with whom ALDISERT, Circuit Judge, joins, dissenting:
Following his arrest for possession of heroin with intent to distribute, appellant’s codefendant, Joe C. Munford, made a self-incriminatory statement to Agent Stephen Hopson. Subsequently, at the joint trial of Munford and appellant Donald E. Belle, the prosecuting attorney elicited from Hopson the following recitation of Munford’s remarks:
Mr. Munford stated that he had come from California and that he was going to deliver the heroin between 8 and 8:30 P.M. that evening of April 30th to a trash can located near the Krispy Kreme Donut Shop at Route 1 on Old Lincoln Highway.
He further stated that approximately two or three times in the past he had transported heroin into the same area and on two occasions had met with O’Neil Roberts.
N.T. 46, Second Day. Belle objected to the introduction of this testimony, urging that it constituted “the most incriminating piece of evidence in this case.” Id. at 49. He contended at trial, and asserts on appeal, that the introduction of Munford’s statement, even with an instruction directing the jury to consider it exclusively against Mun-ford, violates the Supreme Court’s mandate in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). This is so, Belle argues, because despite the instruction, the jury might have inferred from Munford’s admission that Roberts was generally involved in narcotics transactions and thus that Belle — who was arrested in Roberts’ company — was guilty as charged. Moreover, since the remaining circumstantial evidence linking Belle to an illicit narcotics arrangement was, at best, fragile, the use of this hearsay testimony, and the resulting violation of Belle’s Confrontation Clause rights under Bruton, were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Accordingly, Belle urges, his conviction should be reversed.
The majority rejects Belle’s position, holding that the introduction of Munford’s statement at the joint trial did not transgress appellant’s rights under Bruton. “The key to Bruton,” the majority intones, “was that the extrajudicial statement by the nontestifying codefendant was ‘powerfully incriminating’ of Bruton in that it named Bruton as an accomplice. It was in such a circumstance — where the challenged statement (and we emphasize, the statement only) directly implicated the complaining defendant Bruton — that the Supreme Court held that the co-defendant’s statement could not be admitted into evidence at a joint trial.” Opinion, supra at 493 (emphasis in the original). Because Munford’s testimony inculpated Belle “only insofar as other evidence may connect Belle to Munford and to O’Neil Roberts,” id. at 494, no Bruton violation was presented.
Unhappily, the majority reads Bruton as if it were construing the terms of a carefully drafted contract. At no point does it offer a theory of that case or refer, even casually, to the general purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Rather, it extracts from Bruton the phrase “powerfully incriminating,” and, citing to a litany of cases wrenched hopelessly out of context, concludes that Belle’s predicament is not covered. I do not find the words “powerfully incriminating” to be magically self-explanatory, and I cannot accept an elucidation of *502the Confrontation Clause so lacking in analytical exposition. I respectfully dissent.
I. BRUTON v. UNITED STATES AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
From the majority opinion alone, one might suppose that the 1968 decision in Bruton was the Supreme Court’s first and final word on the rights of criminal defendants under the Confrontation Clause.1 Of course, this is not the case. While courts have long struggled with the question of what substantive limitations, if any, are placed by the Confrontation Clause on the introduction of evidence, it was in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), that the Supreme Court began to delineate the precise relationship between the right of confrontation and the production of evidence at trial. Rejecting years of contrary precedent,2 the Pointer Court held that the Confrontation Clause is applicable to state criminal proceedings through the fourteenth amendment. In so ruling, it paved the way for a number of decisions scrutinizing the interplay between the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause.3
In Pointer petitioner and another defendant had robbed one Phillips. During a preliminary hearing at which the defendants were not represented by counsel, Phillips testified against both defendants. When the case was tried, however, Phillips had moved out of state. The prosecution therefore introduced, over petitioner’s unsuccessful objection, the transcript of the preliminary hearing. Petitioner was convicted, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Black set aside petitioner’s conviction. His opinion is noteworthy in that it suggests both the structure and the limitations of the right of confrontation. On the one hand, Black noted, the Confrontation Clause includes a right of cross-examination, a central purpose of which is to “expos[e] falsehood and bring . . . out the truth in the trial of a criminal case.” 380 U.S. at 404, 85 S.Ct. at 1068. Where, as in Pointer, the “statement offered against petitioner at his trial ha[s] not been taken at a time and under circumstances affording petitioner through counsel an adequate opportunity [for] cross-examin[ation] . ., its introduction ... in a criminal case against [the petitioner] amount[s] to denial of the privilege of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 407, 85 S.Ct. at 1070. The Confrontation Clause thus serves an instrumental, truth gathering function insofar as it limits substantively the kinds of evidence that may be introduced against an accused. In addition, Black intimated that the Clause protects intrinsic, “fundamental” values, essential to due process and wholly separate from the more instrumental concern for truth gathering. Id. at 404-05, 85 S.Ct. 1065. On the other hand, Black observed, the dictates of the Clause are not absolute; some evidence, technically hearsay in nature, may nevertheless be admitted. Within this latter category, Justice Black included dying declarations and former trial testimony of a deceased witness. Id. at 407, 85 S.Ct. 1065.
Pointer provided an initial outline of the content of defendants’ Confrontation Clause rights. It isolated both the intrinsic interests of due process and fairness4 and *503the important instrumental interest truth gathering as significant underpinnings of the right of confrontation. At the same time, it suggested that there are limitations on the reach of the Clause, and left open the possibility that the right of confrontation might in the future be found inapposite where the evidence in question satisfied certain yet unspecified indicia of reliability. Id. at 407, 85 S.Ct. 1065. But Pointer was merely a preliminary foray; in a companion case, Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965), the Court elaborated further its Pointer reflections. of
In Douglas two defendants were tried separately on charges of assault with intent to murder. After the first defendant, Loyd, was convicted, he was called to testify at the trial of the second. Because he planned to appeal his conviction, however, Loyd refused to answer any of the questions put to him. The prosecutor thereupon produced what purportedly was Loyd’s confession, which he read aloud, in the presence of the jury, in the guise of cross-examination. The confession incriminated petitioner, who was subsequently convicted.
In reversing Douglas’ conviction, Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, picked up where Justice Black in Pointer had left off. While Black had made clear that the Confrontation Clause places substantive limits on the introduction of hearsay, he had had no occasion to specify in detail the kinds of hearsay that would violate the mandate of the Clause. Justice Brennan turned to this issue directly.
The statements from the document as read by the Solicitor recited in considerable detail the circumstances leading to and surrounding the alleged crime; of crucial importance, they named the petitioner as the person who fired the shotgun blast which wounded the victim.
380 U.S. at 417, 85 S.Ct. at 1076. Justice Brennan thus identified two kinds of hearsay statements which may unlawfully prejudice a defendant: (1) those that provide testimony substantially linking the defendant to the crime (hereinafter referred to as “linkage” testimony), and (2) those that name or identify the defendant as a participant. That Justice Brennan regarded both kinds of remarks as potentially impermissible is again reflected later in his opinion:
In the circumstances of this case, petitioner’s inability to cross-examine Loyd as to the alleged confession plainly denied him the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause. Loyd’s alleged statement that the petitioner fired the shotgun constituted the only direct evidence that he had done so; coupled with the description of the circumstances surrounding the shooting, this formed a crucial link in the proof both of petitioner’s act and of the requisite intent to murder.
Id. at 419, 85 S.Ct. at 1077.
But Douglas does not simply identify two kinds of testimony — directly accusatory and linkage — as potential violations of the Confrontation Clause. In addition, the case relates those forms of hearsay to a deeper, harm-focused theory of the Confrontation Clause. Though he did not abandon the willingness expressed in Pointer to permit some hearsay testimony, Justice Brennan regarded as a violation of the Clause the introduction of all substantially harmful testimony as to which no cross-examination was available. Naturally, what might constitute substantially harmful testimony would depend on the facts of each case and, in particular, on the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecutor against a given defendant. Where the challenged evidence is essential to the prosecutor’s case, however, and thus particularly prejudicial to the defendant, Justice Brennan left no *504doubt that Confrontation Clause values would be implicated.
This case cannot be characterized as one where the prejudice in the denial of the right of cross-examination constituted a mere minor lapse. The alleged statements clearly bore on a fundamental part of the State’s case against petitioner. The circumstances are therefore such that “inferences from a witness’ refusal to answer added critical weight to the prosecution’s case in a form not subject to cross-examination, and thus unfairly prejudiced the defendant.”
Id. at 420, 85 S.Ct. at 1077 (quoting Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 187 (1963)) (emphasis supplied).
It is in the light of the analytical framework provided by Pointer and Douglas that Justice Brennan’s reference, three years later, to “powerfully incriminating” testimony in Bruton must be viewed. The majority construes that phrase to limit the protections of the Confrontation Clause solely to cases where the extrajudicial remark, by itself, accuses the defendant directly. But if Justice Brennan had intended to exclude linkage testimony from the protections of the Confrontation Clause, surely he would have chosen to restrict, or at least to distinguish, his holding in Douglas to the contrary. He did not. Indeed, he relied broadly on Douglas in reaching his decision, and in no respect intimated any change of heart. See 391 U.S. at 126-28, 88 S.Ct. 1620.
The majority goes awry by failing to consider the limited context in which Justice Brennan made reference to the “powerfully incriminating” testimony. In Bruton, unlike in Douglas and Pointer, the lower court had instructed the jury to consider the challenged hearsay only against the declarant. Thus, the Bruton Court considered whether such an instruction could effectively erase the inadmissible statement from the jurors’ minds. Reversing prior case law to the contrary,5 the Court held that where, as in Bruton, the “powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial,” id. at 135-36, 88 S.Ct. at 1628, the jury cannot be expected to ignore them in evaluating the case against the defendant. The Bruton Court thus acknowledged that hearsay statements which directly accuse, and thus devastatingly incriminate a defendant, cannot be erased by simple instructions to the jury. But Bruton did not hold that only such statements will receive scrutiny under the Confrontation Clause. Justice Brennan did not retreat an inch from his Douglas position on the prejudice arising from especially harmful linkage testimony.
Indeed, there are suggestions in Bruton which expressly affirm the harm-focused conception of Douglas. For example, Justice Brennan wrote, “there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Id. at 135, 88 S.Ct. at 1627 (emphasis supplied). Brennan thus identified two considerations — the risk of improper jury use of testimony, and the harm to the defendant — both of which must be considered in deciding Confrontation Clause cases.6 Either or both could conceivably trigger constitutional concerns. Justice Brennan referred to “powerfully incriminating” testimony simply to establish why a high risk factor was present under the Bruton facts.7 Id. at 135-36, 88 S.Ct. *5051620. As for harm, he left intact his earlier observation in Douglas that where the challenged statements are prejudicial, in that they “clearly bore on a fundamental part of the State’s ease against petitioner,”. 380 U.S. at 420, 85 S.Ct. at 1077 a confrontation right is violated. Plainly, linkage testimony is often of this sort, especially in cases built upon circumstantial evidence.8
The majority, in its studied effort to avoid “a far-reaching result,” Opinion, supra at 493, unduly constricts the meaning of Bruton. It woodenly extracts the phrase “powerfully incriminating,” intended by Justice Brennan simply to describe one kind of statement that could not be erased from the jurors’ minds, and concludes that only such hearsay statements are proscribed by the Confrontation Clause.9 But the Supreme Court’s analysis, as I have suggested, is more complex.10 At least as of 1968, the application of the Confrontation Clause, for purposes of regulating the introduction of hearsay evidence, required the consideration of a number of factors. These included the harm to the defendant, the possible ineffectiveness of curing instructions, and, to some extent, the inherent reliability of the evidence.11 The majority’s aversion to the required weighing of these multiple variables, and its adoption of a simplistic direct accusation test, cannot be squared with the Supreme Court’s direction.
II. THE RELIABILITY FACTOR AND POST-BRUTON DEVELOPMENTS
In the years following the Court’s initial decisions under the Confrontation Clause, a good deal of critical commentary emerged. Much of it focused on the growing perception that the Court was constitutionalizing the hearsay rule and its current exceptions.12 As a result, it was said, efforts to *506“liberalize” the law of evidence would be measurably chilled.13 In apparent reaction to this criticism, the Supreme Court decided two cases, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), and Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970), which complicate somewhat the multi-factored model which had evolved by 1968.
In California v. Green, the Court considered the conviction of John Green for the sale of marijuana to a minor, Melvin Porter. At Green’s trial, the prosecution called Porter to testify. Claiming to have been under the influence of LSD at the time of his alleged transaction with Green, Porter stated that he could not recall the underlying facts at issue. Thereupon, the prosecution successfully introduced, for substantive purposes, testimony which Porter had given at a preliminary hearing. The trial court also admitted into evidence statements which Porter had made while in police custody. These statements incriminated Green, and he subsequently was convicted. The California District Court of Appeal reversed, however, and the State Supreme Court affirmed, holding unconstitutional the California statute under which Porter’s statements were admitted.
The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment. Writing for the majority, Justice White held that, while the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules “are generally designed to protect similar values,” there is not a complete “congruence” between them. 399 U.S. at 155, 90 S.Ct. at 1933. “[MJerely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied.” Id. at 156, 90 S.Ct. at 1934. The “core” of the Confrontation Clause, Justice White reasoned, is the “literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial . . ..” Id. at 157, 90 S.Ct. at 1934. Because Porter was available for cross-examination at trial, and because his preliminary hearing testimony was contemporaneously subject to cross-examination, Justice White found no constitutional infirmity in its introduction against Green. He remanded the case, however, to permit the state court to determine whether the cross-examination of Porter at the trial, during which time the witness flatly denied remembering the events in question, was sufficient to establish the reliability of Porter’s statements to the police.
In isolating the opportunity for cross-examination — either at trial or at a preliminary hearing — as an adequate vindication of Confrontation Clause rights, Green establishes reliability as a prominent factor in the Confrontation Clause analysis. Justice White relied heavily on reliability and on the truth gathering function of confrontation in concluding that meaningful cross-examination at some point is sufficient. See 399 U.S. at 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930. He distinguished Pointer, Douglas and Bruton on the ground that the declarants in those cases were not available for cross-examination. Id. at 162-63, 90 S.Ct. 1930. He suggested, moreover, that even if a declarant is unavailable at trial, his statement may still be admitted if it was subject to cross-examination at the time it was made. Significantly, however, Justice White did not suggest that external indicia of reliability, in the absence of some opportunity for searching cross-examination, will also satisfy the truth gathering function of the Confrontation Clause in all cases. Id. at 161-62, 90 S.Ct. 1930.14
In Dutton v. Evans, however, the Court took that next step. Defendant Evans had *507been convicted of murder. At his trial, an accomplice testified against him, but because Georgia law required corroboration of the testimony of alleged accomplices, some nineteen other witnesses were called. One of these witnesses, Shaw, testified that a third culprit, Williams, had told him while they were both in prison that “If it hadn’t been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn’t be in this now.” Williams was not called to testify, and his remarks were admitted under a Georgia exception to the hearsay rule permitting the introduction of hearsay statements made during the “concealment” stage of the conspiracy. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s grant of a writ of habeas corpus, and remanded for consideration of other issues raised in Evans’ motion. There was no opinion of the Court.15
Writing for a plurality, Justice Stewart reiterated that the Confrontation Clause does not forbid all hearsay evidence. 400 U.S. at 82, 86, 91 S.Ct. 210, 218. Distinguishing Douglas and Bruton, he observed that Dutton did not involve “crucial” or “devastating” evidence. Id. at 87, 91 S.Ct. 210, 219. Nor did the ease involve “a confession made in the coercive atmosphere of official interrogation . . ” Id. Moreover, there was no joint trial, a context within which cross-examination was said to be particularly important. Id. at 86, 87, 91 S.Ct. 210. Furthermore, he added, the hearsay testimony “was of peripheral significance at most . . . .’’Id. at 87, 90 S.Ct. at 219.
Besides these distinguishing features, Justice Stewart viewed the challenged evidence as having sufficient “indicia of reliability” to obviate the need specifically to confront the declarant. Id. at 89, 91 S.Ct. 219. Williams’ statement, he noted, was made under circumstances which would not give him a reason to misrepresent Evans’ involvement. Id. Moreover, Williams plainly knew whether Evans was involved; and the spontaneity of his remark, together with its adverseness to Williams’ penal interest, rendered “wholly unreal” the possibility “that cross-examination could conceivably have shown the jury that the statement, though made, might have been unreliable. . . . ” Id.
For purposes of Belle’s Confrontation Clause claim, Dutton identifies at least two critically important factors: (1) was the testimony sufficiently reliable to obviate the need for specific confrontation?16 and (2) was the testimony “crucial” or “devastating”? 17 Of these factors, the first is in some respects novel; while Green had held that cross-examination at some point satisfies the reliability concerns of the Sixth Amendment, Dutton was the first time since Pointer that an unexamined statement was found so intrinsically reliable as to pass constitutional muster. The second factor, however, — the “crucialness” of the statement — had a long history, tracing back at least to the reference in Douglas to the “crucial link in the proof” against the defendant.18 389 U.S. at 419, 85 S.Ct. 1974. Thus, Dutton, to the extent that Justice Stewart spoke for the Court, refined, rather *508than displaced, prior Supreme Court decisions under the Confrontation Clause.
The inquiry which courts face when hearsay evidence is challenged on confrontation grounds is not straightforward. The decisional law, reflecting as it does the intricacies that inevitably arise in given cases, does not constitute a tidy package susceptible to tight, doctrinal elucidation. Regardless of the majority’s desire for a simplistic solution, the task of the lower courts is not to wish away these complexities, but rather to acknowledge them, elaborate them, and apply them as specific facts require. The Supreme Court has set forth the relevant factors: to the extent that the challenged statement directly accuses the defendant, see Bruton, supra; supplies substantial linkage evidence, see Douglas, supra; is particularly significant in the prosecution’s case, see Douglas, supra; Dutton, supra; creates a risk that the jury will improperly use it against the defendant, see Bruton, supra; was never subject to any cross-examination, see Green, supra; was offered in a potentially coercive setting, see Bruton, supra; Dutton, supra; and is neither so merely cumulative nor so plainly reliable that cross-examination would be superfluous, see Dutton, supra, a Confrontation Clause violation occurs.19 The majority, perhaps wary of considering so complicated an equation, sidesteps the problem by seizing on a single variable in the calculus. While sympathetic with its plight, I cannot endorse its evasion.
III. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE TO BELLE’S CONTENTIONS
Because the majority is content to focus simply on Munford’s failure to accuse Belle directly in his statement to the police, little if any consideration is paid to the other factors relevant to Belle’s confrontation right. When these factors are surveyed, however, there can be no question that Belle has suffered a substantial sixth amendment violation.
First, the challenged statement, though obviously linkage testimony, was certainly “crucial” or “devastating.” Munford’s claim that he had twice before engaged in narcotics dealings with Roberts was the only evidence that seriously cast doubt on the legitimacy of Roberts’ appearance on the scene. It was, in addition, the only plainly inculpating evidence against Belle. To be sure, the prosecution attempted to implicate Roberts by drawing attention to the $1300 found on Roberts’ person on the evening of Belle’s arrest. But there is evidence in the record suggesting the equally plausible possibility that these funds were simply the proceeds from Roberts’ restaurant business. N.T. 73, Second Day. The prosecutor further contended that Belle’s guilt is otherwise established by his implausible explanation, after his arrest, for being in Roberts’ company. N.T. 144-45, Second Day. But without any admissible, concrete evidence that there was any reason why he should not be, this explanation, such as it was, is hardly substantive proof of Belle’s participation in the crime.
Second, the risk was substantial that the jury would improperly use the hearsay evidence against Belle. Munford’s statement was testified to by a government agent, a factor which had convinced Justice Brennan that Bruton presented an even stronger ex*509ample of prejudice than Douglas, where the evidence was introduced in the face of a witness’ fifth amendment claim. See 391 U.S. at 127, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Moreover, the fact that the statement was seemingly against Munford’s penal interest, though not providing a strong reason in this instance to find the statement reliable,20 would nonetheless tend to give it an artificially high salience in the jurors' minds. Finally, the great significance of the evidence in the prosecution’s case, noted above, would also increase the risk of its being used against Belle despite the trial court’s cautionary instructions.
Third, the Munford statement was never subjected to cross-examination. It was not offered at a preliminary hearing, nor did the declarant testify at trial. Cross-examining agent Hopson would at best reveal that the statement was made. It would reveal nothing about its truth or Munford’s motivation for making it.
Fourth, the statement was made in police custody. As noted above, the Dutton Court cited the absence of police custody as a basis for distinguishing Bruton. The reliability of evidence offered while the declarant is in police custody must inevitably be viewed with some measure of suspicion.21
■ Finally, the challenged evidence was neither so cumulative nor so reliable that cross-examination would have been superfluous. The Munford statement was vital to the prosecution’s case against Belle. It was not cumulative. Neither was its reliability so untarnished that effective cross-examination would have been “wholly unreal.” Dutton, supra, at 89, 91 S.Ct. 210. That Munford gave his statement in police custody, at a time when he had a distinct interest in cooperating — having been caught so plainly “redhanded” — is surely reason to question his reliability. Moreover, his statement named another individual, O’Neil Roberts, as a joint venturer in his narcotics exploits. The majority apparently agrees that the reliability of a declarant’s statement will depend, in part, on whether it reflects an attempt to shift blame to “an accomplice.” Opinion, supra at 495 n.12. It asserts, however, that “Munford’s statements in no way shift blame to Belle or to anyone else, and there is consequently no reason to suspect their reliability.” Id. This is flatly mistaken. The inculpation of Roberts is self-evident.
The combination of these considerations persuades me that Belle was denied his Confrontation Clause rights. Yet the majority suggests that this conclusion is foreclosed by various circuit court cases which have, in one fashion or another, wrestled with the doctrines announced in Bruton. As an initial matter, I note my reluctance to engage in the search for a “case in point” as a substitute for reasoned analysis, particularly in an area where the decisions are, and must be, so inevitably ad hoc.22 Moreover, virtually none of the cases cited by the majority attempts to account for the wide-ranging concerns which the Supreme Court has articulated in its Confrontation Clause decisions. Nonetheless, the majority also cites no cases that undermine the approach I have endorsed.
Thus, for example, in United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074, 96 S.Ct. 858, 47 L.Ed.2d 84 (1976), a case upon which the majority prominently relies, the court rejected a Confrontation Clause challenge to linkage testimony. It expressly noted, however, that the remaining unchallenged evidence “amply established Wingate’s guilt. . . ..” 520 F.2d at 314. Where evidence is plainly cumulative in nature, I agree that a Confrontation Clause violation may not have occurred.
*510The majority also cites United States ex rel. Nelson v. Follette, 430 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 917, 91 S.Ct. 899, 27 L.Ed.2d 818 (1971). Yet the Nelson case is a good deal more complex than the majority acknowledges. The Second Circuit in Nelson considered Confrontation Clause challenges to two different statements. In rejecting Nelson’s objection to the codefendant’s first statement, the court noted that there was extrinsic evidence which would render less likely a jury’s inference that the person referred to in the codefendant’s statement was in fact defendant Nelson. 430 F.2d at 1057. The court seemed to recognize, if implicitly, that codefendant testimony which is strongly linked by other testimony to the defendant can violate the Confrontation Clause. As to the codefendant’s second statement, the court again noted that there was ambiguous evidence on the record which would require the jury to make “a substantial inference [in order] to implicate Nelson in the crime ..” Id. at 1058. There are no such ambiguities in Belle’s case. Next, the Nelson court reached what I regard as the heart of the matter. Noting that the “circumstances to which the rule of Bruton was directed” are those in which “ ‘the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is . great,’ ” id. (quoting 391 U.S. at 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620 at 1627), the court elicited two reasons why those circumstances were not presented. First, there was so much other evidence against the defendant in Nelson that the codefendant testimony could not be deemed a vital part of the prosecution’s case. Id. at 1059. Second, the eodefendant’s testimony in Nelson was extraordinarily self-serving and exculpatory. Id. at 1059. These two factors convinced the court that there was little risk that the jury would use the codefendant testimony against defendant Nelson. Both factors square neatly with the analysis I have suggested.
Finally, the majority cites the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Mulligan, 488 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 930, 94 S.Ct. 2640, 41 L.Ed.2d 233 (1974). It is true that the Mulligan court required that a challenged statement “directly implicate a co-defendant” before a Bruton violation will be recognized. 488 F.2d at 737. But, in so ruling, the court properly focused on the danger that the jury would improperly use codefendant evidence against the defendant. Id. Given the already extensive evidence against the defendant apart from the codefendants’ hearsay remarks, see, e. g., id. at 734-35, 736-37, it is hardly surprising that the court rejected defendant’s Confrontation Clause contention.23
*511I find more compelling the mode of analysis used by Judge Winter in United States v. Leonard, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 494 F.2d 955 (1974). There, appellants objected to the introduction of two hearsay statements of a codefendant, the first of which constituted linkage testimony, 161 U.S.App.D.C. at 49, 494 F.2d at 968 n.19, and the second of which directly implicated the appellants, id. In rejecting appellants’ Confrontation Clause contentions, Judge Winter considered the multiple factors emerging from the Supreme Court cases, id. at 969-70, 161 U.S.App.D.C. at 50-51. Ultimately, he was persuaded that the challenged statements lacked sufficient reliability, as well as importance in the government’s proof, to constitute a constitutional violation. Id. at 970, 161 U.S.App.D.C. at 51. Nonetheless, he acknowledged that both statements — including the linkage evidence — “would raise a serious Confrontation Clause issue” were the distinguishing factors not present. Id.24
IV. CONCLUSION
This is a case in which the prosecution’s evidence against one particular defendant was wholly circumstantial in nature. More critically, the only solid evidence on one link in that circumstantial chain consisted of an extrajudicial statement by a codefendant. Not only is there “a reasonable possibility that the . . . evidence contributed to the conviction,” Schneble v. Florida, supra, 405 U.S. at 432, 92 S.Ct. at 1060, but there is, in my judgment, no possibility that it did not. Such an error, and error it surely was, can thus in no sense be deemed harmless. The majority does not otherwise contend. Instead, it eludes the difficulties of the ease at the constitutional threshold.25 It extracts a single phrase — “powerfully incriminating” — and expects that to do the work of many years of Supreme Court case law. Its holding, confining the Confrontation Clause to direct accusations and placing circumstantial evidence outside the ambit of the Clause, cannot be reconciled with that case law. A harmless error analysis, while unjustified on this record, would, since it would have fewer future consequences, be less offensive. Instead, the majority has chosen to give the Confrontation Clause the *512narrowest possible reading it could devise, and thus to maximize the government’s opportunity for exposing defendants to the risk that juries will use devastating hearsay against them. I would grant a new trial.
. The Confrontation Clause in the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . ..”
. See, e. g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 97 L.Ed. 1522 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 264, 24 S.Ct. 650, 48 L.Ed. 965 (1904), overruled, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). See also Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 Yale L.J. 1434, 1434 (1966).
. See infra at 502-508.
. The intrinsic fairness interests served by the Confrontation Clause doubtlessly trace historically to the procedural abuses common during the colonial era. See Baker, The Right to Confrontation, The Hearsay Rules, and Due Process — A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 Conn.L. Rev. 529, 532 & n. 16 (1974); Griswold, The *503Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U.Pa.L.Rev. 711, 712 (1971). Trial by affidavit and contentions by faceless witnesses particularly underlay the Framers’ concerns. Many of these abuses were epitomized in the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh; indeed, several commentators trace the Confrontation Clause to the common law reaction against the abuses in the Raleigh trial. See F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment 104 — 05 (1951); 1 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 333-36 (1883).
. Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278 (1957).
. See The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 Harv. L.Rev. 63, 234 (1968).
. Of course, Justice Brennan did not suggest that the risk that juries would improperly consider inadmissible testimony was solely the product of its “powerfully incriminating” character. Even if certain evidence does not, by itself, incriminate a defendant, but simply stands out as a substantial link in the prosecutor’s chain of evidence, a jury may still be unable to avoid using it against the defendant. Thus, the risk of improper jury use of hearsay evidence, which is truly the “key to Bruton,’’ is a risk that is posed both by inherently accusa*505tory evidence and by evidence which significantly links a defendant to a crime.
. Just as improper jury consideration may result both from inherently accusatory evidence and from substantial linkage testimony, so too can both kinds of evidence produce devastating harm to the defendant. Thus, neither of the two principal considerations elicited by the Bruton Court for deciding whether a Confrontation Clause violation is stated — risk and harm — eliminates the Douglas Court’s inclusion of linkage testimony within the umbrella protections of the Sixth Amendment.
. Even if Justice Brennan’s reference to “powerfully incriminating” testimony were intended to limit the protections of the Confrontation Clause, instead of simply describing one circumstance when the risk of improper jury consideration is high, it would not follow that to be “powerfully incriminating” the evidence would by itself have to directly accuse the defendant. Certainly Justice Brennan’s description of the impermissible evidence in Douglas suggests that he was aware of the many ways in which evidence may disadvantage a defendant. See 380 U.S. at 417, 419, 85 S.Ct. 1074. Linkage testimony, no less than inherently accusatory testimony, may be “powerfully incriminating” in a given case. Other than its arid exegesis of Bruton, the majority has adduced no policy, principle, or purpose served by its narrow construction of Justice Brennan’s language.
. That Justice Brennan did not intend to limit the protections of the Confrontation Clause merely to inherently accusatory statements is underscored by Justice White’s dissent. Arguing that the majority's rule would be difficult to apply, Justice White elaborated some of the likely implications of the Bruton holding.
I would suppose that it will be necessary to exclude all extrajudicial confessions unless all portions of them which implicate defendants other than the declarant are effectively deleted. Effective deletion will probably require not only omission of all direct and indirect inculpations of codefendants but also of any statement that could be employed against those defendants once their identity is otherwise established.
391 U.S. at 143, 88 S.Ct. at 1632 (White, J„ dissenting). Obviously, Justice White read Bruton, as I do, to "cover linkage testimony.
. The reliability factor, cited by the majority, Opinion, supra at 495 n. 12, was only casually discussed by the Bruton Court, see 391 U.S. at 138, 88 S.Ct. 1620, and indeed was criticized as a basis for decisionmaking under the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 136 n. 12, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Since Bruton, this factor has grown in importance, see infra at 505- -508. 1 take account of this factor below, see infra at 508, in elaborating the range of considerations relevant to judicial decisions under the Confrontation Clause in the years following Bruton.
. See, e. g., Note, supra note 2, at 1434, 1436 (cited with approval in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 n. 8, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)); The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, supra note 6, at 236 (cited with approval in California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 156 n. 8, 90 S.Ct. 1930). *506See also Baker, supra note 4, at 529-31; Gris-wold, supra note 4, at 717-18. But see Note, Confrontation, Cross-Examination, and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 56 Geo.L.J. 939, 940-41 (1968).
. Among the commentators urging that the exceptions to the hearsay rule be broadened were; 5 Wigmore on Evidence § 1427 (3d ed. 1940); Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, rule 8-03 (preliminary draft) (Advisory Committee’s Note), in 46 F.R.D. 161, 350 (1969).
. But see Western, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 567, 599 (1978).
. Justice Stewart wrote an opinion in which the Chief Justice and Justices White and Black-mun joined. Curiously, Justice Blackmun, with whom the Chief Justice joined, issued a concurring opinion contending that Shaw’s testimony was so incredible that no reasonable jury could have credited it. This argument, while equally addressed to the lack of any need for cross-examination by Evans, is at odds with the thrust of the plurality opinion. See infra at 507 ■ 508. See also Note, The Burger Court and the Confrontation Clause: A Return to the Fair Trial Rule, 7 J.Mar.J. of Prac. and Proc. 136, 153 (1973). Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment because of his view that the Confrontation Clause does not govern the admissibility of evidence but only the proper procedures at trial.
. See The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 3, 192 (1971).
. See Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 Harv. L.Rev. 1378, 1380 n.11 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 16, at 192.
. A number of commentators agree that inquiries under the Confrontation Clause must focus on the importance of the challenged evidence to the prosecution’s case, and thus on the harm to the defendant from the lack of cross-examination. See, e. g., Natali, Green, Dutton, and Chambers: Three Cases in Search of a Theory, 7 Rut.-Cam.L.J. 43, 63, 74 (1975).
. As recently as 1972, the Supreme Court suggested the possibility that linkage testimony may, in a particular case, violate the Confrontation Clause. See the decisions in Schneble v. Florida, 392 U.S. 298, 88 S.Ct. 2067, 20 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1968), 405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972). Petitioner in Schneble was convicted of murder after a trial in which a statement by his nontestifying codefendant was introduced. The statement located petitioner in the car in which the murder had occurred and in such a position as to make him the likelier of the two defendants to have strangled the deceased. Despite the fact that this statement did not, in and of itself, accuse the petitioner, the Supreme Court remanded the case in light of Bruton, 392 U.S. 298, 88 S.Ct. 2067, 20 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1968). When the case came up to the Court a second time, the majority acknowledged that a Bruton error may well have been stated, 405 U.S. at 428, 92 S.Ct. 1056; but it held that any such error was harmless in this instance since the other evidence against the petitioner was “overwhelming,” and the challenged evidence was essentially corroborative. Id. at 431, 92 S.Ct. 1056.
. See infra at 509.
. See Davenport, supra note 17, at 1395-96 (arguing that a declaration ostensibly against the declarant’s penal interest but uttered under conditions of possible duress should be inadmissible).
. Cf. Davenport, id. at 1381 (referring to the “case-by-case factual redeterminations of reliability” required by Green and Dutton); Note, supra note 15, at 161, 166.
. The majority marshals four Third Circuit cases in support of its restrictive reading of the Confrontation Clause. None of them does the slightest damage to the analysis I have suggested. In United States v. Panepinto, 430 F.2d 613 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949, 91 S.Ct. 258, 27 L.Ed.2d 256 (1970), appellant Baglino, despite offering a Bruton contention, did not contest the fact that there was ample evidence to support his guilty verdict. 430 F.2d at 615 n. 1. Indeed, substantial eyewitness testimony placed him at the scene of the crime at approximately the precise time. Id. at 615. Similarly, in United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 733, 50 L.Ed.2d 749 (1977), the court expressly found that the Bruton violations, though unmistakable, were harmless in light of the remainder of the evidence. 538 F.2d at 982-83. In United States v. Lipowitz, 407 F.2d 597 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 946, 89 S.Ct. 2026, 23 L.Ed.2d 466 (1969), the court noted that the codefendant “did not mention [the defendant] by name or say anything which would implicate him in the robbery.’’ 407 F.2d at 600 (emphasis supplied). Plainly, the court implied that confrontation concerns are triggered by remarks that fall short of actually naming the defendant. To be sure, the court observed that “[h]ad [the defendant] been named in [the co-defendant’s] statements . . ., the principles enunciated in [Bruton ] might be applicable.” Id. at 602. But that merely states the most obvious case for Confrontation Clause protection. It does not rule out cases, like Belle’s, where the evidence is a vital link in an inculpatory chain. Finally, United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 914, 96 S.Ct. 221, 46 L.Ed.2d 143 (1975), is also distinguishable, in that the court expressly found the evidence apart from the challenged statement to be “overwhelming.” 519 F.2d at 1055. Alvarez thus depends on Harrington v. California, supra, and Chapman v. California, supra.
. See also 161 U.S.App.D.C. at 66, 494 F.2d at 985 (Bazelon, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause compels exclusion of extra-judicial statements that contribute in any substantial way to the prosecution’s case unless the Government can affirmatively demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable and, hence, cannot be produced for cross-examination at trial; and the required strength of this showing should depend, in turn, on the extent to which the circumstances and content of the statements indicate their reliability.” Thus, if particular extrajudicial evidence is “crucial” to the prosecution’s case, the trial of the codefendant declarant must be severed from that of the defendant and the declarant must be granted use immunity and required to testify. Even then, his extrajudicial statements may only be admitted for impeachment purposes); United States v. Holleman, 575 F.2d 139, 145-46 (Fairchild, C. J., dissenting in the relevant appeals) (arguing that the substantial linkage testimony in the case violated appellants’ confrontation rights).
. In an effort to defend its narrow construction of the Confrontation Clause on policy grounds, the majority argues that a broader rule covering linkage testimony would require the Government “to expose its entire case on a motion for severance.” Opinion, supra at 496. This, the majority asserts, would result in “the practical prohibition of joint trials.” Id. I do not believe that applying Bruton to circumstantial evidence, as well as to direct accusations, entails such draconian consequences. At most, a broader rule would require trial courts to survey the codefendant statements which the government plans to introduce and order the production of those statements which are arguably substantial enough to supply meaningful linkage evidence. Trial judges are thoroughly familiar with such tasks, experienced as they are in the intricacies of complex discovery proceedings in modern litigation. I do not expect them to have any less facility with the responsibility that Bruton requires them to discharge. More critically, even if a less crabbed reading of Bruton does require fewer joint trials, this, at most, will produce some loss in the efficiency of the adjudicatory process. See Note, Joint and Single Trials Under Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 74 Yale L.J. 553, 553 & n. 2 (1965). That small cost, however, will vindicate confrontation rights which Justice Black in Pointer termed “fundamental.” 380 U.S. at 404, 85 S.Ct. 1074. The majority has sacrificed those fundamental rights on the altar of efficiency. The Constitution warrants better treatment.