Opinion for the court filed by MacKIN-NON, Circuit Judge.
Dissenting opinion filed by SPOTTS-WOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge.
MacKINNON, Circuit Judge:On October 17, 1974 appellant Burton was charged with thirty-five counts of distributing a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).1 Seven counts were struck on the Government’s motion, and a jury trial commenced on the remaining twenty-eight counts on April 27, 1976. On May 10, the jury returned a verdict finding appellant guilty as charged on the twenty-eight counts.
On April 26, 1976, the date which was originally set for trial, Dovey Roundtree, one of two counsel retained by appellant, filed a motion to withdraw which was granted by the district court. At the same time, appellant moved for a thirty- to sixty-day continuance for the purpose of seeking counsel to replace Roundtree. The court denied this motion, and it is from this ruling that defendant appeals. The issue presented to us is whether the district court’s ruling deprived appellant of his right to choice of counsel thereby violating the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of “the Assistance of Counsel for [the accused’s] defence.”
I
The Sixth Amendment2 guarantees that a person brought to trial in any federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted.3 The importance of counsel’s function to the effective operation of our adversary system is unquestioned.4 An *489essential element of the Sixth Amendment’s protection of the right to the assistance of counsel is that a defendant must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to secure counsel of his own choosing. As the Supreme Court stated in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932), “[i]t is hardly necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.” 287 U.S. at 53, 53 S.Ct. at 582.5 An accused who is financially able to retain counsel must not be deprived of the opportunity to do so.6
Yet, the right to retain counsel of one’s own choice is not absolute.7 The right “cannot be insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct an orderly procedure in courts of justice, and deprive such courts of the exercise of their inherent powers to control the same.” 8 The public has a strong interest in the prompt, effective, and efficient administration of justice; the public’s interest in the dispensation of justice that is not unreasonably delayed has great force.
In this case, appellant challenges the denial of his motion for a continuance to replace Roundtree, one of his two retained attorneys. It is firmly established that the granting or refusal of a continuance is a matter within the discretion of the judge who hears the application, and is not subject to review absent a clear abuse.9 Yet when the continuance is sought to retain or replace counsel, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel is implicated.10 In such circumstances, the right to select counsel must be carefully balanced against the public’s interest in the orderly administration of justice.
Thus, the trial judge may not insist on such expeditiousness that counsel for the defendant lacks reasonable time to prepare for trial; stripping away the opportunity to prepare for trial is tantamount to denying altogether the assistance of counsel for the defense. On the other hand, the *490defendant cannot insist on an unnecessary delay or a delay of unreasonable proportions. The condition of most criminal dockets demands reasonably prompt disposition of cases; when cases are set far in advance for a day certain, an unreasonable delay in one case only serves to delay other cases, and this carries the potential for prejudice to the rights of other defendants. ■
Given these countervailing considerations, and recognizing that the court has the right to control its own docket to require that cases proceed in an orderly and timely fashion, the conclusion is inescapable that the court in exercise of a sound discretion may grant or deny motions for continuances. As stated by the Court in Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 849, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964),
The matter of a continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process even if the party fails to offer evidence or is compelled to defend without counsel. . . . Contrariwise, a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality. . . . There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.
376 U.S. at 589, 84 S.Ct. at 849.
We recognize that the right to choice of counsel devolves not only from the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment but also from the more stringent and overlapping standards of the Sixth Amendment.11 This, however, does not alter the fact that the determination of whether the defendant’s right to select his counsel was protected depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. Once a fair and reasonable initial opportunity to retain counsel has been provided, and adequate counsel obtained, the court, mindful of the accused’s interest in having counsel in whom he has confidence, is free to deny a continuance to obtain additional counsel if, upon evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, it reasonably concludes that the delay would be unreasonable in the context of the particular case.
What is a reasonable delay necessarily depends on all the surrounding facts and circumstances. Some of the factors to be considered in the balance include12: the length of the requested delay13; whether other continuances have been requested and granted14; the balanced convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court15; *491whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived16; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance 17; whether the defendant has other competent counsel prepared to try the case, including the consideration of whether the other counsel was retained as lead or associate counsel18; whether denying the continuance will result in identifiable prejudice to defendant's case, and if so, whether this prejudice is of a material or- substantial nature19; the complexity of the case20; and other relevant factors which may appear in the context of any particular case.
All of these factors are the appropriate subject of the trial court’s attention when a continuance is sought. How the balance operates to obtain a result must *492depend on the circumstances of the particular case.21 For example, a long delay and a great deal’of inconvenience may be tolerated if defendant’s only counsel is suddenly lost by some unforeseen circumstance in a very complex case. However, only a slight inconvenience or delay may be sufficient grounds for rejecting defendant’s request for a continuance to enable him to retain an additional counsel in a simple case where he has already retained three or four other attorneys.
The evaluation of appellant’s need for additional counsel, and the balance between the right to select counsel and the public’s interest in the orderly administration of justice must all be carefully and delicately weighed; but sitting as a court of review, we afford substantial discretion to the trial court in judging that balance, and we will not reverse absent a showing of a deprivation of the defendant’s right.
II
Upon consideration of the standard outline above with respect to the instant facts, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion, and did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Before engaging in this analysis, we set forth the background of this case, which is essential to a full understanding of the legal issues.22
Appellant is a physician, and has taught medicine and practiced in the District of Columbia since 1939. Appellant was initially charged in May, 1974, with nineteen counts of unlawful distribution of controlled substances. The essence of the charges was that appellant had in effect acted as a pusher in selling preludin and ritalin to numerous persons by writing prescriptions on mere requests without giving proper physical examinations or taking proper medical histories. When he was first indicted, he hired Allen Hutter as his sole legal counsel.23
Sometime thereafter, appellant retained an' additional counsel, Ms. Dovey Round-tree, at Hutter’s suggestion when appellant indicated he desired additional counsel.24 Although the evidence does not indicate the precise date when Roundtree was retained25 Roundtree was present when defendant was brought up for arraignment on October 23, 1974.26 It is fair to say that from the October 23, 1974 proceeding until Roundtree requested to withdraw from the case, Hutter acted as lead counsel. At the October 23 proceeding, Hutter made the entire presentation on appellant’s behalf.27 *493At the November 11, 1974 hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, Hutter and Roundtree were both present, but Hutter presented and argued defendant’s entire case.28 At the April 16, 1975 hearing on the Government’s motion to dismiss, only Hutter was present to argue defendant’s position.29 At the December 17, 1975 status call to set a trial date, both Hutter and Roundtree were present.30 Hutter made the first statement for the defense, and thereafter both attorneys participated in setting the date, as a time convenient to each defense attorney, the Government’s attorney, and the court was sought.31
The trial date was set for April 26, 1976. On April 23, Roundtree filed a motion “for leave to withdraw as co-counsel.”32 In that motion, she stated as reasons for seeking leave to withdraw:
That a definite and broad difference of opinion with respect to the prosecution of this case presently exist between her and the client which would make it impossible and do violence to her sworn duty as a member of the Bar of this Court.
That she has discussed the matter with the client and with the trial attorney, Mr. Hutter, and verily believes that her presence and participation in this matter would create a conflict such as might reasonably jeopardize the best interest of the client as he pursues a full trial on the issues herein.
R. 24. This pleading, prepared and signed by Roundtree, clearly refers to Hutter as the trial attorney.
The April 26 proceeding began with the district judge inquiring into Roundtree’s motion and the reasons which underlay it. Roundtree testified that when she first came into the case, she talked with Burton and Hutter, investigated on her own, and concluded that she had “a reasonable and justifiable basis within [her] own conscience mind and principles” to represent appellant.33 After the case was reinstated, Roundtree stated that she found “hard facts”34 which caused her to decide to withdraw.35 She explained her reasons as follows:
*494I have discussed it with Mr. Hutter; I have discussed it with the Doctor, what is the defense in this case. I just have to speak frankly . . . . I find that I am not only frustrated, but with twenty-four years at the bar, I have a total inaccurate and in violation of what I know to be, that I believe that Mr. Hut-ter and I are now working at cross purposes.
I do not believe from where I see that I have a defense.
I have talked to — at my home, I think it was a Wednesday night — at length with the doctor of my views in this case.
I think under the Cannons [sic] for me to have such view, for Mr. Hutter to have his view, we have the poor Dr. Burton somewhere in the middle. I don’t think there is a reconciliation of it.
[Roundtree then refers to a defense which had figured importantly in her decision to represent Burton.] I think that to this extent, perhaps I was misled; maybe I am naive, but in that posture, I do not think I would be either fair to Dr. Burton to be associate counsel; I couldn’t be associate counsel, and just sit at the table. That is not my role as a lawyer.
I am greatly disturbed about the posture of the case, and as I read the Cannons [sic] of Ethics and my professional responsibility, I am more and more persuaded, I have no alternative, I will go down the road in my thinking in my persuasion based on the things I have told this Court, and I think Mr. Hutter is going down quite a different road.
THE COURT: You could not be effective counsel for Dr. Burton under those circumstances; you don’t think he has a defense.
MISS ROUNDTREE: That is my view.
Tr., April 26, at 4-5 (emphasis added). Roundtree’s explanation refers to a disagreement between counsel for the defense. It is difficult to perceive why, if Roundtree was lead counsel, the disagreement between Hutter and Roundtree was even pertinent: if Roundtree was the lead counsel, then the views of the associate counsel, if different, would not be of severe concern. Burton was free to participate in the selection of a defense. Instead of choosing the defense proposed by Hutter, he could have chosen the defense offered by Roundtree. Burton had full power to rely on one counsel and to agree to the withdrawal of the other. Burton’s acquiescence in Roundtree’s departure and reliance upon Hutter for the presentation of the defense can hardly be viewed as a denial of defendant’s right to have the lead counsel he wanted. Indeed, Burton simply exercised his choice between alternative defenses proposed by his two counsel. Whatever definition we ascribe to “lead” counsel, it is apparent that Hutter was agreeable to advancing some defense that Burton agreed with and that Roundtree was not. Finally, Roundtree’s statement that it would be unfair “to be associate counsel” is not a conclusive indicator of anything: she might be referring either to the unfairness of becoming associate counsel after having been retained as lead counsel, or when she was antagonistic to promoting the defense that Burton desired, to the unfairness of remaining as associate counsel after having been retained in that capacity. Whatever characterization may be given to Hutter and Roundtree — whether they were co-equal, or whether one was lead counsel and the other subordinate — the fact is that Hutter was willing to present the defense that Burton wanted, and that Burton in the end received the representation that he desired. Hutter was hired first, was fully informed as to the case, was fully prepared, and was available to proceed with a defense that Roundtree was not *495willing to espouse. It also appears that Hutter conducted the trial after Round-tree’s withdrawal with the consent of the defendant in such a manner that has not evoked any claim of error on appeal.
After Roundtree’s statement, the court asked Hutter if he was ready to proceed. He responded:
Yes, Your Honor. It is not incumbent to find at this time. I don’t think there is any problem, any statements that the doctor might make now that would pose any problem. I do respect his relationship with Miss Roundtree. I think he could best respond to the Court.
Id., at 6 (emphasis added).36
Acting upon Hutter’s invitation, the court asked appellant to speak to the matter. Appellant stated:
[W]hen I was indicted in 1974, I hired Allen Hutter as lead counsel. After the metting [sic], I thought a skilled trial lawyer would be helpful and necessary if [sic] defending this case, especially one familiar with the ghetto community.
Mr. Hutter presented Dovey Roundtree to me. I was well please, [sic] and indeed, an excellent lawyer.
Id. Burton did not say he hired Roundtree as the lead counsel.
The statement that a “skilled trial lawyer would be helpful and necessary [in] defending this case” does not mean that the newly-retained attorney was expected to act as lead counsel, particularly if the defendant was already being served by a skilled trial attorney such as Hutter. Burton’s statement can be read no further than evidencing a belief that “two skilled attorneys are better than one,” and cannot be read as a statement that he intended the newly-retained attorney to act as the lead counsel.
Burton also explained his reasons for retaining Roundtree:
Although Mr. Hutter is a well qualified lawyer, I do not feel he is able to handle the case alone without the assistance of someone who has the skill as with Attorney Roundtree. I am behind the competence, experience and reputation of Attorney Roundtree. I do not want her to stay since she doesn’t want to create an atmosphere of inadequacy, but getting a seasoned trial lawyer to replace her is difficult. I have to secure a new lawyer who must of necessity become familiar with the case.
Id., at 7-8 (emphasis added). Here again, appellant indicates that Roundtree was retained to assist Hutter, not to take over the conduct of the trial. The statement that “she doesn’t want to create an atmosphere of inadequacy” is some indication that this skilled trial lawyer was not engaged by Burton to employ her full talents. Though Burton’s explanation contains references to obtaining a “seasoned trial lawyer,” it is quite sensible for Burton to desire the best lawyer obtainable, even though that lawyer might perform as associate counsel. That he considered Hutter needed assistance, as opposed to supervision, was again emphasized by Burton in further testimony:
From my observation at the beginning, I felt Mr. Hutter needed assistance. Since I relate to the black community, I spoke to him and he brought in Attorney Roundtree who is capable.
Now, I must confess I do not know of an experienced trial lawyer to assist Mr. Hutter in my trial. This would take some time to arrange, if allowed, and the new lawyer would have to acquaint himself with the case.
I, therefore, request Your Honor to grant an extension of time of thirty to sixty days before the case comes up for trial in order to assist and a judgment can be made.
Id., at 8 (emphasis added). To say that someone needs “assistance” is far different from saying someone needs replacement as lead counsel. Burton wanted an experienced, skilled, and seasoned trial lawyer to assist Hutter. At no point does Burton *496state that he intended Roundtree to conduct the trial.37
After the court made inquiries of Government counsel regarding the Government’s opposition to the granting of a continuance, the court made inquiries of Hutter. Hut-ter’s statement reaffirms Burton’s testimony:
[Appellant] did want a black attorney to assist for problems of relating to witnesses, relating to the jury, because of the nature of the community, and that was the primary object that he had in mind.
Id., at 12 (emphasis added). None of the factors to which Hutter alludes require that Roundtree have been hired as lead counsel. Most importantly, it appears that the court, which was very familiar with the case, believed that appellant simply wanted an additional attorney, not a new lead attorney:
In other words, Dr. Burton wants a black attorney — well, I don’t know.
[T]his is certainly a unique situation where the defendant states on the record in open Court that he wants an additional attorney because the additional attorney would happen to be black. It seems not to be very good. The jury shouldn’t consider on the color of the defendant whether he be pink, blue, green.
Id., at 12, 13 (emphasis added). Dr. Burton then explained why he wanted a black attorney: he stated that blacks relate better to blacks.38 The following dialogue ensued:
COURT: You want a black attorney to make a favorable impression.
BURTON: Just the converse with these people, the witnesses and all I called.
Your Honor, may I say this, I am a citizen of this country and you represent the government and whatevéryou [sic] say, I will abide by it really.
COURT: I believe this case will go forward, Dr. Burton.
BURTON: All right, sir.
COURT: You have, Miss Roundtree, my permission to withdraw. I grant your motion, Miss Roundtree.
Id., at 14.
In the April 26 proceeding, the court also inquired into the Government’s reasons for opposing the continuance. Government counsel indicated that the Government was prepared to go to trial, that it had assembled all the witnesses, that it would be a burden to reassemble them at a later date, and that the Government’s attorneys’ caseloads had been adjusted to accommodate the scheduling of this case.39 The trial lasted eight trial days,40 and the Government introduced eleven witnesses41 and 2300 signed prescriptions.42 Government counsel emphasized his prior contacts with Hutter:
Mr. Hutter should be prepared to go to trial. He has got a lot of the information. I gave him the grand jury testimo*497ny. We have been in contact in terms of what the facts are. He knows what we have.
Id., at 10 (emphasis added). This statement, as do the others made by the various declarants in the April 26 hearing, suggests that Hutter had been conducting the case all along and was intended to do so at trial.
To recapitulate, Burton, in all of his testimony, did not say that he hired Roundtree as lead counsel. Indeed, the plain reasonable interpretation to be given his testimony is that he wanted a skilled, black trial attorney to assist Hutter in the conduct of his defense. Even if Roundtree expected to conduct the trial, it was Burton who retained both counsel and who had the authority to specify who would conduct it.
The reasons given by Roundtree for wanting to withdraw were varied. Round-tree noted a disagreement as to the viability of any defense between herself and Hut-ter with Dr. Burton in the middle; but if Roundtree was lead counsel, what Hutter thought would not be controlling, as he would not be conducting the trial. She also indicated a conflict between herself and her client. We do not and need not speculate beyond the record into Roundtree’s beliefs, as the record reasonably supports the conclusion that Roundtree was not the lead counsel. In reaching this conclusion, it is particularly significant that Roundtree’s motion to withdraw refers to Hutter as the trial attorney.
For these reasons and others mentioned earlier, we conclude that the record does not support the conclusion that Roundtree was hired by Burton with the shared expectation that she would function as lead counsel. Instead, the record points to the conclusion that Roundtree was intended to assist Hutter in the conduct of the trial, and that Hutter would continue in the lead role he had performed throughout the pre-trial period. That Burton would want to retain a skilled black attorney to sit at counsel table, perhaps examine a few witnesses, and otherwise assist Hutter, is perfectly understandable and reasonable. But when the district court’s ruling is viewed against this background, it becomes apparent that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burton’s request for a continuance.
Ill
Although the record does not identify with specificity how the trial judge considered the various factors which determine whether the defendant was afforded his right to choose his own counsel, we are satisfied that the district court under these circumstances perceived the salient factors and evaluated them in a manner within the zone of his proper discretion.
It is true that no prior continuances had been requested or granted but Burton’s motion of October 23, 1974, to dismiss the indictment, had delayed the trial of the case until April 1976. That motion was based on this court’s decision in United States v. Moore, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 319, 505 F.2d 426 (1974), which held an indictment identical in theory to Burton’s to be invalid. However, our decision in Moore was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court, United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 96 S.Ct. 335, 46 L.Ed.2d 333 (1975). This held, in effect, that Burton’s indictment was also valid. Nothing in the record, however, suggests that appellant improperly contributed to any circumstance which caused Roundtree to request leave to withdraw from the case. Nor does the record suggest that the continuance was requested for the specific purpose of disrupting or undercutting the orderly administration of justice. Had that been the case, the district judge would have denied Roundtree’s request for leave to withdraw. It is a fact, however, that Hut-ter told Burton five days before the scheduled trial date that Roundtree was withdrawing. When he was so advised, he should have immediately started to obtain additional counsel if he considered that to be necessary. The record, however, does not indicate that any such attempt was made. Had he acted promptly it might not have been necessary for him to request the lengthy delay that the court found to be unreasonable under the circumstances.
*498No error in the actual conduct of the trial is claimed to exist, and no identifiable prejudice in the trial of the case resulted to defendant by virtue of the denial of the continuance. There is no suggestion that any possible defense was stifled or weakened because the continuance was not granted. The arguments advanced by the defense centered around attacks on the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses and some appeal to sympathy because of Burton’s age and his long practice as a doctor. Indeed, the record shows that flutter fulfilled his duty to his client as a diligent, conscientious advocate. The record is replete with examples of effective representation. This is not to say that a different strategy might have been somewhat more effective, or that some other counsel might have done a better job; however, there can be no doubt that Hutter’s representation of appellant far exceeded the standard of assistance that is constitutionally required.
The question here, however, is whether appellant was afforded his constitutional right to select his own counsel. In determining whether the right was violated, the existence of prejudice is only one of the factors to consider. The existence of prejudice to the case is not a prerequisite to a constitutional violation in this context.43 But in appraising this particular factor, the inability of appellant to prove prejudice to his defense, and the absence of prejudice apparent to us in the record suggests that the district court properly balanced the competing considerations.
It may be that having a black attorney present at the trial, as appellant planned, might have enabled appellant to relate better to the jury, the witnesses, or the court, as Burton expressed it. But appellant chose Hutter to conduct his defense as lead counsel, and this is precisely what he received. Had Roundtree been the lead trial attorney, appellant clearly would have had a stronger case for a continuance — but with her view that Burton did not have a defense,44 a guilty plea might more possibly have been the result.45 As it was, appellant had other competent counsel, fully familiar with the case and prepared and ready to try it, available to present his defense. Crucially, it was the counsel he had chosen as lead trial counsel. This is a significant and weighty factor, which the district court unquestionably took into account.46
The dissent argues that “circumstances beyond appellant’s control invalidated part of the right to choose his defense team and thus the trial court had no discretion to prevent appellant from regaining it.” Dissent at note 45. Thus, the dissent claims that defendant never was given a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice. Dissent at - of 189 U.S.App.D.C., at 500 of 584 F.2d. This argument is based on a quick shift from “de*499fense team" to “counsel” and they are not completely interchangeable. There are a variety of situations that can be imagined where defendant loses access to one of his chosen counsel by circumstances beyond his control. Yet in our view, the fact that circumstances beyond the defendant’s control prevented him from utilizing the services of part of his defense team does not, by itself, conclusively indicate that defendant was denied a fair opportunity to select adequate counsel. This is one important factor, and carries very great weight particularly if circumstances beyond defendant’s control deprive him of his only counsel. Suppose that a defendant retains three attorneys, and that all are prepared and qualified to try the case. Two days before trial, one of the attorneys is suddenly taken ill, and is unable to appear at trial. This factor is certainly beyond defendant’s control, but depending on the circumstances of the case, we are not prepared to say that denying a continuance until the third attorney’s health is restored is an abuse of discretion. See Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971). Or suppose that a defendant retains an attorney far in advance of trial, and the attorney’s obligations in other cases subsequently prevents scheduling of a reasonable trial date. This development is certainly beyond defendant’s control, but depending on the circumstances of the case, we are not prepared to say that denying a continuance until the attorney’s schedule is free is an abuse of discretion and violative of defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. See United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986, 98 S.Ct. 613, 54 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977). Defendants must be given an initial, fair and reasonable opportunity to select counsel. Burton received this opportunity, and enjoyed the services of both Hutter and Roundtree for nearly two years. When Roundtree was granted leave to withdraw, she considered the “Canons of Ethics” to which she was bound as a lawyer would not permit her to go forward with the defense that Burton and his counsel had agreed upon, see text at ---of 189 U.S.App.D.C., at 493-495 of 584 F.2d, supra. The circumstances surrounding that withdrawal, including whether Burton contributed to the withdrawal, were the proper subject of the trial court’s inquiry. The fact that Burton may not have contributed directly to the withdrawal does not, by itself, determine that Burton’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated. We do not believe that every time circumstances beyond the accused’s control result in the loss of one member of the defense team that it follows automatically that the defendant did not receive a fair and reasonable opportunity to select his own counsel.
The district court was in a good position to judge the inconvenience to the litigants, the witnesses, counsel, and the court from granting such a continuance. Any delay might result in some inconvenience, and this case was no exception to that rule.47 Given this, plus the crucial fact that appellant had competent counsel there whom he had retained to conduct the trial as lead counsel, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.48 In essence, appellant contends that a continu-*500anee should have' been granted to allow additional counsel to assist in a trial already adequately prepared by earlier-retained counsel. This is not a strong case for granting a continuance, and the district court did not abuse its discretion.49 To have delayed appellant’s trial further would have amounted to an unreasonable delay under these circumstances.
Since defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated, the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.
. Appellant was indicted on May 21, 1974 for 19 counts of unlawful distribution of controlled substances. The grand jury returned a second indictment containing 35 counts on October 11, 1974, and then a superseding 35-count indictment was returned on October 17, 1974. The Government dropped the first two indictments and appellant moved for dismissal of the third on October 23, 1974. On authority of this court’s holding in United States v. Moore, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 319, 505 F.2d 426 (1974), rev’d 423 U.S. 122, 96 S.Ct. 335, 46 L.Ed.2d 333 (1975), the district court granted the motion without prejudice (Original Record (hereafter “R.”) at 4), but on the Government’s appeal, the order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss was vacated, defendant’s motion was denied, and the case was held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s review of Moore (R. at 16). When the Court eventually reversed our decision in Moore, this case was set for trial.
. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const, amend. VI.
. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595 (1942); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978).
. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942).
. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439, 78 S.Ct. 1287, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448 (1958); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10, 75 S.Ct. 1, 5, 99 L.Ed. 4 (1954) (“[A] defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to employ and consult with counsel; otherwise, the right to be heard by counsel would be of little worth.”); Lee v. United States, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 272, 274, 235 F.2d 219, 221 (1956); Smith v. United States, 53 App.D.C. 53, 54-55, 288 F. 259, 260-61 (1923).
. United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 738, 739-40 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 988, 94 S.Ct. 2394, 40 L.Ed.2d 766 (1974).
. Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Vargas-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881, 887 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986, 98 S.Ct. 613, 54 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977); United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Santoro v. United States, 409 U.S. 1063, 93 S.Ct. 554, 34 L.Ed.2d 516 (1972); United States v. Hampton, 457 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 856, 93 S.Ct. 136, 34 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).
. Lee v. United States, supra, 98 U.S.App.D.C. at 274, 235 F.2d at 221; Smith v. United States, supra, 53 App.D.C. at 55, 288 F. at 261. Accord, Gandy v. Alabama, supra, 569 F.2d at 1323 and cases cited at n.8.
. Gilmore v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 344, 348, 273 F.2d 79, 83 (1959) (Burger, J.); Payton v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 222 F.2d 794 (1955). Accord, United States v. Pou-lack, supra, 556 F.2d at 86; United States v. Harrelson, 477 F.2d 383, 384 (5th Cir. 1973).
. The right of choice of counsel is related to the right to adequate time to prepare for trial. Counsel is not entitled to unlimited preparation time; instead, counsel is entitled to reasonable preparation time. Just as continuances to enable defendants to select counsel need not be granted where the orderly procedures of the court will be disrupted, continuances for more preparation time than necessary need not be granted. In turn, the question of reasonable preparation time is closely related to the issue of inadequate assistance of counsel: if preparation time is unreasonably short, counsel cannot competently represent his client, and may make negligent omissions or acts that deprive defendant of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel for his defense. While all of these rights are related, as they all are within the parameters of the Sixth Amendment’s right to the assistance of counsel, the right to choice of counsel is distinct from the right to adequate assistance of counsel. The fact that one is infringed does not indicate one way or the other whether the other is infringed. See dissent at n.106.
. See Scott v. United States, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 339, 340, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (1970); compare Gandy v. Alabama, supra, 569 F.2d at 1320-23.
. Other listings of factors, similar to ours in many respects, appear in Gandy v. Alabama, supra, 569 F.2d at 1324; Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238, 1240 (6th Cir. 1971).
. A motion for a continuance may not properly be denied on the sole ground that the time sought is longer than necessary to retain new counsel or to prepare for trial, see dissent at n.14, since unjustifiably long requests for continuances, if otherwise reasonable, can simply be granted for a shorter period of time. Yet, unjustifiably long requests may be indicative of some other defect in the request, such as a dilatory or purposeful intendment. See Lee v. United States, supra, 98 U.S.App.D.C. at 274, 235 F.2d at 221 (accused’s third retained lawyer was granted leave to withdraw on account of a conflict of interest; court appointed attorney previously discharged by defendant; court refused to continue trial over weekend to allow defendant to retain counsel of his choice: held, discretion was abused and defendant’s Sixth Amendment right violated).
. United States v. Brown, 495 F.2d 593, 600 (1st Cir. 1974); Giacalone v. Lucas, supra, 445 F.2d at 1243; Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1215 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946, 90 S.Ct. 964, 25 L.Ed.2d 127 (1970); Smith v. United States, supra, 53 App.D.C. at 54-55, 288 F. at 260-61.
. United States v. Mardian, 178 U.S.App.D.C. 207, 213-14, 546 F.2d 973, 979-80 (1976) (en banc); United States v. Brown, supra, 495 F.2d at 600; United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 738, 740 (4th Cir. 1973); Giacalone v. Lucas, supra, 445 F.2d at 1243; Marxuach v. United States, *491398 F.2d 548, 551 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982, 89 S.Ct. 454, 21 L.Ed.2d 443 (1968); Smith v. United States, supra, 53 App.D.C. at 55, 288 F. at 261.
. United States v. Oliver, 187 U.S.App.D.C. 230, 231, 571 F.2d 664, 665 (D.C.Cir.1978); United States v. Mardian, supra, 178 U.S.App.D.C. at 213-14, 546 F.2d at 979-80; United States v. Dilworth, 524 F.2d 470, 472 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Rodriguez Vallejo, 496 F.2d 960, 964-65 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Inman, supra, 483 F.2d at 740; United States v. Sexton, 473 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1973); Marxuach v. United States, supra, 398 F.2d at 551.
By this, we do not mean that the court may inquire, without more, into the defendant’s reasons for choosing a particular counsel. The defendant may choose a particular counsel for any reason that he deems important. However, one of the factors appropriate to testing whether a requested delay is reasonable is the good faith of the defendant; accordingly, a court must at times inquire into the reasons for the request for a continuance. Where defendant seeks to obtain an additional counsel or to substitute another counsel for his present one, the court must make certain inquiries into the reasons for the addition or change. This inquiry is appropriate only when a fair opportunity to retain counsel of choice has already been provided. Regardless of whether inquiry into the defendant’s reasons for adding or substituting counsel is relevant in any particular case, the appropriateness of the court’s decision to grant or deny a continuance may turn on other factors, mentioned in the text, which have more significance in the particular factual context. See dissent at text accompanying notes 34-41.
. United States v. Rodriguez Vallejo, supra, 496 F.2d at 965; Lee v. United States, supra, 98 U.S.App.D.C. at 274, 235 F.2d at 221; Neufield v. United States, 73 App.D.C. 174, 182, 118 F.2d 375, 383, cert. denied, 315 U.S. 798, 62 S.Ct. 580, 86 L.Ed. 1199 (1941).
. United States v. Mardian, supra, 178 U.S.App.D.C. at 213-14, 546 F.2d at 979-80; United States v. Bragan, 499 F.2d 1376, 1379-80 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, supra, 495 F.2d at 600; United States v. Harrelson, supra, 477 F.2d at 384; Giacalone v. Lucas, supra, 445 F.2d at 1243; United States v. Cozzi, 354 F.2d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 911, 86 S.Ct. 896, 15 L.Ed.2d 666 (1966).
. A showing of prejudice to the defendant’s case is not a prerequisite to the granting of a continuance. See United States v. Johnston, 318 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1963). However, if some prejudice is identifiable, that finding would lend weight toward granting the requested continuance. It should be noted, however, that other considerations in any particular case, such as the interest in orderly procedures or the interest in avoiding manipulation or subversion of the process, may countervail a showing of prejudice and thereby justify the denial of a request for continuance.
Judge Robinson has thoughtfully considered the applicability of the harmless-error doctrine articulated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) to this case. In my view, however, this discussion is in the main unnecessary. The Supreme Court has indicated that a Sixth Amendment violation, as it implicates a substantial right of a party, cannot be harmless, Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, and this proposition was forcefully affirmed in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978):
[T]his Court has concluded that the assistance of counsel is among those “constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.” Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. at 827.
Hence, if the trial judge denies a request for a continuance where it would have been fair and reasonable to have done so to enable the defendant to retain or substitute counsel, and thereby violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right, the violation is made out, and harmless error tests do not apply.
. United States ex rel. Davis v. McMann, 386 F.2d 611, 620 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 958, 88 S.Ct. 1049, 19 L.Ed.2d 1153 (1968); United States v. Mitchell, 354 F.2d 767, 769 (2d Cir. 1966).
. United States v. Poulack, supra, 556 F.2d at 86; United States v. Bragan, supra, 499 F.2d at 1378-79; Giacalone v. Lucas, supra, 445 F.2d at 1240. See Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d at 1323-24, 1328.
. In my view, the different view of the record between Judge Robinson and those expressed here explains in large part the different result reached by the two opinions.
. Tr., April 26, 1976, at 6 (testimony of Dr. Burton).
. Id.
. Dr. Burton did not identify the precise date that he retained Roundtree; his testimony indicates that it was sometime after Hutter was retained and sometime before April, 1976 (see, id., at 6-7). Roundtree testified that “I first came into this case before there was a dismissal and not too long before there was a dismissal, and for the record, sometime in early 1975,1 believe, it was.” (Id., at 2). This indicates that Roundtree was not acting as lead counsel at that time.
. Tr., Oct. 23, 1974, at 1. Burton was not arraigned at this proceeding (id., at 7).
. Id., at 1-7. On one occasion, Roundtree attempted to address the court, but Hutter quickly took over:
THE DEPUTY CLERK: Andrew F. Burton, in Criminal Action 596-74, you are charged with unlawful distribution of a controlled substance. How do you wish to plead?
MRS. ROUNDTREE: Your Honor, I was wondering—
MR. HUTTER: Your Honor, I was wondering as Mrs. Roundtree was wondering if in light of these motions, which the Government has, the pleas to this indictment could be held up until that motion has been ruled on as a preliminary matter. .
Id., at 3-4. The remainder of the discussion on this point was handled by Hutter, and Round-tree had nothing else to say at any point in this proceeding. While we decline to speculate from the record, and in no way rely on such observations as a basis for decision, the inference is present that the respective roles of *493Hutter and Roundtree were not completely clear.
. Tr., Nov. 11, 1974. Roundtree was silent throughout the entire proceeding.
. Tr., April 16, 1975, at 1.
. Tr., Dec. 17, 1975, at 1.
. Hutter was the first attorney to speak for the defense position (id, at 2). Both attorneys participated in the scheduling of the trial date (id, at 2-3). Hutter first requested January or February (id, at 3), but Roundtree was committed for the last two weeks in February. After the court excluded January and February due to its commitments, Roundtree suggested “March 20th or April” (id.). Hutter immediately interjected “Your Honor, if we are not going to do it in the first part of March, I would request the first part of April” (id). The trial started April 27, 1976.
Hutter announced the defense intention to file speedy trial motions (id, at 3 — 4). When the court asked how long the case would take, it was Roundtree who responded: “Two to three weeks, Your Honor. Under the Supreme Court decision, I think we have to bring on some substantial witnesses with respect to certain matters,” (id, at 4), whereupon the status call was concluded.
Both defense counsel participated in the December 17, 1975 proceeding; but it would not be apt to conclude from this part of the transcript, viewed in isolation, that one or the other was the lead counsel.
. R. at 24. Burton testified that he first received notice that Roundtree wanted to withdraw on April 21, a Wednesday, when Hutter called him. Unable to reach Roundtree by telephone, he sent her a telegram, requesting an appointment. Roundtree met appellant, according to his testimony, during the evening of April 22. He described the meeting:
At this time, she informed me she would like to withdraw from the case. I asked her why, but her reasons did not seem satisfactory to me. I asked her to continue in the role that she wished, but she refused.
Tr., April 26, 1976, at 7.
. Tr., April 26, 1976, at 2-3.
. Id., at 4.
. Roundtree’s full statement was as follows: When it was re-instated, we got back after the time with counsel as associate counsel, Dr. Burton began to do some research, some reading, and we obtained Mr. Spencer Price who is a private investigator, and we began to then get and develop what I gleened to be hard facts.
*494Id., at 4 (italics added). The italicized portion of the statement might be relevant to whether Roundtree or Hutter was lead counsel, but the statement is so cryptic as to be virtually meaningless.
Burton also stated:
After the case was reopened, [sic] There was a meeting in my office with Mr. Hutter and Miss Roundtree, at which time the case and the trial strategy was fully discussed and was reviewed [sic].
Id., at 7. This does not indicate who was intended to act as lead counsel.
. Hutter’s statement does not clarify one way or the other what relationship Roundtree bore to appellant.
. Burton stated that he did not want Round-tree to withdraw from the case, but he also said that he was not insisting that she remain. In other words, Burton acquiesced in Roundtree’s requested leave for withdrawal:
I do not want Miss Roundtree to drop out of the case. I am concerned with her continuing to represent me in view of the position she has taken within the last several days. Id., at 8. The court said to Roundtree:
Well, under the circumstances, I think Dr. Burton wouldn’t insist that you remain in the case.
Id., at 9. Burton then interjected:
No, sir, I wouldn’t insist for two reasons: first, she doesn’t want to be in;, secondly, I am a Christian, I don’t believe those who reject you for anybody to be forced into anything at such time.
Id. As we find no violation of appellant’s constitutional right to the assistance of counsel for his defense, we need not reach the question of whether appellant’s consent to proceed with Hutter as his counsel amounted to a waiver of his right to any additional counsel. It should be noted, however, that Burton was less than forceful in asserting his need or right to obtain additional counsel.
. Id., at 13.
. Id., at 9-10.
. After the initial hearing on April 26, 1976, the trial lasted through the following days: April 27, 28, and 29; and May 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10.
. See Tr., April 27, 1976, at 62; Tr., April 28, 1976, at 256; Tr., April 29, 1976, at 495; Tr., May 3, 1976, at 681.
. Tr., May 10, 1976, at 1385.
. See note 19 supra.
. Tr„ April 26, 1976, at 4-5.
. Id., at 6.
. The dissent would attach no significance to the fact that the remaining counsel was the lead counsel: “[I]f a [a defendant] becomes objectively or subjectively dissatisfied with one important member of his team, his entitlement to a continuance to secure a replacement normally is no different than if the member in question was his only counsel.” Dissent at-of 189 U.S.App.D.C., at 508 of 584 F.2d. When a defendant is initially afforded the opportunity to retain counsel, he may retain as many as he can afford (subject to the power of the court to limit the number that may participate in court). And a defendant may thereafter add as many attorneys as he desires, so long as he does not acquire counsel to disrupt the orderly process of justice. However, when on the eve of trial, a defendant seeks a continuance to add or substitute counsel which necessitates a rescheduling of the trial, many factors are relevant to whether the request for delay is reasonable. If the defendant has other competent counsel prepared to go to trial, then the court, when considering all the factors, need not tolerate as much inconvenience as in the case where defendant has no other counsel prepared to go to trial. This is not to say that defendant’s rights differ in one case or the other; this is only to say that the result of the balancing may differ when the circumstances are different. And it goes without saying that whether the remaining counsel is prepared to go to trial may be substantially affected by whether he was retained as lead or associate counsel.
. The dissent criticizes the lack of specific record evidence listing the inconvenience which would be encountered from granting the continuance (Dissent at---of 189 U.S.App.D.C., at 510 of 584 F.2d). The Government did refer to the “time to get all the witnesses together.” Tr., April 26, 1976, at 10. It would have been better for our review if the specific nature of the inconvenience had been set forth by the Government and/or sought out by the trial judge. Here, we do not rely on the amount of inconvenience enumerated in the record as the principal factor in the balance. Rather, this is one factor which lends weight toward affirming the district court, inasmuch as defendant did receive the service of his lead counsel.
. It is also stated in the dissent that the district court predicated its disposition on its disapproval of what it deemed to be. a “singular desire on appellant’s part to engage a black trial attorney as one of his counsel” (Dissent at - of 189 U.S.App.D.C., at 510 of 584 F.2d). In our view, the record does not bear out this characterization of Burton’s asserted position. The trial judge noted that, in his view, the defendant wanted “an additional attorney because the additional attorney would happen to be black” (Tr., April 26, 1976, at 13; emphasis added). As noted earlier, the reasons for re*500taining counsel are not subject to approval or disapproval by this court, and we do not see that the district judge denied the request for a continuance simply because he might have thought the defendant’s personal reasons for retaining a particular attorney were without merit. We think that the district court recognized that Hutter was the lead counsel and that defendant’s interest in having an additional attorney assist Hutter — regardless of who that additional attorney was — did not justify delaying the trial at that late date.
. The dissent contends that United States v. Mardian, 178 U.S.App.D.C. 207, 546 F.2d 973 (1976) (en banc) and Lee v. United States, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 272, 235 F.2d 219 (1956), read together, control this case. We disagree. The resolution of cases involving the denial of a request for a continuance depend on the particular circumstances. Mardian is distinguishable on several grounds. First, the counsel for defendant who remained after co-counsel was taken ill had not been personally retained by defendant (178 U.S.App.D.C. at 213, 546 F.2d at 979). Second, Mardian stated in court that he had taken special care in selecting the counsel who became sick, who was very definitely his lead counsel (id.). Third, even though the court recognized that defendant bore no responsibility for his lead counsel’s absence, the court noted two factors which made defendant’s motion unique — (a) joinder of Mardian with the other defendants was not supported by evidence as strong as that against the other defendants (178 U.S.App.D.C. at 214, 546 F.2d at 980); and (b) the Government did not oppose Mardian’s motion (id.). The court gave this last factor the highest importance, as it demonstrated that granting the motion would not have caused undue disruption. Lee is distinguishable on its facts as well. Defendant’s two retained counsel requested, with defendant’s consent, permission to withdraw from the case. Defendant advised the judge that he had obtained a third attorney who was ready for trial. Permission to withdraw was granted by the court. When the new attorney appeared before the trial judge, he announced that he was troubled about a possible conflict of interest. The court, after hearing some of the circumstances, granted permission to the new attorney to withdraw and appellant requested a short two day continuance over the weekend to obtain new counsel. The court refused this request and then directed one of the two attorneys who had been allowed to withdraw, to conduct the defense. It became clear at that time that defendant objected to either of the two prior attorneys representing him and that both prior counsel desired to comply with appellant’s position. The Court of Appeals stated that appellant bore no responsibility for being without counsel at the beginning of trial. Thus, under these circumstances, the defendant was denied a reasonable request to select counsel and was never represented by counsel of his own choosing. 98 U.S.App.D.C. at 274, 235 F.2d at 221. Lee is a far cry from the facts here. Thus, Mardian is distinguishable on several grounds, and Lee involved a situation where defendant was denied a fair opportunity to choose his own counsel after he discharged his original attorneys and had no one available to represent him who did not have a disqualifying conflict of interest. These two cases, read together, do not indicate how the balance of the various factors should be performed in a case where the circumstances are markedly different.