. The beginning point is a summary of the issues raised before the Board in the various steps in the administrative proceedings.
The petition for representation was filed October 1, 1974, and hearings were held shortly thereafter. The employer filed a brief before the Regional Director on November 4, 1974, asserting that MNA was not a labor organization within the meaning of § 2(5) of the Act. While the brief discussed the problem of supervisory personnel, it did not otherwise elaborate on the issue. When the Regional Director ordered an election, the employer filed a petition for *527review, again expressing its opposition on the ground that MNA did not have the status of a labor organization within the meaning of § 2(5) because it was dominated and controlled by supervisory personnel.
The Regional Director concluded to reopen the record and scheduled another hearing. However, on the same day that the new hearing was scheduled to be held, the case was transferred to the Board.
Thereafter, the Board conducted an additional hearing on January 9, 1975, and the parties simultaneously filed briefs on February 6,1975. MNA argued (1) that it was a labor organization within § 2(5) because none of the employer’s supervisors were on the Board of MNA, and (2) for the first time, MNA asserted that it had delegated its collective bargaining activities to the professional chapters. MNA noted that the negotiating committee was chosen by the members of the chapter and contracts had to be ratified by the chapter. The employer persisted in its argument that MNA was controlled by supervisory employees and that the chapters were influenced and controlled by MNA. It did not respond to MNA’s assertion that MNA had delegated its bargaining function to the chapters, because the briefs were filed simultaneously and the assertion on the part of MNA was new. Board regulations do not permit the filing of a reply brief except upon special leave of the Board, 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(i).
The Board’s supplemental decision and direction of election (which in the main text we construe to mean that the Board certified MNA solely on condition that it not do the bargaining) was filed May 7,1975. Admittedly, the employer did not file a petition for reconsideration pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 102.65(eXl).2
When the employer refused to bargain, an unfair labor practice complaint was filed. In answering it, the employer alleged that MNA was incompetent to serve as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees, and it asserted that MNA had not been properly certified as the exclusive bargaining representative. It admitted that it had declined to bargain, but justified its refusal for the reasons stated. General Counsel moved for summary judgment, and in opposition to that motion the employer again argued that MNA was not a bona fide, exclusive representative of the employees and that MNA was influenced, dominated and controlled by supervisory employees. The Board, however, granted summary judgment, finding that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice in declining to bargain and it issued the customary bargaining order.
From this summary, it first appears that the concept of certifying MNA on condition that it not bargain was one that originated with the Board and was not one that was urged by the parties. The obvious purpose of § 10(e) is to permit the Board to act without being unfairly surprised by the consequences of its action. However, when the Board itself originates the concept of the action it takes, and does so at a time when the employer has something less than an unqualified right to advance to the Board the reasons why it thinks the Board’s action is illegal, we think that there was sufficient compliance with § 10(e) so that § 10(e) does not constitute a bar to the employer’s direct attack on the alleged invalidity in a reviewing court.
Next, it is clear that throughout the administrative proceedings the employer was constant in its assertion that MNA could *528not properly be certified because it was dominated by supervisory personnel and that as a consequence certification should be denied. The implied premise of such an argument was that, if certified, MNA was to be the bargaining agent, and that if MNA was not certified, no entity should be certified. The premise was tantamount to an assertion of the obvious, namely that a bargaining agent would bargain. By its order, the Board rejected the premise, but it cannot be said that the issue was not before it.
Finally, it is certain that the principal defect which we perceive in the Board’s order is a purely legal one, namely that under the Act the Board may not certify a bargaining agent on condition that it not bargain. The Board has, in our view, exceeded its legal powers. We think, therefore, that § 10(e) is inapplicable because “the Board has patently traveled outside the orbit of its authority so that there is, legally speaking, no order to enforce.” NLRB v. Cheney California Lumber Co., 327 U.S. 385, 388, 66 S.Ct. 553, 554, 90 L.Ed. 739 (1946). See also NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U.S. 318, 322, 82 S.Ct. 344, 7 L.Ed.2d 312 (1961).
ENFORCEMENT DENIED.
APPENDIX
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 76-1166
National Labor Relations Board,
Petitioner,
versus
Annapolis Emergency Hospital Association,
Inc., d/b/a Anne Arundel General Hospital,
Respondent.
Application for Enforcement of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.
(Argued October 7, 1976 Decided )
Before WINTER, CRAVEN and HALL, Circuit Judges. Richard A. Cohen, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board (John S. Irving, General Counsel, John E. Higgins, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, Carl L. Taylor, Associate General Counsel, Elliott Moore, Deputy Associate General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Aileen A. Armstrong, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board on brief) for Petitioner; N. Peter Lareau (A. Samuel Cook, Christopher H. Mills, Venable, Baetjer and Howard on brief) for Respondent.
CRAVEN, Circuit Judge:The Employer, Anne Arundel General Hospital, refused to bargain with the newly certified representative of its -rank-and-file registered nurses, the Maryland Nurses Association (MNA), on the asserted ground that MNA was not a bona fide labor organization due to the presence of supervisors in its hierarchy. The National Labor Relations Board found that the Employer violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) by its refusal to bargain and entered an appropriate bargaining order. We grant the Board’s petition for enforcement.
I.
Congress, in July of 1974, amended the National Labor Relations Act to bring within its protective ambit the employees of private nonprofit hospitals. Thereafter the MNA petitioned the Board on October 1, 1974, to authorize the election of a collective bargaining representative by registered nurses of the Employer. At initial pre-election hearings the Employer disputed the MNA’s eligibility to be a bargaining representative on the basis that it was not a bona fide “labor organization” within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act due to “supervisory domination.” Rejecting the Employer’s contention, the Board directed an election, and on the basis of its results the MNA was certified.
When the Employer refused to bargain, the Board summarily decided that it was without justification in so doing since (1) it had previously received a hearing on the merits of its allegation of supervisory domination, at which time it was found that the MNA had delegated plenary bargaining responsibility to the local bargaining unit, i. *529e., the Anne Arundel Chapter,1 which is itself free of supervisory membership, and (2) it had come forward with no newly-discovered evidence to support its claim of supervisory domination. It is now the Employer’s position that the Board’s finding of nondomination is without substantial evi-dentiary support and further that its finding of a “delegation” by the MNA of plenary bargaining responsibility to the Anne Arundel Chapter is logically inconsistent with its certification of the MNA as exclusive representative of the local bargaining unit.
Section 3(f) of Article 1 of the MNA’s bylaws states that one of its goals is “to represent nurses by collective bargaining regarding wages, hours and other conditions of employment.” And in fact the MNA has previously negotiated a number of collective bargaining agreements. Internally the MNA is structured much like a three-tiered pyramid. At the apex are its Board of Directors and the Council on Professional Employment Activities (Council) which conducts the MNA’s economic security program. One rung below are the seven District associations which represent specific geographical areas within the state. At the bottom -of the structure are 20 local organizations known as Professional Chapters. The Anne Arundel Chapter is a member of District 3. The Employer points out that at least 10 members of the current 14-member Board of Directors are supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. The Board of Directors appoints the MNA’s executive and associate executive directors, and since 1970 the current associate executive director has been the regular representative of all Chapters at all collective bargaining sessions between the MNA and employers. The Council is comprised of the chief officers of each Chapter; and while it appears that in some cases “supervisors” are eligible to hold those offices, none presently do, nor can any of the Employer’s supervisors ever do so, since the Anne Arundel Chapter excludes supervisors from membership.
The Board found that the MNA had delegated its collective bargaining responsibility respecting the Employer’s employees to its Anne Arundel Chapter; that the Chapter, which coincides with the bargaining unit, has a negotiating committee elected by its general membership; that the members themselves select the bargaining items and collaborate with their negotiating committee; and further that an agreement, if reached, would be ratified by the local membership.
II.
A.
If this Employer’s concern with supervisory domination is genuine, it comes some 30 years too late. Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 the involvement of supervisors with unions was a source of legitimate concern on the part of employers. That was so because of decisions which held that supervisory personnel were entitled to full rights under the Wagner Act of 1935. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 67 S.Ct. 789, 91 L.Ed. 1040 (1947). The effect of Packard was to erode industrial discipline by “obliterating] the line between management and labor.” 330 U.S. at 494, 67 S.Ct. at 794 (Douglas, J., dissenting); S.Rep.No.105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1947); 1 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act 409 — 410 (1947). The Taft-Hartley Act changed this by denying to supervisors the status of “employees” within the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). Today if a supervisor devotes his time or loyalty to a union, he is unprotected by 29 U.S.C. § 157, and does so at the mercy of his employer, who may lawfully fire him for unapproved union activity. Beasley v. Food-Fair of North Carolina, 416 U.S. 653, 94 S.Ct. 2023, 40 L.Ed.2d 443 (1974); Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 417 U.S. 790, 94 S.Ct. 2737, 41 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974). Thus Taft-Hartley, as interpreted in Beasley, has all but eliminated genuine employer *530concern with union activity by its supervisors. For this reason alone, any asserted fear of erosion of management prerogatives is untenable.
B.
The other side of the coin is the fear of erosion of union prerogatives by a fifth column of supervisors loyal to management. Unions fear employer domination. Employers, contrary to the contention here, do not. That is why domination of a labor organization by an employer is made an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). And because of the unprotected status of supervisors under the Act, the Board — like the employer — is free to determine the extent of active union participation to be permitted a supervisor, in order to protect union integrity and to cleanse the collective bargaining process of any possible taint of employer influence.2 Local 636, Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Industry v. NLRB, 109 U.S. App.D.C. 315, 323, 287 F.2d 354, 362 (1961). Thus the Board has denied supervisor-members of a union the right to vote in a union’s election of officers, even absent evidence of higher company involvement or of the impact of the votes — holding that such voting constituted unlawful employer domination and interference in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). Bottfield Refractories Co., 45 LRRM 1522 (1966). Cf., Brunswick Pulp and Paper Co., 152 NLRB 973 (1965).
Here the Employer attempts to turn the statutory offense of “employer domination” into an excuse for refusing to bargain, Apparently it would exploit the Board’s liberality in finding “supervisory domination” where, as above, the remedy is merely to forbid supervisors to do what the Taft-Hartley Act has already denied them the “right” to do. As turned around by the Employer, however, the only possible remedy becomes decertification of the union; it would be a sufficient answer to say that employees have the “right” to bargain collectively “through representatives of their own choosing.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. More importantly, the Employer does not — nor could it — seriously complain of the presence of its own supervisors in the union membership,3 a presence which it controls. Rather we are asked to hold that the presence of supervisors of other employers in the union membership and hierarchy somehow flaws the integrity of the bargaining representative. If that is the case, the reason can only lie in some conflict of interest — the problem we now address.
III.
The Employer’s attempt to disqualify the MNA from serving as a bargaining representative — essentially on the basis of a conflict of interest — runs counter to the literal provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. The Act gives the majority of the employees of a bargaining unit the unqualified right to choose any labor organization as its exclusive representative, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(a), 152(4); and “labor organization” is defined to be:
Any organization of any kind . in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (emphasis added). Accordingly, where, as here, the Board has been properly petitioned by a labor organization and a hearing has disclosed that a substantial number of employees do in fact desire that labor organization to be their *531bargaining representative, and the employer declines recognition, the Act provides that the Board “shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.” 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (emphasis added).
Despite the congressional policy favoring free choice by employees of their bargaining agent, the Board has been permitted to override the literal language of Section 9(c)(1) of the Act when, in its judgment, certification would jeopardize other significant policies of the Act.
[The Board] has discretion to place appropriate limitations on the choice of bargaining representatives should it find that public or statutory policies so dictate. Its determinations in these respects are binding upon reviewing courts if grounded in reasonableness.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 422, 67 S.Ct. 1274, 1278, 91 L.Ed. 1575 (1947) (emphasis added).
Currently it is the policy of the Board not to overturn the democratic processes of the Act save in clear cases of conflict of interest, which render the labor organization incapable of single-minded pursuit of the welfare of the bargaining unit. See International Paper Co., 172 NLRB 133 (1968) and Oak Ridge Hospital of United Methodist Church, 90 LRRM 1217 (1975). In keeping with Jones & Laughlin, the First Circuit has stated that the Board properly puts the burden of demonstrating a “clear and present” danger of conflict upon any employer who refuses to bargain.
There is a strong public policy favoring the free choice of a bargaining agent by employees. This choice is not lightly to be frustrated. There is a considerable burden on a non-consenting employer, in such a situation as this, to come forward with a showing that danger of a conflict of interest interfering with the collective bargaining process is clear and present.
NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505, 507 (1st Cir. 1968).
The Second Circuit has said the same, adopting the clear and present danger test:
There have been exceptions to the general rule that either side can choose its bargaining representatives freely, but they have been rare and confined to situations so infected with ill-will, usually personal, or conflict of interest as to make good-faith bargaining impractical.
General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 517 (2 Cir. 1969). Accord, NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Metal Products Co., 287 F.2d 790, 791 (6th Cir. 1961).
Even though none of its supervisors are officers or directors of the MNA, the Employer asserts a potential conflict of interest in the fact that supervisors generally, by whomsoever employed, share a proprietary perspective which favors the moderation of wages and fringe benefits. The premise is unsupported. The Congress itself must have thought otherwise, for management’s fear of union-oriented supervisors is what originally took them out from under the protection of the Act. Alternatively, the Employer says it fears that MNA officials who are supervisors would be tempted to use their positions to advance the competitive position of their own hospitals as against the Employer.
In evaluating the potentiality of a conflict of interest, it is proper to focus on the presence of two elements — power to control bargaining and a selfish motive to exercise it. Neither alone is sufficient to disqualify a bargaining representative. For instance, the David Buttrick Co. case, supra, involved a loan by the international union of a certified local to a competitor of the employer. First, the Board determined that the possibility of the international’s intervention in local bargaining was too remote to disqualify the local union. Then on appeal the First Circuit, ex industria, found that, even assuming the presence of control over bargaining by the international, there was no evidence that the debtor-competitor’s financial situation was such as to give the international a sufficient equity-like interest in the success of the employer’s rival to create a reason or motive for intervention.4 399 *532F.2d at 507. Accord, Harlem River Consumers Coop, 77 LRRM 1883 (1971).
Beyond purely speculative allegations, the Employer here provided the Board no grounds to support a finding of motive to interfere. There was no evidence tending to show that any of the supervisor-officers of the MNA worked for institutions that compete with the Employer. Thus, assuming the power of supervisors in the hierarchy of the Union to subordinate the interests of rank-and-file employees in favor of helping their hospitals by harming the Employer, the second essential element was lacking. Nor is there anything in the record to suggest that the supervisors who were officers of MNA would have the slightest interest in taking the side of this “stranger” employer versus the interests of the rank-and-file nurses.
The Board, however, never reached the question of motive because it determined that supervisors could not control the bargaining process, given its finding that the MNA “has delegated its collective bargaining authority respecting the Employer’s employees to its Anne Arundel Hospital Professional Chapter independent of ANA or other MNA influences . .” It also found that the local unit admits no supervisors to membership and hence that the MNA “in its collective bargaining process is not subject to the influence, domination, or control of supervisors . . . .” Cf. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 74 NLRB 1168 (1969) and Carle Clinic Assoc., 192 NLRB 512 (1971). The decision of the Board not to override the democratic right of employees to choose their representative falls within its special competence. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra, 331 U.S. at 422, 67 S.Ct. 1274; Marriott Corp. v. NLRB, 491 F.2d 367 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881, 95 S.Ct. 146, 42 L.Ed.2d 121 (1974).
IV.
Finally, the Employer challenges the legitimacy of any such delegation of plenary collective bargaining responsibility by the certified representative.5 It is the Employer’s position that by virtue of the delegation the MNA lost its status as a “labor organization.” The Employer seems to have overlooked basic principles of agency which provide that an agent (the local chapter) may be authorized to use its discretion, and that, if so authorized, an agent’s exercise of discretion binds its principal (MNA).6 2A C.J.S. Agency § 247 (1972). As a result, the MNA will be bound by and must use. its good offices to enforce any collective agreement reached by the Anne Arundel Chapter.7
Alternatively, the Employer may be understood to invoke the general maxim that a delegate (MNA) trusted with discretionary authority cannot lawfully devolve the duty upon another unless expressly authorized to do so; delegatus non potest delegare. This principle binds public and private representatives alike. 3 C.J.S. Agency § 257 (1973). Shankland v. Mayor of Washington, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 390, 395, 8 L.Ed. 166 (1831); Shreveport Engraving Co. v. United States, 143 F.2d 222, 226 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 749, 65 S.Ct. 82, 89 L.Ed. *533600, rehearing denied, 323 U.S. 815, 65 S.Ct. 128, 89 L.Ed. 648 (1944). Here, however, the delegate (MNA) has not further delegated its representational responsibility to a potentially irresponsible third party; it has merely returned a measure of discretion to its principal, viz., the bargaining unit from whence it derived authority in the first place.
The MNA possesses important qualifications of a bargaining representative. Not least, of course, it has succeeded in winning an election. Beyond that the larger MNA apparatus is prepared to use its past experience in order to serve in a supportive capacity to its local Anne Arundel Chapter, offering it the technical advice and bargaining know-how, including sample terms from other collective bargaining agreements, necessary for achieving bargaining goals. But such practical considerations are largely foreign to the question of certification. For, again, we must not lose sight of the largely passive role which the statute assigns the Board in representational matters. Absent a true conflict of interest, the Board has no authority, even in the service of logical symmetry, to deny a place on the ballot to a petitioner in favor of its local chapter. For the Board cannot substitute on its own initiative a “better” or more “logical” petitioner, nor yet can it assume that any such “preferred” petitioner would either desire to wage a union campaign on its own or find favor with the workers if it did. Because of these uncertainties the Act discourages meddling by the Board with democratic processes, providing as it does that the Board “shall” hold the election and “shall” certify the winner. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1).
Having never bargained collectively, the Employer here is basically contesting the initial certification of MNA and does so on speculative grounds. However, once certification has issued and the bargaining process is begun, the Act provides adequate machinery for asserting an actual conflict of interest.8 See Margaret-Peerless Coal Co., 173 NLRB 16 (1968). Indeed, it is certification itself which creates the union’s duty to avoid any conflict with its bargaining duties. Meanwhile, as this case indicates, there is a particularly grave risk that the asserted conflict of interest may simply involve “some employer seeking to delay or avoid the day he must deal with his employees collectively rather than individually.” Bekins Moving and Storage Co., 86 LRRM 1323, 1333 (1974) (Fanning and Penello, Members, dissenting).
To override the literal policy of the Act favoring the untrammeled choice by employees of their own bargaining representative, the Board is justified in requiring an “unmistakable” showing that the duly elected representative is “not capable of dealing on [their] behalf ... at arm’s length with their employer,” Rochester and Pittsburg Coal Co., 56 NLRB 1760, 1763-64 (1944). For want of such a showing the Board’s order will be
ENFORCED.
. In advising counsel that we had directed that the case be reargued in banc, we caused the clerk to write to counsel as follows:
The Court would particularly like to hear argument on the question of whether NLRB legally can certify Maryland Nurses Association as the representative of the employees when bargaining will be conducted solely by The Registered Nurses of Anne Arundel General Hospital, Professional Chapter of The Maryland Nurses Association, Inc., as well as any other issues that you think pertinent.
I would advise you also that counsel will have the right to file a supplemental brief on the issue that I have identified.
Both parties exercised their option to file a supplemental brief.
. It is not clear from the text of the regulation that the employer had an unqualified right to litigate the issue by a petition for reconsideration. In pertinent part, § 102.65(e)(1) states:
A party to a proceeding may move after the decision for reconsideration or rehearing, except that no motion for reconsideration or rehearing will be entertained . . with respect to any matter which could have been raised but was not raised before [the Board] pursuant to any other section of the rules in this part.
Since the employer could have sought special leave to file a reply brief to the MNA brief to the Board, it may be argued that the employer could, but did not, raise the issue earlier in the proceedings and therefore consideration of any motion for reconsideration on its merits was foreclosed.
. The Chapter’s official designation is “The Registered Nurses of Anne Arundel General Hospital, Professional Chapter of The Maryland Nurses-Association, Inc.”
. Supervisors have a right under 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) to belong to a labor union — even one made up largely of rank-and-file workers, Nassau & Suffolk Contractors’ Ass’n., 40 LRRM 1146 (1957), but their activity may be restricted by the Board to prevent employer domination of the Union. Local 636, Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Industry v. NLRB, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 315, 323, 287 F.2d 354, 362 (1961).
. The Employer’s sole contention regarding its current supervisors is that “MNA’s District 3, which controls discipline of Anne Arundel Chapter nurses, is influenced, dominated and controlled by supervisors who are employed by Respondent ”; however, it does not contest the Board’s finding that District 3 officials cannot exert control over collective bargaining.
. Of course motive would have been present had the international in fact owned the rival company. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 34 LRRM 1222 (1954).
. “Delegation” is apparently widespread among state affiliates of the American Nurses Association which seek “representative” status under the National Labor Relations Act. See, e. g., International Paper Co., 172 NLRB 133 (1968); Sierra Vista Hospital Inc., 225 NLRB No. 115 (1976); and Sisters of Charity of Providence, Saint Ignatius Province, 225 NLRB No. 110 (1976).
We think the Board’s order should be enforced even if there had been no delegation to the local unit. See id. at n. 14 (Jenkins, Member, special concurrence) and Oak Ridge Hospital of the United Methodist Church, 220 NLRB No. 9, 90 LRRM 1217, 1218 (1975).
. A “labor organization” need exist only “in part” for the purpose of “dealing with employers,” 29 U.S.C. § 152(5), hence no reason appears why such a partial function should not be performed by some lesser unit of the entire organization.
. The Employer, by contrast, has argued that the MNA Board of Directors through the power of the purse could arbitrarily decree which grievances the Anne Arundel Chapter might process.
. The Board’s bargaining order was based in part upon the fact that the Employer has merely renewed his pre-certification contentions without adducing new evidence of actual bad faith or conflict of interest. See Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 162, 61 S.Ct. 908, 85 L.Ed. 1251 (1941). In the event the Employer should discover such evidence, the Board, having stated elsewhere its sensitivity to the possibility of such future conduct, would presumably be willing to entertain a motion to revoke certification. NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505, 507 (1st Cir. 1968), 69 LRRM 2044, 2044; Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc., supra note 5; Sisters of Charity of Providence, Saint Ignatius Province, supra note 5.