dissenting.
The majority have determined that the National Labor Relations Board did not abuse its discretion1 by refusing to defer to an arbitrator’s decision in a contract dispute grounded on the same facts precipitating the unfair labor practice charge. They further hold that substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that General Warehouse Corporation violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3). I disagree on both counts.
I.
In analyzing the Board’s refusal to defer to the arbitrator, the majority appear to minimize a stipulated fact that I consider extremely important: General Warehouse and the union2 raised and introduced testimony on the issue of unlawful discrimina*974tion before the arbitrator.3 Although the arbitrator did not explicitly address the issue in his memorandum, the majority’s conclusion that the arbitrator failed to consider the evidence reflects an unjustifiable interpretation of his award.
This court’s decision today ultimately must reconcile the arbitrator’s decision that “there was just cause for the discharge of John Coon” with the Board’s decision4 that General Warehouse discharged Coon for discriminatory purposes in violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and (3). If the arbitrator’s decision means that just cause existed for the discharge and also that the discharge was for just cause, then it must logically follow that the arbitrator implicitly considered and rejected Coon’s argument that the discharge was for an illicit cause. Such a conclusion would be in full accord with the case law of . this court on “dual motives,” see Edgewood Nursing Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 1978) (“if the employee would have been fired for cause irrespective of the employer’s attitude toward the union, the real reason for the discharge is nondiscriminatory.”); it would also mandate deferral to the arbitrator’s decision by the NLRB, see, e. g., Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 2, slip op. at 4, [1979-80] CCH N.L.R.B.Rep. 116,648, at 31,080 (1980) (for deferral, unfair labor practice issue must have been “both presented to and considered by the arbitrator.”). Moreover, a Board decision that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice by discriminatorily discharging Coon would be factually irreconcilable with the arbitrator’s decision that the discharge was for just cause.
To reconcile the Board’s order with the arbitrator’s decision is to require a crabbed interpretation of the arbitrator’s decision, an interpretation contrary to Board decisions and ruling case law. Under Edge-wood Nursing Center, “if the employer puts forward a justifiable cause for discharge of the employee, the Board must find that the reason was a pretext....’’ 581 F.2d at 368. To be consistent with the Board’s finding of a pretextual dismissal in this case, the arbitrator’s finding of “just cause” for dismissal must be totally devoid of a causal relationship to the discharge. If the arbitrator found “just cause” and stopped short of relating that cause to the dismissal, then and only then can the two positions become reconcilable. It would be a bizarre interpretation indeed to conclude that the arbitrator stopped so short, yet so far away, from his duty to resolve the dispute before him.5 Yet that is precisely the scenario the *975Board has fashioned for this court, and the majority have accepted it.
This implausible interpretation of the arbitrator’s decision, to be sure, runs counter to the linchpin of labor litigation: the courts must show proper deference to labor arbitration. The Supreme Court cautioned in the Steelworkers Trilogy that
[arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award. To require opinions free of ambiguity may lead arbitrators to play it safe by writing no supporting opinions. This would be undesirable for a well-reasoned opinion tends to engender confidence in the integrity of the process and aids in clarifying the underlying agreement.
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960) (footnote omitted); see also Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352, 355 (9th Cir. 1979). Simply put, the Supreme Court has ordered the federal judiciary and the federal administrative agencies to avoid nitpicking arbitral opinions, thereby diluting the power of the arbitrators and discarding the finality due consensual arbitration.
By assuming that the arbitrator found the existence of “just cause” for dismissal in Coon’s excessive absenteeism, yet failed to determine that this excessive absenteeism was the cause of the dismissal, the Board has interpreted the arbitrator’s award in the most unfavorable light, and has construed the award by resolving all inferences against the effectiveness of arbitration. I disagree strongly with this approach because it runs counter to our national labor policy favoring arbitration of disputes.
In my view, the proper way to interpret any arbitration award is to assume, absent some substantial countervailing indication, that the arbitrator did his job. In this case, his job was to determine not only whether Coon was excessively absent, a point not seriously contested, but more important whether General Warehouse actually discharged him for that reason. If this eminently reasonable assumption is entertained, the only conclusion to be drawn from the arbitrator’s order and accompanying memorandum is that Coon was discharged for excessive absenteeism. Under this interpretation, the arbitrator’s decision can be “arguably reconciled with the policies of the Act,” NLRB v. Pincus Brothers, Inc.—Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 375 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rosenn, J., opinion announcing judgment of the court). Board deferral is required in this situation under Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).6
Accordingly, I would hold that the NLRB abused its discretion in refusing to defer to the arbitrator, and I would deny enforcement.
II.
I now turn to the determination of whether the Board’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. The proper focus is on what I believe to be the crucial finding supporting the Board’s decision, as phrased by the majority: “[t]he Company took absences that had previously been condoned *976and used them as a reason for dismissing Coon.” Maj. op., at 973. Supporting this statement is the opinion of the administrative law judge:
[General Warehouse] contends [Coon] was discharged because of excessive absences, the most recent being on April 4. That he was absent a considerable number of times is amply supported by the record. But because justifiable grounds for discharge existed, it does not necessarily follow such was the motivating reason. The entire record must be examined .... By letter dated November 22, the Respondent pointed out to Coon he had been absent on November 2, 16-18. Coon was suspended without pay for one week[,] later changed to 2 days — December 5 and 6. (G.C. Ex. 10 and 13) Respondent’s records show he was out 14 work days in 1978 prior to his April 5 absence when he was discharged — January 5-6, 13, 16-19, February 13 and 20, March 6, 14-17. The record further shows he called in to report his . absence on only three of these occasions. (G.C. Ex. 3A) Yet after his suspension in early December 1977, he received no written or oral warnings. And then the Respondent lowered the boom on him when he was absent on April 5.
ALJ’s mem. op., typescript at 7, reprinted in app. at 224. Considering the undisputed poor attendance record of Coon in light of the other circumstances existing up to the time of the discharge, I find the conclusion that General Warehouse condoned Coon’s prior absences unsupportable on this record.
The undisputed evidence before the ALJ does not show condonation. The employer’s past practice indicates that a three month interval between warning letters was not unusual. The first warning to Coon on July 2, 1976, covered the period April to July 1976 (three months). A letter of December 1, 1976, covered October and November (two months). Another letter on September 1, 1977, covered January through August (eight months). Although the penultimate letter of November 22, 1977, covered four absences in November, it followed the previous letter by over two months. ALJ’s mem. op. at 7, reprinted in app. at 224. By that letter, Coon was suspended for two days without pay in December, 1977, and neither the union nor Coon challenged the propriety of that action. During the first three months of 1978, Coon had been absent fourteen days, but had called in to report his intention to be absent on only three of those occasions. The dispatch of four warning letters — from July 1976 to November 1977 — plus a suspension in December 1977 to me does not represent condonation. It reflects dissatisfaction and use of every sanction available to the company except the ultimate one — dismissal. The company’s hesitance in invoking the ultimate sanction is consistent with the intervals it waited to impose the lesser sanctions.
But further, by concluding that the company condoned Coon’s absenteeism over this three month period, the Board has erected a classic Catch-22 situation. If the employer had discharged Coon during the wage dispute, it would have subjected itself to charges of attempting to coerce a waiver of the cost of living increase. But by waiting until the dust had settled on the wage dispute to invoke its rights under the contract, the employer is held to have condoned the absences and has subjected itself to a charge of retaliation. I have no doubt that Mr. Coon will relish this irony all the way to the bank.
The finding of condonation is central to the ultimate decision. Without it, the record shows a persistent pattern of unexcused absences, continuing in disregard of the increasing sanctions imposed by the company. Absent evidence that less vocal employees with similarly poor attendance records were retained, a decision that General Warehouse discriminated against Coon must rely on more direct evidence of discrimination. That evidence, according to the ALJ, was the Wrigley work. See ALJ’s mem. op., typescript at 8, reprinted in app. at 225. No inference arises from Coon’s assignment to that work once, on April 3, but the ALJ deemed Coon’s assignment to it a second consecutive day to be quite significant. The objection to the Wrigley work was not *977handling that company’s goods per se; the objection lay in the difficulty of manhandling heavy cartons of chewing gum.7 The first day Coon performed the work, however, the cars contained only Wrigley display racks, not cartons of Wrigley gum. See ALJ’s mem. op. at 5 n.ll, reprinted in app. at 222 n.ll.8 Because his employer required him to perform the offensive work — unloading and stacking the packages of gum — only once, the union’s claim that Coon received discriminatory work assignments lacks support in the record considered as a whole.
Greater awareness of, and sensitivity to, the “common law of the shop” regarding Wrigley work could have made the clear distinction between boxes of chewing gum and display racks determinative. Not surprisingly, the AU’s failure to grasp this distinction has put him at odds with the decision of the arbitrator, in whom the parties have entrusted application of the “common law of the shop.” United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). This failure therefore offers additional support for deferral under Spielberg.
Accordingly, because I believe that the Board abused its discretion in refusing to defer to the arbitrator, producing an inconsistency between the arbitral award and the Board order, and because the Board’s order is not supported by substantial evidence, I would refuse to enforce the order that John Coon be reinstated with backpay.
. Until today, the appropriate scope of review of Board orders refusing to defer to arbitrators had been unsettled in this court. Compare NLRB v. Pincus Brothers, Inc. — Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 372 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rosenn, J., opinion announcing judgment of the court), with id. at 380-81 (Garth, J., concurring). Even under the abuse of discretion standard employed by the court today, however, I believe that the Board’s order should not be enforced.
. Union Local 641, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America.
. Before the administrative law judge, Martin J. Brenner, attorney for General Warehouse, and Paul A. Montalbano, attorney for the General Counsel of the Board, stated:
MR. BRENNER: It is further stipulated that the issue of discrimination for both Mr. Coon’s alleged concerted action and with regard to the Wrigley loads was raised and testimony was adduced on both of those facets of alleged discrimination at the arbitration hearing held before the New Jersey State Board of Mediation on June 22, 1978.
MR. MONTALBANO: General Counsel so stipulates.
[ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE]: I’m not sure I heard that fully with respect to the issue of concerted action. Do you want to repeat that part of it?
MR. BRENNER: Yes, that the issue was raised and that evidence was adduced on both sides with regard to the allegation of discrimination against Mr. Coon and discharge of Mr. Coon because of ... his concerted actions and activities with regard to the union and the work conditions of the men.
MR. MONTALBANO: Judge, in that stipulation General Counsel would like it to be noted that .. . General Counsel enters into the stipulation with the understanding that the stipulation does not ... go to ... the weight or the quality of entering the evidence which was adduced, that the report may have been adduced at the arbitration, there’s been no record of it, but the stipulation merely should be interpreted and given the weight as it appears the issue was raised and some testimony ... was adduced on the issue.
[ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE]: You’re not contending, I understand it, that it was not a fair hearing are you?
MR. MONTALBANO: No we’re not.
App. at 49-50.
. The Board adopted the recommended order of the administrative law judge. 247 N.L.R.B. No. 142, reprinted in App. at 231. '
. This interpretation does not accord even with the language of the contract. Article 47 of the collective bargaining agreement states in part *975that “[t]he Employer shall not discharge nor suspend any employee without just cause and the written notice of discharge or suspension must set forth the specific reason(s) for such action.” New Jersey-New York Area General Trucking Supplemental Agreement, Art. 47, § 1, reprinted in App. at 189. By arguing that Coon’s discharge resulted from other motivations, the union evidenced its understanding that to satisfy the agreement the discharge must be causally connected to the “just cause.”
. In Spielberg, the B,oard indicated that deferral is appropriate when “the proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act.” 112 N.L. R.B. at 1082. Today the majority adopt a fourth requirement for Board deferral, that the unfair labor practice was both submitted to and considered by the arbitrator. Maj. op., at 968-969. I do not disagree with the selection of this precept, but, as my analysis shows, I believe it has been incorrectly interpreted and applied in this case.
. The General Counsel’s brief notes:
The least desirable assignment at the plant, in the view of the warehousemen, was the job of unloading freight cars from Wrigley, one of the Company’s customers. (A.223; 41, 101-102). The Wrigley cars are loaded with 40-45 pound cartons of gum which are slippery and tightly packed. They are stacked by hand, rather than with pallets. Because the cases are packed “very low,” the one man assigned to the job is required to be “constantly bending to pick and lift the weight ... all the time.” (A.223; 41-42, 76, 100-101.)
Brief for Petitioner at 6.
. Coon’s testimony regarding the Wrigley work of April 3 indicates that the work was much less strenuous than usual:
MR. MONTALBANO: What was in the car Mr. Coon?
[MR. COON]: There were ... wire racks that Wrigley uses to make their display stores.
Q Did the car have gum in it?
A No it had no gum.
[ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE]: Well was that strenuous work too?
[MR. COON]: Not half as bad, not one 10th as bad.
[ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE]: But was this in the same area that you described as an area where it was a form of punishment?
[MR. COON]: Yes sir.
[ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE]: But the work wasn’t that difficult — Is that what you’re telling us?
[MR. COON]: Not that car, no sir.
App. at 45 — 46.