dissenting:
I dissent. I disagree that the standard of review is based on Canal Authority v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974) and the four requirements set forth in the majority opinion. While the district court entered an order denying plaintiff’s motion for temporary injunction, the motion was in reality treated as one for a permanent injunction on the merits. The court’s order was fifty-one pages in length and as complete and thorough as a final permanent injunction could be. The case was before the court one year, testimony lasted six days, there were countless exhibits, and the case was under advisement in excess of eight months. In discussing the four prerequisites for a temporary injunction, this court has said:
In considering these four prerequisites, the court must remember that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy which should not be
*444granted unless the movant clearly carries the burden of persuasion. The primary justification for applying this remedy is to preserve the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits.
Although the fundamental fairness of preventing irremediable harm to a party is an important factor on a preliminary injunction application, the most compelling reason in favor of [granting a preliminary injunction] is the need to prevent the judicial process from being rendered futile by defendant’s action or refusal to act.
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2947. Thus only those injuries that cannot be redressed by the application of a judicial remedy after a hearing on the merits can properly justify a preliminary injunction.
Canal Authority v. Callaway, 489 F.2d at 573. This heavy burden of persuasion should not have been placed on the plaintiffs in view of the fact that a trial on the merits was in fact conducted.
I also disagree with the majority that the federal defendants complied with the law.
Section 4332(2)(C)(iii) of Title 42 requires that an environmental impact statement contain a detailed statement of “alternatives to the proposed action.” This requirement is mandatory, explicit, and incumbent upon “all agencies of the Federal Government.” I cannot find that the rapid transit alternative was ever expressly considered by the Federal Government in any environmental impact statement prepared for the proposed highway expansion.
The proper role of the court in reviewing an environmental impact statement is to “determine whether the agency complied with the procedures mandated [by NEPA].”1 I therefore cannot determine upon what ground this court may infer the consideration of an alternative where none has been provided. I have examined the EIS’s, have found no express consideration of MARTA’s rapid rail system as an alternative to the proposed highway expansion, and fail to see how this court may infer such a consideration based upon the “no-build” alternative.
Our affirmance here permits the defend- • ants United States Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration to avoid compliance with the law.
In a December 20, 1977, memorandum to Secretary Adams, Urban Mass Transit Administrator Page stated:
Both of these large investments probably are not needed in the same corridor, at least not until well after the turn of the century.
* * * * * *
The problem is we cannot be sure of this because there never has been an analysis of the promising scaled down rail and highway options.
* * sft # * #
We have insisted on this type of alternative analysis in Washington, Baltimore, Boston and about 20 other large cities around the nation and we should do the same thing in Atlanta.
In a January 25, 1978, memorandum from Assistant Secretary Davenport to Secretary Adams, he stated:
The proposed improvement [1-85] is in the same corridor where the next phase of the Atlanta rapid rail system would be built and UMTA is concerned about its impact on the viability of MARTA.
* * * * # *
From our view it appears unlikely that both the 1-85 improvements and the full extension of MARTA will be needed to meet the passenger demand in the corridor through 1990. Clearly, the construction of the additional highway capacity will affect MARTA ridership.
In the Decision Memorandum Secretary Adams decided to: “Approve the EIS for 1-75/85 and do not require the highway to *445be included in a corridor alternatives analysis ”
As I read the law and the environmental impact statement, I can only conclude that the Federal Government did not follow the mandates of the statute.
With regard to the segmentation issue, I also respectfully dissent. The law is well settled that, under NEPA, segmentation of highway projects is improper for purposes of preparing EIS’s.2 Although there are significant exceptions to this rule, as, for example, where segmented projects have “substantial independent utility,”3 these exceptions do not fit this case. Defendants intend to redesign the Brookwood Interchange into a six-lane expressway (actually eight lanes) running parallel to an already existing four-lane expressway.
It is illogical to think that the Brookwood Interchange can be considered in a vacuum without also considering the impact it will have on the other components of the highway system, including Northern DeKalb 1-85 and the Downtown Connector. It makes little sense to segment components which must function as a unitary system in order to facilitate the efficient movement of traffic, and I therefore cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the three highway segments can be defined as “separately proposed to accomplish independent purposes.”4
. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417, 91 S.Ct. 814, 823, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971).
. Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982, 987 (5th Cir. 1974).
. Inman Park Restoration, Inc. v. Urban Mass Transportation Administration, 414 F.Supp. 99 (N.D.Ga.1975).
. Maj. at 441.