ORDER ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
In his petition for rehearing, John Keith McCauley asserts that the court, in part IIA of its opinion in this case, improperly bypassed constitutional issues he previously raised and brings to our attention Strom-berg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931). Upon reconsideration, we agree that McCauley’s constitutional arguments must be reached but conclude those contentions are without merit.
McCauley challenges on due process grounds the application in this case of the portion of the National Firearms Act (Act) defining “machinegun” as a weapon “designed to shoot * * * automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” 26 *340U.S.C. § 5845(b) (1976) (emphasis added).1 McCauley contends the challenged definition of machinegun (1) is unconstitutionally vague, i.e., fails “to give comprehensible notice of what is required or proscribed [or] to provide a sufficiently definitive standard for nonarbitrary application by the jury,” and (2) permits a conviction without scien-ter for an innocent act, such as possession of a device which, though originally “designed to shoot” automatically, cannot now be made to do so because it lacks an irreplaceable part.
1. Vagueness.
It is “ ‘well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.’ ” United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92, 96 S.Ct. 316, 319, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975), quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975). Here McCauley possessed a Japanese type-96 machinegun in working order except that the gun lacked a magazine necessary for firing more than one shot at a time. The evidence indicates that magazines for Japanese type-96 machineguns are rare, but McCauley’s own expert witness testified that he possessed two such magazines, although they were not for sale. Moreover, the evidence of McCauley’s conversation with a prospective purchaser of the machinegun conclusively demonstrates that McCauley did not possess the machinegun merely as a curio or ornament.
On the facts of this case, we think the challenged portion of the statute, defining “machinegun” as a weapon “designed to shoot” automatically, even taken in isolation, sufficiently advised McCauley that the mere fact that his machinegun was not then equipped with a magazine did not remove his weapon from the Act.2 While one may conceive of marginal fact situations in which notice under this definitional language would be constitutionally inadequate, this is not such a case.3 We therefore reject McCauley’s vagueness challenge to the statute.
2. Scienter.
In United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971), the Supreme Court rejected a blanket attack charging that the Act impermissibly imposes criminal liability for possession of unregistered firearms without a finding of criminal intent, or scienter, as to the unregistered status of the weapons. The Court characterized the Act as “a regulatory measure in the interest of the public safety,” United States v. Freed, supra at 609, 91 S.Ct. at 1118, and concluded that the character of the weapons subject to the Act — “highly dangerous offensive weapons” — justifies liability under the Act without a specific finding of criminal intent.4
*341McCauley seeks to avoid Freed by arguing that,
[i]f literally applied, § 5845(b) makes it a severely punishable crime to possess, without consciousness of wrongdoing or evil intent, a device which, though designed to shoot as a machine gun, can’t and won’t because of the absence of an irreplaceable part, as the jury could have believed of the alleged firearm in this case. It cannot with reason be argued that such a device is invested with [the] inherent dangerousness of the grenades in Freed * * * to justify sacrificing the deeply-rooted moral notions associated with the mens rea requirement in our criminal law * * *.
This high-sounding argument of McCauley, however, misconceives both the import of the “designed to shoot [automatically]” language of section 5845(b) and the record in this case.
An ordinary reading of the “designed to shoot” language does not disclose the broad meaning, encompassing devices lacking “irreplaceable” parts necessary to shoot automatically, contended by McCauley. Moreover, cases arising under the pre-1968 version of the National Firearms Act, which defined a “machinegun” as “any weapon which shoots, or is designed to shoot, automatically * * 5 indicate a narrow construction of that language. See United States v. Leavell, 386 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Lauchli, 371 F.2d 303, 311-13 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Thompson, 202 F.Supp. 503 (N.D.Cal.1962). No indication exists that Congress intended to alter this judicial construction of the “designed to shoot” language when it reenacted the Act, with amendments, in 1968.6 Thus, contrary to McCauley’s premise, it does not appear that the challenged portion of section 5845(b) makes punishable the possession, without criminal intent, of a device that no reasonable effort could render capable of automatic fire.
In addition, the record refutes McCau-ley’s claim that “the jury could have believed” that his machinegun lacked an “irreplaceable” part and therefore was permanently incapable of automatic fire. As already indicated, McCauley’s own evidence at best demonstrated that magazines for a Japanese type-96 machinegun are difficult — not impossible — to obtain. The record contains no evidence indicating complete unavailability of such magazines or effective substitutes.
In sum, McCauley’s machinegun represents the type of highly dangerous offensive weapon placing its possessor on notice that possession of such a weapon “is not an innocent act.” United States v. Freed, supra, 401 U.S. at 609, 91 S.Ct. 1112.
Accordingly, we reject McCauley’s contentions that the conviction violated his constitutional rights.
. McCauley stands, convicted under the Act of possessing an unregistered firearm, specifically, a machinegun. The entire definition of ma-chinegun reads:
(b) Machinegun. — The term “machinegun” means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any combination of parts designed and intended for use in converting a weapon into a machi-negun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person. [26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).]
As the trial court included only the first sentence of § 5845(b) in its jury instructions, the jury considered only the three disjunctive definitions of machinegun contained in that sentence. Arguably, the jury’s verdict may have rested on any of those disjunctive definitions.
. In any event, we think it is beyond peradventure that the complete definition of “machine-gun” in the Act, see note 1 supra, provided adequate notice to McCauley that his machine-gun fell within the Act’s coverage.
. The record, even if viewed in the light most favorable to McCauley, simply fails to support McCauley’s contention that his machinegun is “functionally inert” and therefore not the type of device at which Congress aimed the National Firearms Act.
. In Freed, the defendant stood convicted of possessing unregistered hand grenades. In rejecting his claim that his lack of knowledge of *341the unregistered status of the hand grenades precluded conviction, the Court stated that “one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act.” United States v. Freed, supra, 401 U.S. at 609, 91 S.Ct. at 1118.
. Former 26 U.S.C. § 5848(2) (emphasis added). Congress incorporated the language of this definition, with certain additions, in the 1968 amended version of the Act. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845 (1976).
. Congress in 1968 did, however, extend the coverage of the Act by adding to the definition of “machinegun” the language “can be readily restored to shoot” and the second sentence now appearing in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b), see note 1 supra. See Gun Control Act of 1968, Conf. Rep. No. 1956, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. -, [1968] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 4426, 4434.