concurring:
After some hesitation, I too conclude that summary judgment was proper in this case, and I concur in the judgment of the court and in the approach adopted by Judge Barnes. Certain conclusions of the trial court do remain troublesome, however, and further comment on these matters seems appropriate.
The standards for determining the constitutionality of systems for electing state legislators set forth in cases such as White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973), and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971), have not yet been applied by the Court to systems for electing city council members or mayors. This was noted in the concurring opinion of four Justices in Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 550, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978), but it was not there suggested how municipal elections differ in relevant respects from cases involving state legislatures. Perhaps in the two cases different weights might be assigned to the analytic elements examined to determine whether or not the election system is unconstitutional, cf. United States v. Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District, 461 F.Supp. 117, 122 (W.D.Tex.1978); 87 Harv.L.Rev. 1851, 1857 (1974), but where a system for electing government representatives is created or maintained for the purpose of discriminating against a minority group, see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), it must be held unconstitutional whether municipal or state elections are involved. As the Fifth Circuit has done, see Marshall v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927, 930 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1978), and cases cited therein, it is appropriate to apply the principles of White, Whitcomb, and other relevant precedents to suits challenging municipal at-large election methods.
The plaintiffs originally brought this suit alleging violation of both the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, but on appeal they do not argue in the briefs that fifteenth amendment standards differ from fourteenth amendment standards. See Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3247 (Sept. 22, 1978) (No. 78-492). Moreover, I assume arguendo that under either or both the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments the court could grant equitable relief to restructure an at-large system where necessary to correct deliberate government acts designed to deprive ethnic minorities of political participation or political benefits, even without a finding that the system itself was maintained with that intent. Nevertheless, that remedy would not be justified in this case, since restructuring the election system is so fully disproportionate to any discriminatory act that might be established after hearing all of the plaintiffs’ evidence here.
The precise wrong the plaintiffs appear to assert in the case is that the city council refused to submit to the electors an ordinance providing for the election of members of the legislative body by or from districts, as is permitted under Cal.Gov.Code § 34871. Based on the evidence adduced by these plaintiffs, I do not think a reasonable finder of fact could conclude, see Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1094 (5th Cir. 1975), that the at-large electoral system of San Fernando was operated or maintained for the purpose or with the intent of discriminating against ethnic minorities.'
The forbidden intent, normally considered a finding of fact, but see United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 425 (7th Cir. 1977), may be inferred either by direct evidence bearing on passage or maintenance of the at-large system, or, as is more usually the case, from evidence bearing on other aspects of the political system. Thus, under White and Whitcomb, improper intent may be inferred from evidence demonstrating that “the political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in question— that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.” 412 U.S. at 766, 93 S.Ct. at 2339.
*1276In Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), aff’d on other ground sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976), the Fifth Circuit developed a framework for district courts considering whether a minority group has been denied equal access to the political process as part of a claim that an at-large plan was maintained with a discriminatory purpose.
The court in Zimmer established two categories, one containing criteria going primarily to the issue of denial of access or dilution, the other containing inquiries as to the existence of certain structural voting devices that may enhance the underlying dilution. The “primary” factors include: the group’s accessibility to political processes (such as the slating of candidates), the responsiveness of representatives to the “particularized interest” of the group, the weight of the state policy behind at-large districting, and the effect of past discrimination upon the group’s participation in the election system. 485 F.2d at 1305. The “enhancing” factors include: the size of the district; the portion of the vote necessary for election (majority or plurality); where the positions are not contested for individually, the number of candidates for which an elector must vote; and whether candidates must reside in subdistricts.
Nevett v. Sides, supra, 571 F.2d at 217 (footnote omitted). While I would not necessarily adopt the Zimmer test as the law of this circuit, it is a useful way to approach whether a minority group has been denied access to the political process.
The Supreme Court’s analysis of challenges to various methods for electing representatives has produced another principle important for resolution of this case. The Court has stated unequivocally that minority groups have no constitutional right to proportional representation in a legislative body. Failure to elect a minority candidate, whether the government entity maintains an at-large election scheme or some other method, does not by itself violate the Constitution. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166-67, 97 S.Ct. 996, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977); id. at 179-80, 97 S.Ct. 996 (Stewart & Powell, JJ., concurring in the judgment); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 148-60, 91 S.Ct. 1858. A showing that minority group candidates consistently lose at the polls may be a prerequisite to a claim, supported by other evidence, that the voting scheme is maintained with discriminatory intent. See Nevett, supra at 223. If, however, the only evidence offered by a plaintiff challenging an at-large voting system is the outcome of elections, summary judgment is appropriate. No reasonable person could infer from only these election results that the at-large method was maintained because of discriminatory intent.
The facts on which plaintiffs base their claim are detailed at greater length in the majority and district court opinions. They include: Mexican-Americans in 1970 constituted 48.9% of the city’s population; the highest percentage of Mexican-American registered voters was 28.7% of all registered voters in 1972; since 1911 three Mexican-Americans have been elected and one appointed to the city council; some Mexican-American poll watchers were harassed during the 1972 elections; half to nearly all the polling places in recent elections have been located in homes of families, none of which are Spanish surnamed;1 a lower percentage of Mexican-Americans are appointed as participants in the mechanics of operating the elections than exists in the general population; a lower percentage of Mexican-Americans have been appointed to city commissions, at least since 1964, than exists in the general population; two construction proposals were considered, one for expansion of a street, and one for the building of *1277an apartment complex, and relevant portions were deleted as a result of sentiment expressed by members of the barrio community; the city failed to place a stoplight at a street intersection in the barrio; prior to 1948 racially restricted covenants existed in real estate deeds; a particular newspaper editorial was printed in 1954; passages from a few newspaper articles from the early 1900’s allegedly contained disparaging words about Mexican-Americans; at the time of a Mexican-American voter registration drive the city clerk in 1972 issued statements concerning alleged voter registration irregularities; and the mayor issued a subsequent statement concerning the efforts of “activists” to take over the city government. Finally, it is undisputed by the parties that the municipality of San Fernando has a population of about 16,500, that its area is approximately two square miles, and that Mexican-American candidates have appeared on the ballot and campaigned for council positions in recent elections.
Assuming that plaintiffs’ factual allegations are true, when taken together, they would not permit a reasonable person to infer that the at-large system for electing the mayor and city council members is maintained because of an invidious intent. Viewed through the Zimmer framework, it is apparent that only a very small number of the facts alleged are probative of discriminatory maintenance of the at-large plan or denial of opportunity to participate in the political processes.
Political parties do not take an active part in city council elections. It is thus not necessary for a potential candidate to secure approval through party primaries or slating processes in order to appear on the ballot. Compare White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 766-67, 93 S.Ct. 2332. Further, Mexican-American candidates have appeared on the ballot and campaigned for council positions in recent elections, and a Mexican-American candidate was almost elected to the council in 1974 and was later appointed to the city council. In addition, there is no claim that the city council set barriers to voting registration. Finally, I note that several of plaintiffs’ allegations of defects in the electoral process resulting from the use of English only in registration and voting procedures appear to be remedied by the Voting Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(a), and Cal.Elections Code § 1635 (1975), and there is no allegation that defendants have not complied with these statutes. This fact is highly probative regarding equal access to the political process. Cf. Hendrix v. Joseph, 559 F.2d 1265, 1268 (5th Cir. 1977).
Also relevant to determining access to the political process is plaintiffs’ evidence regarding the location of many polling places in private white homes outside the barrio. See note 2, supra. The district court made no explicit finding as to the reasons why so few polling places were located in the barrio or in a Mexican-American surnamed home. I believe plaintiffs’ evidence in this respect might be sufficient in other contexts to survive a summary judgment motion, but assuming plaintiffs’ charge of discriminatory placement is true, the facts still cannot reasonably be viewed as indicating denial of access to the political processes which in turn would justify either an inference that the at-large system was maintained because of discriminatory intent or a finding that restructuring the system is the appropriate remedy to cure the violation. There is no substantial evidence in the record indicating that location of polling places has made it systematically more difficult for Mexican-Americans to vote, causing Mexican-Americans who otherwise would have voted to forego voting. More important, placement of polling places is only one component of determining accessibility to the political processes.
The facts advanced by plaintiffs similarly cannot reasonably be viewed as suggesting that San Fernando’s municipal government is unresponsive to the particular interests of the Mexican-American community. Plaintiffs refer to a proposed redevelopment project which was opposed by several barrio residents. The project was substantially altered in response to comments by members of the Mexican-American community, which suggests just the opposite conclusion from what plaintiffs seek to prove.
*1278Plaintiffs’ other evidence regarding unresponsiveness is more substantial. Mexican-American representation on various city commissions is, in general, substantially lower than the percentage of Mexican-American residents or registered voters. The district court found: “The small number of councilmen and commission members from the barrio is due to low civic awareness which is the result of high unemployment and low levels of education and not the result of racial discrimination.” It is not clear that service on the various city commissions requires a high level of education or that the small number of Mexican-American councilmen results from the lack of available qualified Mexican-Americans. The district court’s finding may, after further examination, turn out to be not clearly erroneous, but it was not proper on summary judgment to conclude this result was not the product of deliberate bias. Even assuming invidious discrimination in city commission appointments, however, it does not follow that the present election system must be restructured.
Plaintiffs also present city employment data showing that Mexican-Americans are employed primarily in the nonprofessional and lower salary categories. The district court did not improperly choose between competing reasonable inferences in concluding that professional positions require higher levels of education than nonprofessional positions. Given the undisputed facts that as of 1970 10% of barrio residents had no education, 20.8% had a high school education, and 2.0% had a college education, the employment statistics are insufficient in this context to support a reasonable inference that the city’s hiring policies reflect unresponsiveness to the Mexican-American community.
Hendrix v. Joseph is relevant both to commission appointments and employment data. In that case the Fifth Circuit reviewed a district court holding that the at-large system for electing the county commission of Montgomery County, Alabama, was unconstitutional. The facts were roughly similar to those in the instant case; indeed, plaintiffs’ case was stronger in many respects in Hendrix than here. In its discussion of the commission’s responsiveness to minority interests, the court noted that the commission had already been found guilty of discriminatory hiring practices and was under court order to end those practices. See id. at 1269. Noting that “the hiring disparity here is indicative of some measure of lack of responsiveness since the prerequisites to a hiring discrimination lawsuit include a showing of intentional refusal to hire otherwise qualified persons by the defendant Commission,” the court still concluded: “This finding alone, however, is not enough . . . Hiring disparity is relevant at all only because it is suggestive of the fact that the Commission believes it can treat black citizens unequally with impunity. Such a belief, of course, is in turn a symptom of dilution The allocation of jobs is only one piece of the puzzle.” Id. The court eventually held that, as a matter of law, the facts found by the district court were insufficient to support a finding of unconstitutionality, and remanded for further proceedings. As discussed below, plaintiffs’ evidence may be sufficient in other contexts to justify some relief. I agree with the court in Hendrix that this type of evidence cannot as a matter of law support a finding that the at-large plan is unconstitutional.
The remaining factors of the Zimmer test favor the defendants. The state’s policy supporting at-large plans is long standing. Indeed, it was only in 1955 that California passed a statute permitting cities the option of holding single-member district elections. See Cal.Gov.Code § 34871. Further, the continued vitality of the state and local interests supporting at-large plans is illustrated by recent hearings conducted by the state legislature over various proposals to restructure local election plans. See, e. g., Hearings Before the Assembly Committee on Elections and Reapportionment, Whether City Councilmen Should Be Elected by District; Whether Local Elections Should Become Partisan, October 10, 1975 (conducted at San Fernando City Hall). As to the effect of past discrimination on plain*1279tiffs’ ability to participate in the election system, the relevant facts are the existence of racially restrictive covenants in property deeds, not outlawed until Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948), newspaper articles from the early 1900’s and one from the mid-1950’s which, construed favorably to plaintiffs, show general anti-Mexican-American sentiment in the community, and apparently a lower rate of voter registration among Mexican-Americans than whites. Plaintiffs did not present to this court the percentage of voter registration among eligible Mexican-Americans, but I infer from plaintiffs’ other statistics it is lower than that of whites. San Fernando does not have the history of pervasive official discrimination which is discussed in several Fifth Circuit voting dilution cases. And, while it appears that the residential patterns of the city are at least in part the product of past discriminatory covenants, the relation of this fact either to voter registration data or other indicia of inability to participate in the political process is remote at best. As the court in Hendrix stated: “The factual question is whether that discrimination precludes effective participation in the electoral system by blacks today in such a way that it can be remedied by a change in electoral systems.” 559 F.2d at 1270. On the facts presented, the answer to that question must be no.
Of the “enhancing factors” listed in Zim-mer, three out of four favor the defendants. San Fernando is smaller than most populations where at-large plans have been found unconstitutional. But see Kendrick v. Walder, 527 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1975) (population of 6227). A majority of the votes is not necessary to be elected; the candidates with the most votes are elected to the available positions. A voter in San Fernando need not cast all of his or her allotted votes. The factor which favors plaintiffs is that there is no requirement that candidates reside in any particular geographical district.
“In cases such as these, all factors must be considered, and those which imply a non-diluted system cannot be ignored.” Hendrix, supra at 1270. The standards described in relevant Supreme Court cases do require balancing several elements, and such balancing is normally the province of the finder of fact. Still, there comes a point where the paucity of factors supporting a plaintiff, and the abundance of those supporting the defendant, require that summary judgment be granted. That point has been reached here. Although the case favoring summary judgment is not overwhelming, the facts plaintiffs allege could not reasonably support strong enough inferences on enough aspects of intentional denial of access to the political process to justify striking down the at-large plan. See Hendrix v. Joseph, supra. Cf. Black Voters v. McDonough, 565 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977); McGill v. Gadsen County Commission, 535 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1976).
To conclude that the plaintiffs’ evidence could not justify striking down the at-large election system does not, in my view, necessarily mean that plaintiffs may not be entitled to some relief. For example, plaintiffs’ statistics regarding placement of polling places in private homes, few of which are Spanish-surnamed or located in the barrio, might be sufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion in a lawsuit seeking to have some of the city’s polling places located in the Mexican-American community. Similarly, although a minority group does not have a constitutional right to proportional appointments on municipal commissions, the plaintiffs’ showing in this case regarding Mexican-American representation of city commissions might, after further examination, justify a remedial requirement of increased consideration and/or appointment of Mexican-Americans to such bodies. These factors are mentioned solely to define the limits of our decision and not to suggest the outcome if such a case were presented.
What distinguishes the present case from the possible challenges mentioned above is the weakness of the inference of intent and the more extreme nature of the remedy sought here. Federal courts have required single-member districting plans to be prepared and implemented where plaintiffs *1280have demonstrated the appropriateness of such a remedy. Conceivably, reasonable people presented with plaintiffs’ evidence in this case might make a finding of intentional discrimination in some aspects of the city’s political processes. That evidence is not, however, sufficient to permit invalidation of the at-large electoral mechanism.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the judgment of the court.
. The plaintiffs’ brief summarizes the facts:
For the 1972 election, only 5 out of the 15 polling places were located in public buildings; the remaining polling places were non-Spanish-sumame households. For the 1964 election, only 5 of the 27 polling places were Spanish-sumame households. Out of the 27 polling places for the 1964 election, only 3 were public buildings. In the 1970 elections, out of the 13 polling places, only seven were public buildings, and there were no Spanish-sumame households.