specially concurring:
Were the matter open for consideration, I would deny lawyers employed on a contingent fee the right to intervene in order to safeguard their fees, at least when they can protect their interest in some other way. A lawyer is entitled to protection, but he can usually safeguard the fee he has earned by some means other than intervention. In such cases “the disposition of the action [will not] as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest.” Rule 24(a)(2), F.R.C.P.
In Georgia, a lawyer employed on a contingent fee basis has a lien on any recovery, and the suit may not be satisfied until the lien of the attorney is fully satisfied. Ga. Code Ann. (1973) § 9-613. See Dorsey v. Edge, 1947, 75 Ga.App. 388, 43 S.E.2d 425. The attorney has no right to his fee unless the event contracted for has occurred; nor may he recover his fee by action in the cause in which the fee is earned. Haldi v. Allen, 1977, 141 Ga.App. 414, 233 S.E.2d 478. He may, however, if discharged from the case by his client, bring an action under quantum meruit for the reasonable value of services rendered. Brookhaven Supply Co., Inc. v. Rary, 1974, 131 Ga.App. 310, 205 S.E.2d 885. If the client dismisses the suit, settles it, or allows it to lie dormant, the lawyer apparently may also establish the amount of recovery that could have been had, and the consequent amount of his lien, by prosecuting the suit independently. See *768Haldi v. Allen, supra; Dorsey v. Edge, supra.
In Louisiana, (to whose law I advert because our prior decision in Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 5 Cir. 1970, 434 F.2d 52, involved a Louisiana lawyer-client agreement), the attorney’s interest can be protected by filing the contract of employment with the clerk of court; thereafter any settlement or other disposition of the suit or claim by either the lawyer or the client without the written consent of the other is void. LSA-R.S. 37:218.
If there is an absolute right to intervene, the former lawyer may attempt to assert new issues or indeed to interfere with the management of the lawsuit by his successor as if he were a co-owner of the claim when he has only a contingent fee and should only be entitled to protection with respect to payment of the amount due him. See C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 1920 (1972); 3B Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 24.16 (2d ed. 1978).
In the present case, Mr. Lowe seeks only to collect his fee if Dr. Gilbert is successful. That right deserves protection but it can be protected by assertion of a lien. Therefore, I would prefer to hold that he is not entitled to intervene.
However, without discussion of the question of the adequacy of other protection, the right to intervene in these circumstances has been recognized both before the adoption of Rule 24, Barnes v. Alexander, 1914, 232 U.S. 117, 34 S.Ct. 276, 58 L.Ed. 530, and since, Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 5 Cir., supra. These views appear to be binding on us, but I hope that they will be reconsidered some day lest the practice of intervention permitted to lawyers formerly employed by a litigant unnecessarily adds to the length and complexity of trials.