dissenting:
Respectfully, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the acts of the petitioner-employer (TRW) justify the heavy hand laid upon it by the Board. Although recognizing that ours is a limited scope of review with only substantial evidence necessary to support the Board’s findings, my review of this record results in findings and conclusions which differ markedly from that of the majority. I find the credible evidence fails to justify the setting aside of the election results and the other relief ordered by the Board. For purposes of clarity, the headings in the majority opinion are used in the notation of my principle objections.
A. Coercive Interrogation
The AU, Board and majority found coercive interrogation. The ALJ and Board found eight instances; the majority found two, noting that it was questionable whether the others were supported by substantial evidence. I do not share the majority’s hesitance or uncertainty; the instances glossed over are not supported by substantial evidence. For example, a new supervisor, Gisela Wilson, called an employee, George Thomas, into her office to inquire how he felt about the union. According to Thomas, he told her that he had not made up his mind. Wilson responded that it was *422his decision to make and she apologized for asking. Incredibly, the AU concluded: “I find that her interrogation of Thomas was coercive.”
Other equally “compelling” examples of coercive interrogation found by the Board include two instances of a supervisor asking an employee what he thought about the union, one instance of a supervisor asking an employee what he thought about the company, a supervisor asking an employee if he was going to a union meeting, and a supervisor telling an employee who had been wearing a union badge: “I see you don’t have your badge on today.”
The majority opinion focuses on conversations between Safety and Training Director Sam Wyse and employees Milton Andrews and Willie Sutton. None of these three were employed by TRW at the time of the hearing before the AU. Wyse did not testify, and the testimony of Andrews and Sutton is singularly unimpressive. I conclude that they in fact were not coerced by their conversations with Wyse, nor were these conversations reasonably likely to coerce or intimidate these men. Wyse tried to pump Sutton about union activities; he got nowhere. If anyone were intimidated in that discussion, it obviously was not Sutton.
The conversation with Andrews is equally insipid with one minor exception, a mote which became a beam in the eye of the ALJ and Board. Wyse inquired of Andrews of the attitude of the employees. Wyse wanted to know what the employees thought of him. I admit to a total failure of comprehension how this could possibly constitute coercive interrogation. Wyse was not circumspect, he asked Andrews to go to union meetings and brief him on what “was going on.” Andrews refused and that was the end of that episode. Wyse should not have asked, but he got an unqualified answer which concluded the matter. This does not rise to the level of misconduct sufficient to set aside an election.
The conversations detailed in the ALJ findings, more particularly the whole of the conversations as contained in the transcript, are representative of the hyperbole and rhetoric neither foreign nor uncommon to an election contest. There were things which should not have been said on both sides, but these instances of excesses did not so permeate the election atmosphere as likely to lead to an impermissibly distorted result.
B. Solicitation to Report on Union Activities
This incident has already been alluded to. Wyse asked Andrews to attend union meetings and, in the language of the majority, “report to management the activities of the Union.” Wyse should not have done this. As noted, Wyse did not testify, It is impossible to know with certainty his purpose, motivation or intent from this record. Regardless, this impropriety does not justify today’s ruling.
C. Threats of Plant Closure, Job Loss and Loss of Promotion
Much is made about these allegations, but as I view the evidence, it merely points to the rhetoric and semantic excesses of a moderately heated election campaign. I conclude that the record does not support the finding that anything said or written by TRW representatives could reasonably be interpreted as (1) a threat to close the plant, (2) a threat of job loss, or (3) a threat to loss of promotion if the employees voted union. Spectres were raised by both sides. As the ALJ correctly concluded regarding a number of other allegations, this was all part of the election campaign and the employees could sort it out, just as is done in other election matters. Much is also made of the October 7, 1977 letter which TRW sent to its employees in response to a letter dated September 30, 1977 which the Union had sent to the employees. That letter ended with the exhortation: “We, therefore, ask you not to sign a Union Card or anything else until and unless you know exactly what your obligations and liabilities will be if you do.” It strains credulity that this statement is found to be evidence of an unfair labor practice. I find it to be sound advice to be offered in any situation: know what you are signing, and its effects, before you sign.
*423D. Threats of a Regressive Bargaining Posture
Finally, TRW is faulted because its manager, Roland Springstroh, and a supervisor made statements in which they purportedly threatened to take a regressive or intransigent bargaining position if the Union were successful in the election. I am in total disagreement with this finding. It is correct that these men informed the employees that bargaining sessions would begin “from scratch” and that the negotiators would start with' a “blank sheet of paper,” the latter statement being graphically demonstrated by holding up a blank sheet of paper. This plain vanilla bit of dramatics somehow becomes unclean and then illegal. I believe it to be neither.
Critical evidence in this aspect of the dispute was noted by the AU, who referred to the testimony of Springstroh telling the employees that “during negotiations, wages and benefits could go up, remain the same, or go down.” An editorial in the company newspaper contained the. same statement and testimony of employees corroborated Springstroh.
I differ with my colleagues in the majority when they conclude that the “blank paper” and “bargain from scratch” scenario constitutes an unfair labor practice which warrants the Board’s order.
Conclusion
The AU’s findings of coercive interrogation are purely conclusory. He failed to follow the test first enunciated in Bourne v. N. L. R. B., 332 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1964), and subsequently adopted by this circuit and underscored on several occasions. See Federal-Mogul Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 566 F.2d 1245, 1250 (5th Cir. 1978), and cases there cited. The majority opinion attempts to fill this void in a careful and scholarly manner. I remain unconvinced.
Today’s holding is inconsistent with our prior decisions, particularly the holdings in Paceco v. N. L. R. B., 601 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1979), Delco-Remy Div., General Motors Corp. v. N.L.R. B., 596 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1979), and Federal-Mogul, supra. In Federal-Mogul we refused to enforce an order of the Board which was based, inter alia, on alleged coercive interrogation and statements. The Federal-Mogul court noted the ALJ’s failure (actually refusal) to apply the Bourne test. In Delco-Remy we denied enforcement of an order ostensibly based on coercive interrogation, soliciting aid against the union, and threatening discharge. The Delco-Remy court did not find these charges supported by substantial evidence. In Paceco we vacated an order of the Board and remanded for failure of the Board to set forth the legal standards by which it determined that the interrogation was coercive. The Paceco court again underscored the viability of the Bourne standards which the Board had failed to apply, just as the ALJ and Board failed in the case at bar.
Based on my appreciation of the credible evidence in this record and my understanding of the teachings of our prior jurisprudence, particularly the trilogy cited in the foregoing paragraph which I find controlling and dispositive, I would deny enforcement of the Board’s order. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.