dissenting:
Because on this record the government has not established probable cause for appellant’s initial arrest for drinking in public, I dissent.
An arrest is among the gravest intrusions of government upon the autonomy of a citizen:
*59No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.1
Once under arrest, an individual is deprived of his liberty. He is also subject to additional, obvious indignities such as handcuffing and body searches.2 And, even if acquitted, an arrest record carries lingering consequences to the individual that may damage both his career and reputation.3
In recognition of these very real harms, the Fourth Amendment assures protection against all unreasonable arrests.4 The stringency of this “reasonability” requirement has long been established: an arrest is not reasonable — or valid — unless the arresting officer obtains a warrant or acts upon probable cause.5 Either route to establishing reasonableness requires grounds sufficient to convince an objective person, removed from the scene, that a citizen has committed a crime necessitating government intrusion into his protected sphere of personal privacy.6 In assessing probable cause the Supreme Court has thus instructed reviewing courts to determine whether challenged police conduct has been “reasonable,” 7 “prudent,”8 or “cautious.”9
An elementary aspect of “reasonable” conduct is that before effecting an intrusion of the gravity of an arrest an officer should seek to confirm his suspicion that an arrest is, in fact, justified.10 In some circumstances, an officer may be forced to rely upon his immediate observations in reaching this determination.11 But where there is no need for immediate action, and potential sources for confirming or denying his suspicion are *60readily at hand, the arresting officer should at least make a minimal inquiry before acting.12 Any lesser standard would permit interference with Fourth Amendment privacy on the basis of mere speculation.13
In the case at hand, the critical question was whether appellant was drinking illegally. This, in turn, depended upon whether drinking was prohibited in the carry-out portion of Barnett’s where the defendant was standing.14 The arresting officer had ample opportunity to learn that drinking was legal there, and yet failed to take this obvious minimal step.15 It is also clear from the record that there was no need for immediate action. The arresting officer testified that he saw appellant “[e]very day practically,”16 including the day before at Barnett’s,17 and there is no evidence the officer had received a single complaint about appellant’s presence or behavior there.
The majority’s finding of probable cause thus rests entirely on their claim that there was no basis “for even a suspicion ”18 that drinking was permitted in the carry-out. This, I submit, blinks reality. Barnett’s is not, as the majority would portray it, a carry-out shop tangentially related to a separately owned and operated “J.J. Lounge.” The majority has not furnished, and I have been unable to find, any record support for its conclusory statements to that effect. The evidence in the record indicates that the J.J. Lounge is part of Barnett’s, separated only by a common kitchen from the carry-out section where appellant was arrested.19 Indeed, from this record it is un*61clear whether there is even a separate entrance to the lounge.20 The majority therefore states things backwards when it asks whether a reasonable police officer would have had reason to suspect that the “J.J. Lounge liquor license would cover the entire premises.”'21 The question, instead, is whether the officer acted reasonably in assuming that Barnett’s license was so restricted that it applied to only one portion of the establishment.
The officer knew that liquor was regularly sold in the lounge portion of Barnett’s.22 He also knew that the carry-out and lounge were part of a single establishment sharing a common kitchen and owned and operated by the same proprietor.23 Further, the photographs submitted as government exhibits reveal the character of the neighborhood in which Barnett’s is located: next door is a liquor store, and on the front window of Barnett’s is an advertisement for a nearby “Crystal Room” featuring “Go Go Girls” and “Mixed Drinks. 24 Barnett’s, as far as these photographs reveal, is indistinguishable from these surroundings. In the face of such facts, plainly “observable on the scene,”251 cannot fathom how a “prudent,” “cautious,” and “reasonable” police officer would arrest and handcuff someone for quietly drinking beer in the carry-out without at least taking the time to ask whether drinking in that part of Barnett’s was illegal. Even if this minimal inquiry would not have yielded a ready answer — which under the circumstances would seem to be incredible — it was the least that could be expected before subjecting a citizen to the indignity and serious deprivation of an arrest. The Constitution requires as much.26
In the absence of that minimal inquiry, there was no probable cause for appellant’s arrest. Since the evidence seized in the subsequent search was inadmissible,27 I would reverse the conviction resting on such evidence.28
. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 1001, 35 L.Ed. 734 (1891)).
. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973).
. As this court has stated:
Even if no direct economic loss is involved, the injury to an individual’s reputation may be substantial. Economic losses themselves may be both direct and serious. Opportunities for schooling, employment, or professional licensing may be restricted or nonexistent as a consequence of the mere fact of an arrest, even if followed by acquittal or complete exoneration of the charges involved.
Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (footnotes omitted).
. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S.Const. amend. IV (emphasis added).
. See Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958) (warrant); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (probable cause known to the arresting officer). The probable cause requirement of the warrant clause is applicable to warrantless arrests as “the accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience as to the minimum justification necessary to make the kind of intrusion involved in an arrest ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2254, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).
. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80, 83 S.Ct. 407, 413, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971).
. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959).
. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).
. Thus, the Supreme Court has often emphasized that mere suspicion of crime cannot constitute probable cause. See e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).
. For example, an arrest may be permissible when an individual reasonably suspected of criminal activity goes into flight upon the approach of the police. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968).
. See e.g. United States v. Barber, 557 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1977) (no probable cause where officers confronted with possible illegal passage of counterfeit bill failed to take simple investigatory steps); Lawrence v. Henderson, 478 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1973) (possession by suspect fitting robber’s description of uncuffed trousers still bearing store label insufficient to establish probable cause absent further investigation); Winfield v. United States, 430 F.Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (arrest held to be without good faith belief of probable cause where no danger of flight by suspect and police failed to investigate identity or question suspect before arrest). As the court stated in Filer v. Smith, 96.Mich. 347, 55 N.W. 999 (1893):
An officer is not warranted in relying upon circumstances deemed by him suspicious, when the means are at hand of either verifying or dissipating those suspicious without risk, and he neglects to avail himself of those means.
Id. 55 N.W. at 1002. This is no more than the familiar tort principle that nonnegligent conduct requires reasonable inquiry before risking serious harm to others. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts 163 (3d ed. 1964).
. “The history of the use, and not infrequent abuse, of the power to arrest cautions that a relaxation of the fundamental requirements of probable cause would ‘leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.’ Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 [, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879].” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479, 83 S.Ct. 407, 413, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (footnote omitted).
. Appellant was arrested for violating 25 D.C. Code § 128 (1978), which prohibits consumption of alcoholic beverages in any “street, alley, park, parking, or unlicensed public place ” and carries a maximum fine of $100 and/or 90 days imprisonment. Id. (emphasis added). Barnett’s did not come within the terms of the statute because it maintained a Class C Retailer’s license, entitling it “to keep for sale and to sell spirits, wine, and beer.” 25 D.C. Code § 111(g) (1978).
. The arresting officer testified he “had been walking that beat since 1975,” Trial Transcript of April 27, 1979 (D.D.C. Crim. No. 79-120) (Tr.) at 19, yet never ascertained the status of Barnett’s Alcohol Dispensing License. Tr. at 24.
There can be no doubt, despite certain equivocal language of the Majority, that drinking was permitted in the carry-out. Not only did appellant provide the trial court with a copy of Barnett’s license (which no one claimed was in any respect different from Barnett’s license at the time of the arrest), see Tr. at 22-23, but the government’s own witness at the suppression hearing testified that Barnett’s possessed such a license and that the owner had informed him that someone could walk in off the street and buy liquor at Barnett’s. Tr. at 21; see Tr. 24-25.
. Tr. at 19.
. Tr. at 24.
. Supra at p. 56 (emphasis added).
. Mr. Barnett is the owner and operator of both the carry-out and the lounge, Tr. at 19, and his name appears in bold letters above the establishment’s entryway. Gov’t Exh. 2A. *61Furthermore, in the proceedings below the word “Barnett’s” was used repeatedly to describe the entire establishment. See, e.g., Tr. at 20-21; 29; 32. As just one example, the following exchange took place toward the close of the suppression hearing:
THE COURT: Is there any legal definition in the District of Columbia that the front of Barnett’s is any different from the middle of it? They [the police] had no right to go in there and bother him at all, did they?
[PROSECUTOR]: That is true, Your Hon- or, that is correct. I can’t deny that.
Tr. at 32.
The majority cites the testimony of the arresting officer that “Mr. Barnett runs three separate operations there.” Supra at p. 55 (quoting Tr. at 19). Apparently this is intended to show that the lounge and carry-out were distinct establishments, bearing little if any relation to each other. The fact that the officer spoke of “three separate operations” should suffice to rebut this contention. One of these “separate” operations was simply the “area in between [the lounge and the carry-out] for the preparation of food.”
Tr. at 19.
. Supra at p. 55 n.2.
. Supra at p. 56.
. Tr. at 21.
. See note 19 supra.
. See Gov’t Exh. 2A.
. See supra at p. 57 n.6.
. The majority’s fear that invalidating appellant’s arrest would “require police officers to know at all times the specific structures covered by all liquor license,” supra at p. 57 (emphasis added), is plainly inapposite. All that is required is the limited inquiry that simple prudence dictates when an officer intends to make an arrest and can confirm his suspicions with risk neither to himself or the public.
. This is true whether the search is viewed as a search incident to an unlawful arrest, see Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), or as a seizure of property discarded as a result of unlawful police activity, see United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1979); Lawrence v. Henderson, 478 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1973); Fletcher v. Wainright, 399 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1968); Work v. United States, 243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Williams v. United States, 237 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
. The government’s evidence at trial consisted entirely of the Kool package, testimony about its contents, and the circumstances of its seizure from appellant, all of which derived from appellant’s illegal arrest. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
*62Another troubling aspect of this case is the trial court’s failure to articulate its reasons for allowing the government to introduce evidence that the defendant was arrested within 175 yards of Woodson High School despite the clear danger that this evidence might be unduly prejudicial. See Tr. at 53. We have counseled before that effective appellate review under Rule 403 is impossible unless the trial court “confront[sj the problem explicitly, acknowledging and weighing both the prejudice and the probative worth of [proposed evidence] in the spirit of balancing stressed in the Federal Rules.” United States v. Robinson, 530 F.2d 1076, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See United States v. Slade, 627 F.2d 293, at 304, (D.C.Cir., 1980) (abuse of discretion for trial court not “to attempt to strike any balance between the relevance and potential prejudice of the evidence.”). See also United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1978) (trial court should give clear statement of process of balancing probativeness and prejudice); John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632, 635 (3d Cir. 1977) (same); United States v. Dwyer, 539 F.2d 924, 928 (2d Cir. 1976) (same); [1979] 1 Weinstein’s Evidence ' 403[02] at 403 - 14 to 403-15 (same).
Here, where appellant was prosecuted for intent to distribute dangerous narcotics, the government’s reference to Woodson High School and its students was obviously highly inflammatory. See United States v. Works, 526 F.2d 940, 946 (5th Cir. 1976) (reference in similar prosecution to “two high school-looking kids” held inadmissible); United States v. Parkison, 417 F.Supp. 730, 734 (E.D.Wis.1976) (government barred in similar prosecution from referring to junior high school across the street from defendant’s residence because “the relevance was greatly outweighed by the possibility of prejudice to the defendant”). And the proposed use of this evidence here called for especially sensitive balancing under Rule 403, because the evidence’s relevance was predicated entirely on the intervening assumption that the high quality heroin found in the cigarette pack would be diluted by adolescent purchasers — an assumption that was never directly supported by government witnesses. Cf. United States v. James, 555 F.2d 992, 1000 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (danger of prejudice rendered evidence inadmissible where inference necessary for relevance attenuated by need for intervening premises).
As an appellate tribunal, to be sure, we are bound to accept the trial court’s balance under Rule 403 absent an abuse of discretion. United States v. Williams, 561 F.2d 259, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See supra at p. 58. But, “discretion does not mean immunity from accountability.” United States v. Dwyer, supra, 539 F.2d at 928. By failing to explain how it reconciled the danger of prejudice associated with the evidence about the high school with the probative value of that evidence, the trial court has made any review of its exercise of discretion highly speculative.