Appellants unsuccessfully sought below a declaratory judgment of the unconstitutionality of, and injunction against the enforcement of, the East Hartford public school teachers’ dress code. Suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and jurisdiction was invoked under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201, and 2202. The appellant teacher, Richard P. Brimley (hereinafter “appellant”), was joined as a plaintiff below, and is joined as an appellant here, by his local and state teachers’ unions. Appellant exhausted his administrative remedies by seeking to use his union’s grievance procedures, his grievance going to arbitration before Professor Archibald Cox; the grievance was dismissed as not arbitrable because its subject was not covered by the collective bargaining agreement. East Hartford Education Association v. East Hartford Board of Education, Amer. Arb. Ass’n No. 12-39-0184-72 (Jan. 25, 1973). Chief Judge Clarie granted summary judgment to the appellees and dismissed the complaint below, 405 F.Supp. 94 (D.Conn. 1975), finding no violation of any Fourteenth Amendment or First Amendment rights and a legitimate governmental interest. We reverse and remand for hearing on the merits.
I. FACTS
Appellant Brimley teaches English and film-making in an East Hartford public high school. He objects to so much of the Board’s dress code, set out in the margin,1 *840as requires him to wear a shirt and tie with his sport jacket; he seeks to wear a turtleneck sweater or opennecked sport shirt with his jacket. In the present posture of the case, there is involved no claim whatsoever that appellant’s desired dress would cause any disruption of the classroom, any problem of pupil discipline, any challenge to school board curricular authority, or any other interference with school operations. Nor is there any suggestion that appellant has at any time been otherwise than moral, neat and clean in person and in dress, or that he has in any way defied the orders of the school board. He has at all times complied with the dress code, albeit under protest, and he has made his challenge through the proper legal channels. Cf. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975) (distinguishing, for equitable abstention purposes, between challengers to local ordinance who obeyed it while injunctive action pending and one who violated it).
As Professor Cox, the arbitrator, found, and as we must assume, appellant feels “very deeply and very strongly that his personal integrity is invaded and his effectiveness as a teacher diminished by the dress regulation.” Appellant in his brief alleges, and we must accept at this summary judgment stage, that he wishes to present himself to his students as a person “not tied to ‘establishment conformity’ ” but rather as one associated with the ideas and social outlook of the student generation. He feels that his dress “enables him to achieve a closer rapport with his students and thus enhances his ability to teach.” The Board’s own interpretation of its dress code, as set forth in its answers to interrogatories, is that the code presumes that a jacket, shirt and tie is the appropriate attire for male teachers in “ordinary classroom situations” (which do not in the Board’s view include physical education, industrial arts, science laboratories and field trips); the presumption may be rebutted in individual cases if a teacher can establish that “more informal attire would be more appropriate to the subject matter and/or method of instruction involved (e. g. small group instruction involving drug education or sex education where the method of instruction is a ‘rap session’).” Appellant apparently made a sufficient showing that informal attire was appropriate for his film-making classes, but failed to win approval to wear such attire in his English classes.
II. THE INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS AT STAKE
A. The Liberty Interest In One’s Personal Appearance
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 96 S.Ct. 1440, 47 L.Ed.2d 708 (1976), is the principal Supreme Court case2 bearing on the ques*841tions whether and to what extent a person has a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest in his or her personal appearance. Kelley did not decide these questions, although it did indicate that whatever the interest is, it is somewhat less weighty than the interests implicated in cases involving “procreation, marriage, and family life.” Id. at 244, 96 S.Ct. 1440. In upholding a hair code for policemen, the Supreme Court emphasized the employment status of the police officer and the unquestioned “need for discipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity” in a police force. Id. at 246, 96 S.Ct. at 1446. See also Stradley v. Andersen, 478 F.2d 188, 190-91 (8th Cir. 1973); Yarbrough v. City of Jacksonville, 363 F.Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D.Fla.1973); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 670, 768-69 (1973). We commence with the premise that quite different considerations apply here. Even though both teachers and policemen are employees of the state through local governmental units, terms like “discipline” and “esprit de corps,” appropriate for members of a uniformed paramilitary force, are manifestly inappropriate for high school teachers. Compare Kelley v. Johnson, supra, 425 U.S. at 245-46, 96 S.Ct. 1440 (policemen must salute flag), with Russo v. Central School District No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932, 93 S.Ct. 1899, 36 L.Ed.2d 391 (1973) (public high school teacher need not salute flag). Mr. Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Kelley reinforces the view we share that “no negative implication” as to the more general liberty interest in personal appearance is to be drawn from the Kelley majority opinion. Id. at 249, 96 S.Ct. 1440. On this assumption, we examine the liberty interest asserted by appellant.
The right to control one’s own body, recognized by Supreme Court decree as constitutionally derived, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), extends in the minds and hearts of many individuals to the body’s teguments, be they clothing or hair. People have been conscious of personal appearance and fashion from the time the first of our forebears crawled out of what Judge Learned Hand so onomatopoetically referred to as the “primordial ooze.” Samson, for one, was thought to be deprived of his strength when shorn of his hair by Delilah. Our Roman, Grecian, and European antecedents made much of their styles of dress and hair. See Op. Vt. Att’y Gen. No. 23 (1967), reprinted in [1966-1968] Vt. Att’y Gen. Biennial Rep. 199-200.
Substantial creative efforts of mankind have been devoted to matters of dress, from the robes of the ancient Egyptians to King Henry VIII’s armor, and dress has often conveyed a message, whether it be one of martyrdom in the sackcloth and ashes of the early Christians, respect for God in the skullcaps worn by many Jews, or achievement and calling in the regalia worn in academic processions. The mark of authority for priest and judge alike has been a robe, for monks baldness has been a sign of asceticism, • and for English judges and our own founding fathers powdered wigs were a symbol of wisdom, authority, and sometimes affluence.
Conversely, recognizing the role clothing plays in giving individuals a sense of freedom and identity, the military, prisons, and other authoritarian institutions have long used strict uniformity of dress and hair style to effectuate conformity. Their purpose has been to deprive a person of his individuality in the interests of better discipline and related aims. T. E. Lawrence described the effectiveness of such measures:
[I]t came upon me freshly how the secret of uniform was to make a crowd solid, dignified, impersonal: to give it the singleness and tautness of an upstanding man. This death’s livery which walled its bearers from ordinary life, was a sign that they had sold their wills and bodies to the State: and contracted themselves *842into a service not the less abject for that its beginning was voluntary.
Revolt in the Desert 317 (1927).
History is replete with instances of oppression accomplished by body-tegument conformity. Following the Manchus’ invasion of China in 1644, for example, the conquerors sought to consolidate their power by requiring the population to wear a prescribed hair style and prescribed clothing; thousands chose to die rather than accept these marks of servitude. See Crews v. Clones, 432 F.2d 1259, 1264 n.7 (7th Cir. 1970), citing H. McAleavy, History of Modern China 23 (1967). Peter the Great attempted to force upon his country a more Western lifestyle by the autocratic imposition of a heavy tax on the beards that were universally worn by 17th century Russian men. The beards had religious significance in the Russian Orthodox Church, however, and hence were saved even after being shaved off in order to ensure their owners’ entry into heaven. See J. Robinson, Readings in European History 390 (1906). Today, dictatorships of both the left and the right use hair and dress regulation as part of their programs of behavior regulation. In short, as Judge Wisdom has eloquently reminded us, a person deprived of the freedom to dress as he pleases
is forced against his will to hold himself out symbolically as a person holding ideas contrary, perhaps, to ideas he holds most dear. Forced dress . . . humiliates the unwilling complier, forces him to submerge his individuality in the “undistracting” mass, and in general, smacks of the exaltation of organization over member, unit over component, and state over individual. I always thought this country does not condone such repression.
Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 621 (5th Cir.) (en banc, 8-7) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989, 93 S.Ct. 307, 34 L.Ed.2d 256 (1972). See also J. S. Mill, On Liberty (1859).
In view of these historical and contemporary factors, it would be difficult not to conclude that “a liberty interest within the Fourteenth Amendment,” Kelley v. Johnson, supra, 425 U.S. at 249, 96 S.Ct. at 1447 (Powell, J., concurring), is involved in this case. In a passage cited recently by Mr. Justice Powell, id., Mr. Justice Harlan wrote that, in assessing claims of infringement of liberty, we judges must “hav[e] regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which [this country] developed as well as the traditions from which it broke,” and he added, “[t]hat tradition [sic ] is a living thing.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1776, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961) (dissenting opinion). Along the “rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints,” id. at 543, 81 S.Ct. at 1777, the liberty interest asserted by appellant here is a weighty one deserving our careful attention.
B. Teaching and the First Amendment
In addition to the general liberty interest in one’s appearance, in the teaching context there is a strong additional interest that must be weighed in the scales in determining the constitutionality of regulatory intrusions like the one at issue here. The claim appellant makes is not simply a symbolic speech claim. Rather, it is a claim that the inseparable complex of speech, conduct and character known as teaching is a First Amendment interest that in and of itself should be protected from needless regulation by the State.
The academic context has long been given special constitutional protection in our country, because the educational needs of a free people are of utmost importance. See, e. g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-05, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-03, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). As Jefferson so clearly recognized,3 an educated and *843enlightened citizenry is a prerequisite to the functioning of any representative democracy. See also San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); id. at 111-15, 93 S.Ct. 1278 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). We are dealing here, in short, with the assertion of a First Amendment right by one in a special profession “essential ... to the public welfare,” Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, 262 U.S. at 400, 43 S.Ct. 625, whose freedom to teach is entitled to be protected accordingly. See generally Russo v. Central School District No. 1, supra, 469 F.2d at 631-34.
Freedom to teach in the manner of one’s choice is a form of academic freedom that is universally recognized, if not invariably protected, at the college level, see, e. g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957); T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 593-626 (1970); Developments in the Law — Academic Freedom, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 1045 (1968), and that has been accorded significant respect in cases involving public secondary school teachers, see Epperson v. Arkansas, supra; Birdwell v. Hazelwood School District, 491 F.2d 490, 493 (8th Cir. 1974), aff’g 352 F.Supp. 613 (E.D.Mo.1972); Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir.), aff’g 323 F.Supp. 1387 (D.Mass.1971); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School District, 376 F.Supp. 657, 661-62 (S.D.Tex.1973), vacated on other grounds, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974); Moore v. Gaston County Board of Education, 357 F.Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C.1973); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School District, 344 F.Supp. 791 (N.D.Iowa 1972); Downs v. Conway School District, 328 F.Supp. 338 (E.D.Ark.1971); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F.Supp. 352 (M.D.Ala.1970); Lindros v. Governing Board of Torrance Unified School District, 9 Cal.3d 524, 108 Cal.Rptr. 185, 510 P.2d 361, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112, 94 S.Ct. 842, 38 L.Ed.2d 739 (1973); Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High School Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1032 (1971); Van Alstyne, Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 Duke L.J. 841; Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 Mich.L.Rev. 1373 (1976); Note, Academic Freedom in the Public Schools: The Right to Teach, 48 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1176 (1973). In secondary schools, it is true, the idea of academic freedom may be balanced to a degree by the countervailing interest of states, acting through local school boards, to inculcate basic community values in students who may not be mature enough to deal with academic freedom as understood or practiced at higher educational levels. See Mailloux v. Kiley, supra, 323 F.Supp. at 1392; Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1293, 1342-44 (1976). See also Presidents Council, District 25 v. Community School Board No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998, 93 S.Ct. 308, 34 L.Ed.2d 260 (1972). This may mean that public secondary school boards have considerable discretion as to the substantive content of what is taught, but there is no reason to extend this wide discretion to the teaching process itself. There is, as we see it, a sharp distinction between content of curriculum and pedagogical methodology. see Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District, 384 F.Supp. 698, 707 (M.D.Ohio 1974); Beebee v. Haslett Public Schools, 66 Mich.App. 718, 727, 239 N.W.2d 724, 729 (1976); Goldstein, supra, 124 U.Pa.L.Rev. at 1337-39. As long as the substantive values that the school board seeks to inculcate are not subverted by the way in which a teacher wishes to communicate with his students, *844compare Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School District, supra, with Knarr v. Board of School Trustees, 452 F.2d 649, 650 (7th Cir. 1971), the teacher’s freedom to choose teaching methods is entitled to be weighed in the constitutional scales.
This irreducible core of academic freedom extends, in our view, to the particular style of clothing that appellant wishes to wear here.4 As noted, he is subverting no community values; neatness, cleanliness and morality are not involved. Moreover, appellant is concededly sincere in his belief, which is certainly reasonable, that a slightly more informal mode of dress will make him a more effective teacher.4A It is a truism that, long after a student’s substantive knowledge has been forgotten, it is the character of a good teacher — of which appearance and style are inevitably part— that is most remembered and that continues to inspire. Cf. Dunau as Teacher: A Student View, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1359 (1975) (student memorial tribute to Professor Bernard Dunau); In Memory of Alexander M. Bickel, 84 Yale L.J. 198 (1974) (student tribute to Professor Bickel). Appellant’s attempt to express himself on this level is, we hold, an interest entitled to First Amendment protection.
III. THE STATE’S COUNTERVAILING INTERESTS
The reasons advanced by appellees for their tie code are that it establishes “a professional image for teachers,” that it promotes “good grooming among students,” and that it aids maintenance of “respect” and “decorum” in the classroom.5 While other reasons for teacher dress codes might be generated by a fertile imagination, under recent Supreme Court authority we are required to limit our attention to legitimate, articulated, non-illusory state objectives. See Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 & n.6, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976) (per curiam); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 376, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974); San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at 17, 93 S.Ct. 1278; McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973). See also Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term — Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 1 (1972).
The first of the Board’s stated interests, establishing a Professional image for teachers, is outside the scope of the authority delegated to school boards by the State and hence cannot be used to uphold the disputed regulation. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at 17, 93 S.Ct. 1278 (state purpose must be “legitimate”). The relevant statute, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 10-221, provides in pertinent part: “Boards of education shall prescribe rules for the management, studies, classification and discipline of the public schools . .” This statute contains no grant of authority to control the image of teachers for its own sake. The Board may regulate teacher image under the statute only if to do so would contribute to the management, studies or discipline of the schools, an issue related to the other asserted purposes for the regulation. See Herzig v. Board of Education, 152 Conn. 144, 150, 204 A.2d 827, 830 (1964) (“local boards of education are agencies of the state . . . and . *845possess only such powers as are granted to them by the General Statutes expressly or by necessary implication”).
Moreover, even if the Board had authority to require teachers to maintain a “professional image,” that phrase is almost meaningless as applied to neckties for men. Informality is making inroads even in the staid legal profession, see In re DeCarlo, 141 N.J.Super. 42, 357 A.2d 273 (App.Div. 1976) (per curiam) (female attorney in slacks and sweater properly attired for court), and among other groups, male doctors, dentists, clergymen, engineers, and teacher — and particularly for the younger members of these groups — a tie is no longer mandatory and is far from typical. See also J. Frank, “The Cult of the Robe” in Courts on Trial 254-61 (1949). Considering the wide variations in the attire worn by professionals today, the Board’s statement that it wants its teachers to wear ties to enhance their “professional image” amounts to little more than a statement that it wants its teachers to wear ties because it wants them to wear ties. Such a purpose is plainly entitled to little or no weight.
As to the promotion of Good grooming among students, as an independent interest this also seems to be ultra vires the Board’s statutory powers. The student hair regulations of this very school board, moreover, have been held unconstitutional by a state court. Yoo v. Moynihan, 28 Conn.Supp. 375, 262 A.2d 814 (Super.Ct.1969). Finally, even were the Board’s second purpose to be considered legitimate, the connection between teacher and student dress is so tenuous, as a glance at any public high school classroom will confirm, that the Board’s means — requiring its male teachers to surround their necks with a tie — lack the requisite “significant relationship” to the Board’s end. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972).
We turn, then, to the final asserted interest, the need for respect, discipline, and decorum in the classroom. This is certainly a valid concern of the school board, as Conn. Gen.Stat. § 10-221 makes clear. It is far from clear, however, that a tie code like that in issue here has any connection with respect or discipline. Indeed, appellant puts forward the seemingly more reasonable proposition, which we must accept at this stage, that being tieless helps him to maintain his students’ respect.6 Teenagers, who are so often rebellious against authority, may find a tieless teacher to be a less remote, more contemporary individual with whom they can more easily interact, and hence to whom they are better prepared to listen with care and attention.7 It is highly questionable, and certainly not established on this motion for summary judgment, that the Board’s valid end of promoting discipline is substantially, or even incrementally, furthered by its tie regulation.8
*846IV. THE BALANCE
In view of our finding in the preceding section that the Board’s articulated interests carry very little weight, we conclude that the decision below must be reversed. The requirement that teachers wear ties appears, at this stage of the proceedings, to be one of those “purposeless restraints” to which Mr. Justice Harlan referred, Poe v. Ullman, supra, 367 U.S. at 543, 81 S.Ct. 1752, in contrast to the many legitimate personal appearance regulations that further substantial state purposes, see, e. g., Kelley v. Johnson, supra (hair of policemen); Miller v. School District No. 167, 495 F.2d 658, 664 & nn.20-22 (7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens, J.) (dictum) (State may make hair regulations for restaurant kitchens for public health reasons, require headgear for miners and motorcyclists for safety reasons, and prohibit indecent exposure). Certainly a school board may make regulations that help to promote the effective and efficient education of children. It may not, however, make regulations that infringe on constitutional interests while not realistically and significantly furthering the board’s proper purposes.
The regulation at issue here implicates both a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest and a First Amendment interest.9 The intersection of these two interests calls for a higher degree of scrutiny of the government’s countervailing interest than would the presence of either individual interest alone. See Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (equal protection analysis — higher level of scrutiny required because both First and Fourteenth Amendment interests involved). See also Gunther, supra, 86 Harv.L.Rev. at 7 (“responsible ‘balancing’ ” requires careful identification and separate evaluation of “each analytically distinct ingredient of the contending interests”). Thus we cannot “accept unquestioningly the school authorities’ judgment as to the effects of classroom conduct or speech,” James v. Board of Education, 461 F.2d 566, 575 n. 22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042, 93 S.Ct. 529, 34 L.Ed.2d 491 (1972), but rather must require a regulation of the sort at issue here to be “drawn as narrowly as possible to achieve the social interests that justify it" and to be “reasonably related to the needs of the educational process,” id. at 574. At this stage of the proceedings, the Board has plainly failed to carry this burden, and its asserted interests are far outweighed by the individual interests at stake.
We accordingly vacate the summary judgment and remand for a hearing on the merits.
. The attire of professional employees during the hours when school is in session must be judged in light of the following:
1. Dress should reflect the professional position of the employee.
*8402. Attire should be that which is commonly accepted in the community.
3. It should be exemplary of the students with whom the professional employee works.
4. Clothing should be appropriate to the assignment of the employee, such as slacks, and jersey for gym teachers.
In most circumstances the application of the above criteria to classroom teachers would call for jacket, shirt and tie for men and dress, skirts, blouse and pantsuits for women.
If an individual teacher feels that informal clothing such as sportswear, would be appropriate to his or her teaching assignment, or would enable him or her to carry out assigned duties more effectively, such requests may be brought to the attention of the Principal or Superintendent. An attempt should be made on all levels to insure that the above principles are applied equitably and consistently throughout the school system.
. In Quinn v. Muscare, 425 U.S. 560, 96 S.Ct. 1752, 48 L.Ed.2d 165 (1976), the Court dismissed as improvidently granted a writ of certiorari in a challenge to a fire department hair regulation. The cases in the lower courts are collected in Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 670, 760-70 (1973). Over 100 hair-length opinions had been written by state and federal courts by October, 1973. Id. at 760 n.584. See also 1 N. Dorsen, P. Bender & B. Neuborne, Political and Civil Rights in the United States, 846-48, 1015-16 (4th ed. 1976). An interesting analysis of the constitutional theory underlying these and related cases is Fourth Circuit Judge Craven’s Personhood: The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 Duke L.J. 699. Judge Craven acknowledges his indebtedness to Professor Freud for the term “personhood” as an alternative to “privacy” or “autonomy.” Id. at 702 & n.15.
. I think by far the most important bill in our whole code is that for the diffusion of knowledge among the people. No other sure foundation can be devised for the preservation of freedom, and happiness. . . Preach, my dear Sir, a crusade against ignorance; *843establish and improve the law for educating the common people. Let our countrymen know that the people alone can protect us against these evils, and that the tax which will be paid for this purpose is not more than the thousandth part of what will be paid to kings, priests and nobles who will rise up among us if we leave the people in ignorance.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe, Aug. 13, 1786, quoted in The Portable Thomas Jefferson 399-400 (M. Peterson ed. 1975).
. We recognize that this view contrasts with the views of 1883, when Josiah Royce wrote that a teacher “may find of a sudden that his nonattendance at church, or the fact that he drinks beer with his lunch, or rides a bicycle, is considered of more moment than his power to instruct.” Quoted in Note. Academic Freedom in the Public Schools: The Right to Teach, 48 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1176, 1179 (1973).
. In this respect his views of communication are not unlike those of the President of the United States, who recently delivered his first “Fireside Chat” while pointedly wearing a cardigan sweater.
. The Board also claims that its regulation builds respect for teachers among members of the public and that it creates an effective and efficient school system, but these abstract propositions appear to have no meaning apart from the three purposes listed above.
. Appellant is peculiarly well situated to assert this claim, since he teaches both English, where a tie is required, and film-making, where it is not.
. The fact that the School Board allows teachers to be tieless for “rap sessions” is in effect a concession of this point. If for purposes of “rapping,” why not for purposes of teaching? Socrates and his students certainly equated the two.
. There is one additional interest that, while not explicitly asserted, may underlie the extremely weak interests advanced by the school board here: an interest in standardization or uniformity. Such a state interest cannot be recognized in the courts. All may not be forced by a school board to share the beliefs of the majority, whether it be a theory of the world’s creation, Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968), a belief in saluting the flag, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943), or a belief that the German language is evil, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). See Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 Mich.L.Rev. 1373, 1457-59 (1976). This must be so “if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, supra, 319 U.S. at 637, 63 S.Ct. at 1185. The Bill of Rights forbids us to adopt the credo of the Good Citizens’ League of Zenith “that American Democracy . . . demanded] a wholesome sameness of thought, dress, painting, morals, and vocabulary.” S. *846Lewis, Babbitt 311 (Signet ed. 1961) (1st ed. 1922).
. This distinguishes the instant situation from two cases in which courts of appeals have upheld dismissals of public school teachers. The dismissals were alleged to be for reasons related to personal appearance, although school officials in both cases asserted other, more substantial reasons for the dismissals. Tardif v. Quinn, 545 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1976) (length of teacher’s skirt); Miller v. School District No. 167, 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974) (beard and sideburns). In neither case was a First Amendment claim raised. See 545 F.2d at 763 n. 3; 495 F.2d at 662. In the Tardif case, moreover, it was conceded that the school officials’ concern about the “disruptive effect” of the teacher’s short skirts was not irrational, in marked contrast to the situation here. The Tardif court itself recognized that its decision might well be different in a case like the instant one:
Once even a small, as distinguished from a fundamental, constitutional right is shown to be involved, an employee might succeed by showing the invasion so irrational as to demonstrate lack of good faith.
545 F.2d at 764.