In a trial without a jury, appellants Beck and Dickerson were convicted, respectively, of possession of cocaine and of possession of heroin, with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On appeal, they challenge as erroneous the denial of their motions to suppress evidence seized. We reverse.
FACTS
At about 9:00 in the evening of Tuesday, March 8,1977, three men entered the pedestrian gate at the Grand Avenue border entrance to Nogales, Arizona. Larry Swanson, a Customs Inspector on duty at the gate, stopped the men and, as was his routine, asked if they were U.S. citizens, if they had purchased anything, how long they had been in Mexico, and what they had been doing there. They responded that they were U.S. citizens, had been drinking 3 or 4 hours in Mexico and had made no purchases. Swanson smelled alcohol and thought the men appeared slightly inebriated. Upon request the men produced their drivers’ licenses and identified themselves as John Beck, John Dickerson, and Dan McDowell, all from Missouri. Swanson noticed that Dickerson’s hands were trembling and that he appeared to be nervous. He felt it was unusual that the men, although being from out of town, had not purchased anything.
Swanson asked all three men to step inside a secondary search area. They were asked to empty their pockets and roll up their sleeves. Dickerson’s arms revealed what, to Swanson, appeared to be needle marks. When Swanson inquired about the marks, Dickerson stated that they were scars from intravenous feedings given during a recent hospital stay.
Customs Patrol Officers David Salomon and Juan Treto were also present in the detention area. Dickerson conversed with Treto and told him that he had come to Arizona because Beck wanted to check out the University of Arizona. Dickerson further related to Treto that he and his companions had arrived the previous day in Tucson, had taken a taxi to the bus depot, and from their had come by bus to Nogales. Beck had told Swanson that he had flown to Tucson to look at the University and planned to remain in the Nogales area several days.
*499Swanson ran a computer check of the three men, but it was negative: no information was recorded on any of the three men. He then conducted a strip search of each man, but no contraband or weapons were found.
The three men were allowed to leave. Swanson, however, remained suspicious; he had a hunch and asked Agents Treto and Salomon to maintain a surveillance on the three men. When the three men left the inspection station, Treto followed them to the Siesta Motel in Nogales, where they were registered under their own names.
The next day, Wednesday, March 9, 1977, Treto requested that Alfred Smith, a radio coordinator in El Paso, Texas, contact the police department in Clinton, Missouri, about the three men. Smith later reported to Treto that the desk sergeant had recognized Beck’s name as being involved locally in drugs and had identified Dickerson as Beck’s sidekick, but that neither of the men had ever been arrested. At some unspecified time, Treto spoke directly with the sergeant in Clinton. Because he omitted the conversation in his report, he was unable to recall what he was told, but thought the officer mentioned that Beck was suspected of an offense involving the use of weapons.
Treto also learned that the three men had moved from the Siesta Motel to the El Dorado Motel, a nicer motel. The surveillance continued; a room next to the one assigned to McDowell was used by customs agents.
On Thursday afternoon, March 10, 1977, the three men took a taxi to the border and walked into Mexico. The customs patrol officers following them remained at the gate until it closed at midnight. Word was then left with the customs inspectors to look out for the three men. Surveillance at the motel also continued until midnight and then ceased. The three men were not observed again until the following day, Friday, March 11, 1977.
Dickerson was seen leaving the motel about 10:00 a. m. Friday. He went to a bank and obtained a safety deposit box. He then returned to the motel about 20 minutes later. He left again shortly after and took a taxi to the border where he again crossed into Mexico by foot.
Beck and McDowell were first seen again returning to the motel in a taxi at about 4:00 p. m., Friday. Both were carrying large Mexican oil paintings. Dickerson was not with them, but was seen shortly thereafter leaving the motel room. He went to the bank again and upon his return stopped beside some hedges across the motel and appeared to be looking for something. At about 6:00 p. m., Beck and McDowell came out of the motel and also approached the hedges; one stood by while the other appeared to be looking for something. After the two men departed, a customs patrol officer searched the area and found nothing.
Before departing the motel, Beck had been observed making a telephone call in the lobby and noting airline information on a pad of paper. Treto later determined that the three men were booked on a flight from Tucson to Kansas City at 3:30 p. m. He decided then that he and other officers would make a stop of the men on the way to the airport.
On Saturday, March 12, 1977, at 1:38 p. m., the three men left the motel in a taxi. Nine customs patrol officers in four cars followed the taxi. The agents followed the cab for 20 minutes, and, according to arrangements made by radio, one CPO vehicle pulled in front of the taxi, one went to the left and the other behind to “box in” the taxi and pull it over. Emergency lights were also used. Six agents approached the taxi. The remaining three agents stood on the median strip across from the taxi. All were armed but no guns were displayed at any time. Beck was in the front seat of the taxi and McDowell and Dickerson were in the back. Treto approached the taxi on Dickerson’s side, showed his badge and opened the taxi door, while the other agents proceeded to open the other doors. The three passengers were requested to get out of the taxi. No contraband or weapons were in sight, nor were there any suspicious *500circumstances observed by the officers during this interval of time. Two agents took each man by the arms to different locations around the car. Treto and another agent escorted Dickerson to the rear of the taxi, between the taxi and a CPO vehicle. Treto asked Dickerson routine questions such as who he was, where he had been, and how long he had been in Nogales, even though he admitted he already knew the answers. According to Treto, Dickerson was nervous and his hand shook when he handed his driver’s license to Treto. Treto then asked Dickerson if he minded if Treto searched him and his belongings, to which Dickerson replied either that he didn’t mind or to go ahead. After Dickerson emptied his pockets, Treto frisked him. While patting him down, Treto felt a bulge in Dickerson’s boots. He put his hand inside the boot and under the sock and felt something made of rubber. Treto then arrested Dickerson and advised him of his rights. The boots were subsequently removed to reveal to two packages of heroin wrapped in prophylactics.
Two other agents, Scimone and Herndon, had escorted Beck to the front of the taxi. While Herndon questioned Beck, Scimone simultaneously did a preliminary patdown. After Beck emptied his pockets, Scimone continued the patdown and noticed two large bulges in Beck’s boot. He then asked Beck to remove his boot. As he did so, a package of cocaine, also wrapped in a prophylactic, fell out. A similar package was found in the other boot.
At the evidentiary hearing on the motions to suppress, the district court observed that the case was a close one, but concluded that the agents had founded suspicion to stop and detain the occupants of the taxi and that patdown searches were proper. It also specifically found that probable cause for arrest did not exist at the time of the stop and detention.
ARREST
Appellants preliminarily contend that the conduct of the nine customs patrol officers in effectuating the stop of the taxi in which they were passengers and in further detaining them was such as to constitute an arrest. Because the arrest was without probable cause, appellants further maintain, the arrest was illegal and the evidence seized must be suppressed accordingly.
The line between an arrest without probable cause and an investigatory stop based on founded suspicion is blurred and often difficult to detect, but the task here is less troublesome than in most cases. See United States v. Ramos-Zaragosa, footnote 3, infra.
Whether an arrest has occurred “depends on an evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances,” United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 420 U.S. 924, 95 S.Ct. 1118, 43 L.Ed.2d 393 (1975), and not the subjective intent of the officers involved. Taylor v. State of Arizona, 471 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1130, 93 S.Ct. 948, 35 L.Ed.2d 262 (1973).
While recognizing that a suspicious individual may be briefly stopped and detained for the purposes of limited inquiry and weapons frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), or “to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information,” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), the dimensions of an encounter bettveen the individual and officer may be sufficiently constrictive to cause the average person,1 innocent of crime, to reasonably think that he was being arrested. See United States v. Scheiblauer, 472 F.2d 297, 301 (9t,h Cir. 1973).
In evaluating the surrounding circumstances of the encounter, a significant consideration is the extent that freedom of movement is curtailed. Sibron v. New *501York, 392 U.S. 40, 67, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378, 380 (9th Cir. 1974). However, more than the restriction of liberty is required.2 The other critical consideration is the degree and manner of force used in the stop and detention. But utilization of force in making a stop will not convert the stop into an arrest if it is precipitated by the conduct of the individual being detained, United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 1466, 55 L.Ed.2d 504 (1977); United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d at 1028 29, or if it occurs under circumstances justifying fears for personal safety. United States v. Russell, 546 F.2d 839, 840 (9th Cir. 1976) (Wright, J., specially concurring).
Utilizing the required objective analysis, we conclude that the arrest of Beck and Dickerson occurred prior to the discovery of the contraband by an overwhelming show of authority and by implied restraint which immediately ripened into actual physical restraint and custody. While the question is close, the contrary finding by the trial court that this was a mere investigatory stop and frisk is clearly erroneous.3
Beck, Dickerson and McDowell had shown no signs of hostility or resistance when they were first questioned and searched at the border four days before the abrupt interruption of their planned departure. If anything, the record demonstrates that they were cooperative and acquiescent throughout that prior encounter. They had no previous record of arrests or involvement in smuggling. Furthermore, the search conducted then did not reveal any contraband or concealed weapons. The customs patrol officers also had appellants under surveillance for four days and observed nothing during that time to suggest that any of the three men were armed or dangerous. Treto did recall being advised by the sergeant in Missouri that Beck was a suspect in something involving weapons, but he did not include this information in his report and he admitted that his recollection of the conversation was extremely vague. Moreover, it does not appear that the information was conveyed to the other officers who accompanied Treto.
In addition, unlike the situation in United States v. Russell, supra, the stop did not take place late at night in an isolated area, where fears for personal safety would be justified, but in broad daylight on an open highway in an area purposely chosen because it would be difficult for anyone to flee across the terrain there.
Nor was there anything erratic or unusual about the progress of the taxi or the behavior of appellants to require precautionary force at the time the stop was made. The decision to take nine officers and stop appellants on the way to the airport had been made the night before. The plan to box the taxi in and pull it over and for two agents to take each man was arranged by radio communication as the taxi was followed out of town.
The officers were armed, though they apparently did not draw their guns. Once the taxi was pulled over, Treto, followed closely behind by five other agents, ap*502proached the taxi, showed his badge and opened the door. The other agents surrounded the taxi while three more watched nearby covering the other officers. Although the three men unhesitantly complied with the officers’ request to get out of the taxi and apparently made no threatening gestures of any kind, each was physically escorted by two agents to separate locations where they were then questioned and frisked.
We believe the ordinary citizen, innocent of criminal activity, but who had previously been stopped and searched at the border, would undoubtedly and reasonably have concluded that he was being arrested in the circumstances here. Coates v. United States, supra. The degree of force, even though no guns were drawn or pointed, was unreasonable; it was neither precipitated by the conduct of the appellants nor justified by the immediate environment and events. The circumstances of this case are similar to those in United States v. Strickler, supra. The court there held the arrest was complete when Strickler was encircled by police vehicles and confronted with official orders made at gunpoint. See United States v. Ramos-Zaragosa, 516 F.2d 141, 144 (9th Cir. 1975), and Plazola v. United States, 291 F.2d 56, 60 (9th Cir. 1961). We find that the arrest was complete in our case by the time each man was taken by two agents to separate locations, if not before.
The court below specifically ruled that there was no probable cause for an arrest. We agree with that determination. Most of the activity observed by the agents was innocuous and consistent with the behavior of a typical visitor. Any inferences to be drawn from their observed activities would be contrived at best. Finally, there is a strong suggestion that the stop and detention was a pretext or subterfuge to enable the officers to conduct a warrantless search after having failed to otherwise substantiate their suspicions during the four days of surveillance. The stop and detention of appellants did not occur under the usual exigent circumstances and was not motivated by the need to secure information; it was simply the last chance the officers had. We hold that the stop, with all of the attendant circumstances, was an arrest not based on probable cause, and therefore illegal.
The evidence subsequently seized was a product of the illegal arrest and must therefore be suppressed in accordance with the dictates of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). See United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d at 381.
REVERSED.
. When we use “average” or “ordinary” person, we do so in the same sense as what the “reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the defendant’s shoes,” (Coates v. United States, 134 U.S.App. D.C. 97, 99, 413 F.2d 371, 373 (1969)), and not what the defendant thought.
. Restriction of liberty or movement remains as one of the factors to be considered in determining whether an arrest has been made under these circumstances. We need not, and do not, decide if restriction of movement remains as a relevant part of the analysis where there is a stop authorized by Terry v. Ohio, supra, followed by a “full-bloom” arrest.
. As Judge Sneed put it in United States v. Ramos-Zaragosa, 516 F.2d at 145, “an arrest, unsupported by probable cause [cannot] be saved by redesignating it an investigatory stop.” We are persuaded that Terry v. Ohio does not sanction the police conduct here. Investigatory stops were permitted as “necessarily swift action predicated upon on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat — which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.” 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. The circumstances here differ radically from the context in which Terry v. Ohio, supra, and Adams v. Williams, supra, were decided. On the evidence presented, the district court erred in not finding that an arrest occurred here.