dissenting.
As blameworthy as the conduct of the defendants may be, in my opinion it simply does not constitute the commission of an offense as defined by section 201(c)(1). I would therefore reverse.
On August 26, 1975 defendant Arroyo, a loan officer with the Small Business Administration, recommended approval of Fernandez’ application for an SBA approved loan. Arroyo’s supervisor concurred in that recommendation on the same day. The loan application was then processed through usual channels and the money eventually paid to Fernandez.
On August 27 Arroyo’s codefendant, Sanchez, talked to Fernandez and arranged for him to see Arroyo. Fernandez first met Arroyo on August 28, two days after Arroyo had recommended approval of the loan. Thus, Arroyo’s authority to take official action with regard to the loan application had been exercised and terminated before any attempt was made by either Sanchez or Arroyo to solicit a bribe.
Two sections of the statute which deal with bribery, sections 201(b) and (c), are parallel provisions which prohibit the request for and giving of bribes. Two other sections, (f) and (g), also parallel provisions, cover the giving and receipt of gratuities. It is most important to distinguish properly between the bribery and gratuity sections, a distinction made in the statute but not in the majority’s opinion. Although both types of activity are prohibited under the statute, bribery is clearly considered to be the more serious offense as evidenced by the difference in penalties.1
The bribery sections punish those who would substitute the wishes of an interested party for the “objective evaluation and unbiased judgment on the part of those who participate in the making of official decisions.” United States v. Labovitz, 251 F.2d 393, 394 (3d Cir. 1958). The purpose of these sections is therefore to prevent corruption of the decision-making process.
Section 201(b) may be violated even though the official was not corrupted by the offer, or the purpose of the bribe was unattainable,2 or even though there was actually no occasion to seek to influence an official’s conduct.3 In each case, however, the defendant must intend to influence the bribee. Kemler v. United States, 133 F.2d 235 (1st Cir. 1942). Similarly, a public official charged with violating section 201(c) must intend to corruptly solicit something of value in return for being influenced, that is, intend to permit himself to be influ*658enced. United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 195-96 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967, 86 S.Ct. 1272, 16 L.Ed.2d 308 (1966).
In the case at bar, Arroyo’s part in the decision-making process had already been completed at the time it was represented that a bribe might bring about a favorable decision. No evidence was introduced to show that Arroyo could in any way have altered or influenced the decision that had already been made. The matter was completely out of his hands. It therefore follows that he did not have the requisite intent necessary for a conviction under section 201(c).
In Woelfel v. United States, 237 F.2d 484, 488 (4th Cir. 1956), the Fourth Circuit held that where a federal government employee’s requests for a payment “was not made until after [the employee] had exhausted his power of decision or action on the question or matter before him, and was not made under any prior promise or understanding that a gratuity would be forthcoming,” the request did not constitute a violation of the bribery statute. I would follow the Fourth Circuit’s holding in the present case.
Both Arroyo and Sanchez misrepresented, implicitly if not explicitly, that the decision on the loan application was still pending, but that misrepresentation was made to Fernandez after the application was approved. I emphasize again that a bribery statute is designed to prevent official decisions made as a result of corrupt influence. Accordingly, when a public official represents to a prospective briber that a decision is still pending when in fact it has already been made, the misrepresentation takes on the character of fraudulent conduct, but it does not constitute solicitation of a bribe as defined by section 201(c)(1). The language of that section is plain and unambiguous. Its literal meaning ought not be expanded by interpretation as the majority has done, for it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a criminal statute must be strictly construed. United States v. Wilt-berger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95-96, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820).
Despite appearances, the defendants’ conduct was actually solicitation and acceptance of a gratuity for an “official. act performed,” a transgression of 18 U.S.C. § 201(g). See United States v. Brewster, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 506 F.2d 62 (1974). Such conduct does not constitute a violation of section 201(c)(1).
. One convicted under section 201(b) or (c), the bribery sections, “[s]hall be fined not more than $20,000 or three times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or both, and may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.”
One convicted under section 201(f) or (g), on the other hand, “[s]hall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.”
. See, e. g., United States v. Troop, 235 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1956).
. See, e. g., United States v. Labovitz, 251 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1958).