dissenting:
The majority decides that one prosecuted for an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1)1 cannot defend on the ground *982that the prior conviction for a felony rendering-his receipt or possession of a firearm a violation of law was obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Because I believe that § 1202(a) does not place on the defendant the burden of affirmatively seeking to vacate a conviction manifestly invalid because of the denial of counsel, I respectfully dissent.
I.
As this case comes to us, I do not understand, as the majority asserts, that defendant concedes the “facial” validity of his earlier conviction. He asserts that the record of that conviction shows that he was unrepresented by counsel and that the conviction is void on its face. The district court declined to consider the record of the prior conviction, ruling it immaterial. In arguing the correctness of the district court’s ruling, the government in effect concedes that for present purposes the conviction was obtained in violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. For purposes of this appeal, we must treat that as a fact.
The majority’s interpretation of § 1202(a) rests on the premise that Congress meant to punish the possession of a firearm by a person who has been convicted of a felony, even if that conviction was obtained in total disregard of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. I am reluctant to attribute to Congress such a cavalier attitude toward one of the “fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341, 83 S.Ct. 792, 794, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932)).2 Moreover, I find insubstantial support for the conclusion.
Section 1202 was introduced as a last-minute amendment on the floor of the Senate. It is therefore doubtful that Congress gave full consideration either way to the matter of the constitutional validity of the prior felony conviction.3 Even the opinion in United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65 (3 Cir. 1977), upon which the majority heavily relies, admits that “the applicable legislative record is somewhat limited in scope and does not speak directly to the precise issues raised in this case,” and that the legislative intent must be gleaned from “some clues” in the statutory history. Id. at 73.4
*983In any event, it is axiomatic that a statute should be read, if possible, to avoid a construction that would render it unconstitutional.5 See, e. g., United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973); United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70, 91 S.Ct. 1294, 28 L.Ed.2d 601 (1971). In my view, the majority’s construction of § 1202(a) runs afoul of that rule.
II.
I had thought that, as a matter of constitutional law, Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967), prohibited the very thing that was done here. Burgett held that the record of a prior conviction which showed on its face that the conviction was obtained in violation of the right to counsel was inadmissible in a prosecution under a Texas recidivist statute. “To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright [372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)] to be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense . . . is to erode the principle of that case.” Id. at 115, 88 S.Ct. at 262.6 Here, defendant’s receipt and possession of a firearm was illegal solely because he had been previously convicted of a felony. A necessary element of the crime was proof that he had been convicted of a felony and the government’s only proof was that of a conviction which had been obtained without counsel. The conclusion is inescapable that the prior offense supported the determination of guilt for the instant offense in violation of Burgett.
Our decision in United States v. Allen, 556 F.2d 720 (4 Cir. 1977), does not lead to a contrary conclusion. Allen concerned a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) which prohibits the making of a false statement in connection with the acquisition of a firearm. Allen had signed the prescribed form for obtaining a firearm stating that he had never been convicted of a felony. The statement was false, but Allen sought to show that the prior conviction was obtained in violation of his right to counsel. We held the validity of the prior conviction immaterial, distinguishing Burgett on the ground that under § 922(a)(6), unlike the Texas recidivist statute, the penalty is not for the prior conviction but rather for the untruthful statement concerning it.
III.
I do not read the majority opinion to deny the applicability of Burgett to § 1202(a) prosecutions; it is implicit from what it says that if Lewis had been successful in post-conviction attack on his earlier conviction, he could not have been convicted under § 1202(a). Rather, its holding is that even an invalid, uncounseled felony conviction is sufficient to bring an accused within the § 1202(a) prohibition on firearms possession, unless the defendant has successfully taken affirmative action to overturn the invalid conviction. To my mind, Burgett may not be so limited.
In the first place, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has seen no need to impose this requirement. In Burgett, the *984prior uncounseled conviction of the defendant was held inadmissible, even though the defendant had never sought postconviction relief to have his prior conviction overturned. Similarly, in Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 92 S.Ct. 1014, 31 L.Ed.2d 374 (1972), where the Supreme Court forbade the use of a prior uncounseled conviction for purposes of impeaching a defendant, the Court showed no concern over the fact that the defendant had not taken affirmative steps to have his prior conviction declared invalid. And in our own decision in Williams v. Coiner, 392 F.2d 210 (4 Cir. 1968), we held that a state court unconstitutionally considered a prior uncounseled conviction in sentencing a defendant under a habitual offender statute, even though the prior conviction had not been collaterally attacked.
The majority notes the concern expressed in the Graves case that allowing a defendant in a § 1202(a) prosecution to raise for the first time the validity of his prior felony conviction would lead to a wasteful “trial-within-a-trial.” In Graves, however, the defendant alleged that his prior felony conviction was invalid not because of a denial of counsel but rather because of failure to observe the complex due process requirements for transferring cases from juvenile courts, as announced in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). The Graves court noted the involved factfinding that would be necessary to determine the validity of the prior conviction and specifically contrasted this defense with the simple assertion that a prior conviction was invalid for a denial of counsel, as in Burgett. Thus, one of the grounds on which Graves explicitly distinguished Burgett was that “Burgett was bottomed on a manifest abrogation of the right to counsel — a constitutional guarantee not asserted here.” 554 F.2d at 80.7
In contrast to the complex attack on the prior conviction attempted by the defendant in Graves, Lewis asserts that it clearly appears on the face of the record of his prior conviction that he was not afforded counsel. Lewis’ assertion can be quickly and easily verified without the necessity of conducting an involved “trial-within-a-trial.” Indeed, every court of appeals which has addressed the issue has held that a defendant charged with possession or transportation of a firearm by a felon may defend against the charge by asserting for the first time that the prior felony conviction was invalid for denial of the right to counsel. See, e. g., United States v. Lufman, 457 F.2d 165, 168 n.3 (7 Cir. 1972); United States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654, 663-64 (9 Cir. 1970) (decided under former 15 U.S.C. § 902(e)).8 See also United States v. DuShane, 435 F.2d 187 (2 Cir. 1970).
*985IV.
In short, neither reason nor authority supports a rule that one previously convicted of a felony in violation of his Sixth Amendment right cannot assert the invalidity of that conviction as a defense to a prosecution under § 1202(a). Thus, I am persuaded that “since the defect in the pri- or conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right.” Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. at 115, 88 S.Ct. at 262. I would therefore reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial with directions to receive the record of the prior offense in order to determine whether the prior conviction was obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment. If it was, in my view defendant cannot be guilty of the crime charged.
. § 1202(a) Any person who—
(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony . . . and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce . . . *982any firearm shall be fined ... or imprisoned .
. “Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.” United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65, 82 n. 68 (3 Cir. 1977) (quoting Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Trials, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956)).
. “Title VII [which includes § 1202] was a last-minute Senate amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. The Amendment was hastily passed, with little discussion, no hearings, and no report.” United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 344, 92 S.Ct. 515, 520, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). The amendment, introduced by Senator Long, received a favorable but cautious reaction on the Senate floor, but suggestions for further study and modification were preempted by a unexpected call for a vote. Title VII received similarly scant attention in the House. See id. at 344 n. 11, 92 S.Ct. 515.
. The majority also seeks support for its statutory interpretation in United States v. Allen, 556 F.2d 720 (4 Cir. 1977), but that case dealt not with § 1202(a) but with 18 U.S.C. § 922, which prohibits the giving of a false statement in connection with the purchase of a firearm. Unlike § 922, § 1202(a) requires a conviction for a felony, not merely an indictment or a statement about prior criminal activity. Thus, the reasoning in Allen that mere probable cause to believe that a person has committed a felony, rather than a reliable conviction, is enough to restrict his ability to possess a firearm and to support a conviction is inapplicable to § 1202(a). While § 922 is a part of Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, § 1202(a) is part of Title VII of that Act. In another context, the Supreme Court has cautioned us that these titles must not be assumed to “dovetail neatly.” United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 344, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). See also United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65, 87 (3 Cir. 1977) (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, as I discuss below, the exact holding of Allen was that § 922(a)(6) penalized making false statements rather than being a felon. Broader and more general language in Allen is thus dictum.
. The opinion in United States v. Liles, 432 F.2d 18 (9 Cir. 1970), on which the majority heavily relies to support its statutory interpretation, gives no indication that it ever considered the implications of Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967). This omission is not surprising, since the prior conviction in Liles was asserted to be invalid on grounds of substantive state law, not considered in Burgett. Nor is it surprising that on four separate occasions, the Ninth Circuit, when faced with the problem of Burgett, has ruled that the constitutional invalidity of a prior felony conviction may be asserted as a defense to a charge of possession or transportation of a firearm by a felon. United States v. Pricepaul, 540 F.2d 417 (9 Cir. 1976); Pasterchik v. United States, 466 F.2d 1367 (9 Cir. 1972) (per curiam); McHenry v. California, 447 F.2d 470 (9 Cir. 1971); United States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654 (9 Cir. 1970).
. The Supreme Court has extended the rule of the inadmissibility of prior uncounseled convictions to sentencing, United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972), and to impeachment of a defendant who has testified, Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 92 S.Ct. 1014, 31 L.Ed.2d 374 (1972).
. The other cases cited by the majority to support its position are likewise inapposite, since the defendants in those cases sought to attack the validity of their prior convictions on grounds other than denial of the right to counsel. See Barker v. United States, 579 F.2d 1219 (10 Cir. 1978) (improper jury instructions at prior conviction; further, defendant had waived this defense by pleading guilty to firearms charge); United States v. Maggard, 573 F.2d 926 (6 Cir. 1978) (incompetent performance of counsel at prior conviction); United States v. Bryant, 448 F.Supp. 139 (D.S.C.1978) (prior conviction based on uninformed guilty plea).
. The government’s brief urges that these cases were wrongly decided and directs us instead to two cases in each of which the accused, after he was convicted of a firearms offense and then successfully obtained a court order invalidating the prior felony conviction, was granted relief from the firearms conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Dameron v. United States, 488 F.2d 724 (5 Cir. 1974); Pasterchik v. United States, 466 F.2d 1367 (9 Cir. 1972) (per curiam). By arguing that these two cases permit affirmance of Lewis’ § 1202(a) conviction, the government implicitly concedes that Lewis could at some future time collaterally attack his prior conviction and, if he was successful, could then obtain § 2255 relief from the instant conviction. Since the validity or invalidity of Lewis’ prior conviction is apparent from the face of the record and will not require a mini-trial, I think that this argument exalts procedure over substance. From the standpoint of judicial efficiency and economy, let alone the unfairness of subjecting Lewis to suffer the indignity of a federal firearms conviction when it is quite clear that he will be able to obtain subsequent § 2255 relief, I see no reason to require it. Certainly nothing in the Dameron or Pasterchik cases requires a defendant to go through this convoluted procedure.