dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s holding that the collection and retention of the plaintiff’s past insurance history by Equifax did not constitute an invasion of his privacy by unreasonable intrusion. There is no substantial evidence that the manner of the procurement of this information constituted an offensive interference with the plaintiff’s affairs,1 or that the information col*420lected was of such a personal nature or so unrelated to any legitimate business purpose that its collection and retention by Equifax constituted ipso facto an invasion of the plaintiffs right to privacy.2 See Pearson v. Dodd, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 279, 410 F.2d 701, 704, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947, 89 S.Ct. 2021, 23 L.Ed.2d 465 (1969); Beaumont v. Brown, 65 Mich.App. 455, 465-466, 237 N.W.2d 501, 505-506 (1975). Cf. Liberty Loan Corporation of Antioch v. Brown, 493 S.W.2d 664 (Mo.App.1973).
I disagree, however, that there is insufficient evidence of “publicity” to justify submission of the case to the jury under the theory of public disclosure of private facts. As acknowledged by the majority, the common law tort of public disclosure of private facts requires “a communication that reaches, or is sure to reach, the public.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, Comment a at 384 (1977) (emphasis added). See also Biederman’s of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892, 898 (Mo.1959). The likelihood of widespread dissemination can be inferred from the medium employed by the defendant for the particular publication, see Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942) (magazine article) and Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting Div.— Meredith Corp., 472 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.App.1971) (television broadcast), or from the defendant’s action in making private information available to the public where that action is likely to result in the further dissemination of the information. See Ind. Foundation, Etc. v. Texas Ind. Acc. Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 683-684 (Tex.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 1550, 51 L.Ed.2d 774 (1977).3
In my view, the collection and retention of personal information about a particular consumer by a commercial information broker such as Equifax makes the dissemination of that information sufficiently likely as to meet any reasonable requirement of “publicity.”4 Equifax, formerly known as Retail Credit Company, has more than 2,000 locations across the continent and is the largest individual consumer investigative firm in the country.5 Approximately 46 million consumer files are maintained by Equifax, and the corporation claims to make some 35 million reports on consumers each year.6 Evidence at trial indicated that once a report on a particular consumer is made, a copy of that report is retained in the files of the reporting office for use in later reports about the same individual requested by the same or a different customer.7 Upon request from another office, a *421copy of the report is sent to the requesting office for dissemination to its local customers. A copy of the report which was the subject of the present suit was sent to the Fort Lauderdale, Florida, branch office, apparently in anticipation of requests for information about the plaintiff in that locale.
The majority cites Peacock v. Retail Credit Company, 302 F.Supp. 418 (N.D.Ga.1969), aff’d, 429 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1970), in support of its holding. In Peacock, reports containing private information about the plaintiff were distributed to insurance companies, banks and other businesses requesting sdch information. The court held that no public disclosure of private information had occurred since “[o]nly clients of Retail Credit have been supplied with this information;” and as assurance against further dissemination, the court cited the presence of a clause in the contract between Retail and its customers, requiring that the information reported and Retail’s identity as the source be kept “strictly confidential.” Id. at 423. I find this analysis wholly inadequate. The dissemination of private information by a commercial credit broker to insurance companies, banks and other customers requesting such information is no less “public” than the posting of a debt in a creditor’s shop window.8 Nor does the fact that the information in issue in that case had been disseminated to only a few customers, or that the contract between Retail and its customers limited further dissemination by the latter, limit future dissemination by Retail itself in any way or make that dissemination any less likely.
Even if there is substantial evidence tending to show that the elements of a cause of action for invasion of privacy have been met,9 a verdict in favor of the defendant must be directed if the defendant’s conduct serves any basic public interest which outweighs the individual right infringed. See Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1206-1207, 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1942); McNally v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 532 F.2d 69, 78 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855, 97 S.Ct. 150, 50 L.Ed.2d 131 (1976). The determination as to what is a matter of sufficient public interest is similar in principle to the determination as to the existence of a qualified privilege in libel. Barber v. Time, Inc., supra, 348 Mo. at 1207, 159 S.W.2d at 295. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652G (1977); W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 117, at 817-818 (1971).
Most jurisdictions have granted credit bureaus and other consumer investigative agencies a conditional privilege in defamation and invasion of privacy actions under the theory that the information supplied by these companies is useful to society in preventing the improvident extension of credit or the payment of fraudulent insurance claims.10 Assuming that such reports would be conditionally privileged under Missouri law,11 that privilege would not pro*422tect the disclosure made here. A conditional privilege extends only to the publication of information which bears upon the public interest which is entitled to protection. See W. Prosser, supra § 115, at 792; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 605 (1977). The public interest asserted by Equifax — that of determining the validity of the plaintiff’s insurance claim — was not served by publication of the fact that the plaintiff had applied for life insurance “in excess of $10,-000,000” since 1949. Even if, as urged by Equifax, current applications for life insurance might contain relevant medical information bearing on the question of present disability, applications made twenty-five years ago certainly would not.12
Consumer reporting has become a multimillion dollar industry,13 with files maintained on millions of Americans.14 Justice Douglas, in describing governmental collection and dissemination of personal information, has stated:
We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy, where everyone is open to surveillance at all times; where there are no secrets from government.
^ * jfc * s{:
The dossiers on all citizens mount in number and increase in size. Now they are being put on computers so that by pressing one button all the miserable, the sick, the suspect, the unpopular, the offbeat people of the Nation can be instantly identified.
These examples and many others demonstrate an alarming trend whereby the privacy and dignity of our citizens is being whittled away by sometimes imperceptible steps. Taken individually, each step may be of little consequence. But when viewed as a whole, there begins to emerge a society quite unlike any we have seen — a society in which government may intrude into the secret regions of man’s life at will.
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341-343, 87 S.Ct. 429, 439, 17 L.Ed.2d 394 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
In my view, the potential for abuse by the commercial consumer reporting industry is no less real. The dissemination of personal information must be limited to that which serves those legitimate business needs which such companies cite to justify their existence. Otherwise, we may indeed be threatened with the loss of the very core of personal privacy: control over the dissemination of information about ourselves.15
. Private investigations utilizing fraudulent misrepresentations, over zealous surveillance and other unreasonably intrusive techniques for the gathering of information about an insurance claimant or credit applicant may give rise to a cause of action for damages for invasion of privacy by unreasonable intrusion. See Noble v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 33 Cal.App.3d 654, 109 Cal.Rptr. 269 (1973); Tucker v. American Employers’ Insurance Company, 171 So.2d 437 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1965); Souder v. Pendleton *420Detectives, 88 So.2d 716 (La.App.1956); Note, Constitutional Right of Privacy and Investigative Consumer Reports: Little Brother Is Watching You, 2 Hastings Const.L.Q. 773, 789-790 (1975).
. See Comment, Protection of the Consumer Interests and the Credit Rating Industry, 2 Pac. L.J. 635, 652 (1971); Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, 57 Geo.L.J. 509, 525 (1969). Unrelated personal information is routinely collected and disseminated by the preparers of investigative consumer reports. See Hearings on S. 823 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm, on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 310-311 (1969); Hearings on H.R. 16340 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm, on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 478-485 (1970).
. In Ind. Foundation, Etc. v. Texas Ind. Acc. Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 1550, 51 L.Ed.2d 774 (1977), the court held that where government records containing private information pertaining to individuals are opened to public inspection, the information is sufficiently “publicized” as to give rise to a cause of action for invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts. “To hold otherwise would be to deny an individual any protectable privacy interest in private information disclosed to a governmental unit, if such information would otherwise be ‘public information’.” Id. at 684.
. See Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, supra at 524.
. See Note, Constitutional Right of Privacy and Investigative Consumer Reports: Little Brother Is Watching You, supra at 773, 774 n. 4.
. Ibid.
. Not only is potentially adverse information copied by investigators from prior reports, but the reports in which the information was originally contained have often been destroyed, making the original source of the information impossible to ascertain. Evidence in this case indicated that the information about which the *421plaintiff complains was copied from previous reports in the files of the St. Louis office; that office, however, had no records showing the origin of the information, and when asked whether such information could exist in the files of other offices, the St. Louis branch manager replied that he doubted it.
. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, Comment a, Illustration 2 (1977).
. In addition to publicity, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s conduct was offensive, unreasonable, serious and unwarranted to a person of ordinary sensibilities. See Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting Div.—Meredith Corp., 472 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo.App.1971); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1207, 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1942). The trial court held that there was sufficient evidence establishing this element to justify submission of the case to the jury. I would agree.
. See, e. g., Wilson v. Retail Credit Company, 325 F.Supp. 460, 463 (S.D.Miss.1971), aff’d, 457 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1972); Bartels v. Retail Credit Company, 185 Neb. 304, 308, 175 N.W.2d 292, 296 (1970); H. E. Crawford Company v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 241 F.2d 387, 393 (4th Cir. 1957). The protection of the qualified privilege was denied to the credit reporting industry in the following libel cases: Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985, 94 S.Ct. 1580, 39 L.Ed.2d 882 (1974); Retail Credit Company v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 218 S.E.2d 54 (1975); Pacific Packing Company v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 139 P. 1007 (1914).
. The appellate courts of Missouri apparently have not yet addressed the question as to whether consumer investigative agencies should receive the protection of such a conditional privilege. Those cases which have *422stressed the balancing of the individual right of privacy against community interests have involved freedom of the press. See Barber v. Time, Inc., supra; Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting Div. — Meredith Corp., supra.
. The irrelevance of this information is acknowledged in the report, where, after three insurance carriers are listed, it is stated that “[w]e are not quoting the remainder of the 23 insurance companies due to their age.” The branch manager of the St. Louis office of Equifax testified that underwriting files for life insurance applicants are routinely destroyed after a period of 13 months, five years, or ten years, apparently because any information contained therein would be obsolete. See also Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(l)-(6) (1970), which prohibits in most instances the reporting of adverse information which is more than seven years old.
. Total revenues of Retail Credit Company were $195,262,000 in 1972. FTC, In the Matter of Equifax, Inc., para. 12, at 10 (1977) (initial decision).
. Credit Data Corporation, the nation’s second largest individual consumer reporting firm, maintains files on some 27 million persons and is reportedly adding new files at the rate of one-half million per month. Comment, Protection of the Consumer Interests and the Credit Rating Industry, 2 Pac.L.J. 635, 636 (1971). Almost all of Credit Data’s'operations are computerized, id., and when asked in 1968 how long it would take before every American’s name was listed with the corporation, its president replied, “we regard it as approximately a five-year job.” Comment, Commercial Credit Bureaus: The Right to Privacy and State Action, 24 Am.U.L.Rev. 421, 424 (1975).
. See Note, Constitutional Right of Privacy and Investigative Consumer Reports: Little Brother Is Watching You, supra at 773 , 775, 825; Note, Protecting Privacy in Credit Reporting, 24 Stan.L.Rev. 550 (1972); Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, supra at 524, 532.