dissenting.
This case follows a pernicious trend that has been developing in our federal criminal jurisprudence over a long period of time: the extension of federal jurisdiction beyond anything intended by Congress when it enacted the various provisions of the Criminal Code. (Only the Supreme Court seems to have recently called a halt, e. g., United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 94 S.Ct. 645, 38 L.Ed.2d 603 (1974); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971).) The trend I speak about is not confined to the mail fraud statute and the federal travel act,1 but in this dissent I shall confine my attack on the overextension of federal jurisdiction to these two statutes because they are the ones involved in this case.
I wish to make one thing clear at the outset. The scheme to defraud in this case was of large magnitude. It was also pervasive, involving members of both houses of the Illinois legislature and of both major political parties. The defendants and their unindicted coschemers perpetrated a corrupt fraud upon the citizens of Illinois. Vigorous prosecution was called for. But as large and perverse as the scheme was, it did not constitute violation of either the federal mail fraud or travel act statutes.
I
In United States v. Joyce, 499 F.2d 9, 23 (7th Cir. 1974), I voiced the view that the Government had stretched the mail fraud statute to the breaking point by using mailings which were at best only tangentially related to the fraudulent scheme. I reluctantly concurred in an affirmance in that case. Here the mailings used to sustain the convictions have gone beyond the breaking point. To affirm is to extend impermissibly the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction.
A
As illustrated by the majority’s opinion, federal courts have increasingly given the mail fraud statute 2 a very expansive interpretation. But in their zeal to convict the guilty, these courts have blurred a very important distinction between the two elements of the offense of mail fraud. I concur in the view that the first element — the scheme to defraud — should be liberally and broadly interpreted so as to cover the many unforeseen and diverse kinds of fraud which may be devised. I am equally convinced, however, that the second element— use of the mails — ought to be interpreted strictly and narrowly. This strict interpretation is necessary not only because the mailings provide the basis of federal jurisdiction, but also because such an interpretation comports with the limited scope of the statute.
The purpose of the mail fraud statute, first enacted in 1872,3 was limited to pro*498tecting the postal service rather than providing a weapon against every fraud perpetrated in the states. Although the legislative history of the statute is sparse, it is important to note that the provision was placed within the chapter entitled, “An Act to revise, consolidate, and amend the Statutes relating to the Post-office Department.” That Congress was concerned with the misuse of the postal service, as distinguished from the prevention of schemes to defraud as such, is shown by its insertion of the following language in the original enactment:
[T]he court . . . shall proportion the punishment especially to the degree in which the abuse of the post office establishment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme and device.
The first judicial decisions interpreting the statute confirmed the limited congressional purpose. In United States v. Jones, 10 F. 469, 470 (S.D.N.Y.1882), the court noted, “[T]he gist of the offence consists in the abuse of the mail.” In United States v. Loring, 91 F. 881, 883, 887 (N.D.Ill.1884), the court was more specific:
[T]he right to punish a person who uses the mails for purposes of fraud . is the scope and intent of [the mail fraud statute].
* * * * * *
The object of the law was to prevent persons having fraudulent designs on others from using the post office as a means of effectuating such fraud.
This court has adopted a like interpretation. In United States v. Browne, 225 F.2d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 1955), Chief Judge Major declared:
In any event, it is not the scheme to defraud which the federal statute condemns but only the use of the mails in its execution. It is that use which constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense.
See United States v. Aldridge, 484 F.2d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Lowe, 115 F.2d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 717, 61 S.Ct. 441, 85 L.Ed. 466 (1941); United States v. Minnec, 104 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 577, 60 S.Ct. 94, 84 L.Ed. 484 (1939); Worthington v. United States, 64 F.2d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 1933). Other circuits have adopted a similar interpretation.4
That the essence of the federal offense is the abuse of the postal service and not the scheme to defraud is further shown by the fact that counts are related to the number of mailings involved, not the number of schemes. United States v. Aldridge, 484 F.2d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Browne, 225 F.2d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 1955). This is because the offense against the United States is the misuse of the mails and the injury is sustained as soon as the mailing occurs. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394, 36 S.Ct. 367, 60 L.Ed. 706 (1916); In re Henry, 123 U.S. 372, 374, 88 S.Ct. 142, 31 L.Ed. 174 (1887). Cf. Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625, 35 S.Ct. 710, 59 L.Ed. 1151 (1915). The point is obvious. If prevention of schemes to defraud were the primary purpose of the mail fraud statute, then the converse would be true: a defendant could be convicted only on the number of schemes he had devised, not on the number of mailings.5
*499But the statute is even more restrictive than just proscribing the use of the mails. It requires that the mailings be “for the purpose of executing such scheme.” Though the mailings do not have to be fraudulent in themselves they, nonetheless, must be “sufficiently closely related to [the defendant’s] scheme to bring this conduct within the statute.” United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399, 94 S.Ct. 645, 648, 38 L.Ed.2d 603 (1974). The statute requires, therefore, a close and substantial nexus between the mailings and the fulfillment of the scheme.6 A number of formulations make the point: “[U]sing the post office as a means of effectuating such fraud,” United States v. Loring, 91 F. 881, 887 (1884); “[T]o prevent the post office from being used to carry [the fraud] into effect,” Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314, 16 S.Ct. 508, 511, 40 L.Ed. 709 (1896); The mails must be used “as a central, necessary instrumentality in [the scheme’s] perpetration,” and play “an indispensible role,” United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. at 408-09, 94 S.Ct. at 652 (White, J., dissenting); The mails must be “a step toward receipt of the fruits of the scheme,” United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875, 880 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837, 96 S.Ct. 65, 46 L.Ed.2d 56 (1975). In sum, a causal relation must exist between the mailing and the execution of the scheme.
The majority acknowledges that the mailings must be “in furtherance of” the scheme, but then fails to demonstrate how the mailings listed in the indictment actually fulfilled that requirement. Instead it uses an incorrect test: the mailings were “incidental to an essential part of the scheme.” This test, standing alone, is wholly insufficient. It leaves out the necessary causal relation. Any mailing can be incidental to the scheme; yet it may not further its execution. The flaw in the majority’s test is that the “essentiality” element is misplaced. The mailing must be essential to the execution or furtherance of the scheme. It matters not whether it relates to an essential element of the scheme because all the essential elements of a fraudulent scheme must exist a priori before a determination of the sufficiency of the mailings can be made. To use the majority’s terminology, the mailing must be an essential incidence of the furtherance of the scheme, that is, of putting it into effect (not incidental to an essential element of the scheme).
Congress could have drafted a much broader statute than it did.7 But it did not do so. Rather, Congress intended only to combat a certain, limited type of fraud.
The federal mail fraud statute does not purport to reach all frauds, but only those limited instances in which the use of the mails is a part of the execution of the fraud, leaving all other cases to be dealt with by appropriate state law. Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 95, 65 S.Ct. 148, 151, 89 L.Ed. 88 (1944).
Because the mail fraud statute reaches only a use of the mails which is essential to the execution of the scheme, a careful diagnosis *500of each mailing is necessary. Upon that diagnosis depends the jurisdiction of a federal court to convict one who has devised a scheme to defraud. The temptation to adopt a cavalier attitude once a fraudulent scheme is shown to have existed must be resisted. The trend to extend federal jurisdiction haphazardly so as to convict the guilty at all costs must be stopped. States have the ability and resources to prosecute those who perpetrate fraudulent schemes against their own citizens.
Against this backdrop, I now turn to an analysis of the individual mailings.
B
To reiterate, the mail fraud statute requires that there be a scheme to defraud and a mailing. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954). But to support federal jurisdiction, the mailing element further requires that: (a) the defendant “cause” the use of the mails, and (b) he use the mails “for the purpose of executing” the scheme. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399, 94 S.Ct. 645, 648, 38 L.Ed.2d 603 (1974). One causes the mails to be used when he “does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended . .” Pereira, supra. To meet the second requirement, the mailings must “further,” “aid,” or be a “step toward” the fulfillment of the scheme. The mailings in the present case cannot be said to further the scheme, or in some instances, be said to be caused or foreseen by the defendants.
(1) Counts Two through Five: MVLC Notices
The mailings which formed the basis for the convictions on Counts Two, Three, Four, and Five were notices and agenda of the December 1971 and January 1972 meetings of the Motor Vehicle Laws Commission (MVLC) which were mailed to ready-mix industry representatives Connolly and McBride, two unindicted coschemers. Because the purpose of the scheme was the enactment of a new weight law for cement trucks, it cannot be doubted, as the majority observes, that submission of the proposed legislation in the MVLC was an important step in the scheme. Nor is there any question that Connolly and McBride caused the mailings.8 It cannot be said, however, that these mailings furthered the scheme.
It was entirely immaterial whether McBride and Connolly received written notices of future MVLC meetings. As they were present at the committee meetings,9 they could hear the announcement when the committee met next. Moreover, the MVLC met on a regular basis10 and a key Government witness testified that these notices are “not necessarily” received before the next meeting. Because there was no need for any notice, no reliance upon the receipt of the notice through the mails, and no reliance upon the notice itself, these mailings were not in furtherance of the scheme and were not sufficiently related to it to bring them within the statute. These mailings cannot be considered “a step toward receipt of the fruits of the scheme.” United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d at 880.
The majority’s effort to distinguish Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 80 S.Ct. 1171, 4 L.Ed.2d 1277 (1960), is a combination of illogic and irrelevancy.11 One has only to *501look at the notices themselves to see how remote they are from the scheme, or perhaps better to say, how utterly innocuous they were. See Appendices A and B.
(2) Counts Six and Seven: Waiver of NIRMMA Dues
Counts Six and Seven are duplicate letters sent to the members of the Northern Illinois Ready-Mix and Materials Association (NIRMMA). The letters simply informed the members of the association that dues would be suspended for three months because of the large reserves accumulated in NIRMMA’s treasury. See Appendix C.
During the NIRMMA annual convention in Miami Beach in February 1971, several members of the association, including Connolly, met to discuss the raising of the $50,000 demanded as a bribe for the passage of the so-called “cement bill.” Connolly suggested that the dues of the association members be suspended for a period of time to compensate partially those members contributing to the fund. On March 9, NIRMMA’s board of directors moved to suspend the dues payments of members for three months to reduce the reserve monies of the association and to compensate in part the members contributing to the fund.
Given this background, it must be noted that the $50,000 fund was not derived from funds of any of the NIRMMA companies.12 The waiver of the dues, however, benefitted the companies, not the individuals who provided the funds. Moreover, the waiver extended to all members of the association whether or not their officers had contributed to the fund. Finally, the dues suspension was not rescinded with the return of the $50,000 fund to its contributors.
The majority says: “It is clear from the record that the collection of the $50,000 bribery fund was an essential part of the scheme and that the mailings were done as incidental aspects of the task of assembling the fund.” This facile pronouncement does not meet the issue. The letters forming the basis of Counts Six and Seven may have been “incidental” to the raising of the bribe fund, but they do not meet the Staszcuk test. How can it possibly be maintained that the suspension-of-dues letters in any way furthered the scheme? If anything, they were merely bookkeeping devices to offset the internal accounts of the association members. Even this is a loose description. Certainly they were not an integral part of the execution of the scheme which was well under way when the letters were written. If the Government had produced letters mailed to solicit the $50,000 fund, it would be on more solid ground. But when it uses internal communications between the association members that are only incidental to and not in furtherance of the scheme, it reaches for a straw. If mail fraud cases are to be built on such flimsy foundations, then the distinction between mere incidental use of the mails and the use of the postal facilities to further the execution of the scheme to defraud disappears.
(3) Counts Eight and Nine: Fraudulent Expense Vouchers
When the $40 per truck assessment of the NIRMMA members proved to be insufficient to raise the $50,000 bribe fund, the $3160 deficit was made up by coschemers Wille and Moeller. To reimburse them for this outlay, false expense vouchers were submitted by Bernard Arcquilla and Morris Lauwereins to Connolly of NIRMMA. The cash generated by these vouchers was turned over to Connolly who in turn reimbursed Wille and Moeller. The mailings of these two expense vouchers form the basis *502of Counts Eight and Nine. See Appendices D and E.
It can readily be seen that this operation was a side swindle to defraud NIRMMA concocted by industry schemers Connolly, Wille, Moeller, Arcquilla, and Lauwereins. The mailings of the vouchers may well have been in furtherance of this separate scheme (to benefit themselves at the expense of NIRMMA), but they were only incidental and peripheral to the scheme to defraud the public by using bribery to pass the cement bill. The vouchers, much less their mailing, were not essential to the success of the scheme and were not an integral part of its execution. The following diagram brings home the point.
[[Image here]]
The diagram illustrates my difficulty in understanding how the appellants here, the legislative schemers, can be said to have caused the mailings of these two false expense vouchers. How can it be said that the legislative schemers could have reasonably foreseen that an entirely different fraud would be perpetrated against NIRMMA? How can it be said that they could have reasonably foreseen that the industry schemers would use and mail false vouchers to assemble a small part (6%) of the fund? I am fully aware that the law of conspiracy holds each member responsible for the use of the mails caused by other members. But to blindly apply this principle to a case such as this is to exhalt fiction over reality. I believe that the Counts Eight and Nine mailings fall within the ambit of Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954), as too remote and unforeseeable.
(4) Counts Ten and Eleven: Trade Association Bulletins
The mailings which were the subject of Counts Ten and Eleven consisted of bulletins mailed by two ready-mix industry associations, Northern Illinois Ready-Mix and Materials Association (NIRMMA) and Illinois Division-Midwest Ready-Mix Concrete Association (ID-MRCA), informing their members of Senate passage of H.B. 4176 and urging them to contact the Governor to sign the bill.13 See Appendices F and G. Whether these otherwise innocuous trade bulletins can be said to be “in furtherance of the scheme” depends on how the scope of the scheme is defined.
As the majority notes, the ultimate goal of the ready-mix industry was the enactment of a new weight law for cement trucks. There was nothing improper or illegal in seeking such an objective; indeed, one of the major purposes of trade associations is to obtain favorable legislation. This activity includes lobbying efforts such as urging members to contact the Governor.
What was corrupt about the instant conduct was the bribery of the legislators.14 This was the fraud perpetrated upon the citizens of Illinois, not the passage of a new weight law.15 These considerations lead to the inescapable conclusion that these mailings were not an integral part of the execution of the scheme to defraud and were not in furtherance of its execution. Under the Maze test, they were not sufficiently related to the scheme to come within the mail fraud statute.
*503(5) Count Twelve: Mailing of $500 in Cash to Walker
H.B. 4176 was passed by the Illinois House of Representatives on May 12, 1972. It was introduced in the Illinois Senate three days later. Shortly thereafter Carpentier spoke with ten Illinois Republican senators. One was Jack E. Walker. Carpentier asked Walker to support the cement bill, saying ambiguously “that there would be help in his district.” In mid-June 1972 while the bill was pending in the Senate, Carpentier told Walker that Senator Harris could no longer sponsor the bill because Harris was ill. Carpentier then told Walker that if Walker would handle the bill, “an additional $500 would be given him.” Walker agreed to handle the bill.
Carpentier testified that in September 1972 he received $5000 in $100 bills from Pappas. He said that a few days later he had his wife type the addresses of nine senators on plain envelopes. He further testified that using the cash supplied by Pappas, he placed a $100 bill in each of eight envelopes and five $100 bills in an envelope addressed to Walker, and that he then mailed these envelopes. Walker testified at the trial and denied that he was offered money or that he received any money in connection with the bill.
At trial the Government introduced an envelope mock-up,16 see Appendix H, apparently realizing that its proof of mailing was on extremely shaky grounds: the assertion by Carpentier that he had mailed $500 in cash in a plain envelope to Walker juxtaposed against Walker’s denial that he had been promised or had received any money. There being no corroborating evidence, the proof of the use of the mails to further this vast scheme, convicting numerous defendants on this count, boils down to one man’s word against another’s.
Despite the fact that the proof rested on quicksand, the majority says with seeming assurance: “It was shown at trial that Carpentier placed $500.00 in an envelope and mailed it to Walker in fulfillment of their prior agreement that Walker would receive $500.00 for handling the cement bill in the Senate. We have no difficulty in concluding that this distribution of the proceeds of the bribe fund was in furtherance of the scheme.” It is true that the distribution of part of the bribe to Walker, if it occurred, was in furtherance of the scheme, but that does not make its delivery, as asserted by Carpentier, through the postal service, a use of the mails as contemplated by the statute. It was a fortuitous, unforeseen circumstance. In other words, it was a sport in the totality of the scheme — not an integral part of its execution or an incident essential to its success. To hold that these convictions on charges for using the mails to defraud should depend on this weak thread is to say that the most attenuated use of the post office is sufficient under the statute.
II
The flaw in the majority’s diagnosis of the convictions on the two travel act counts17 is similar to that in the mail fraud counts. My colleagues, ignoring the limited congressional purpose of the act, stretch the statute beyond recognition and extend unduly federal jurisdiction to prosecute what was essentially a state crime.
The congressional purpose of the travel act was to attack criminal activities extending beyond the borders of one state by providing federal assistance in situations in which local law enforcement was ineffective. United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 290-92, 89 S.Ct. 534, 21 L.Ed.2d 487 (1969). See also Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 245-46, 93 S.Ct. 477, 34 *504L.Ed.2d 446 (1972). The statute was aimed primarily at organized crime and, in particular, at persons who reside in one state while operating or managing activities located in another. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971). I concur with the view that the scope of the statute is not limited to the original congressional purpose, i. e., organized criminal activity operating interstate. See United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71, 76-77 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818, 97 S.Ct. 63, 50 L.Ed.2d 79 (1976). As with the mail fraud statute, the alleged criminal activity should be viewed broadly. But, as with the mail fraud statute, Congress did not intend a broad-ranging interpretation of section 1952. The interstate travel aspects should be scrutinized narrowly. Otherwise, federal jurisdiction is extended to situations never intended by Congress. Rewis, supra, 401 U.S. at 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056.
The test for application of section 1952 is the nature and degree of interstate activity in furtherance of the state crime. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1148 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 3183, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974). As the majority concedes, that degree of interstate travel or activity must be more than minimal or incidental; the statute was intended to reach only significant interstate activity. Isaacs, supra at 1146; United States v. Altobella, 442 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. McCormick, 442 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1971).
There was no significant interstate activity in this case. The defendants’ activities were all local: Illinois residents, corporations, and trade associations seeking to bribe Illinois legislators to obtain a new Illinois law. There is no evidence in this record of any interstate activity with the single exception of Lauwereins’ one trip to Indianapolis.
Lauwereins, an unindicted coschemer, travelled from Chicago to Indianapolis to meet with members of the Illinois Division-Midwest Ready-Mix Concrete Association (ID-MRCA), who were attending an annual convention there. The purpose of his trip was to inform them of the $50,000 bribe and to seek their support in raising the money. When the ID-MRCA refused to help, Lauwereins returned to Chicago.
There is no showing that the bribery scheme in any way depended on this one incident of interstate travel. That the members of the ID-MCRA were meeting in Indianapolis was completely fortuitous.18 The assistance of ID-MRCA was not even necessary or essential to the scheme as the $50,000 bribe was raised without its help.19
This one trip cannot suffice to invoke jurisdiction under the travel act. The scheme involved here was outside the ambit of congressional concern — there is nothing about the scheme which suggests any reason why state police powers needed to be supplemented by the federal government. I would therefore hold that the interstate activity was “so minimal, incidental, and fortuitous, and so peripheral” to the scheme, Isaacs, supra at 1146, that it was error to submit these counts to the jury.
Ill
Little need be said about Count One, the charge of conspiracy to use the mails to *505defraud. Where proof of the mailings is insufficient to establish the substantive counts and the alleged conspiracy was to commit the same offenses as charged in those counts, then the insufficiency of the mailings carries over to the conspiracy charge. Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 393, 80 S.Ct. 1171, 4 L.Ed.2d 1277 (1960). Equally important is the fact that the record is completely bare of evidence that any of the defendants or their co-schemers ever contemplated, agreed or intended to use the mails to further the execution of their scheme to defraud the citizens of Illinois.
I conclude by depicting a scenario which I have little doubt approximates the facts of this prosecution. Federal officials, getting wind of a deal between the Illinois state legislators and the ready-mix cement industry, assign agents to investigate. In due course, immunity is promised to some of the involved legislators and company officials in return for their cooperation and testimony. Recording devices are placed on some of the immunized persons to obtain inculpating admissions from those who are the targets of the prosecution. Once the investigation is completed, consideration is then given to what federal offense, if any, has been committed. The mail fraud statute? The federal travel act? The investigation files are searched to find some mailings or evidence of interstate travel. The United States Attorney’s office sifts through the mailings in the file and then constructs a legal theory in order that they may be used to form the basis for a charge of mail fraud. One fortuitous trip, totally incidental and unforeseen, by an unindicted coschemer forms the basis of the two travel act counts. A conspiracy count is, of course, added. In this fashion, the mail fraud statute and the travel act are subverted to purposes for which they were never intended. No longer are the mailings and travel considered essential or an integral part of the scheme; they are seen and used as mere technicalities which are necessary to obtain federal jurisdiction. Naturally, the public is pleased, and rightfully so, that corrupt public officials have been brought to book. But what of the prosecutor’s responsibility to use the federal criminal laws only in a manner in which they were intended? Once the prosecutor determines that federal jurisdiction is lacking, his responsibility lies in cooperating with the state law enforcement officials and aiding the state in prosecuting the guilty. When he seeks convictions for crimes that are not within the federal jurisdiction, he acts irresponsibly and not in keeping with his high office. The court should not condone.
I would reverse.
Appendices to follow.
. This trend is also visible in prosecutions under the Hobbs Act, United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47, 54 (7th Cir. 1968) (Swygert, J., dissenting); United States v. Battaglia, 394 F.2d 304, 318 (7th Cir. 1968) (Swygert, J., dissenting); and conspiracy, United States v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698, 716 (7th Cir. 1966) (Swygert, J., dissenting).
. 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335 § 301, 17 Stat. 323. Although the statute has been amended on several occasions, these amendments have made only insignificant changes in wording; the provision has always prohibited schemes to defraud involving use of the mails “for execu*498ting such scheme[s].” See Note, Survey of the Law of Mail Fraud, 1975 U.Ill.L.F. 237, 239.
. In Cochran v. United States, 41 F.2d 193, 197 (8th Cir. 1930), the Eighth Circuit declared:
The use of the post office establishment in the execution of the alleged scheme to obtain money by false pretenses is the gist of the offense which the statute denounces, and not the scheme to defraud.
See also United States v. Anderson, 466 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Lynn, 461 F.2d 759, 762 (10th Cir. 1972); Milam v. United States, 322 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 911, 84 S.Ct. 1174, 12 L.Ed.2d 181 (1964); Rosenberg v. United States, 120 F.2d 935, 937 (10th Cir. 1941).
. Similarly, this court has held that neither the ultimate success of a fraudulent scheme nor the actual defrauding of a victim is crucial to a successful prosecution. United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 545 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976, 96 S.Ct. 1481, 47 L.Ed.2d 746 (1976). Again, this can be true only because the federal offense is the misuse of the mails and therefore the injury is complete when the defendant uses the mails.
. In Maze, the Supreme Court reviewed its prior mail fraud decisions and explained the differing results on the degree of connection between the mailings and the execution of the scheme. For example, in Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954), the conviction was affirmed because the mailing “played a significant part in enabling the defendant in that case to acquire dominion over the $35,000.” 414 U.S. at 401, 94 S.Ct. at 649. In contrast, the convictions in Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 80 S.Ct. 1171, 4 L.Ed.2d 1277 (1960) and Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 65 S.Ct. 148, 89 L.Ed. 88 (1944), were reversed because the mailings were “immaterial” to the consummation of the schemes. 414 U.S. at 400, 401, 94 S.Ct. 645. The defendant’s conviction was also reversed in Maze because the success of the scheme did not depend in any way on the mailings. Id. at 402, 94 S.Ct. 645.
. Congress could have drafted the mail fraud statute so as to require only that the mails in fact be used. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405, 94 S.Ct. 645, 38 L.Ed.2d 603 (1974). See also Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393, 36 S.Ct. 367, 60 L.Ed. 706 (1916). Or, using the commerce clause, Congress simply could have prohibited fraud as a class of activities affecting interstate commerce without any use of the mails. Cf. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971).
. The parties dispute whether the MVLC is required by law to send these notices or does so merely as a courtesy to interested persons. Resolution of the issue is irrelevant in light of United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875, 880 n.11 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837, 96 S.Ct. 65, 46 L.Ed.2d 56 (1975).
. Also present at the MVLC meetings were defendants Peter V. Pappas, Craig, Wille, and Chalden, and coschemer Lauwereins.
. MVLC met on the second Monday and, if necessary, the second Tuesday of every month.
. Staszcuk also is not inapposite as the majority contends. As in Staszcuk, “[t]he purpose of the notices was to provide an opportunity for affected persons to state objections to the proposed [legislative] changes.” 502 F.2d at 880. As in Staszcuk, parties did come as a result of the notices to state their objections to the bill *501(here, the State Police and the Department of Transportation). Therefore, as in Staszcuk, the purpose of the mailings conflicted with rather than promoted defendants’ scheme to defraud.
. For example, Wiggington supplied $1600 from fees collected for the use of a company’s scale. Arcquilla supplied $1020 from personal funds, Moeller contributed $8200 from personal funds, and Lester Crown supplied $8000 from his personal safe.
. The ID-MRCA bulletin also urged its members to write the Governor concerning H.B. 4177, legislation not subject to the bribery scheme. See Appendix F.
. That the illegal scheme was limited to passage of the law in the two houses is supported by the fact that the bribes were paid, though in lesser amounts, after the Governor vetoed the bill.
. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Government neither alleged nor proved that the object of the conspiracy was to influence unlawfully the Governor or his staff.
. Interestingly, the envelope mock-up is addressed to 18018 Arcadia Avenue. Count Twelve of the indictment charges a mailing to 18225 Burnham Avenue.
. Count Thirteen charged the defendants with Lauwereins’ trip to Indianapolis on February 29, 1972, and Count Fourteen charged them with his return trip to Chicago the next day.
. The Midwest Ready-Mix Concrete Association has both Illinois and Indiana divisions. The annual convention alternates between the two states.
. United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818, 97 S.Ct. 63, 50 L.Ed.2d 79 (1976), upon which the Government relies, is therefore distinguishable. In Peskin, it was essential that the defendant receive money to make the bribes. To obtain the money, the check had to clear the Detroit bank where it was drawn. Furthermore, the court in Peskin noted that the interstate scope of the unlawful activity was “clear.” Id. at 78.
The recent case of United States v. Burstein, 560 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1977), is also distinguishable. As in Peskin, the interstate clearance of the checks was “essential to the carrying on of the illegal activity.” Id. at 783.