dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the conclusions reached by the majority, except as to the estoppel issue.
It is well recognized under Arizona law that any ambiguities in an insurance contract are construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. O’Brien, 24 Ariz.App. 18, 535 P.2d 46 (1975); and Mesa Oil Co. v. Business Men’s Assurance Co. of America, 476 F.2d 491, 492-93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1003, 94 S.Ct. 358, 38 L.Ed.2d 239 (1973), applying Arizona law.1 Hoyt points out that the phrase “if claim is made” is not defined anywhere in the policy. He, therefore, urges that St. Paul is responsible for any inherent ambiguity in the meaning and consequences of that term and must be prepared to defend and answer any claim against an insured that arguably comes within the policy’s provisions. Hoyt maintains the April 5th letter was within a broad definition of the meaning of a “claim”; i. e., a mere notice that there may have been some negligence on his part in rendering a legal service.
While I do not fully subscribe to Hoyt’s expansive definition of a “claim,” I do agree with Hoyt’s contention that a claim of professional malfeasance was made against him through the content of the April 5th letter well within the policy period. The April 5th letter clearly asserts a claimed financial loss to the Cope estate resulting from a questioned professional practice by Hoyt. It would be foolhardy for any reasonable attorney to interpret Henry’s polite request for Hoyt’s thinking or information on the matter as other than a claim to justify the challenged profession*868al practice or pay up.2 Hoyt’s response of April 11 acknowledged the risk involved and sought to place the blame elsewhere.
The majority attempts to distinguish the rationale of this Court’s opinion in J. G. Link & Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 470 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 829, 94 S.Ct. 55, 38 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973), from the facts here. I am convinced that the rationale of J. G. Link & Co. dictates a reversal of the District Court’s summary judgment. The majority’s attempt to distinguish the holding in J. G. Link & Co. is based solely upon their reading of the April 5th letter. I read that letter as an explicit notice of a “defect” in Hoyt’s professional advice and product. Only a naive attorney and his insurer would think the adverse assertion would evaporate with the coming dawn. The letter was sufficient to elicit Hoyt’s lame excuse of April 11.
St. Paul did not raise the defense of untimely notice of the claim made. The District Court did not reach that issue nor should we. If the majority does not wish to squarely meet and disagree with the rationale of J. G. Link & Co., they should seek a reversal of that precedent.
. However, as the Arizona Court of Appeals cautions:
“While it is true that ambiguities will be construed against the insurer, when a policy’s meaning and intent are clear, it is not the prerogative of the courts to create ambiguities where none exist or to rewrite the contract in attempting to avoid harsh results. . . ” (Citations omitted). Harbor Ins. Co. v. United Services Auto Ass’n., 114 Ariz. 58, 559 P.2d 178, 181 (1978).
See also Pawelczyk v. Allied Life Ins. Co., (App.), 120 Ariz. 48, 583 P.2d 1368, 1371-72 (1978), and Schwab v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 27 Ariz.App. 747, 558 P.2d 942, 946 (1976).
. See J. G. Link & Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 470 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 829, 94 S.Ct. 55, 38 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973), a Montana diversity action, which involved an analogous factual setting. Link, an architect, was covered by an insurance policy which provided coverage “if claim ... is first made against the insured during this policy period.” During the period covered by the policy, complaints relating to squeaks in the floors were brought to Link’s and the contractor’s attention. Link also attended a later meeting where the squeaking floors were discussed. This Court found two ambiguities. With regard to the second stated ambiguity, the Court held that “the insured would be entitled to coverage since the ambiguity of the ‘if claim’ provision is to be construed against the insurer.” Jd. at 1138. See Cornell, Howland, Hayes & Merryfield, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 465 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1972); Brander v. Nabors, 443 F.Supp. 764 (N.D.Miss.), aff’d, 579 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1978).