Defendant-appellant Michael Shapiro appeals from a judgment and sentence entered upon a guilty verdict of a jury for conspiracy to misapply bank funds and aiding and abetting the misapplication of bank funds, violations of 18 U.S.G. §§ 371, 656, and 2.2 We reverse.
I
Evidence adduced at trial showed that Shapiro and his codefendants maintained nine business and personal checking accounts at the First National Bank of Glendale, Wisconsin. Phyllis Wypiszynski, head bookkeeper at the bank, was responsible for monitoring such checking accounts. When dealing with a check on an overdrawn account, she had the authority either to reject the check or to allow payment on it. During the early part of 1972 Wypisz-ynski became aware of the overdrawn status of the Shapiro-related accounts. When she brought the matter to Shapiro’s attention, he told her that his pending real estate deals would generate funds which would cover any overdrafts. She then allowed payment on the checks.
Helen Dornfield, Shapiro’s personal secretary, maintained physical control of the accounts in question and prepared checks and deposits on a daily basis. Wypiszynski was frequently in contact with Dornfield about the overdrawn status of the bank accounts. Although some “good” money was deposited to cover the overdrafts, the majority of the deposits were checks drawn on other Glendale bank accounts which were also overdrawn. These deposits were made by Dornfield on instructions from Shapiro. The check-kiting scheme continued and expanded throughout 1973, eventually involving all nine of the accounts.
In December 1973, officers of the Glendale Bank questioned the status of these accounts and stopped all further activity. A bank audit indicated an overdrawn status of $687,335.48.
II
The defendant initially contends that the trial judge committed prejudicial error by failing to remain impartial during the questioning of a witness before the jury and therefore should have declared a mistrial. We do not agree. After considering the record in its entirety, we conclude that any interjection by the trial judge had, at most, negligible effect. It is the judge’s duty to “oversee the presentation of evidence and generally supervise the proper conduct of the trial . . . .” United States v. Medansky, 486 F.2d 807, 814 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989, 94 S.Ct. 1587, 39 L.Ed.2d 886 (1974). Additionally, the instruction given to the jury shortly after the incident as well as the charge to the jury at the close of the trial certainly overcame any possible prejudical effect. Therefore, we hold that the involvement of the trial judge during the examination of the witness did not amount to reversible error. Moreover, we find no merit in the defendant’s claims of reversible error with respect to either the sufficiency of the evidence or the instructions tendered to the jury.
III
We turn to the more serious claim of reversible error, the admission of prior convictions. The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence his two prior convictions, one for bankruptcy fraud in 1938 and one for income tax evasion in 1952.
Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence deals with the impeachment of a witness by evidence of prior convictions. Subsection (b) addresses the question of time *481limitations on the admission of such evidence and provides that evidence of a conviction more than ten years old is not admissible “unless the court determines, in the interest of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.”
As originally submitted by the Supreme Court and adopted by the House Committee on the Judiciary, Rule 609(b) made impeachment by evidence of convictions totally inadmissible if more than ten years had elapsed since the date of conviction or of release from confinement. The Senate Committee disagreed with this approach and suggested there might be “exceptional circumstances” under which the conviction might substantially bear on the credibility of the witness. The Committee did note, however, that “[i]t is intended that convictions over 10 years old will be admitted very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances.” Notes of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Report No. 93-1277, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1974, pp. 7051, 7062. Because of the differences between the House and Senate versions, the Conference Committee adopted a compromise, basically the Senate version with the addition of the notice requirement to avoid surprise.
In exercising his discretion on admission of such evidence, the trial judge must consider several factors, most importantly the danger of unfair prejudice. When the prior conviction and the charged act are of a similar nature, the danger increases. The jury is more likely to misuse the evidence for purposes other than impeachment, that is, to regard the prior convictions as evidence of a propensity to commit crime or of guilt, despite instructions to the contrary. See United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 89-90 (7th Cir. 1975); 3 Weinstein’s Evidence 1609[02] at 609-59 through 60; Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by His Prior Convictions and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: A Half Step Forward and Three Steps Backward, 1 Loyola U.L.J. 247, 248-51 (1970); Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant With a Criminal Record, 4 Colum. L.J. & Soe.Prob. 213 (1968). Because the probative value of a prior conviction on the issue of credibility tends to decrease with the passage of time, the danger of prejudice clearly increases. In the case before us, we are unable to find any “exceptional circumstances” which would justify the admission of the convictions.
The defendant in this case is an eighty-year-old man, convicted of both bankruptcy fraud and income tax evasion thirty-eight and twenty-four years earlier. In oral argument, the Government conceded its concern that the defendant had a grandfatherly appearance and that he would appear totally blameless on the stand. In other words, while arguing that the evidence had bearing on veracity, the Government sought to have the evidence admitted to prejudice the defendant by coloring the jury’s idea of the type of person he was. Additionally, in view of the similarity between the prior convictions and the charged offense, the risk of unfair prejudice was especially great. Clearly, the probative value of such evidence did not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court committed error in admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions. Because we cannot state with fair assurance that the error did not have substantial influence on the jury’s decision, the conviction cannot stand. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 763-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). The conviction is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
. Defendant’s codefendants, Ben Libowsky, Jack LaKam, and Julius Rubin, his sons-in-law, pleaded guilty to lesser offenses prior to trial.