I concur in the portions of this opinion prepared by Judges Pell and Tone.
II.
Extortion Defense Instruction
As noted earlier, defendant Ingram never denied making certain of the illicit personal payments to officials of the Sanitary District. Instead Ingram premised his defense to the counts relating to these payments on the theory that these payments were not intended as bribes but were extorted from him by threats that, unless these payments were made, the Sanitary District would, contrary to an alleged understanding, refuse to purchase the pipeline which Ingram had already constructed and would invoke the liquidated damages clause to further penalize Ingram Corporation.18 In relation to these arguments, the trial court gave the jury the following instructions on the defense of extortion:
Now, I have just told you that willful conduct, which is required in each of the crimes charged in this indictment, must be voluntary.
One of the defenses raised by the Defendants Frederick B. Ingram and E. Bronson Ingram is that they authorized certain payments to be made only because they were told unless the payments were made, the pipeline would not be *1339paid for and the liquidated damage provision would be used against Ingram Barge Company in an unreasonable and punitive manner. These defendants claim, therefore, that they did not commit bribery or conspire to commit bribery and lacked the intent to bribe.
In analyzing this defense, there are several things for you to consider. First, you should determine whether a defendant did in fact authorize payments because of a fear of economic loss. If you find that a defendant did authorize any of the payments in question, but that he did so solely to procure an economic advantage rather than out of fear of an economic loss, then this defense that the act was involuntary must fail.
On the other hand, if you do find that a defendant authorized payments because of his fear of economic loss, then you should proceed to a consideration of whether that fear of economic loss was such as to render his action involuntary within the meaning of the law.
There are several things to consider in this connection. First, did the defendant fear loss as a result of a withholding of something to which he believed Ingram Barge Company was already legally entitled? Specifically, did the defendant believe that the Metropolitan Sanitary District was already under a legal obligation to pay Ingram Barge for the pipeline? Did he believe that the threatened assessment of liquidated damages was legally unjustified?
The answers to these questions are important because there is a difference between paying a public official for something one is entitled to receive and paying a public official for something one is not entitled to receive.
If one does not believe he is legally entitled to receive the thing in question, then, no matter how much he needs it and no matter how great the economic loss one might suffer by not receiving it, there can be no legal justification for paying a public official to get it. Such a payment is bribery, pure and simple.
However, if one is legally entitled to the thing in question or in good faith believes he is legally entitled to it, then the fear of economic harm from not receiving it may be sufficient to render the act of payment involuntary, depending upon three additional considerations: The seriousness of the economic harm perceived by the defendant, the effect that perception had on his ability to exercise free choice, and the defendant’s awareness of reasonable alternatives to the making of the demanded payments.
If a defendant did not in fact fear serious economic harm or if his fear did not substantially impair his ability to exercise free choice or if he was aware of actions he might take to forestall the harm without making the payments and chose not to take those actions, then his conduct in authorizing the payment cannot be considered involuntary within the meaning of the law.
In order to prove, therefore, that a defendant acted willfully as opposed to involuntarily in authorizing a payment, the government must prove one of the following things: (a) that the defendant was not motivated by a fear of economic harm in authorizing the particular payment, or (b) the thing which the defendant sought to obtain by making the payment was not something he believed Ingram Barge Company was legally entitled to have without making the payment, or (c) the defendant did not perceive the threatened economic harm to be of serious magnitude, or (d) the defendant’s fear was not such as to substantially impair his ability to exercise free choice, or (e) and finally, the defendant was aware of reasonable alternatives to making the payments and chose not to pursue those alternatives.
Defendant Ingram urges that this instruction was prejudicial error in three respects. In considering these contentions we shall assume without deciding, that as the instruction states, under Illinois law, if one who pays a bribe is or believes himself to be “legally entitled” to have the official take the action induced by the bribe, “then the *1340fear of economic harm from not receiving it may be sufficient to render the act of payment involuntary.” This court’s decision in United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71, 84 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818, 97 S.Ct. 63, 50 L.Ed.2d 79 (1976), in the following words, left open the question whether this is so but did establish the rule applicable in the case of a discretionary official decision:
[A]t least in a case where a discretionary or legislative decision . . . has been requested, the withholding of such action until a money demand is met could not negate the intent (to influence the performance of an official act) required by the Illinois bribery statute.
Id. at 84.
First, Ingram argues that the distinction between economic loss and gain was erroneous. The prejudice from this distinction allegedly arose from the fact that the jury was likely to define economic loss as the payment of money and economic gain as the receipt of money and therefore might have rejected the extortion defense out of hand on the ground that the admitted object of the payment was to complete the sludge-hauling project and thereby gain a profit. In response we note initially that Ingram here has too narrowly characterized his own defense. Ingram asserted throughout the trial and continues to assert before us that the payments were at least in part motivated by a desire to avoid assessment of liquidated damages. Even under the simplistic construction of the loss-gain distinction which Ingram alleges was most likely, this would constitute an economic “loss” thereby preventing the jury from rejecting the defense on the basis of the loss-gain distinction.19 Moreover it is not clear that Ingram preserved this objection for appeal; the written objection to the instruction tendered at trial makes no mention of any error in this distinction.20 Finally, we are not convinced that the jury would put such a simplistic construction on the loss-gain distinction. Certainly it requires no extraordinary economic acumen to realize that the receipt of money may not represent an economic gain if the amount received is less than an amount to which one was previously entitled. Conversely, an ordinary juror would certainly realize that a real economic gain accrues only when a person becomes entitled to something to which he had no prior entitlement, that is, when a discretionary official act is performed for his benefit. The district court followed this gain-loss instruction with a discussion of the concept of entitlement, explicitly denoting a “loss” as a failure to receive a benefit to which one was entitled, thereby further clarifying the interdependent relation between these two concepts.21
*1341Ingram advances a second attack on this instruction. He argues that the district court erred in instructing the jury that the extortion defense is unavailable if the defendant did not believe that he had a legal entitlement to the official action. Once again we must note that this objection appears not to have been properly preserved for appeal, since Ingram’s objection to the trial court did not criticize the entitlement aspects of the instruction.22 Even if this objection were properly preserved, it lacks merit. The district court’s instruction is consistent with Peskin.23
Ingram’s final objection to the trial court instruction is that the instruction, by its emphasis on the voluntariness of the payments, implicitly disallowed the extortion defense and permitted only the narrower defense of duress. Assuming that the distinction drawn in United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1966), between the defenses of duress and extortion is correct,24 the instruction could not have prejudiced Ingram since Ingram, before this court and the trial court, characterized his own conduct in such a way as to absolutely preclude the availability of the extortion defense, even assuming that the voluntariness of his conduct alone would not negate the extortion defense. Ingram, during the course of the trial, admitted that he had no legal entitlement to the benefits which his payments were designed to obtain.25 Accordingly he is absolutely precluded from prevailing on an extortion defense under Peskin, which makes that defense unavailable where the defendant is seeking to obtain a benefit not owed and thus the em*1342phasis of the instructions on involuntariness could not have harmed the defendant.26
III.
Evidence of Ingram's Bribes of Foreign Officials
At trial the government, seeking to rebut Ingram’s testimony that he made the payments only as a victim of extortion, sought to demonstrate that in other instances Ingram had been willing to make such payments without the alleged incentive of extortion. The trial court carefully screened this proffer with an ex parte review of the evidence, an in camera meeting with all counsel, and a voir dire of the government witnesses. After this careful consideration, the court, although rejecting a substantial portion of the government’s offer of proof 27 permitted the government to introduce testimony that Ingram had made surreptitious payments to an employee of a semi-official Brazilian corporation in order to receive preferential treatment.
The government introduced at trial the testimony of Chris Daley, an official of the Ingram Corporation, to establish the government’s account of Ingram’s alleged *1343prior bribe. Daley testified that in 1967 the Ingram Corporation became interested in engaging in an off-shore drilling project conducted by Petrobas, a Brazilian oil company owned jointly by the Brazilian government and private investors. Daley and Benton then met with Levindo Caniero, the Petrobas official with responsibility for procuring the contractor for the off-shore drilling. As a result of this meeting, Caniero agreed to provide inside information to Ingram Corporation to assure that it was low-bidder in exchange for a “payoff or commission.” Benton, Daley and Caniero agreed that these payments should be made into a Swiss bank account. The contract was then awarded to Ingram Corporation through a letter of intent. However, Caniero threatened to withdraw the letter of intent because of a delay in Ingram Corporation’s establishment of a Swiss account for him. At this point Daley informed Ingram that the letter of intent was about to be lost because of the delay in making the payoffs. Ingram then put Daley in touch with an international banker at Lehmann Brothers to expedite the establishment of the account. Subsequently, between 1969 and 1973, $172,000 was paid into the account.
We hold that this evidence was properly admissible against Ingram in that it tended to refute Ingram’s defense that he lacked the intent to bribe the Chicago defendants and made the payments only to satisfy extortionate demands. Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits proof of prior crimes or acts where it is used for such purposes “as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” This provision has been interpreted as permitting admission of evidence of prior acts as long as it has a substantial relevance to an issue other than showing that the defendant has a criminal character and therefore possesses a propensity to commit criminal acts. See, e. g., United States v. Sigal, 572 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1978). Or, as this court has held, such evidence is admissible “if, entirely apart from the matter of ‘propensity,’ it has a tendency to make the existence of an element of the crime charged more probable than it would be without such evidence.” United States v. Fairchild, 526 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942, 96 S.Ct. 1682, 48 L.Ed.2d 186 (1976) (emphasis added).
Ingram forwards three attacks on the admission of this evidence. First, he claims, the prior payments to Caniero were not sufficiently similar to the payments for which he was indicted to establish their relevance to his intent. Before examining the particular dissimilarities urged, we note that there is no requirement that the prior acts be virtually identical to the charged acts and that it is sufficient that the acts be similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant. The major thrust of Ingram’s argument is that there is no showing that the Brazilian payments were either illegal or immoral since such payments are simply a way of doing business in Brazil. Initially we must note that we would be loathe to assume that surreptitious payments to governmental or private officials is a common and accepted practice in Brazil absent proof to that effect. Ingram admits that neither he nor the government offered proof on that matter, and thus this argument rests solely on Ingram’s facile and unsupported characterizations of Brazilian practice. However, even were we to accept that such payments are a legal and accepted practice in Brazil,28 we do not find that fact sufficient to differentiate the two transactions. In United States v. Boggett, 481 F.2d 114 *1344(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116, 94 S.Ct. 850, 38 L.Ed.2d 744 (1973), the government was permitted to introduce in a Travel Act bribery prosecution against a zoning official evidence showing a series of transactions wherein gifts were made to the official and favorable actions by him on behalf of the donor followed shortly thereafter. The defendant urged that since no showing of a quid pro quo had been made by the government there was nothing to establish anything improper in these transactions. The court, however, admitted the evidence holding that regardless of the propriety of the individual’s acts, the evidence demonstrated a course of conduct which indicated the defendant’s “preference for favors and gifts over his public duty.” Id. at 115. Likewise here, whatever the moral and legal status of the Brazilian payoffs, they indicate that the defendant had knowingly circumvented ordinary business channels with “facilitating payments.” Admittedly the illegality of such payments to government officials in the United States would make such payments less likely than those not involving illegality; that, however, does not deny that one making such payments, legal or not, is more likely to have the intent to influence official action by similar payments in other instances than one who has never made such payments.29 The other differences urged by Ingram are even less substantial. The fact that the Brazilian official was an employee of a semi-public entity and that the indictment alleged payments to employees of a wholly public governmental entity is a completely negligible difference, unless of course one makes the irrational assumption that one who would knowingly cheat both the public and private investors would not knowingly cheat the public alone. Nor is it relevant that the Brazilian payoff was not initiated by Ingram: we can see no difference in active participation in making payments suggested by another and initiation of the suggestion itself, since one who is willing to perform the essential act of bribery — that is, to dispense the bribe moneys themselves — must be presumed to have also been willing to suggest the bribe. Finally, we reject Ingram’s characterization of the Brazilian transaction as involving less harm that the Sanitary District bribes since the latter added the amount of the bribes onto the contract price. Nothing in this record suggests that the amounts charged to Brazil would not have decreased once the cost of the project was reduced by the amount of the bribes. Further, it is axiomatic that for a competitively-bid project, where no inside information was available, Ingram would have bid less and therefore charged less than where the project is guaranteed by virtue of a bribe and Ingram could set its own price. It is therefore completely disingenuous to suggest that the level of harm differed.
Ingram’s second objection is that there was no clear and convincing proof that Ingram knew the purpose of the payments made to Caniero. We have held that there must be clear and convincing evidence of the prior act to justify its admissibility,30 and we find that there is evidence in the record to meet that standard. Daley testified in camera as to Ingram’s reaction when he learned of the payments and that Benton’s delay in setting up the account might lead to a revocation of the letter of intent. Daley stated:
Benton was to open it, which we wouldn’t do. So that’s when I called Fritz, and Fritz says, “Jesus Christ. How did you get into that,” or whatever. And he says, “Okay, okay. We will go ahead and call him back and see what we can put together.”
*1345(Tr. 5638). At trial, Daley testified as to Ingram’s response to knowledge of the payments in the following terms: “Mr. Ingram, in disgust, says ‘Well, okay. I will see what I can do about it. . . . ’” (Tr. 5674). It is difficult to understand why Ingram would have responded “in disgust” or with queries as to how Daley became involved “in that” unless he knew that the payments were illicit payments made to procure unauthorized benefits or at least were improper in some respect. Furthermore, the government introduced a memorandum sent out by Daley to Ingram in which Daley stated that he knew after speaking with Petrobas personnel that Ingram would be the low bidder and that Caniero had assured Daley that “we could count on him for any assistance we need.” Considering all the evidence, particularly Ingram’s reaction to Daley’s statement and his knowledge that Ingram was assured to be the low bidder, there is a convincing portrait of Ingram’s knowledge of the purpose of the Caniero payments.
Finally, Ingram urges, relying on Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, that the prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighed its relevance and therefore should have been excluded. Ingram must sustain a heavy burden to succeed on this argument since the careful balancing of the probative value of prior acts versus their possible unduly prejudicial effect is uniquely appropriate to the informed discretion of the trial judge. See United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71, 84 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818, 97 S.Ct. 63, 50 L.Ed.2d 79 (1976); United States v. Sigal, 572 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1978). More precisely, this balancing entails considering whether the probative value this evidence had in indicating that Ingram’s intent was to bribe, not to satisfy extortionate demands, outweighs its possible prejudicial effect, that is, the possibility that the jury will take the evidence to be indicative of a criminal disposition.
The highly judgmental character of this test mandates that we not restrike the balance ourselves but instead examine only the manner in which the district court exercised its discretion. The record here shows that the trial court was meticulous and deliberate in its decision to admit the evidence. The trial court heard in camera evidence of a number of prior acts which the government had sought to introduce.31 After extensive discussion the court permitted proof only of the Petrobas transaction. Further, the court required the government to present its witness to the Petrobas transaction in camera to confirm the substance of the testimony. Finally, to minimize any prejudice the court preceded the presentation of this witness’s testimony before the jury with an extensive limiting instruction emphasizing that Ingram was not “on trial” for this previous transaction, that the evidence was to be considered only as it concerned Ingram’s intent in the Sanitary District transaction and that the court passed no judgment on the value of this evidence. Courts have often looked to these factors indicating due consideration to uphold the trial court’s judgment. See, e. g., United States v. Carleo, 576 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1978). In particular the use of limiting instructions has been accorded great significance. See United States v. Sigal, 572 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1978). We therefore decline to hold that the trial court abused its discretion.
IV.
Government’s Compliance with Brady v. Maryland
During his opening statement, counsel for the government revealed that the principal government witness, Benton, had embezzled and applied to his own benefit $375,000 of the money he obtained from Ingram in order to pay off the Chicago defendants. Although the government had turned over to the defendants both Benton’s and Ingram Corporation’s financial records, from which the government asserts the defalcations could have been discerned by the defendants, the government did not turn over to *1346the defendants Benton’s grand jury testimony in which he referred to the $375,000 as “the amount of money I am responsible for keeping,” nor did the government disclose that Benton had expressly admitted the embezzlements in interviews with government counsel. Defendants McPartlin and Janicki, relying on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), urge that this failure to disclose this information earlier violated their Due Process rights and mandates reversal of the convictions.
We note initially that Brady and its successor, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), address a thoroughly different problem than the one before us. The concern of Agurs and Brady is whether the suppression of exculpatory material until after trial requires that a new trial be given so that this evidence may be considered. The Court in Agurs characterized the situations to which the Brady principles apply as those involving “the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.” 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. at 2397 (emphasis supplied). Indeed the standard developed in Agurs can only sensibly be applied to the suppression of evidence throughout the trial: “if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed. Id. at 112, 96 S.Ct. at 2402 (emphasis supplied).
The defendants here, however, do not complain of a total suppression of favorable evidence but merely attack the timing of the disclosure of such evidence. Here the prosecutor did not conceal or withhold evidence of Benton’s defalcations but waited until early in the trial to reveal them.32 There is nothing in Brady or Agurs to require that such disclosures be made before trial, and we have explicitly held this in the past. United States v. Stone, 471 F.2d 170, 173-74 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 1898, 36 L.Ed.2d 391 (1973). See also United States v. Lomprez, 472 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965, 93 S.Ct. 2144, 36 L.Ed.2d 685 (1973). Thus, even though evidence might be material or might create a reasonable doubt as to guilt, Due Process, albeit requiring eventual disclosure, does not require that in all instances this disclosure must occur before trial.
The appropriate standard to be applied in a case such as this is whether the disclosure came so late as to prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial. See United States v. Stone, 471 F.2d at 174. After considering the record and the claims of prejudice forwarded by the defendants, we cannot say that this disclosure came so late as to violate Due Process.
The defendants, apparently relying on their misinterpretation of Brady as a constitutional mandate for pretrial discovery, concentrated on the exculpatory nature of the evidence and barely developed before this court any specific ways in which they were prejudiced by this delay.33 McPartlin merely argues that, had the Benton embezzlements been revealed before trial, “specific requests could have been directed toward more detailed information concerning these [embezzled] funds. ... A thorough investigation into the disposition of those funds which he admittedly retained might have revealed that additional funds were *1347similarly expended, deposited or hidden.” Brief for Defendant McPartlin at 34-36. It is difficult for us to discern any undue prejudice on this basis. To begin with, there was nothing to preclude the defendants from having made additional investigations between the time of the disclosure and the close of the evidence almost two months later, and yet nothing in the record reveals that defendants directed any further inquiries to Benton. This omission is even more important given the statement of the trial court that it would reconsider the defendant’s motion for a recess if it later became apparent that “anyone has in fact been prejudiced by a late disclosure.” Tr. at 250. Nor did the defendants subsequently renew their request for a continuance. Thus, given the failure of the defendants to pursue adequately any subsequent investigation and their subsequent failure to request additional time for any investigation thoroughly discredits their assertion that they were prejudiced by the timing of the disclosure.
V.
Admission of Benton’s Desk Calendars
At trial the government introduced as exhibits over the objections of the defendant, the desk calendar-appointment diaries of William J. Benton described above, Part I, B, 1. These diaries documented in some detail the dealings of Benton with the Chicago defendants. As a foundation for admission of the diaries, Benton testified that he had kept such business diaries since 1952 or 1953 and that he maintained these diaries during the period of his dealings with Metropolitan Sanitary District officials. Benton further testified that he kept these diaries and made entries in them as a regular part of his business activity as a vice-president of Ingram Corp., noting in them anticipated meetings, telephone calls, personnel matters and bids. These entries were characterized by Benton as “things which I would need to look back on,” to recall a bid or to prepare letters and memoranda, for example.
In admitting the diaries the trial court made the following findings:
It was the regular course of business for Mr. Benton to make entries in diaries about the things he did during the course of a business day, where he went, what people said to him, what commitments he made and what commitments were made to him in connection with that business. The entries that are contained in the diary, in the series of diaries, do pertain to Ingram’s business.
The contents of the diaries further indicated their reliability to the district court:
I find no indication of a motive to falsify. At the time these entries were made back in 1971 and 1972, there is not the slightest bit of evidence to suggest that Mr. Benton thought this scheme was going to be disclosed; that he thought that he would be caught. There is nothing self-serving about these entries. They implicate Mr. Benton in serious criminal misconduct. Indeed, if he were unavailable, I think these diaries might well be admissible as statements against penal interest, so incriminatory are they of Mr. Benton.
So I think they have the earmarks of reliability in that sense.
We agree with the district court that these diaries were admissible. These diaries clearly fulfilled all the requirements which justify the admission of business records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6). These records were kept as part of a business activity and the entries were made with regularity at or near the time of the described event. Most importantly these diaries satisfied the central rationale of the business records exception: since Benton had to rely on the entries made, there would be little reason for him to distort or falsify the entries.
The application of the business record exception to documents differing greatly from the classic “shopbook” or business ledger is well established. See, e. g., United States v. Reese, 568 F.2d 1246 (6th Cir. 1977) (scrapbook of press clippings compiled by public relations department); United *1348States v. Yates, 553 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1977) (letter from bank to employees describing recent robbery); Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 446 F.Supp. 874 (E.D.Wis. 1978) (corporate officer’s personal notes of business negotiations); Aluminum Co. v. Sperry Products, Inc., 285 F.2d 911, 916 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 890, 82 S.Ct. 139, 7 L.Ed.2d 87 (1961) (inventor’s diary of progress on invention). Moreover, the business record exception has been applied to admit documents indistinguishable in kind from Benton’s desk calendars. In United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1978), the court permitted the introduction of “pocket-size appointment calendars known as ‘daytimers.’ ” Id. at 487. The court noted in support of its holding that these calendars were business records that “[t]he entries purport on their face to list business entertainment expenses . [and] such documents were used as a matter of company policy.” Id. at 488. Likewise, the calendars here on their face describe business matters and, even if not mandated by Ingram policy, were kept in accord with the widespread practice of business executives to maintain such records.
Defendants McPartlin and Weber have argued that several facts differentiate the records here from admissible business records. First, the defendants stress that some of the entries in the calendars were made out of sequence. The defendants’ document expert testified that fifteen entries out of all those made over a two-year period were made out of sequence. We do not however agree with the defendants that nonsequential entries preclude admissibility as business records. Although there is no dispute that Benton’s entries in a few cases did not proceed page by page in the book, the defendants’ document examiner could not disprove Benton’s statements that entries were made at or about the time of the described event.34 Indeed, it seems to us that insisting that entries proceed methodically from the first to last page is as pointless as insisting that ledger and account entries proceed in alphabetical order or from top to bottom. As long as the entries satisfy the contemporaneity and regularity requirements, their sequence is irrelevant. This point was made clear by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Carranco, 551 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1977). There the defendants attempted to block the admission of freight bills on the ground that some of the notations on the bills occurred after the document had been completed by the freight originator. The court rejected this argument noting:
The notations on the freight bill were explained by the witnesses, and this is probably more than is required by the business records exception to the hearsay rule. As pointed out by the appellee, a freight bill is not meant to be a static document nor is it used as such. As testified to by those familiar with the shipping business, a freight bill is used by many different people and it is their job to make notations on the freight bill so it will continue to be an accurate description of the shipment. It was adopted by ICX as its record, in the regular course of its business, when the ICX driver signed it as he picked up the interline shipment. He used it as an ICX record, verified the shipment, and made the notations on it. The notations as testified to by the witnesses were thus also made in the regular course of business of ICX. One of the freight bill copies went into the ICX terminal records, and one or more copies continued with the shipment. The requirements of Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence were met.
Id. at 1200. Similarly here there is no reason to require that an appointment calendar remain a “static document”; indeed as appointments and other matters change *1349the calendar to be useful must be nonsequentially revised. The only requirement is that these revisions be contemporaneous and regular, and the defendant’s proof of simple nonsequentiality does not rebut Benton’s testimony that the entries were made regularly and contemporaneously. However, even if several of the entries were made non-eontemporaneously, it remains within the district court’s discretion to determine whether the few non-contemporaneous entries so undermine the reliability of the record as to preclude admissibility. Given that there were only fifteen non-sequential entries over a two year period, even if many of these were shown to be non-contemporaneous, we could not say that this discretion was abused.
The defendants also urge that these diaries could not be business records because-they were relied on by no one other than Benton and in any event contained many entries of a purely private nature, viz., the alleged extortion scheme engaged in by Benton which supposedly was not related to Ingram Corporation’s official business. However, nothing in the text or comments to the Rule provides any indication that a necessary prerequisite to the reliability of a business record is verification by persons other than the one making the entry. Indeed, the Advisory Committee Notes appear to suggest otherwise:
The element of unusual reliability of business records is said variously to be supplied by systematic cheeking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation.
Certainly the second and fourth, and possibly the first, indicia of reliability contemplate only the accuracy imposed by the record keeper on himself. Accordingly, admissibility has been upheld even in instances in which the records were made only for the benefit of the record keeper himself and not for the benefit of the entire business entity. See United States v. Prevatt, 526 F.2d 400, 403 (5th Cir. 1976); Aluminum Co. of America v. Sperry Products, Inc., 285 F.2d 911, 916 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 890, 82 S.Ct. 139, 7 L.Ed.2d 87 (1961).
Nor do we consider it significant that the illegality of Benton’s activities may have removed these actions in some technical sense from a narrow construction of his duties at Ingram. This argument proceeds on the false premise that because Benton’s activities were not a part of Ingram Corporation’s business, they could not be a business at all. United States v. Re, 336 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904, 85 S.Ct. 188, 13 L.Ed.2d 177 (1964), addressed, and rejected, such a contention. There the defendant after having gained control of a company, engaged in a fraudulent scheme for the distribution of that company’s securities for his own personal benefit. The court was unpersuaded that records relating to that scheme, since they were not part of the company’s business, could not constitute business records. The court pointed out that the defendant, “while distributing a huge block of control stock to the investing public through a complex system of brokerage accounts and over-the-counter sales, was engaged in a ‘business,’ ” albeit a business of his own and not the company’s. Id. at 313. The court further rejected the notion that business records would lose admissibility as such because of the illegality of the underlying business. We think that the same rationale applies here. Benton was engaged in systematically negotiating under-the-counter payments either for himself or the Chicago defendants in order to facilitate the award of business contracts. Although this is not a business of “the usual orthodox nature” (id.), there is no question that this bribery scheme was as much a business as a fraudulent securities-marketing scheme.
However, even if there were to be some question as to whether Benton’s activities constituted an independent business, we believe that his activities can also be characterized as part of Ingram’s business. As long as the recorded activities had become, properly or not, an integral part of Benton’s business activities for Ingram, the records are not too personal to preclude admissibili*1350ty under this exception. In this matter we are persuaded by United States v. Schiller, 187 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1951). There the defendant, a government employee in the Rent Control Program, maintained a diary which evidenced a bribe paid to him. The court, in refusing to consider a Fourth Amendment challenge to the admission of the diary premised on the personal, non-official nature of the papers, noted:
We think . . . there was a sufficient showing that the entries introduced in evidence dealt with official duties. Such matters as rent adjustments and recommendations regarding the same were within his general duties, whether he performed them rightly or wrongly, at lunch or elsewhere. .
187 F.2d at 575 (emphasis supplied). Certainly if such papers have sufficient business character to remove them from the personal paper protections of the Fourth Amendment, they have sufficient reliability to permit admissibility.
Defendants finally rely heavily on Buckley v. Altheimer, 152 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1945) in support of their position. In Buckley, this circuit declined to permit, under the business record exception, the admission of a diary which contained entries documenting the amount of indebtedness between two parties, Frost and Altheimer. The court, in denying admission, noted that “[t]he book did not contain any regular set of entries relating to any accounts between Frost and Altheimer.” Id. at 507. It was argued that, although no claim was made that the entries in the diary occurred in the regular course of business and was “informally kept,” the diary should have been admitted because the entries were made “precisely and meticulously.” Id. The court rejected this argument, stating that “private diaries as distinguished from account books or individual memoranda of particular transactions” are inadmissible. Id. at 508. It is this latter statement upon which the defendants rely.
We believe however that the defendants’ emphasis on the court’s language concerning “private diaries” is misplaced. We do not believe that the court there intended to make any per se rule precluding the admissibility of private diaries; instead it is clear that the decisive factor in that case was that no regular entries had been made documenting the relationship. The desk calendar before us is clearly a record of a different order: regular and frequent entries documenting the relation between Benton and Sanitary District officials were made systematically for the purpose of allowing Benton to rely on its accounts of the status of the relationship.
We note as a final matter that even if any of the defendant’s arguments were sufficient grounds to prevent admission of these diaries under the business record exception, they would be admissible under two other exceptions. First, they would be admissible under the “residual” exception, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24).35 A number of factors combine to demonstrate the reliability of the entries: the highly self-incriminatory nature of the entries themselves, the regularity with which they were made, Benton’s need to rely on the entries. Where evidence complies with the spirit, if not the latter, of several exceptions, admissibility is appropriate under the residual exception. See generally, United States v. Ianconetti, 406 F.Supp. 554 (E.D. N.Y.), aff’d, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041, 97 S.Ct. 739, 50 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (especially Judge Weinstein’s opinion for the district court). Furthermore the degree of reliability necessary for admission is greatly reduced where, as here, the declarant is testifying and is available for cross-examination, thereby satisfy*1351ing the central concern of the hearsay rule. Second, these calendars would also be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as statements “by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Since these entries were made so that Benton could rely on them in carrying out his scheme, they aided and were “in furtherance of” the conspiracy. See United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1978).
VI.
Weber’s Prior Consistent Statements
The government’s evidence revealed that the first installment of the bribe money consisted of $75,000 given to McPartlin in Weber’s presence. Some part of that amount consisted of thousand-dollar bills. The government further presented evidence to establish that three days after this cash payment, Weber deposited nine thousand-dollar bills in the bank account of one of the companies controlled by Weber. Weber, in an attempt to rebut the damaging inferences that could properly be drawn from such a cash deposit, testified that he obtained this money from a safe-deposit box maintained by himself and his mother. His mother testified that they indeed had such a joint safe-deposit box and that it did contain several thousand-dollar bills. As further corroboration, Weber sought to introduce the testimony of his accountant, as well as the accountant’s copy of the bank statement recording the deposit. In an offer of proof Weber indicated that the accountant would testify that in 1973, two years after the deposit, Weber told him, in connection with his preparation of an IRS audit, that the funds were obtained from Weber’s mother. The proffered bank statement contained the accountant’s notation next to the sum: “Overdraft covered and paid in cash from Mother (per FNW).” The trial court refused the admission of the accountant’s testimony and his copy of the bank statement. Defendants McPartlin36 and Weber urge that this was error.
Two theories of admissibility are advanced. First, it is argued that the evidence was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) as a prior consistent statement.37 We do not believe, however, that these statements were admissible under this theory. Evidence offered under this theory must have some probative value in rebutting the implied charge of recent fabrication or improper motive. However, where a motive to falsify also existed at the time of the earlier statement, it possesses no such probative value. As Judge Weinstein correctly pointed out in his treatise on the Federal Rules:
Substantive use under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is limited to situations where high probative value is most likely . . . Evidence which merely shows that the witness said the same thing on other occasions when his motive was the same does not have much probative force “for the simple reason that mere repetition does not imply veracity.”
4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence 1801(d)(l)(B)[01] at 801-100 (1977). Obviously Weber would have had no more reason to tell the IRS that the proceeds were illegal bribes than he has a motive now to tell that to a jury in a criminal prosecution. Indeed, Weber would have even had a fur*1352ther reason not to tell the IRS that the $9,000 was part of a kickback: a bribe would be includable in Weber’s gross income whereas an appropriation of jointly-held funds might not have been. Thus, we do not feel that these prior statements were admissible under 801(d)(1)(B).
As a second ground of admissibility, Weber and McPartlin urge that the bank statement was admissible as a business record under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6). This argument creates a paradoxical tension with their arguments that Benton’s desk calendars were not business records. The defendants assailed the diaries on the grounds that the entries were not made at or near the time of the event related (but recorded in advance as reminders of appointments) and that many of the entries were derived from “second or third-hand information.” Brief for Defendant Weber at 7. Yet the defendants urge that a single notation of a cash transaction made more than two years after the transaction and based solely on information supplied by someone other than the person making the entry constitutes a business record. We do not rely on these two grounds, however, to uphold the exclusion of the notation on the bank statement. Instead we find a more fundamental flaw in this evidence: this notation, unlike those in Benton’s diaries, was not made for future reference and reliance but was made in anticipation of IRS litigation. The defendants appear to admit this fact, and the trial judge was informed of this. (Tr. 1363-69). As such prelitigation records, we hold that they lacked sufficient trustworthiness to permit admissibility. Indeed, this case is not significantly distinguishable from Hartzog v. United States, 217 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1954), which was cited by the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 803(6) as an example of insufficient trustworthiness. In Hartzog the court held it was error to admit the worksheets of an IRS agent, deceased at the time of trial, that had been prepared from his examination of the defendant’s records in preparation for a tax-evasion prosecution. The court explained the reasons for finding insufficient trustworthiness as follows:
These worksheets were made in preparation for this prosecution; they were Baynard’s [the agent’s] personal working papers, were the product of his judgment and discretion and not a product of any efficient clerical system. There was no opportunity for anyone ... to tell when an error or misstatement had been made. These worksheets were not more than Baynard’s unsworn, unchecked version of what he thought [the defendant] Hartzog’s records contained.
Id. at 710. The records made by Weber’s accountant are no more trustworthy than those prepared by the agent in Hartzog: they were prepared as a matter of his judgment and discretion; they were not produced as part of any regular system; there was no reliance on these notations by the accountant or others to guard against error or misstatement. If anything, the records in this case are less trustworthy since, unlike Hartzog where the agent examined records that the defendant had prepared for his own use, these notations were the product of Weber’s own representations for the purposes of the audit, thereby furthering the possibility of misstatement. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to exclude these records.38
. It is to be noted that this defense is inapplicable to the counts under which Ingram was found guilty of participation in payments made prior to February, 1972. (Counts 3, 4, and 6.) As to these counts Ingram contended he did not know of the payments. The conspiracy count (Count 1) involved payments made before and after that date, but the verdicts on the three substantive counts tell us that the jury disbelieved Ingram’s denial of knowledge of the earlier payments, so the extortion defense would not suffice under the conspiracy count.
. Indeed Ingram seems to have admitted as much. In his brief defendant Ingram states: “Alternatively, the jury might confusingly [sic ] have reasoned that threatened liability under the liquidated damages clause was an ‘economic loss’. . . . ” Brief for Defendant Ingram at 37.
. Ingram made the following written objection to the instruction:
Court’s Instruction No. 2: The Ingram defendants have tendered several alternative charges dealing with the subject matter as Court’s Instruction No. 2, each of which we submit correctly states the law with respect to the effect of economic coercion on the defendant’s alleged intent to bribe. In support of the tendered charges, we referred to our memorandum on the “extortion defense” submitted to the Court in July 1977, which we incorporate by reference here. The instruction given by the Court treats the issue not as one of economic coercion bearing on intent, but as one of duress, contrary to the analysis in United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1966), and contrary to the pattern instruction in Devitt & Blackmar § 34.10. Accordingly, we object to the Court’s charge in this respect and we object to the omission of any of the proposed instructions on this issue tendered by the Ingram defendants, or some modified version of those proposed instructions.
. Ingram attempts to bolster this argument by urging that decisions under the Hobbs Act have rejected any distinction between threats of economic loss and gain in extortion prosecutions. See, e. g., United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 819, 97 S.Ct. 64, 50 L.Ed.2d 79 (1976). We do not see the relevance of such authority, however, since there is no reason that conduct giving rise to criminal liability for extortion should necessarily provide a criminal defense for the reciprocal party. Indeed it does not seem illogical to *1341suggest that it may be reasonable to prosecute both the official who conditions discretionary benefits on bribes and the person who seeks to obtain such benefits. See United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 321 (10th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 919, 97 S.Ct. 313, 50 L.Ed.2d 285 (1977) (“bribery and extortion are not to be considered mutually exclusive nor does the fact that the alleged victims of the extortion were also bribers nullify anything.”); United States v. Gill, 490 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 417 U.S. 968, 94 S.Ct. 3171, 41 L.Ed.2d 1139 (1974).
. See note 20 supra.
. United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71, 84 (7th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 818, 97 S.Ct. 63, 50 L.Ed.2d 79 (1976). See p. 25 supra.
. As the court in Barash noted:
Although the instruction that only a threat of death or serious bodily injury would make out the defense of duress appears correct enough . . . that was only part of the story since Barash had also requested instructions as to the bearing of threats of economic harm on the intent required for conviction. . We think that if a government officer threatens serious economic loss unless paid for giving a citizen his due, the latter is entitled to have the jury consider this, not as a complete defense like duress but as bearing on the specific intent required for the commission of bribery.
365 F.2d at 401-02.
. The defendant clearly makes these admissions in his brief when he argues that the entitlement distinction was erroneous:
This second element [of the instructions, that the extortion defense was not available if the defendant was seeking a benefit to which he was not entitled,] was tantamount to a judicial instruction to reject the extortion defense in light of the record that had already been made. Bronson Ingram had testified (as quoted at pp. 16-17, supra) that on February 21, 1972, during the meeting between the Ingram brothers and Benton, Benton had said, “[W]e don’t really have a legal position to get the rest of our money” (Tr. 4075). Indeed, it was precisely because there was no legal recourse that, according to both In-grams, they saw no option other than to capitulate to the demands.
On any fair reading of the record, Mr. Ingram was in the position of ordinary applicants for zoning variances or for discretionary governmental action. He honestly — and with substantial basis — believed that it was right and proper for the MSD to exercise its discretion to purchase the pipeline and to refrain from punitive use of the liquidated damages clause. Whether he also believed that Ingram Corporation had a legal right under the existing contracts to obtain this result was completely irrelevant to the question of his intent to commit bribery.
Brief for Defendant Ingram at 39-41 (emphasis supplied). Ingram’s admission that he was in the same position as “ordinary applicants for zoning variances” is particularly damaging in that it was in precisely that context in Peskin that we explicitly held the extortion defense to be unavailable as a matter of law. 527 F.2d at 84. See also the cited quotation on p. 25 supra.
. Ingram also objects to the trial court’s refusal to give a “theory of defense” instruction describing Ingram’s view of the extortion. This is a somewhat surprising argument since the trial court’s instruction gave more factual information as to the defendant’s theory, albeit more concisely, than the defendant’s proposed instructions. Ingram’s factual theory of his defense is detailed in the following excerpts from the defendant’s proposed instructions:
If, on the other hand, the Ingram defendants had formed no purpose of offering any money or thing of value to any personnel of the Metropolitan Sanitary District, and acted only because of demands or threats communicated by Benton, and believed that the Metropolitan Sanitary District intended to carry out the threats not to pay for the pipeline and destroy the company on the barging operations unless their demands were satisfied, or if you have a reasonable doubt on this issue, then the essential element of intent is not present and you will find the defendants Frederic B. Ingram and E. Bronson Ingram not guilty of all charges.
It is the position of the defendants Frederic B. Ingram and E. Bronson Ingram that they had no purpose of improperly offering or promising any money or thing of value to any official of the. Metropolitan Sanitary District in connection with the sludge contract, and that they did not devise or intend to devise a scheme or artifice to defraud either the Metropolitan Sanitary District, its citizens, its officers and employees, or the Burlington Northern Railroad and other competitors. Indeed, it is the position of the defendants Frederic B. Ingram and E. Bronson Ingram that they acted only because of demands or threats communicated to them by William J. Benton and because they believed that those threats would be carried out unless the demands were satisfied.
If you find that the defendants Frederic B. Ingram and E. Bronson Ingram did not act voluntarily, or had formed no purpose of offering any money or thing of value to the employees or officers of the Metropolitan Sanitary District, and acted only because of demands or threats communicated by William J. Benton, and that they believed that those threats would be carried out unless the demands for payment were satisfied, then the essential element of intent is not present and you must find the defendants Frederic B. Ingram and E. Bronson Ingram not guilty of the charges against them.
In contrast to these generalized and repetitive instructions, the trial court instructions, set out on pages 23-25 supra, concisely explained the defendant’s theory that the alleged extortion scheme revolved around threats not to purchase the pipeline, as well as setting out defendant’s additional factual theory that the scheme involved threats to assess liquidated damages in an unreasonable manner. Thus, the defendant Ingram’s claim that the trial court erred in rejecting a “theory of defense” instruction is without merit.
. The government offered to prove that Ingram had personal control of a cash box containing unreported funds from scrap sales which were distributed to Louisiana politicians. Additionally the government offered to prove that a joint-venture in which Ingram Corp. was a participant had paid a real-estate commission to a Louisiana state representative who gave part of that payment to another state representative and kicked back another part of it to Frederick Ingram personally. The government also offered to prove that Ingram Corp. made kickback payments to an Amoco employee who was potentially able to provide inside information and influence the level of payments by Amoco to Ingram. Finally, the government said it could prove that Ingram Corp. had made an interest-free, uncollateralized loan to an Indonesian military officer who was able to influence contracts for Ingram in Indonesia.
. Ingram’s assertion that such a practice is “moral” in Brazil tempts us to examine the philosophical underpinnings of an ethical system that varies with geographical or cultural boundaries. Even if morality varies with one’s own culture, can it be said that an individual from a cultural and moral tradition that condemns a practice can morally engage in that practice once he simply steps “across the river” into a culture with different norms? See B. Pascal, Pensées 151 (Editions Gamier Freres 1964) (“Plaisante justice qu'une riviere borne! Vérité au dega des Pyrénées; erreur au dela.” —“Curious justice that a river bounds! Truth on one side of the Pyrenees; error on the other.”)
. See also United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71, 84 (7th Cir. 1975), cert denied,. 429 U.S. 818, 97 S.Ct. 63, 50 L.Ed.2d 79 (1978) (upholding admission of evidence of subsequent bribes to public officials).
. United States v. Feinberg, 535 F.2d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929, 97 S.Ct. 337, 50 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976). Compare the majority opinion in United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 910, 912-913, (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) with the dissent in that case, id. 918, 922-923 (Goldberg, Godbold, Simpson, Morgan, and Roney, JJ., dissenting).
. See note 27 supra.
. Defendant Janicki also apparently claims that the government did not ultimately turn over all exculpatory material relating to specific instances of embezzlement: “the Government may have secured information about particular instances of embezzlement about which the defendant was unaware. . . ” Brief of Defendant Janicki at 32. However, a denial of Due Process cannot be premised on the defendant’s mere conjecture that there might have been favorable evidence which was undisclosed. The existence of the evidence must be established, and here the defendants offered nothing to rebut the government’s assertion that it had turned over to the defendants all its information on the embezzlement.
. At trial the defendants made only generalized claims of prejudice without advancing any specific theories upon which a finding of prejudice might be based. Tr. at 230-31 (Janicki), 249-50 (McPartlin). Such specific theories were advanced for the first time in the briefs submitted to this court.
. The defendants have also attacked the contemporaneity of the entries, arguing that the records were inadmissible because entries were made relating to appointments before the appointment took place. This is an overly narrow construction of “at or near the time.” Even though such entries were not made “at or near the time” of the meeting they were “at or near the time” the appointment was made. This seems to be sufficient contemporaneity to constitute a business record documenting the making of appointments.
. Rule 803(24) provides:
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
. McPartlin argues that evidence denying Weber’s participation in the first bribe installment would have inured to his benefit since the original installment was alleged to have been delivered to McPartlin in Weber’s presence. Thus, presumably, any cash deposited by Weber, if not from innocuous sources, would have been obtained from McPartlin. We do not think, however, that any benefit from such evidence would have been sufficient to have made its exclusion a denial of a fair trial to McPartlin. The fact that Weber may not have received a cash rake-off from this first installment in no way detracts from the credibility of testimony that McPartlin received the money; at most such evidence would have only contributed to a demonstration of McPartlin’s penuriousness.
. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides that
(d) A statement is not hearsay if .
(B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive .
. Further support can also be found in this circuit’s decision in United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957), also cited by the Advisory Committee as a proper application of the untrustworthiness principle. In Ware this circuit held that records of drug purchases made by a drug agent were inadmissible in subsequent prosecutions, noting that “such utility as [these records] possess relates primarily to prosecution of suspected law breakers and only incidentally to the systematic conduct of the police business.” Id. at 700 (emphasis supplied). Likewise, the notations here must be seen as relating primarily to the avoidance of additional tax liability or prosecution as a result of an audit and only incidentally to the conduct of Weber’s business.