concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the opinion affirming Vissars’ conviction. However, I cannot join the majority in the Keenberg case because I do not believe that the Bruton error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The case against Keenberg was strong, but I do not believe that it was overwhelming. Therefore, I would agree with the majority if we were applying an ordinary harmless error rule. I cannot conscientiously apply the constitutional error standard as the majority does. In reaching this conclusion I am influenced not only by the weight of the evidence as a whole, but also by the impact on the whole course of the trial of the improper admission of the testimony in violation of the Bruton rule. After the testimony was admitted, Keenberg had no practicable course open to him other than taking the stand and attempting to establish entrapment. Accordingly, I would reverse Keenberg’s conviction for Bruton error.