concurring:
I agree that none of the testimony in the juvenile trial would have been helpful to the adult defendant, and therefore I concur in the judgment of the court. However, the holding that juvenile records sealed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5038 (Supp. V 1975) may be disclosed in proceedings that involve a “transaction” in which “the juvenile himself was involved” is unnecessary and also, I think, quite wrong.
The holding is unnecessary because it is now well settled that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the Constitution requires production of material that is needed to cross-examine, notwithstanding statutory provisions for nondisclosure of juvenile proceedings. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). It is true, as the majority opinion states, that we should avoid constitutional questions; but we break no new ground here by acknowledging that the defendant would have a constitutional right of access to the transcript if it would assist him in cross-examination. That issue is definitively settled. There is no reason to ignore Davis v. Alaska. The majority opinion does, however, break new ground in its disposition of the statutory question, and in so doing it severely limits the congressional policy of safeguarding juvenile records from disclosure.
The statutory question in this case concerns the proper construction of section 5038(a)(1). The relevant subparagraph provides that disclosure shall be made to the extent necessary to meet “(1) inquiries received from another court of law.” This is the first of five specific exceptions to the general statutory rule prohibiting disclosure of the record in juvenile proceedings. The other four exceptions embodied in the statute (subsections (a)(2) through (a)(5)) allow release of juvenile records only to law enforcement authorities (subsection (aX3)) or when release of the records is requested in a matter which directly affects the juve*1377nile’s own interests (subsections (a)(2), (a)(4)-(5)). The first exception should be construed as parallel to the other exceptions and thus confined to cases where the interests of the juvenile himself are at stake in the judicial proceeding.
Some idea of the congressional concerns motivating a policy which shields juvenile records is suggested by the Senate Report on the bill which included what eventually became section 5038:
The highest attention must be given . to minimizing the involvement of young offenders in the juvenile and criminal justice system ....
S.Rep.No. 93-1011, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 5283, 5285 (quoting National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards & Goals, A National Strategy to Reduce Crime 23 (1973)). In keeping with the direction of Congress’ solution of this perceived problem, I would confine the statutory exception in question to permit release of juvenile records on inquiry of a court only when the juvenile himself is already directly involved in the court proceeding.
The majority opinion, understandably, attempts to limit the scope of its holding to the circumstances of this case. But having elected a statutory interpretation which permits a party in a court proceeding not involving the juvenile to inquire into the juvenile’s records, the majority seemingly forecloses the possibility of confining this case to its facts. I would reject entirely this expanded construction of section 5038(a)(1).
The case where the juvenile is a coprincipal in a criminal transaction is precisely the one in which protection afforded by a sealed transcript is needed the most urgently. Every encouragement should be given to the juvenile to discuss his actions freely and completely so that rehabilitation can commence without delay, and without fear of retaliation or censure from any others who participated in the alleged offense. This is especially true where the coprincipals are adults.
I would hold that the transcript of a juvenile proceeding may not be reviewed by a third party involved in a separate proceeding unless the requirements of the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment pertain. In this case, the panel is unanimous in its view that the sealed transcript was unnecessary for the proper defense of the charges. Hence the sixth amendment problem is not presented, and there was no error in denying Chacon access to the juvenile record.1
. Our examination of the transcript of the juvenile proceeding in light of the entire record of the Chacon trial convinces us that the juvenile record was irrelevant to Chacon’s defense. Hence Chacon would be unable to show that he was denied “the right of effective cross-examination.” See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Of course, were we to have concluded that the juvenile transcript was in any way relevant to the defendant’s effective defense, “ ‘no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it.’” Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131, 88 S.Ct. 748, 750, 19 L.Ed.2d 956 (1968), quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966).