dissenting:
The majority holds that solely because plaintiff, in seeking reemployment, insisted upon a “guarantee” that she would not be called upon to work on Saturday in derogation of her deeply held and sincere religious beliefs, the Bank was automatically excused from compliance with the Act on the ground that plaintiff’s reemployment would constitute “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b). I think that the majority misses the real issue in *77the case; and when that issue is defined and the record examined, one is inevitably led to conclude that the district court’s judgment should be sustained. From a contrary decision, I respectfully dissent.
I.
There is not any question but that plaintiff, pursuant to her religious beliefs, would absolutely decline to work on Saturday. Her request for a “guarantee” is both an expression of the firmness and sincerity of her beliefs and fair notice to the Bank or any other employer that she could not comply with any order or direction to work on Saturday, lest the Bank or that employer think otherwise.
But this is the beginning of the case, not the solution. It is the premise which invokes the Act and the regulation, for lacking one who has religious beliefs of the unbending nature of those held by plaintiff, neither Congress nor the Commission would have occasion to say that an employer has the duty to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs unless such accommodation would visit “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” The issue here is precisely the same as the issue in the very recent decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (June 16, 1977). In that case, a member of the Worldwide Church of God, one of the tenets of which is that one must not work from sunset on Friday until sunset on Saturday, was discharged because he declined to work on Saturday, and he sought injunctive relief. In describing the case for the majority of the Court, Mr. Justice White wrote:
Section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee or a prospective employee on the basis of his or her religion. At the time of the events involved here, a guideline of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b), required, as the Act itself now does, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), that an employer, short of “undue hardship,” make “reasonable accommodations” to the religious needs of its employees. The issue in this case is the extent of the employer’s obligation under Title VII to accommodate an employee whose religious beliefs prohibit him from working on Saturdays. 432 U.S. at 66, 97 S.Ct. at 2267.
Then, after summarizing the procedural history of the case and the terms and provisions of the statute and the regulation, Mr. Justice White wrote:
In brief, the employer’s statutory obligation to make reasonable accommodation for the religious observances of its employees, short of incurring an undue hardship, is clear, but the reach of that obligation has never been spelled out by Congress or by Commission guidelines. With this in mind, we turn to a consideration of whether TWA has met its obligation under Title VII to accommodate the religious observances of its employees. (Emphasis added.) 432 U.S. at 75,1 97 S.Ct. at 2272.
II.
In deciding the instant case, the district court correctly directed its attention to what, if anything, the Bank had done to determine if there were jobs within the Bank in which plaintiff’s religious beliefs could be accommodated. It found that the Bank had done nothing to satisfy the Act. The detailed findings of the district court are attached hereto as an appendix to this opinion. From my review of the record, I find them amply supported and not “clearly erroneous.” Certainly they are not impeached by the fact that plaintiff wanted absolute assurances that her beliefs would *78be respected if she were reemployed. Nor are they assailable because the Bank offered her a position on the understanding that it would try to avoid requiring her to work on Saturday. Such an offer withheld the very element that plaintiffs religious beliefs required, and in all honesty, plaintiff could not accept such an offer when she knew that she would not and could not work on Saturday.
The findings need not be restated. It suffices to point out that the district court found that the Bank failed and refused to make any investigation whether or not there was any vacancy in any one of its 1,261 positions in which plaintiff, if qualified and employed, would not be required to work on Saturday without undue hardship to the Bank, or to take any other steps to attempt to accommodate plaintiff’s religious beliefs and practices. At the same time, the evidence showed that the Bank was accommodating another employee of plaintiff’s faith without any apparent undue hardship to it. These are the operative findings which, to my mind, require affirmance.
III.
Subsidiary to its condemnation of the “guarantee,” the majority asserts that granting it would obligate the Bank to provide it for all of its employees and entail extra expense. This, the majority concludes, would constitute “undue hardship,” citing Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 84, n.15, 97 S.Ct. 2264.
The record is barren of any evidence to show that, if plaintiff’s religious beliefs were accommodated, how many, if any, of the religious beliefs of other employees would require similar accommodation,2 and what extra expense, if any, to the Bank would be incurred. Since there is no support in the record for the assertion, I must presume that the majority reaches this conclusion as a matter of law (not fact) on its reading of footnote 15 in Trans World Airlines. If so, I disagree that footnote 15 may be so read.
The footnote, the text of which appears below,3 was appended to the statement, “[t]o require TWA to bear more than a de minimus cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship; ” and this statement was made as part of the rejection of the view of the Court of Appeals that the Act required TWA to transfer supervisory personnel or qualified personnel from other departments or to have paid someone premium wages to obtain a person to replace Hardison on Saturday work in order to retain him as an employee. The statement was made in the context of an employer which the district court found “runs a twenty-four-hour-a-day, seven-days-a-week operation.” Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F.Supp. 877 (W.D.Mo., 1974). In addition, there was proof both of what TWA had done to accommodate Hardison and what it would cost TWA to provide a Saturday substitute. In this context, there was a factual basis on which the Court could assert that the cost of what was done for Hardison would be magnified by each of TWA’s other employees who might have religious scruples against Saturday work. Surely this factual basis is the explanation of footnote 15, for if it is to be presumed as a matter of law that an employer may be required to do for one employee only what it may do for all employees “without undue *79hardship,” no employer would ever be required to accommodate any religious belief of any employee.
To the extent that footnote 15 rests on a factual basis, that basis is lacking in the instant case. The Bank is, with rare exception, only a five-day-a-week operation, and for most employees Saturday is not a normal workday. Any Saturday work for most employees would thus involve extra expense to the Bank. There was no showing that an accommodation of those whose religion prohibited Saturday work could not be made with or without any additional cost to the Bank for the simple reason that the Bank failed to investigate what, if anything, could be done and what the effect on the Bank, if any, would be of accommodating plaintiff. With regard to the number of other employees who would decline Saturday work for religious reasons, the present record reflects that there is only one. As a consequence, I think it incorrect to assert that if plaintiff’s religious views were accommodated, the Bank would incur extra expense and that it would be subjected to an “undue hardship.”
APPENDIX
Pertinent Finding of the District Court
9. . In early May, 1970 the plaintiff went to the offices of NCNB to seek reemployment. At that time, she obtained an interview with Harris A. Rai-ney, Jr., an employee of NCNB who, at that time, was Employment Manager and who was responsible for hiring clerical employees. .
10. Plaintiff, during her initial interview with Mr. Rainey in May, 1970, indicated that she desired any type of work which would not require her to work on Saturday. She indicated that she would be willing to work on Sunday if necessary and that she would further be willing to work overtime at anytime which did not conflict with her Sabbath. She explained to Rai-ney, however, that her religion absolutely prohibited her from Saturday work at NCNB.
11. Rainey explained to the plaintiff that the Bank could not promise her that she would never have to work on Saturday. Rainey made no efforts to determine if there were jobs within the Bank wherein the plaintiff’s religious beliefs could be accommodated. He merely spoke to Mr. Charles Cooley, his superior at the Bank, who reaffirmed Rainey’s conclusion that the Bank could not promise (or guarantee) the plaintiff that she would never have to come in on Saturday. Rainey indicated that any job in the Bank might require Saturday work and that the plaintiff would have to be available for Saturday work if, when an emergency occurred, she was called. The plaintiff in her discussions with Rainey, emphasized that her religion absolutely prohibited her from working on her Sabbath and that she could not take a job where her employer would expect her to work on her Sabbath and where she would be required to work and to be available to work on her Sabbath. Rainey understood the plaintiff’s beliefs but made no attempts to locate a job for the plaintiff where Saturday work would not be necessary.
12. At trial, Rainey admitted he was not knowledgeable with respect to all the various job functions and duties in all departments at the Bank. He admitted that the front line or department supervisors were much more familiar with the various job requirements in their department and were better qualified to determine whether there were jobs available in their departments for which the plaintiff was qualified and in which she would not have to work on Saturday. No investigation was conducted and no department heads were contacted to ascertain if the plaintiff’s religious beliefs could be accommodated. Neither in May, 1970 or thereafter did Rainey speak to any department supervisors or foremen to attempt to find a job where Saturday work could be absolutely excluded. The Court finds that no attempts were made by Rai-ney or any other Bank officials to attempt to determine if there was a job in the Bank to accommodate the plaintiff’s religious practices and beliefs.
*8013. As of May, 1970 the Bank’s entire Equal Employment Opportunity policy was the following brief statement:
POLICY OF DISCRIMINATION It has been and will continue to be the Policy of North Carolina National Bank to recruit and hire qualified applicants without regard to race, creed, color, sex, age or national origin; and to treat employees equally with respect to compensation and opportunities for advancement, including upgrading, training, promotion, and transfer.
Bank officials had never formulated or communicated to its personnel supervisory staff any policies with respect to accommodation of the religious beliefs and practices of Bank employees or prospective NCNB employees. There were no written standards with respect to the proper procedures to take to attempt to accommodate religious beliefs, and Mr. Rainey, the Personnel Manager, was not aware of the regulations concerning religious discrimination promulgated prior to 1970 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
14. As of May 15, 1970 the Bank employed approximately 1243 employees. As of June 15, 1970, the Bank employed approximately 1261 employees. As of May, 1970 and thereafter, there were vacancies at the Bank in jobs for which the plaintiff was qualified. The plaintiff had previously been employed in a Level Three grade job which is a clerical job. The Bank maintains numerous Level Three positions and there are positions at Level Three in most of NCNB’s departments.
16. The great majority of the Bank’s operations are not normally in operation on Saturday. For most employees, Saturday is not a normal work day.
17. The Bank, in its various dealings with the plaintiff in May and June, 1970, took no steps to attempt to accommodate the plaintiff’s religious beliefs and practices. Specifically, the Bank refused to take any steps to investigate, through interoffice channels, whether or not there were jobs available in various departments in the Bank where the plaintiff would not have to be available for Saturday work and where the plaintiff’s religious beliefs could be accommodated. The Bank, by refusing to accommodate the needs of the plaintiff and by refusing to attempt to find a job for her which would not require Saturday work, made clear its policies required that all employees be available to work on Saturday if called.
20. Elizabeth Woods, A Seventh Day Adventist, testified at the trial. Ms. Woods testified that she began working for NCNB on January 8, 1974. Prior to the time she began working for the Bank, she was interviewed for a job with the defendant by Tom Nicholson, an NCNB employee. After her initial interview with Mr. Nicholson she spoke with the supervisor in the audit department, Ken McReady. When Ms. Woods spoke to McReady, she informed him that she was a Seventh Day Adventist and that, as such, she could not work from sundown Friday until sundown Saturday. She did agree to work overtime on Sunday or during periods other than her Sabbath. McReady informed Ms. Woods that she would not have to work on Saturday and if extra work was necessary over the weekend she could do the work on Sunday. Ms. Woods’ position is that she absolutely cannot work on Saturday; the defendant has successfully accommodated her religious needs without a hardship on the Bank. McReady has guaranteed (or promised) Ms. Woods that she will never be asked to work on Saturday and never will have to work on Saturday. Other employees in the audit department do work on Saturday from time to time. In addition, training programs are held on Saturday. Ms. Woods is not required to work on Saturday or to attend any Saturday training programs. She has observed no morale problems in her department because of the accommodations made to her beliefs and, to the best of her knowledge, there have been no complaints concerning the fact that NCNB has accommodated her religious beliefs.
*8121. The defendant’s position that accommodation of plaintiff’s religious beliefs would result in business hardships to NCNB with respect to employee relations, morale, personnel management, discipline and uniformity of policy is not demonstrated by the evidence. Indeed, the religious needs of Elizabeth Woods, a Seventh Day Adventist who has worked and is now working for the Bank, have been met with no hardship to the defendant. There is simply no evidence that morale will suffer or that disciplinary problems would be created if the plaintiff’s religious needs had been or are now accommodated. In fact, all the evidence is to the contrary.
. The Court held that, on the evidence of the alternatives that were available to TWA to enable it to employ the plaintiff and the reasons why TWA rejected each, TWA had satisfied its obligation. The case is completely distinguishable from the instant one where, as will be shown, the Bank made no effort to determine if it could accommodate plaintiff’s religious beliefs.
. So far as the record shows, the Bank has only one employee who is a Seventh Day Adventist. Conceivably, the Bank may have one or more employees who are Orthodox Jews, members of the Worldwide Church of God, or other religious sects proscribing Saturday work, but, if so, the number of such employees is not established.
. 15. The dissent argues that “the cost to TWA of either paying overtime or not replacing respondent would [not] have been more than de minimus.” Post, at 2281 n.6. This ignores, however, the express finding of the District Court that “[b]oth of these solutions would have created an undue burden on the conduct of TWA’s business,” 375 F.Supp., at 891, and it fails to take account of the likelihood that a company as large as TWA may have many employees whose religious observances, like Hardison’s, prohibit them from working on Saturdays or Sundays. 432 U.S. at 84, 97 S.Ct. at 2277.