City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury

MESKILL, Circuit Judge

(dissenting):

I respectfully dissent, for I cannot agree that the plaintiffs have standing to maintain this action. However, before turning to the issue of standing, I should like to comment upon the unusual procedural posture in which East Hartford, West Hartford and Glastonbury (“appellants”) now find themselves. The plaintiffs’ complaint originally named HUD, its Secretary, its Regional Administrator and its District Director as the only defendants (the “federal defendants”). The local defendants (Farm-ington, Windsor Locks, Vernon, Enfield and the appellants) were joined as parties by the federal defendants. At the district court level, the defense of this action, was dominated by the federal defendants, upon whom the local defendants relied to carry the burden of this litigation. This approach was encouraged by the district judge, who, in order to simplify the proceedings, asked the local defendants to “tag along and support the federal defendant [sic] and take the same position.” On January 28, 1976, the district court issued its decision enjoining the local defendants from spending the funds granted under the Block Grant Program. The federal defendants decided not to appeal from that decision because (1) HUD finds the result to be consistent with its present practices, (2) the district court’s opinion can be read in a manner consistent with HUD’s interpretation of its duties under the Act, and (3) the injunction only applies to the seven local defendants. Brief For The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Amicus Curiae at 3. With a few minor exceptions, the brief filed by HUD is in general agreement with the decision of the district court and the position taken by the plaintiffs. The issue of standing is not discussed, for it is outside the scope of the brief. Id. at 4.

Of the seven local defendants thus left holding the bag, three have appealed. All have now learned the hard way that it is not always a good idea to “tag along” with and “take the same position” as a co-defendant. The three appellants are now represented by counsel who did not participate in any of the proceedings below.

*1045It is relatively easy to see why all of this occurred. HUD of course, has a substantial interest in the manner in which the courts construe the 1974 Act, and so it would naturally want to play a dominant role in any proceeding concerning that Act. The local defendants who were joined as such by HUD would naturally want to rely heavily upon the latter’s expertise. This is particularly true where, as here, the district court asks them to do so in order to simplify the proceedings. As a result of what has occurred, however, much has been lost in terms of the sharpening of the presentation of issues upon which the courts rely so heavily. It is not my intention to disparage counsel’s presentation, for counsel have, in my judgment, done a fine job in that regard. I wish only to point out that it could have been improved if greater foresight had been shown at the district court level. District courts and private counsel can, and should, be alert to the potentially conflicting interests of private litigants and governmental agencies, but governmental agencies bear a special responsibility in this respect. Because of their expertise in their respective fields, and because of the frequency with which they are likely to encounter problems such as that which has arisen here, governmental agencies are in a superior position to foresee and avert those problems. It is to be hoped that in the future agencies such as HUD will make some effort to assure that their co-defendants are made aware of possible conflicts of interest so that other litigants will not find themselves in appellants’ position.

Turning now to the standing issues presented, I believe a brief restatement of the facts is in order. On April 15, 1976, the Hartford Area Office of the’Department of Housing and Urban Development received an application for Community Development Block Grant Assistance filed by the City of Hartford pursuant to the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. By ■ letter dated June 24,1975, HUD approved a grant to Hartford in the amount of $10,-025,000. Hartford executed a Grant Agreement on July 30, 1975.

The towns of East Hartford, West Hartford and Glastonbury followed much the same procedure in applying for Block Grant Assistance, and they were granted $440,000, $999,000 and $910,000, respectively. Hartford and two of its low-income residents now challenge those grants on the ground that the applications submitted by the towns fail to satisfy one of the requirements of the Act.1 The majority holds that the plaintiffs have standing to make such a challenge. I cannot agree.

The majority holds that Hartford has satisfied the “injury in fact” test established in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,152, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829, 25 L.Ed.2d 184,187 (1970), .because (1) if the grants to the towns are disapproved, there is a “strong likelihood,” ante, at 1038 that Hartford will receive reallocated funds under 42 U.S.C. § 5306(e) (Supp. V 1975),2 and (2) HUD’s approval of applications that failed to comply with the statutory requirements “substantially less*1046en[ed] the probability,” ante, at 1039, that Hartford would benefit from the “spatial deconcentration” objective of the Act.

Assuming, arguendo, that a potential claim to a fund that will not even exist unless plaintiff is successful on the merits can ever satisfy the injury-in-fact test— which appears to require a present injury in addition to a prospective benefit — it is clear that in this case there is not the slightest chance that Hartford will ever receive reallocated funds as a result of this lawsuit. While it may be true that Hartford would have a priority position in applying for reallocated funds, that priority will mean little if there are no funds to reallocate. Despite the indications to the contrary in the majority opinion, Hartford, as the party who asks the Court to assume jurisdiction, bears the burden of proof on the issue of standing Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 44-45, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1927, 48 L.Ed.2d 450, 464 (1976), and although Hartford may have proved that it would have a priority position in applying for reallocated funds, it has failed to prove that the intervention of the federal courts will result in the availability of funds for reallocation. The wrong of which Hartford complains is HUD’s approval of the defendant towns’ allegedly defective applications. If Hartford is correct that the applications were defective, and that HUD abused its discretion in approving them, Hartford would not be entitled to relief preventing the defendant towns from ever receiving their grants. Hartford would be entitled only to an injunction pending the submission of acceptable applications — precisely what it sought, and precisely what the district court granted. Such an injunction would result in the availability of funds for reallocation only if the towns forfeited their grants by failing to submit acceptable applications. West Hartford and Glastonbury have already submitted new applications, thereby negating any possible inference that they intend to forfeit their grants — in addition to creating a substantial mootness problem — and there is not the slightest indi-' cation that East Hartford has any intention of forfeiting its $440,000 grant by failing to do likewise. It is sheer fantasy to suppose that Hartford will ever receive reallocated funds as a result of the intervention of the federal courts. In my view, Hartford’s asserted interest in reallocated funds is even more speculative than the interest found to be not judicially cognizable in Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973), and, accordingly, I would hold that it is insufficient to confer standing upon Hartford.3

The majority also finds standing on the basis of “a second, less quantifiable,” injury suffered by Hartford, ante, at 1038. That injury is the “bleak” housing situation that exists in Hartford. That situation will be improved, we are told, if the suburbs are required to include accurate “expected to reside” figures in their applications for Block Grants. This injury is insufficient to confer standing for three reasons. First, it cannot fairly be said that the housing situation in Hartford is a result of, or can be traced to, the challenged action of the defendants. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, supra, 426 U.S. at 41, 96 S.Ct. 1917, at 1926. Second, the possibility that the inclusion of accurate “expected to reside” figures will result in the betterment of the housing condition in Hartford is at least as remote and speculative as the possibility in Linda R. S. v. Richard D., supra, that the prosecution of an unwed father for failing to support his child will result in the payment of support. Third, and more important, Hartford may not properly assert an interest in improving its bleak housing situation in an action against the federal government. The doctrine of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923), places strict limits on the power of states to represent their citizens in actions against the federal government. See, e.g., Com. of Pa., by Shapp v. Kleppe, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 441, 533 F.2d 668, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977, 97 S.Ct. 485, 50 L.Ed.2d 584 (1976). The *1047power of a political subdivision of a state is even more rigidly circumscribed. As the majority recognizes, ante, at 1040, a city cannot sue as parens patriae, but is limited to the vindication of such of its own proprietary rights as might be congruent with the interests of its residents. California v. Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. (In Re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31), 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045, 94 S.Ct. 551, 38 L.Ed.2d 336 (1973). Hartford’s assertion of an interest in improving its bleak housing situation is nothing more than an attempt to vindicate a general' interest in the social and economic well-being of the citizenry. Even a state would encounter serious difficulties in asserting such an interest against the federal government, and it can hardly be said that this is the sort of proprietary interest which Hartford may assert.

Merely because Hartford may not assert the rights of its citizenry in a representative capacity does not mean that individual citizens may not assert their own rights. Accordingly, I next turn to the claims of the low-income plaintiffs to determine whether they have alleged a stake in the outcome sufficient to confer standing.

The individual plaintiffs in this case are low-income residents of Hartford who live in substandard housing and who have sought, unsuccessfully, to secure affordable housing in the suburbs. There is, of course, no question that an individual who is, effectively, trapped in a slum suffers a serious, present and continuing injury. Abstract injury alone, however, is insufficient to confer standing. Linda R. S. v. Richard D., supra, 410 U.S. at 618, 93 S.Ct. at 1149. The injury alleged must fairly be traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and the desired exercise of the Court’s remedial powers must in some perceptible way serve to remove the harm. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, supra, 426 U.S. at 40-46, 96 S.Ct. at 1925-1928. The majority is correct in holding that the facts of this case are distinguishable from those of Warth and Evans.4 However, the distinctions are not great enough in my judgment, to justify the conclusion reached by the majority.

To begin with, the bleak housing situation in Hartford is not the product of HUD’s failure to require the defendant towns to include “expected to reside” figures in their applications for Block Grants under the 1974 Act. The housing situation in Hartford was bleak long before 1974. Nor are the specific conditions of which the plaintiffs complain a product of HUD’s alleged abuse of discretion. Plaintiff Jordan had been living at her present address for two years as of June 30,1975, and therefore her plight antedates the Act by roughly one year. Plaintiff Mauldin’s position is no stronger. She moved to Hartford approximately one month before David Meeker wrote his memorandum “waiving” the requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1975). Of course, Mrs. Mauldin’s plight has nothing to do with acts of Congress or HUD or David Meeker’s memorandum. Her plight is the direct result of the fact that her husband became incapacitated. That incapacitation led to his unemployment, which, in turn, led to the loss, through foreclosure, of the family home in the suburban town of Bloomfield.

As indicated above, the injury suffered by the individual plaintiffs is a continuing one. However, because the basic injury of which the plaintiffs complain antedated the action they challenge, they would have standing only if they can allege that their injury has been, or will in fact be perceptibly aggravated by the challenged action. The plaintiffs have not made, and, indeed, could not make, such an allegation. HUD’s failure to require the defendant towns to include “expected to reside” figures in their applications for Block Grants did not make the plaintiffs’ situation worse, but merely left it the same. The “waiver” of the requirement by HUD did not have a negative effect. It merely failed to produce the hoped-for positive effect. Thus, the low-in*1048come plaintiffs’ claim of standing, like that of the City of Hartford, depends not upon a present injury that has been caused by HUD’s allegedly unlawful action, but upon a prospective benefit that they hope will accrue if the federal courts intervene and require the inclusion of accurate “expected to reside” figures. The standing vel non of plaintiffs with such claims depends upon whether there is a direct nexus between the vindication of their interests and the relief they seek, or whether the prospect that their lot will be improved by the desired exercise of the Court’s remedial powers is merely speculative. See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., supra, 410 U.S. at 618-19, 93 S.Ct. 1149. The most recent applications of these standards by the Supreme Court place formidable barriers in the way of actions such as the one now before this Court. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, supra. The plaintiffs have not, in my view, successfully cleared those barriers. It is naive to imagine that plaintiffs’ lot will be perceptibly improved merely by coercing the defendant towns into including accurate “expected to reside” figures in their Block Grant applications. The “expected to reside” figure lacks the magical power that would be required to produce such a result. The causes of the housing problems that plague the cities of this Nation are legion. Suggested cures for those problems are complex and equally numerous. The “expected to reside” figure is a new and relatively small part of the federal government’s attack on urban housing problems. Its impact on those problems is unknown and unmeasurable. The prospect that it will have the desired impact or that its impact will be perceptible is gos-samery.5 Thus, the complaint does not demonstrate, and the plaintiffs could not possibly show, a substantial likelihood that victory in this suit would result in their securing the adequate, low-cost housing that they desire. See, Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, supra, 426 U.S. at 44-46, 96 S.Ct. at 1927. Accordingly, I would hold that the low-income plaintiffs, like the City of Hartford, lack standing to maintain this action.

The judgment of the district court should be vacated and the cause remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint.

ON REHEARING EN BANC

, • «Before KAUFMAN, Chief Judge, and SMITH, FEINBERG, MANSFIELD, MULLIGAN, OAKES, TIMBERS, GURFEIN, VAN GRAAFEILAND and MESKILL, Circuit Judges.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, M. Joseph Blumenfeld, Judge, 408 F.Supp. 889 (D.Conn.1976), enjoining appellants from spending federal funds granted to them under Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq., pending their compliance with one of the requirements of that Act. A divided panel of this Court affirmed. On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the appellees lacked standing.

Judgment reversed and remanded.

MESKILL, Circuit Judge:

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, M. Joseph Blumen-feld, Judge, held that the City of Hartford and two of its low-income residents have standing to challenge the propriety of the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (“HUD”) approval of federal grants-in-aid to seven suburban communities in the Hartford area. On the merits, the District Court held that HUD had acted unlawfully in approving the grants. The communities were enjoined from drawing upon the Treasury or spending their funds pending the submission of lawful applica*1049tions. 408 F.Supp. 889 (D.Conn.1976). Three of the suburban communities appealed, and on December 23, 1976, a divided panel of this Court affirmed. The appellants petitioned for a rehearing en banc. It was urged that the jurisdictional issue was one of exceptional importance because it involves the standing of a municipality and its residents to challenge federal grants to a separate municipality. It was also urged that a rehearing en banc was necessary in order to secure uniformity of our decisions. A majority of the active judges agreed, and pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 35(a) a rehearing was ordered on February 8, 1977. The appeal was submitted without further oral argument. We reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case with instructions to dismiss the complaint.

I.

The material facts of this dispute have been set forth in the opinions of the panel majority and dissent. Except for a further explanation of the nature of the so-called “expected to reside figure” — which is essential to an understanding of the issue of standing — the facts of this case will not be repeated here.

In order to obtain assistance under the Community Development Block Grant program created by Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq. (“1974 Act”), a town must submit an application to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. That application must include, among other things, a “housing assistance plan.” According to HUD’s general instructions for the completion of the Housing Assistance Plan forms:

The Housing Assistance Plan section of the Community Development Block Grant application consists of four forms and a map, with narrative explanations, showing, respectively: I. Survey of Housing Conditions; II. Housing Assistance Needs of Lower Income Households; III. Annual Goal for Housing Assistance; and IV. General Locations for Lower Income Housing.

Form II is designed to satisfy the community’s obligation to “accurately . . . [assess] the housing assistance needs of lower-income persons ... in the community.” 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4)(A). That assessment must account for low-income persons who (1) actually reside in the community, (2) are displaced or are to be displaced, or (3) are expected to reside in the community. Id. The “expected to reside figure” at issue in this case represents the number of persons in this third category. Put another way, the expected to reside figure is a relatively small part of a very large application.

The expected to reside figure is merely an educated guess at the number of people who are going to move into the community. HUD’s regulations refer to it as an “estimate.” 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(c)(2). During 1975, the first year in which the Act was in effect, it became clear that accurate predictions of the future would not be easy to make. The methodologies used by many communities were unsophisticated, and it was difficult to obtain reliable data. These difficulties eventually led HUD to waive the requirement of an expected to reside figure, on the condition that towns indicate on their applications what steps they planned to take in 1976 to arrive at acceptable estimates. The requirement was not waived in later years, and current regulations give applicants considerably more guidance than did those in effect in 1975. Nevertheless, the expected to reside figure remains a guess, albeit a better educated one.

A community’s estimate of the number of low-income persons expected to reside within its borders has never been a self-fulfilling prophecy. The figure entered on a community’s application does not alter its future population, but merely predicts it. It is theoretically possible for an expected to reside figure to influence the future availability of low-income housing in a given community, because federal housing as*1050sistance subsidies1 are allocated to communities based in part on the anticipated needs reflected in their housing assistance plans. See Title II of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, § 213(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1439(d)(1). In this case, however, the housing assistance plans submitted by the defendant towns fully utilized all available Title II funds. Therefore, even if the seven defendant communities had revised their expected to reside figures upward, no additional housing subsidies would have been obtained, because no additional funds were available.

With this background, we turn to the issue of standing.

II.

The plaintiffs in this action challenged the legality of HUD’s waiver of the expected to reside requirement. It is our task to determine whether they have standing to make such a challenge. The applicable standards are clear:

The essence of the standing question, in its constitutional dimension, “is whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.” . . . The plaintiff must show that he himself is injured by the challenged action of the defendant. The injury may be indirect . . . but the complaint must indicate that the injury is indeed fairly traceable to the defendant’s acts or omissions.

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260, 97 S.Ct. 555, 561, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (citations omitted). Furthermore, the plaintiff’s injury must be one which is “likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). In other words, a ¡plaintiff must show injury; he must trace it to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful acts; and he must show that the remedy he seeks is likely to redress his injury.

Our analysis of this case begins with an examination of the injury alleged by the plaintiffs. The 1974 Act, it is claimed, was intended to benefit the plaintiffs in various ways. Specifically, it is designed to eliminate urban blight and create viable urban communities. 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c). It is also designed to reduce “the isolation of income groups within communities and geographical areas” and to increase “the diversity and vitality of neighborhoods.” 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c)(6). These latter objectives are to be achieved by means of “the spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities for persons of lower income” and by means of “attracting] persons of higher income.” Id. Plaintiffs allege that the Act is designed to encourage the wealthy to return to the cities and to facilitate the movement of the poor into the suburbs.2

The plaintiffs claim that the defendants’ unlawful acts — the submission and approval of applications without expected to reside figures — caused them injury because it made them less likely to benefit from the 1974 Act. This is said to injure both Hartford, which must bear the heavy burden of caring for its low-income residents, and the low-income residents themselves, who cannot find adequate housing in the suburbs. These claims will not withstand scrutiny.

Assuming arguendo that the plaintiffs have a legitimate, judicially cognizable expectancy interest in the benefits that should accrue to them under the Act, it is impossible to know whether the lack of expected to reside figures on the first year applications submitted by the defendant towns had, or will have, any detrimental effect on that interest.

*1051If this were an appeal from a judgment granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing, we woiild be required to accept as true all of the material allegations of the complaint. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). However, we are reviewing a final judgment based on a fully developed record, and the issue of standing is one on which the plaintiffs bear the burden of proof. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Wei fare Rights Organization, supra, 426 U.S. at 45, 96 S.Ct. at 1927. In this context, plaintiffs have either proved a “specific and perceptible harm,” United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973), or they have not. Here, they have not. It is theoretically possible that a failure to comply with any requirement in the Act will have a negative effect on the plaintiffs’ expectancy interest. In order to have standing, however, the plaintiffs must show more than a theoretical possibly:

A plaintiff must [prove] that he has been or will in fact be perceptibly harmed by the challenged agency action, not that he can imagine circumstances in which he could be affected by the agency’s action.

United States v. SCRAP, supra, 412 U.S. at 688-89, 93 S.Ct. at 2416. Here, it is probable that the lack of compliance with the Act did not affect plaintiffs at all. The defendant towns’ housing assistance plans have fully utilized all of the funds available for low-income housing subsidies under Title II of the Act. Because the only effect of the expected to reside figure is indirect — via Title II subsidies — and because no additional Title II subsidies are available, it is unlikely that the lack of expected to reside figures had any effect on the interests of the plaintiffs.

Moreover, it is speculative whether the relief sought by the plaintiffs — an injunction against the use of Title I funds pending the submission of applications complying with the Act — will redress their alleged injury. The only evidence in the record indicating the probable effect of increased expected to reside figures is contained in an affidavit from Lawrence L. Thompson, the Area Director of the Hartford Area Office of HUD. According to his affidavit, an upward revision of the defendant towns’ expected to reside figures could not make additional housing subsidies available. Consequently, the prospect that the submission of accurate expected to reside figures sought by the plaintiffs will have a positive effect on the plaintiffs’ expectancy interest is at best speculative.

The expected to reside figure is not a goal for the future which communities are required to satisfy, but merely a prediction of what is going to happen. It is a device used to plan for future population changes, not a device for achieving them. A modification of the expected to reside figure would have no greater impact on the number of future residents than a modification of tomorrow’s weather forecast would have on tomorrow’s weather.

Much has been made in this case of the fact that if the defendant communities fail, or refuse to comply with the Act, their grants will be reallocated. This, it is claimed, will lead to the possibility that the plaintiffs would benefit from the reallocation of funds. This theory also is inadequate to support standing in the instant case. The relief sought and obtained by the plaintiffs left the defendants two choices: they could revise their figures and receive their grants, or they could refuse to comply and forfeit their grants. Inasmuch as the first alternative would produce no benefit for plaintiffs, it is immaterial whether they might benefit from’ the second — at least absent a “substantial probability” that the second alternative will in fact be chosen. Warth v. Seldin, supra, 422 U.S. at 504, 95 S.Ct. 2197. Here, there was not the slightest showing that any of the defendant towns would choose to forfeit their grants rather than modify their applications.3

*1052Thus, we conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to trace their alleged injury to the allegedly unlawful conduct of the defendants, and they have failed to demonstrate that the relief they seek would serve to redress that injury.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed, and the cause is remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the appellees lack standing.

. Of the eight municipal governments, including the City of Hartford, who were parties to this action, only one, East Hartford, made any attempt to satisfy the requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1975). Thus, Hartford and six of the defendant towns entered zero as the number of low-income persons “expected to reside” within their borders. East Hartford entered 135. HUD subsequently reduced this figure to 131.

. The complaint does not mention the possibility of obtaining reallocated funds as a prospective benefit of this lawsuit. To find that the plaintiffs have alleged a stake in the outcome sufficient to confer standing on the basis of a prospective benefit that is not even mentioned in the complaint is to grant far greater pleading latitude than prior cases indicate is appropriate. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 37-46, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924-28, 48 L.Ed.2d 450, 460-465 (1976) ; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501-02, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688-89, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-36, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972); Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571, 592 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066, 97 S.Ct. 797, 50 L.Ed.2d 784 (1977). See also 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3531, at 17-18 (Supp. 1976).

. To the extent that the low-income plaintiffs’ claim of standing rests upon their assertion of an interest in reallocated funds, see ante, at 1038, it too must fail.

. Warth v. Seldin, .422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197 (1975); Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066, 97 S.Ct. 797, 50 L.Ed.2d 784 (1977).

. It is true, of course, that Congress expects, or at least hopes, that the “expected to reside” figure will have some impact. However, legislative expectations are not necessarily disposi-tive in determining whether those expectations are speculative. See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., supra.

. Community development grants may not be used for housing.

. We accept this interpretation only for purposes of discussion. It is by no means clear whether Congress sought to encourage inter -city spatial deconcentration or intra -city spatial deconcentration or both.

. We learn from events which have occurred after the district court rendered its decision that five of the original seven defendant towns have already revised their expected to reside figures and their applications now meet the approval of both HUD and the plaintiffs. Of *1052the appellants, only East Hartford has not yet submitted a revised figure. East Hartford’s failure to do so is consistent with its position that the figure of 131 included on its application was in fact correct. It has been suggested that East Hartford may be barred from revising its figure as a result of its failure to comply with a deadline for resubmission set by HUD after the district court’s decree was entered. We need not consider what would happen if HUD, as one of the defendants in this action, sought, by means of such a deadline, to prevent East Hartford from following an order of the district court to comply with the 1974 Act. We have no doubt that HUD would be happy to permit East Hartford to correct its application, particularly if the Court held that the Act so required. In any event, the plaintiffs’ standing must be judged as of the time this action was commenced. At that time, the prospect that East Hartford would forfeit its grant was even more remote than it is now. Events occurring after the filing of the complaint cannot operate so as to create standing where none previously existed. Any other rule would permit lawsuits to be maintained in the mere hope that the lawsuit itself would generate a constitutional “controversy” before the appellate process is complete.