concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Appellant charges the Bureau of the Census with a variety of discriminatory conduct. In 1974, he says, the Bureau barred his participation in training sessions because of his religion,1 in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 as extended to the federal workforce by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.3 In 1975, he continues, the Bureau discharged him because of his age as well as his religion, and in retaliation for an administrative complaint asserting denial of on-the-job training on account of his age.4 Thus, additionally to Title VII, appellant implicates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,5 as broadened by coverage of federal personnel through the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974.6 The District Court awarded appellees summary judgment on each of these claims.6 7
I concur in affirmance of the ruling on training opportunities, but for reasons different from those expressed ■ by my colleagues.8 I join, too, in affirmance of the ruling on discharge to the extent that religion and attained age are alleged as causes.9 I cannot, however, accept either the rationale or the result today ascribed to the" claim of retaliatory discharge, and to that extent I respectfully dissent.10
I
In December, 1968, appellant was employed by the Bureau as an electronics technician.11 Almost from the beginning his six-year career there was stormy, but in many respects beyond the purview of this litigation.12 In September, 1970, appellant complained to the Bureau of religious discrimination in admission to training sessions,13 but that effort terminated unsuccessfully eleven months later when the agency’s finding of no discrimination was *780sustained on administrative appeal.14 Difficulties of other sorts persisted,15 and ultimately the events precipitating this lawsuit came to pass.
In early 1974, suspecting ongoing religious prejudice,16 appellant conferred with Paul Cerwonka, a supervisory appeals examiner for the Civil Service Commission.17 In June of that year appellant followed with a second complaint to the Bureau, this time claiming age discrimination only.18 Appellant states that he did not raise anew any question of religious bias because Cerwonka told him that his 1970-71 venture had exhausted all available administrative recourse on that score.19 Appellees, disavowing that claim,20 call attention to administrative regulations demanding consultation with an agency-designated equal employment opportunity counselor — a step appellant never took21 — as a condition precedent to a formal administrative complaint of Title VII violations.22 My brethren hold that appellant either knew of his requirement from his earlier battles with the Bureau or was legally chargeable with “constructive knowledge” of them.23 I travel another route, though I arrive at the same destination.
When appellant held his ill-fated conversation with Cerwonka, regulations of the Civil Service Commission 24 called upon fed*781eral executive agencies subject to Title VII25 to designate equal employment opportunity counselors,26 and to publicize to employees information identifying the counselors and advising of their availability to advise any employee believing that he had been subjected to discrimination of a type prohibited by Title VII.27 Those regulations also summoned the agencies to require any aggrieved employee to consult with a counselor before presenting a discrimination complaint administratively,28 and to inform employees of the need to do so.29 Among the evident objectives of the consultation was an opportunity for exploration of the employee’s problem with a view to a solution on an informal basis.30
The record discloses that before appellant embarked upon his 1974 quest for relief, the Department of Commerce ordered consultation with an equal employment opportunity counselor as a precondition to a formal administrative complaint.31 The record is silent, however, on just what if anything was done to communicate the existence and content of this order to employees, as the Civil Service Commission had mandated.32 My colleagues attempt to bridge this gap by suggesting that perhaps “constructive knowledge” can be imputed to appellant, and by ruling that in any event he had actual knowledge.33 I cannot subscribe to an automatic “constructive knowledge” attribution to employees of information of a rule which the agency is directed by higher regulatory authority to publicize suitably for their edification.34 Nor can I understand how appellant could actually have gained actual knowledge of the consultation requirement from past experience in his other bouts with the Bureau, which either antedated establishment of the requirement or stemmed from personnel actions completely beyond its ken.35
I join in affirmance on this branch of the appeal simply because appellant has not met a burden that plainly was his. There is a well-settled legal presumption that public servants duly perform their official duties36 *782—meaning, of course, that he who asserts the contrary has the onus of demonstrating it.37 Appellant does not suggest that the Department of Commerce was derelict in its obligation to inform its employees of the availability and function of equal employment opportunity counselors, and of the necessity of consulting with them before proffering a formal discrimination complaint. Surely we cannot proceed on mere conjecture that the Department did not discharge its responsibility to publicize the precomplaint consultation procedure.
Indubitably, appellant did not utilize that procedure, and the justification he now advances — misadvice by Cerwonka — is unpalatable.38 It follows that, for failure to pursue this course toward possible informal agency-level adjustment of the charge of religious deprivation of training opportunities, appellant is foreclosed from litigating that claim in the courts.39 I thus agree that the District Court’s summary judgment on that much of the case was in order. I do not agree that it is appropriate, under the aegis of “constructive knowledge,” to interpose an unnecessary impediment to employee-complainants who might in the future seek to raise a meritorious issue as to whether an agency did in fact publicize its mechanism for counseling employees on their prerogatives under Title VII.
II
In his complaint in the District Court, appellant also launched a three-pronged attack on his ultimate discharge by the Bureau in early 1975. The dismissal, he said, was attributable both to his religion and to his age, and was a reprisal for his 1974 administrative complaint alleging denial of training because of his age.40 The District Court’s summary judgment rejected each of these contentions,41 and this court now affirms that disposition in toto.42 Since appellant did not seek administrative consideration of the first two facets of his discharge protest — discrimination because of religion and attained age — he effectively barred himself from urging them in his suit. Appellant’s charge of retaliatory discharge, however, does not invite condemnation of that sort, and in my view should be heard in the District Court.43
*783After the Bureau terminated appellant, he went to the Federal Employee Appeals Authority of the Civil Service Commission.44 There, represented by counsel,45 he protested his firing on several grounds, but none suggested in the least that the discharge was induced by his religious faith or his attained age.46 Exhaustion of administrative remedies is as much a normal prerequisite to suits alleging age discrimination 47 as it is to those invoking Title VII.48 Even assuming that appellant was not obliged to press his claim of age-based discharge at either the departmental or the appellate level49 he would still be barred by his failure to comply with a statutory requirement that he give notice of his intent to institute suit on that claim.50
Standing on an entirely different footing, however, is appellant’s charge that the Bureau dismissed him in retaliation for his 1974 age discrimination complaint.51 That was the opening allegation inaugurating his appeal to the Appeals Authority,52 and one that his counsel voiced at the hearing.53 Accordingly, there is general agreement that appellant thus exhausted his administrative remedy respecting the reprisal charge, and was free to litigate that charge in this suit.54 My colleagues, however, point out that the Appeals Authority found that appellant’s removal was a justified *784personnel action rather than a retaliatory step,55 and proceed to hold that all he was due was a review of the administrative record to ascertain whether that finding was buttressed by substantial evidence.56 Concluding that it was, they affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the retaliatory-discharge claim without further ado.57
I cannot subscribe to this disposition. If that claim is within the ambit of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act — and I think it is 58 — the question is whether appellant, like a litigant under Title VII,59 is entitled to have it tried de novo.60 This court already has proceeded on the premise that employees suing the Federal Government for alleged violations of the Act have the right to a trial.61 At least two other courts, for reasons I find appealing, are fully in accord with that view,62 and I would abide it here. So, while concurring in affirmance on all other aspects of the summary judgment under review, I would remand the case to the District Court for appropriate proceedings on the charge of retaliatory discharge.63
. Appellant’s Complaint (Complaint) (Id 4-6, Joint Appendix (J.App.) Document (Doc.) B at 2.
. Pub.L.No.88-352, tit. VII, §§ 701 et seq., 78 Stat. 253 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1976) [hereinafter cited as codified].
. Pub.L.No.92-261, §§ 2 et seq., 86 Stat. 103 (1972), codified, as amended, variously at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1976) [hereinafter cited as codified]. This is not the first time appellant has asserted such a claim; he did so administratively in 1970-71, but lost. See text infra at notes 13-14.
. Complaint (HI 17-21, J.App.Doc. B at 5-6. See also note 7 infra.
. Pub.L.No.90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (1976) [hereinafter cited as codified]. In the District Court, appellant asserted that the refusal of training opportunities also contravened the First Amendment, and that the discharge transgressed both the First and Fifth. Complaint MI 1, 6, 10, 12, 17, 21-22, J.App.Doc. B at 1-6. He does not, however, urge constitutional grounds on appeal.
. Pub.L.No.93-259, § 28(b)(2), 88 Stat. 74 (1974), 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1976), since amended (Supp. Ill 1979) [hereinafter cited as codified].
. Siegel v. Morton, Civ. No. 75-2152 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 1977) (order), J.App.Doc. L. The judgment also rejected appellant’s additional contention that his discharge was procedurally and substantively deficient, Complaint ([ 22, J.App.Doc. B at 6, but left open a charge, Complaint (H[ 5-9, J.App.Doc. B at 2-3, that appellant was denied training because of his age. J.App.Doc. L. The first claim is not pressed on appeal, and the second was dismissed by consent of the parties with the court’s approval, J.App.Doc. M, and consequently is not before us.
. Discussed in Part I infra.
. Discussed in Part II infra.
. Discussed in Part II infra.
. Complaint (12, J.App.Doc. B at 1.
. Appellant’s troubles are summarized by the Federal Employee Appeals Authority of the Civil Service Commission, Appeal of Stanley Siegel (Oct. 14, 1975) at 1-3, J.App.Doc. A at 1-3, and by my brethren, Majority Opinion (Maj. Op.) at note 7.
. Affidavit of Robert P. Stephens fl 3, J.App. Doc. E Exhibit (Ex.) A at 2.
. Id. Predating the extension of Title VII benefits to federal employees, see notes 2-3 and related text, and unaccompanied by any claim of continuing discrimination, see Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co., 193 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 339, 595 F.2d 711, 724 (1978); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 185 U.S.App.D.C. 322, 366, 567 F.2d 429, 473 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086, 98 S.Ct. 1281, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 156 U.S.App.D.C. 69, 77-78, 478 F.2d 979, 987-988 (1973), this episode has no current role. Grubbs v. Butz, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 82, 84, 514 F.2d 1323, 1327 (1975); Womack v. Lynn, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 504 F.2d 267 (1974).
. See Appeal of Stanley Siegel, supra note 12, at 1-3, J.App.Doc. A at 1-3; Maj. Op. at note 7.
. Affidavit of Stanley H. Siegel H 2, J.App.Doc. H at 1.
. Id. HU 4-9, J.App.Doc. H at 1-2. See also Affidavit of Paul Cerwonka HU 3-8, J.App.Doc. J at 1-2.
. Affidavit of Robert P. Stephens ¶ 4, J.App. Doc. E Ex. A at 2.
. Affidavit of Stanley H. Siegel ¶¶ 6 — 11, J.App.Doc. H at 2; Brief for Appellant at 6-7, 21-22.
. In the District Court, as here, appellees contradicted appellant’s account of his conversation with Cerwonka. See Affidavit of Paul Cerwonka HU 6-8, J.App.Doc. J at 2; Brief for Appellees at 5-6. My colleagues deem implicit in the court’s grant of summary judgment for appellees “the finding that appellant was not improperly advised by Cerwonka, or that, if he was given erroneous advice, he was not justified in relying thereon.” Maj. Op., text following note 12. I am unable to agree. There is no room for factfinding on a motion for summary judgment; indeed, such a judgment is improper when any material fact remains genuinely in dispute. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Bloomgarden v. Coyer, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 114-115, 479 F.2d 201, 206-207 (1973); Leonard v. BHJK Corp., 152 U.S.App.D.C. 97, 99, 469 F.2d 108, 110 (1972). Nor is summary judgment to be awarded merely because the court believes that a litigant’s version of events is unlikely to prove true in the event of trial. Harl v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 115 U.S.App.D.C. 166, 168-169, 317 F.2d 577, 579-580 (1963). However, even with the details of the meeting with Cerwonka in dispute, I think summary judgment was appropriate because what transpired at that meeting is not material to the legal issue upon which this aspect of the appeal turns. See text infra at notes 24-30, 38-39.
. Affidavit of Robert P. Stephens H 5, J.App. Doc. E Ex. A at 2.
. Brief for Appellees at 11. See text infra at notes 24-30. Appellees argue that, as a further consequence of nonobservance of the regulations, appellant was not justified in relying on Cerwonka’s advice. Brief for Appellees at 14-15.
. Maj. Op., text following note 12.
. When Congress brought the bulk of the federal workforce within Title VII’s ambit by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L.No.92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), it gave the Civil Service Commission rulemaking and enforcement authority in the federal sector and directed subject agencies to comply with pertinent Commission regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (1976). Pursuant to the Reorganization Act of 1977, Pub.L.No.95-17, 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-912 (Supp. III 1979), those functions were transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, effective October 1, *7811979. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, § 3(a), 43 Fed.Reg. 19807 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 354 (Supp. III 1979). See also Exec. Order No. 12106, 44 Fed.Reg. 1053 (1978). The regulations cited infra notes 26-30 were adopted by the Civil Service Commission, 37 Fed.Reg. 22717 (1972), 37 Fed.Reg. 25699 (1972), were redesignated and continued in effect by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 43 Fed.Reg. 60900 (1978), and are hereinafter cited as currently codified.
. See Lawrence v. Staats, 640 F.2d 427 (D.C.Cir.1981).
. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.204(c) (1979).
. Id. § 1613.204(f)(3).
. Id. §§ 1613.213(a), 1613.214(a)(l)(i).
. Id. § 1613.204(f)(3).
. Id. § 1613.213(a).
. This was accomplished by amendment in 1971 of a departmental order originally issued in 1969, Ad. Order No. 202-713 § 713.213(1).
. See text supra at notes 26-30.
. Maj. Op., text following note 12.
. See text supra at notes 26-30. I speak, of course, of the Department of Commerce’s consulfation order, and not to the Civil Service Commission’s regulations, for publication of the latter in the Federal Register was “sufficient to give notice of [their] contents ... to a person subject to or affected by [them].” 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1976). The regulations, however, were not self-executing; rather, they expressly called for action by the agencies individually, and for affirmative steps to acquaint employees with that action. See text supra at notes 24-30.
. Appellant’s complaint alleging religious discrimination in the denial of training opportunities was filed on September 24, 1970. Affidavit of Robert P. Stephens j| 3, J.App.Doc. E Ex. A at 2. The Department of Commerce did not prescribe consultation until April 19, 1971. Appellee’s Appendix (A. App.) C at 24. None of the other personnel problems appellant subsequently encountered gave rise to any administrative complaint charging Title VII discrimination. See Appeal of Stanley Siegel, supra note 12, J.App.Doc. A at 2-4; Affidavit of Robert P. Stephens ]|[[ 4-5, J.App.Doc. E Ex. A at 2.
. Lewis v. United States, 279 U.S. 63, 73, 49 S.Ct. 257, 260, 73 L.Ed. 615, 619 (1929); United States v. Royer, 268 U.S. 394, 397-398, 45 S.Ct. 519, 520, 69 L.Ed. 1011, 1013-1014 (1925); No-fire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657, 660-661, 17 S.Ct. 212, 213, 41 L.Ed. 588, 589-590 (1897); Koch v. United States, 150 F.2d 762, 763 (4th *782Cir. 1945); United States v. Fratrick, 140 F.2d 5, 7 (7th Cir. 1944); Kozak v. United States, 458 F.2d 39, 40-41 (Ct.Cl.1972). This presumption extends to the substantive validity as well as the procedural regularity of administrative action. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Lynn, 168 U.S.App.D.C. 407, 412, 514 F.2d 829, 834 (1975); Udall v. Washington, V. & M. Coach Co., 130 U.S.App.D.C. 171, 175, 398 F.2d 765, 769 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017, 89 S.Ct. 622, 21 L.Ed.2d 561 (1969); Duesing v. Udall, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 370, 374, 350 F.2d 748, 752 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 912, 86 S.Ct. 888, 15 L.Ed.2d 667 (1966).
. See cases cited supra note 36.
. To accept appellant’s claim in that regard is to license federal employees to choose other federal employees of their own liking as advisors on Title VII matters, and to bind agencies to the consequences thereof. Government could hardly thrive under such a regime, and administration of Title VII likely would be hampered. Be that as it may, no valid objection to agency designation of qualified personnel as equal employment opportunity counselors has been registered, and certainly none is apparent.
. Brown v. General Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1967, 48 L.Ed.2d 402, 411 (1976); President v. Vance, 200 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 307, 627 F.2d 353, 360 (1980); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Hampton, 163 U.S.App.D.C. 283, 285-287, 501 F.2d 843, 845-847 (1974). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1976).
. See text supra at notes 4-6. In 1974 appellant, bom July 22, 1922, Complaint U 2, J.App. Doc. B at 1, was qualified by age to invoke the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 631, 633a (1976 & Supp. II 1978). His complaint in the District Court, however, was broader than his administrative appeal from his discharge, which did not embrace the first two grounds. A.App. A at 1-2.
. Siegel v. Morton, supra note 7, J.App.Doc. L.
. Maj. Op. pt. III.
. The parties have proceeded on the common ground that a discharge in retaliation for a complaint of age discrimination is itself discrimination on the basis of age. The Act puts that beyond peradventure for the private sector. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1976). While the provision doing so is not extended statutorily to federal employment, id. § 633a(f) (Supp. III *7831979), it seems clear that analytically a reprisal for an age discrimination charge is an action in which age bias is a substantial factor. Compare Barnes v. Costle, 183 U.S.App.D.C. 90, 96-98, 561 F.2d 983, 989-991 (1977). See also Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d 465, 484 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919, 96 S.Ct. 2623, 49 L.Ed.2d 372 (1976).
. See Appeal of Stanley Siegel, supra note 12, J.App.Doc. A; A.App. A.
. See Appeal of Stanley Siegel, supra note 12, J.App.Doc. A at 1; A.App. A, B.
. See Appeal of Stanley Siegel, supra note 12, J.App.Doc. A; A.App. A. For present purposes, I distinguish a personnel action taken solely because an employee has reached a given age from one taken as a reprisal for something done by the employee in the past. See text infra at notes 52-55.
. Bunch v. State, 548 F.2d 336, 340 (9th Cir. 1977); Trammell v. Callaway, 415 F.Supp. 212, 216-217 (N.D.Miss.1976). See also Hinton v. Soloman, 475 F.Supp. 105, 108-109 (D.D.C.1979).
. See text supra at notes 38-39.
. Appellant brushes this possibility aside with the bare comment that as a discharged employee he had no such duty. Reply Brief for Appellant at 3. I do not address this contention, for in any event another omission by appellant is fatal to its consideration here. See note 50 infra and related text.
. “When the [complaining] individual has not filed a complaint concerning age discrimination with the [Civil Service] Commission, no civil action may be commenced by any individual under this section until the individual has given the Commission not less than thirty days’ notice of an intent to file such action. Such notice shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred.” 29 U.S.C.' § 633a(d) (1976). While appellant did in 1974 present a complaint of age-based discrimination in job training to the Commission, at no time did he bring before the Commission his charge that the same kind of bias prompted his 1975 discharge, nor did he ever notify the Commission that he planned to institute suit on the latter theory. Affidavit of Jeanne M. Monk, J.App.Doc. F Ex. D; Affidavit of Larry K. Goodwin, J.App.Doc. F Ex. E at 2.
. That complaint was filed June 19, 1974. Affidavit of Robert P. Stephens ]| 4, J.App.Doc. E Ex. A at 2. On November 11, 1974, the Appeals Review Board of the Civil Service Commission remanded it to the Bureau for further processing. Appeal of Stanley Siegel, supra note 12, at 7, J.App.Doc. A at 7. On February 17, 1976, the agency made a finding of no discrimination. Affidavit of Robert P. Stephens 1)4, J.App.Doc. E Ex. A at 2. Meanwhile, on October 24, 1974, the Bureau instituted the removal action. Appeal of Stanley Siegel, supra note 12, at 7, J.App.Doc. A at 7.
. “The removal is in retaliation for Siegel’s appeal to the Civil Service in an age discrimination case. Siegel was successful and the Commissions [sic] decision generated this removal action.” A.App. A at 1.
. “As alleged in the answer and in the appeal letter, Mr. Siegel feels this action is in retaliation for his pursuit of an appeal to the U.S. Civil Service Commission [employment discrimination], and Mr. Siegel feels that only after the successful remanding by the Commission did this retaliatory action take on full steam.” Hearing Transcript 157-158.
. See Maj. Op., text following note 16; Post-Argument Memorandum for Appellees at 7-8.
. Maj. Op., text following note 16. See Appeal of Stanley Siegel, supra note 12, J.App.Doc. A at 7.
. Maj. Op., text following note 16. The explanation there given is that appellant’s effort in the District Court called for consideration of the Appeals Authority’s decision under the review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1976). I believe appellant’s suit was an original action authorized by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1976), and as such is governed by different principles. See text infra at notes 58-62 and note 43 supra.
. Maj. Op., text following note 16.
. See note 43 supra.
. E.g., Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 96 S.Ct. 1949, 48 L.Ed.2d 416 (1976); Hackley v. Roudebush, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 376, 520 F.2d 108 (1975).
'. In the District Court, appellant insisted upon a trial de novo on this claim. Complaint ¶ 20, J.App.Doc. B at 8.
. Nakshian v. Claytor, 202 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 628 F.2d 59, cert. granted sub nom. Hidalgo v. Nakshian, 449 U.S. 1009, 101 S.Ct. 563, 66 L.Ed.2d 467 (1980). Indeed, in Nakshian the court concluded that such employees have the right to a jury trial on factual issues arising from demands for relief traditionally deemed legal rather than equitable in nature — the precise holding to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Compare Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978) (employees in the private sector entitled to a jury trial in suits under the Act). The Act now expressly gives private-sector employees the right to a jury trial of factual issues in actions seeking monetary recovery for violations, whether or not equitable relief is sought. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
. Nabors v. United States, 568 F.2d 657, 658-660 (9th Cir. 1978); Hall v. United States, 436 F.Supp. 505, 507-509 (D.Minn.1977). These are apparently the only two decisions squarely addressing the question of entitlement to a trial de novo.
. Appellees, conceding that this claim is cognizable under the Act, and that appellant’s action in the District Court is to this extent available to him, argue that “appellant’s complaint is simply too vague to raise it adequately,” and resultantly that he must seek that court’s leave to amend. Post-Argument Memorandum for Appellees at 7-8. I would leave that contention to the District Court in the first instance. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), (c).