Plaintiff Ritz was charged with misconduct by his union, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). With one exception, the union’s Hearing Board dismissed all the charges against Ritz.1 The Board found Captain Ritz guilty of “disobeying or failure to comply with a decision of the ALPA Board of Directors.” Specifically, the Hearing Board found that subsequent to the merger of Northeast Airlines with Delta Airlines, Ritz, then chairman of the Northeast Airlines Master Executive Council (MEC),2 wilfully refused to report to ALPA funds which had been collected from Northeast’s pilots for the NEA Master Executive Council Legal Fund.3 ALPA had repeatedly requested that Ritz supply the home office with the information, which was needed to file a report required by the Labor Department (LM-2 report).4 Ritz eventually supplied the information directly to the Labor Department, and sent a copy of the report to the ALPA home office.
The decision of the Hearing Board was sustained by ALPA’s Appeal Board, which assessed a $500 fine against Captain Ritz. He then brought this action in the district court seeking to enjoin ALPA and its officers from enforcing the decision of the Appeal Board. Captain Ritz contended, inter alia, that he was denied a “full and fair hearing” as required by section 101 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 411; that the disciplinary action was instituted in retaliation for his opposition to the policies of *735the union’s leadership; and that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the decision of ALPA’s Appeal Board. The district court rejected these allegations and granted summary judgment for the defendants. Ritz v. O’Donnell, 413 F.Supp. 1365 (1976). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the decision of the district court.
I. ALLEGED DENIAL OF A FAIR HEARING
The charging parties, the individual defendants in this action, did not appear at either the Hearing or Appeal Board proceedings.5 The plaintiff alleges that this prevented him from exercising his right of confrontation and cross-examination, and thereby denied him the “full and fair hearing” he was entitled to under section 101(a)(5)(C) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)(C).
While section 101(a)(5)(C) prohibits the disciplining of any member by a union unless he is afforded a “full and fair hearing”, the member need not necessarily be provided with the full panoply of procedural safeguards found in criminal proceedings. Tincher v. Piasecki, 520 F.2d 851, 854 (7th Cir. 1975). In determining whether a full and fair hearing has been afforded a member, the “fundamental and traditional concepts of due process” serve as the basis for decision. Tincher v. Piasecki, supra; Parks v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 314 F.2d 886, 912 (4th Cir.), cert. den., 372 U.S. 976, 83 S.Ct. 1111, 10 L.Ed.2d 142 (1963). The courts have uniformly recognized that the right of confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is fundamental to the “full and fair hearing” requirement, Parks v. IBEW, supra. They have also uniformly declared that union members who knowingly fail to exercise rights guaranteed or offered them in connection with union disciplinary proceedings have waived those rights. Indeed, even under the more stringent procedural due process standards applicable to criminal proceedings, the courts have held that the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses may be waived. Taylor v. United States,, 414 U.S. 17, 19-20, 94 S.Ct. 194, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973).
We agree with the district court that in this case the plaintiff did waive his right of confrontation. The charging members were not present — apparently due to other union business. But the Hearing Board repeatedly stated in the presence of the accused, the plaintiff here, that he had the right to call for the appearance of the charging parties and to examine them.6 Captain Mudd, the representative of the charging parties, offered several times to produce for cross-examination any persons requested by plaintiff. Each time plaintiff indicated, expressly or tacitly, that he was not making any such request, even though he stated his awareness of his right to do so.7
Plaintiff did request that he be permitted to cross-examine his accusers before ALPA’s Appeal Board, but his request was denied. The ALPA Constitution specifically permits the Appeal Board to determine *736appeals solely upon the record submitted to it by the Hearing Board. That is the rule of appellate procedure followed by appellate courts, and is entirely congruent with fair procedure. Given Ritz’s repeated failure to exercise his right of confrontation at the hearing level, his claim of denial of a right of confrontation at the appeal is without merit.
Finally, even if plaintiff’s course did not constitute a waiver of his right of confrontation and cross-examination, we conclude that on the facts of this case he was not denied any right essential to or implicit in the statutory requirement of a full and fair hearing by the union. What is frequently characterized as “the right to confront one’s accusers” is, in essence, the right to examine or cross-examine the pertinent witnesses. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). A person does not have the right to question those who filed charges against him. Those charges may have been based on responsible hearsay, rather than the direct knowledge of the charging party. If the charging party, or his counsel, presents witnesses or other evidence at the proceeding, and the respondent is offered both full opportunity to test the validity of that evidence and the opportunity to call the charging persons as witnesses (even as hostile witnesses) in the event he thinks there testimony will help his case, a full and fair hearing is assured. Here the entire case against Captain Ritz was proven by written documents, the authenticity of which Ritz conceded; there were no witnesses for him to cross-examine; and there is no suggestion of any claim made that he had any request or need to call the accusing parties in order to present some kind of affirmative defense.
II. REPRISAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff also asserts that the disciplinary proceedings violated section 609 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 529, because they were instituted as a reprisal for plaintiff’s opposition to the policies of ALPA’s leadership. Section 609 clearly prohibits a union from penalizing its members because they have exercised their rights of free speech and assembly, and the courts have not hesitated to nullify disciplinary actions that have infringed upon those rights. Kuebler v. Cleveland Lithographers and Photoengravers Union Local 24-P, 473 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1973). In the instant case, however, plaintiff has failed to make even a minimal showing that the disciplinary proceedings were instituted as a retaliatory measure. It was, therefore, proper for the district court to grant summary judgment for the defendants.
In support of his claim of reprisal, plaintiff calls attention to the fact that twenty-three other LM-2 reports were not filed with the Labor Department at the time charges were instituted against him. Charges were not brought against these other twenty-three chairmen, and this, the plaintiff argues, indicates he was “singled out” in an impermissible attempt to punish him for his opposition to the union’s leadership. However, Ritz was not disciplined for failure to file the LM-2 with the Labor Department, but for failure to comply with an ALPA order specifically directing him to supply the union with the data that it needed so it could file the report. There is no evidence that the other twenty-three chairmen refused to supply information to ALPA.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Plaintiff contends that there is no evidence showing it was the policy of ALPA, or that he knew it was the policy of ALPA, to file the LM-2 reports with the Labor Department through the home office rather than directly from the Master Executive Councils. Conviction by a union on charges unsupported by any evidence violates the full and fair hearing requirement of the LMRDA. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 246, 91 S.Ct. 609, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971). However, the Supreme Court has held that in reviewing union disciplinary proceedings, the courts are limited to deciding whether *737there is “some evidence” to support the charges made. Boilermakers, supra at 246, 91 S.Ct. 609. There is no requirement of “substantial evidence.” The limited judicial role staked out by the Supreme Court for these cases leads us to affirm the conclusion of the district court that the union met its burden of producing some evidence to support the charges against Ritz.
In 1971, pursuant to a consent order with the government, Ruby v. Hodgson, Civil Action No. 1104-70 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1971), ALPA instituted procedures requiring the Master Executive Councils to provide the home office with the information necéssary to file the LM-2 reports. The consent order clearly permits ALPA to require that the LM-2 reports be filed from the home office. There is evidence in the record that the ALPA Board specifically informed Ritz of the requirement that he supply the information to the home office.
IV. DISQUALIFICATION ALLEGATION
Plaintiff charges error in the proceedings against him in the failure of two members of the Appeals Board to disqualify themselves by reason of the Board’s rule “that a member disqualify himself in any case involving pilots of his own airline.” (J.A. 479) The two members were employed by the same airlines as two of the charging parties, officers of ALPA at the time charges were brought against plaintiff. The purpose of the rule appears to be to avoid any possibility of bias in favor of a party with whom one is acquainted and may have worked. The two charging parties were no longer officers of ALPA at the time of the appeal (J.A. 486), and any involvement was nominal.
Plaintiff has made no attempt to show actual prejudice from the composition of the Appeals Board, so we must construe the argument as one of inherent prejudice.8 The statutory test for this claim is whether plaintiff got a “full and fair hearing,” not whether the Appeals Board abided by the literal words of its own rules. By this standard and the doctrine of harmless error, we conclude that plaintiff was not deprived of a “full and fair hearing” by the failure to disqualify in these circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
We end with a summary that will also serve to take account of points raised in the dissenting opinion. Plaintiffs role in the dispute with ALPA promotes sympathetic consideration of his appeal for judicial relief. He was a leader of an insurgency against the national union and in emotional terms the union’s sanction became exposed to the challenge that it was retaliation. However, the recourse to the Hearing Board and Appeals Board provided by the ALPA Constitution yielded substantial victories to plaintiffs in these forums. Moreover, the courts are subject to restraint, to the clear import of Boilermakers that in this field of law the courts have a distinctly narrower supervisory role over union disciplinary proceedings than over agency proceedings, and a fortiori than criminal proceedings.9 We must scrutinize the procedures, but intervene only if there has been a breach of fundamental fairness.
Plaintiff had an acrimonious dispute with the ALPA national leadership. Charges were brought against plaintiff in connection with the financing of the fight against *738ALPA. The Hearing Board, while troubled by the absence of the charging parties, gave consideration to all contentions, including plaintiffs and the evidence presented. It dismissed all charges against plaintiffs except for finding plaintiff Ritz guilty of refusal to file required financial information. It required pro rata reimbursement of the unexpended litigation funds and other actions on pain of expulsion from ALPA. The Appeals Board likewise considered plaintiff’s contentions, affirmed the Hearing Board’s finding of guilt on the refusal to file reports, and reduced the penalty to a $500 fine.
The dissent stresses the failure of the charging parties to appear either before the Hearing Board or the Appeals Board notwithstanding the fact that the case against the plaintiff was based in its entirety on documents whose authenticity was unchallenged. The union constitution explicitly permits a charging party to be represented by another member.10
The presence of the charging parties was discussed several times during the four days of hearings in January, 1975. Plaintiff was clearly aware of the issue and its possible significance for his defense. There was ample opportunity for consultation with counsel during recesses (J.A. 435) and between sessions. When plaintiff finally addressed the matter, he made it clear that he had decided not to request the presence of the charging parties. Perhaps he did not want the onus of bringing the national officers to Boston at a time when there was a flurry of activity going on in Washington, D.C. in connection with ALPA’s boycott of hazardous materials (J.A. 447). In any event, plaintiff took a deliberate position.
While the Appeals Board may receive additional evidence, what is involved here is not new or subsequently discovered evidence, but rather evidence that plaintiff, for whatever reason, decided not to demand. In view of our limited review function, we can hardly find an abuse of discretion by the Appeal Board.
The dissent argues that since the union’s rule for appeals prohibits cross-examination of a party, this is tantamount to a denial of a fair hearing in a case that requires the testimony of a charging party. This point was not argued by counsel. Indeed appellants’ counsel does not even cite the rule which the dissent italicizes, though a number of other rules are invoked.11 This does not signify inattention by counsel, but rather a mis-reading of the rule by the dissent. What the rule means is that there is to be no cross-examination of an individual simply because he is a party. Obviously, if he is a witness, and gives testimony that is material, he would be subject to cross-examination. This court would be the first to join the stream of citations in appellants’ brief (pp. 12-13) to the effect that a fair hearing includes “the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,” e. g., Parks v. Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 314 F.2d 886, 912 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976, 83 S.Ct. 1111, 10 L.Ed.2d 142 (1963).
Here, the individuals who signed the charges were not witnesses in support of the charges, the appellants expressly refused to call them as (hostile) witnesses in resisting the charges, and that, in our view, is the end of the matter. The same condition prevailed even later, at the hearing of the appeals board, when Ritz — who had already procured the aid of counsel in the District Court proceeding — not only failed to submit evidence by September 15, 1975, the date set by the Board’s letter a month previous, but made it clear that he was calling for the appearance of the individuals *739concerned not as witnesses but as “accusers.” 12
We stress again that this was not a judicial or even agency proceeding, it was a union proceeding and the courts are not to interfere except on a kind of showing of grievous unfairness that is entirely lacking in this case.
Affirmed.
. At the same time, the Hearing Board also dismissed all the related charges against nine other pilots, who are also named as plaintiffs in this case. Since their alleged injury is less than that of Captain Ritz, our disposition of his case also applies to them. For convenience, we will refer to plaintiff in the singular.
. The Master Executive Council is the union’s administrative arm at each airline. Each pilot group elects its own MEC on an airline-by-airline basis.
. The funds were collected both before and during Ritz’s term as chairman. However, since he was the last chairman, the records indicating the amounts collected were in his possession.
. In 1971, pursuant to a consent order with the government, Ruby v. Hodgson, Civil Action No. 1104-70 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1971). ALPA instituted procedures requiring the MECs to provide the home office with the information necessary to file the LM-2 reports. While plaintiff challenges the validity of the consent decree, that issue is not now before us. It is clear that ALPA could require the MECs to report to the home office, and Ritz violated a Valid union regulation.
. As permitted by the ALPA Constitution, the charging parties were represented by another individual, Captain David Mudd. The charging parties’ entire case against Captain Ritz consisted of written documents.
. In this regard, the following statement by one of the members of the Hearing Board is particularly noteworthy. “We have been sort of waiting, I think, for someone to suggest that their accuser be here to face them, but nobody seems to want to do it.”
. Before the Hearing Board, plaintiff Ritz stated:
Mr. Mudd just said that there had been a request from the Charging [sic] Party, and no Charging [sic] Party requested that the national officers be here — of this group, either those that I represent that are not here, nor this group that are here. Now, if the Board made such a request that Mr. Mudd heard, that is between you- and him, but no Charging [sic] Party, — or Charged Party made such a request, and Jack McWalter [one of the charged parties] summed that up quite adequately in his closing comments, as to our position. (Emphasis added).
Transcript of proceedings before the ALPA Hearing Board, January 21-24, 1975 at 3-158 to 3-159, J.A. 221-22.
. Current developments in federal judicial recu-sals have departed from the one time rule that disqualification was required only in case of a “substantial” interest, and what is now contemplated is utmost punctilio. The rule of fundamental fairness governing union proceedings is not violated by the kind of minor, formal involvement of the two charging parties.
. That the scope of review is limited appears clearly from the rule requiring affirmance if the record contains “some evidence,” International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 246, 91 S.Ct. 609, 28 L.Ed.2d 10 (1971), even though this is less than the “substantial evidence” required to affirm an administrative agency acting by formal rulemaking or adjudication, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). The appellate court’s scope is of course less for review of agency proceedings than for review of judgments in civil and criminal cases.
. ALPA Constitution, Art. VIII, § 3.D (J.A. 457):
Both the accused member and the accuser shall have the right, both at the original hearing and at any appeal taken therefrom, to designate and be represented by an active member of the Division in good standing.
. Section I.C of appellants’ brief (“Procedural Violations before the Appeal Board”), makes a number of other points, including claims of violations of Rules D and F of the Rules of the Appeal Board, and of Sections 3D, 4C and 7B of Article VIII of the Constitution and Bylaws of the union.
. Captain Ritz’s letter of Sept. 12, 1975 (J.A. 477) called for the appearance of Flack, Shaughnessy and Miles as “witnesses," and separately demanded “that all of my accusers, J, J. O’Donnell, A. Bonner, Wm. Davis and J. Giberson, be present at the hearing.” There was no indication of what evidence, if any, was sought, or even hoped, to be elicited from these “accusers.”