The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from the district court’s granting of a *1127writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner Eric Weir took the stand in his own defense át his murder trial in state court. The prosecutor cross-examined him and made comments to the jury concerning Weir’s silence after he was arrested but before he was given Miranda warnings. The district court concluded that the state had violated Weir’s Fifth Amendment Rights, as outlined in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Accordingly, the district court granted Weir’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We agree, and affirm Judge Johnstone’s decision.1
FACTS
Petitioner Eric Weir was convicted in Kentucky state court of first degree manslaughter in the stabbing death of Ronnie Buchanan. The stabbing occurred during a fight in the parking lot of a night club in McCracken County, Kentucky.
While the evidence is not clear as to the cause of the fight, all witnesses agreed that during the course of the fight Buchanan pinned Weir to the ground.2 Suddenly Buchanan jumped to his feet shouting that he had been stabbed. Weir immediately left the scene with his wife, returned momentarily to pick up a friend, and thereafter drove to the home of some friends. He never reported the incident to the police. Subsequently, Weir was apprehended, indicted and brought to trial.
Weir was charged with intentional murder in violation of Kentucky Revised Statute KRS 507.020(l)(a). At trial, he took the stand in his own defense. His testimony on direct examination detailed events inside the bar which led up to the fight and described the circumstances surrounding the stabbing.3 Weir freely admitted stabbing Buchanan, but claimed that he acted in self-defense and that the stabbing was acci*1128dental. This was the first time he had offered an exculpatory story for his actions.
The prosecutor vigorously cross-examined Weir. He inquired into Weir’s assertion that he had been seriously injured. Weir admitted that his injuries had hot required medical attention. The prosecutor then turned to the issue of the knife, asking Weir how he happened to stab Buchanan and how the knife happened to disappear after the stabbing.4 The prosecutor also questioned Weir about his failure to report *1129the incident to the police and disclose his exculpatory story.5 Weir was found guilty of first degree manslaughter and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.
Weir then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the prosecutor’s effort to impeach his testimony, by inquiring into and commenting upon his failure to offer the exculpatory story to the police officers at the time of his arrest, violated his constitutional rights. Citing Doyle, supra, and Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), the district court granted the writ conditioned upon the right of the Commonwealth of Kentucky to retry Weir within 120 days. The Commonwealth has appealed.
I. Preliminary Discussion
We can divide the questions asked by the prosecutor into two basic areas: those concerning pre-arrest silence and flight by the petitioner and those concerning post-arrest silence. Most of the prosecutor’s questions dealt with pre-arrest silence. The prosecutor emphasized that the defendant did not go to the police and was not apprehended for 17 hours after the stabbing. The prosecutor also grilled Weir as to what happened to the murder weapon — the knife with which Weir stabbed the victim.6
Thus far, there was no constitutional impropriety. In Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980), the Supreme Court ruled that prearrest silence could be used to impeach a defendant who takes the stand. Under Jenkins, much of the prosecutor’s examination of the defendant was proper.
The problem is that the prosecutor did not stop his questioning at petitioner’s prearrest silence. The prosecutor went on to ask Weir why he had not disclosed the knife’s location to the state police when they came to his house to arrest him. The prosecutor also asked Weir why he didn’t try to give an exculpatory explanation to the state police when he was arrested.7
It does not appear from the record that at the time the state police went to Weir’s house and arrested him, that they immediately read Miranda warnings to him. Thus, this case presents the threshold question whether post-arrest silence can be used to impeach a defendant, even though Miranda warnings were not given to him. For reasons discussed below, we conclude that a defendant cannot be so impeached.8
II. Impeachment on the Basis of Post-Arrest Silence
The underlying rationale for limiting impeachment because of silence is simply that “[i]n most circumstances silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative force.” United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 2136, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975). In addition,
*1130evidence at the time of arrest . .. also has a significant potential for prejudice. The danger is that the jury is likely to assign much more weight to the defendant’s previous silence than is warranted. And permitting the defendant to explain the reasons for his silence is unlikely to overcome the strong negative inference that the jury is likely to draw from the fact that the defendant remained silent at the time of his arrest.” Id. at 180, 95 S.Ct. 2138 (citation omitted).
Hale, of course, was decided under the Supreme Court’s supervisory authority over federal proceedings. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) the Court extended the rationale of United States v. Hale to state cases. However, in Doyle, the Court was dealing with a constitutional question and its holding was limited:
We hold that the use for impeachment purposes of petitioners’ silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at 619, 96 S.Ct. at 2245.
A key premise underlying Doyle was the unfairness of giving Miranda warnings to a defendant — which include a statement that the defendant has the right to remain silent — and then impeaching the defendant at trial with that silence. As the Court noted, “[sjilence in the wake of [Miranda] warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee’s exercise of these Miranda rights.” Id. at 617, 96 S.Ct. at 2244.
In a similar vein, in Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980), the Court held that pre-arrest silence was a proper subject for cross-examination of a suspect at trial. The Court concluded that inquiry into pre-arrest silence was not unfair because “no governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent before arrest.” Jenkins, supra, 100 S.Ct. at 2130.
There is thus a superficial logic to the position that only when a government officer actually reads Miranda warnings to a defendant is it unfair to impeach the defendant with his post-arrest silence. Nonetheless, we conclude that impeachment of a defendant with post-arrest silence is forbidden by the Constitution, regardless of whether Miranda warnings are given. Doyle and Jenkins were decided on a rationale of basic fairness. We think that it is inherently unfair to allow cross-examination concerning post-arrest silence.
First, we believe that post-arrest silence is not probative. In Jenkins, the Supreme Court thought that in many circumstances pre-arrest silence was probative:
Common law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted. 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 1042, at 1056 (Chadbourne rev. 1970). Each jurisdiction may formulate its own rules of evidence to determine when prior silence is so inconsistent with present statements that impeachment by reference to such silence is probative. Id. at 2129.
In the Jenkins case itself, the defendant did not come forward with his claim of self-defense until trial. The state courts could conclude that his failure to come forward earlier was a proper ground for cross-examination.
We think that Jenkins should be limited to instances of pre-arrest silence. Whatever probative value silence has in a pre-arrest context, it has none in a post-arrest situation. An arrest initiates a formal series of proceedings against a defendant. The defendant stands accused of a crime. Under these circumstances, fear and anxiety will lead a defendant — whether innocent or guilty — to silence. As Justice Marshall stated in United States v. Hale, supra :
At the time of arrest and during custodial interrogation, innocent and guilty alike— perhaps particularly the innocent — may find the situation so intimidating that they may choose to stand mute. A variety of reasons may influence that decision. In these often emotional and confusing *1131circumstances, a suspect may not have heard or fully understood the question, or may have felt there was no need to reply. See Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U.Chi.L.Rev. 657, 676 (1966). He may have maintained a silence in response to the hostile and perhaps unfamiliar atmosphere surrounding his detention.
These considerations have little force in a pre-arrest situation, before one stands accused. Arrest changes things. The fact that one has been arrested is significant and should make a difference.
There is a second important reason not to permit post-arrest silence to be used as impeachment. There is widespread knowledge in society that one who is arrested has no obligation to speak to the police and that he is entitled to consult with an attorney. The news media has widely publicized the Miranda case and its formal warnings requirement. Simply stated, many if not most persons under arrest know of their right to remain silent and exercise that right. In fact, many lawyers give out the routine advice to their clients that if the client should be arrested for any reason, the client should say nothing and call the attorney. We do not think that persons who are exercising their right to remain silent should be penalized for it.
Jenkins and Doyle thought it unfair to impeach by use of silence where “governmental. action induced petitioner to remain silent.” Jenkins, supra, 100 S.Ct. at 2130. We think that an arrest, by itself, is governmental action which implicitly induces a defendant to remain silent. When one combines a suspect’s fears and anxieties upon arrest with widespread knowledge of one’s right to remain silent, the result is often just that — silence. Given these realities, we think it is fundamentally unfair to allow impeachment through the use of any post-arrest silence.
The facts of this case illustrate this unfairness. Petitioner Weir got into a fight with Ronald Buchanan and stabbed Buchanan to death during the fight. Petitioner fled. After some delay, the police came to his house and arrested him. The police also searched the house. When repeatedly questioned at trial as to why he didn’t exculpate himself to the police, petitioner stated that “I didn’t feel I ought to tell them anything.”
The petitioner was absolutely correct. His best course of action was to consult with counsel and remain silent until then. He generally knew this. It was clear that petitioner would face legal problems as a result of the fight. The nature and extent of these difficulties, however, was unclear. Petitioner’s silence was thus not probative of guilt. It was unfairly prejudicial for the prosecutor to pursue this matter at trial.9
*1132III. Some Practical Considerations
If we were to limit Doyle to instances where the police actually read Miranda warnings to a defendant, many practical problems arise.
First, it would penalize the knowledgeable defendant. As indicated above, many persons are aware of their rights and do not need to be read Miranda warnings. We see no logic in allowing impeachment of the defendant who tells the police that he is aware of his rights and wants to talk to his attorney, but not allowing impeachment if the police actually read the Miranda warnings.
Second, such a position would discourage the reading of Miranda warnings. By its terms, Miranda applies to “in custody interrogation.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). This means post-arrest interrogation.10 Most police departments routinely have officers read Miranda warnings at the time of arrest. This helps prevent difficulties which may develop if the officer and the defendant converse on the way to the police station. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). More important, this procedure ensures that the defendant is aware of his rights from the inception of the arrest. However, there is no requirement that the Miranda warnings be read at the time of arrest. As the Court noted in Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at 300, 100 S.Ct. at 1689, “the special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation.” 11
Thus, the police have some discretion in deciding when to read Miranda warnings. If we limited Doyle v. Ohio to instances where the police actually read the warnings, they could eviscerate Doyle through the simple expedient of not reading Miranda warnings at the time of arrest. The police could simply arrest a suspect and be careful not to interrogate him for 15-20 minutes. If the police wanted to question the suspect, they could then read the Miranda warnings. If the suspect had remained silent for those 15 — 20 minutes, that silence could be used for impeachment at trial. Such a result would be illogical.
IV. Harmless Error
The state has a good argument that the improper use of post-arrest silence in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The unlawful prosecutorial inquiry into Weir’s post-arrest silence was not prolonged or emphasized. In addition, the questions paralleled questions the prosecutor properly asked about Weir’s pre-arrest silence. The issue of harmless error in Doyle v. Ohio situations has come up often. We refer the reader to Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 353, 360-65 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing numerous cases) for an extensive discussion of this question.
In this case, we conclude that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We are dealing with a fight which *1133ended in a stabbing. As can be expected, the witness’ testimony is conflicting. The jury convicted Weir not of murder, but of first degree manslaughter.
Courts should be cautious in applying the harmless error doctrine. See Eberhardt v. Bordenkircher, 605 F.2d 275, 278-80 (6th Cir. 1979). In this case, although the error was not pronounced, it may well have affected the jury’s decision. The circumstances surrounding the fight and subsequent stabbing were very muddled at trial. A jury plays a particularly important fact-finding role in cases like this. A jury should have an opportunity to determine Weir’s culpability without the taint of constitutional error. We conclude that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
V. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
. The state raises a threshold objection. The state argues that Weir’s attorney failed to lodge a timely objection to the questions claimed to violate Weir’s constitutional rights. The state characterizes this failure as a procedural state default, precluding a federal habeas action under the “cause and prejudice” rule of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977).
We disagree. The Kentucky state courts did not invoke their own procedural default rule when they reviewed the case on direct appeal. Since the Kentucky courts did not rely on Kentucky’s contemporaneous objection rule, we likewise decline to invoke it at this time. See Cook v. Bordenkircher, 602 F.2d 117 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 286, 62 L.Ed.2d 196 (1979).
In addition we note that while the state raised the issue before the United States Magistrate, it did not include the issue in its objections to the magistrate’s report. Under these circumstances, we believe it proper to reach the merits of this appeal. See United States v. Waiters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). See also Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2127 n.1, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980).
. Weir was being held upside down by Buchanan.
. Well, I was shooting pool with — I didn’t know him at the time and I still don’t — I think it was Kenneth Turner. I was in the middle of the game when I went out on account of Owen; so, I go back in and get my cigarettes and play a half a pool game or something, you know. My wife, I think, was standing there at the door. So, I go on and shoot the rest of this game of pool, or was almost finished with it when my wife says they jumped on Owen. Well, I didn’t know what was going on either, you know, so I run out the door and just go down to the end of the building. Well, I said what’s going on? I was talking to my wife, and when I did I could see Owen. 1 couldn’t see him until Ronnie Buchanan turned around. He was down further towards the end of that car, and he said I’ll tell you what’s happening they’re all over my car. At that time my wife said well, he’s a damn liar. When she said that he just come on running stronger and at the same time swinging at my wife, which she was standing right to my side and in back of me. He swung kind of past me, but I just — all I did was throw up my arm to block that and he come around evidently with his left, because the next thing I knew I was on the ground. I remember him coming down on me and getting ahold of my legs, and he gets me up by the legs and when he picks me up, he’s standing on my hair. I think you saw the pictures, it was a little longer than it is now, and he dropped me up and down. He was swinging me all around. I was half conscious about that time after beating my head on the ground a few times, and then he just comes down, I guess, to pin me or whatever; but I remember trying to get the knife out. I was trying to get up from there; I was in bad shape. He come down on me, and *1128then he got up and I heard him say he had been stabbed. Then I got up and I was pretty dizzy. I couldn’t really straighten up real good. I remember seeing him backing away, and I just tried to get my stuff together and get out of there.
, I didn’t know who was with who, or what. There were several people around that I didn’t know — everybody but Owen. I think that she mentioned that I was chasing them up the walk or something, but I had no intention to chase anybody. I was just trying to — my truck was parked on the far end of the building and I was trying to find my wife, and I think I run across her somewhere along about the front door, and I got her and said let’s go. We went on down to get in the truck and backed out going towards Paducah.
. Q Well, you were upside down, as I recall what you said, and you took the knife off the pouch on your right side, you opened it up with both hands and stabbed him, right?.
A No, sir. He fell on it. When he come down on me, he come down on the knife.
Q What did you have the knife out for then?
A I was going to try to get him off of me.
Q You did get him off of you; didn’t you?
A Yes.
Q Let me ask you about that knife disappearing like it did. Where did you say you put it?
A It was evidently on the tool box on the back of the truck.
Q Why did you put it there? Why didn’t you put it back in the pouch?
A Well, I was kind of shook up.
Q Now, you say you took the keys out and unlocked the car; is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why didn’t you put your knife back in the pouch, if you didn’t?
A I don’t know. 1 just laid it on the truck evidently; it was gone.
Q Do you remember that now, or did somebody say that?
A I distinctly remember laying it up there trying to find the keys.
Q The next day when the State Police came to your house and searched it, why didn’t you just tell them that I lost it?
A I don't know.
Q Why didn’t you tell the State Police where the knife was?
A I don’t guess they even asked me.
Q Well, you didn’t offer it, did you?
A No.
Q Then you took off towards Paducah heading home, right?
A I was just leaving.
Q Then you came back and picked up Owen and Debby, right?
A Yes.
Q And after some period, you did end up in Barlow, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q How long did you stay there?
A Well, we went to Barlow and we stayed all night down there until probably 10:00 o’clock the next morning.
Q Then where did you go? Did you go to Wickliffe after that?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do in Wickliffe?
A I stopped by a friend of mines house over there. It wasn’t his house, it was his place of business. They had a grocery store and I got some sandwich meat and lunch meat.
Q Who’s place is that, Mr. Weir?
A That’s Bill Compton.
Q How long were you there?
A Oh, approximately an hour, maybe a little longer — maybe two hours.
Q Did you talk to Bill Compton about what happened?
A No, sir.
Q What did you tell him you were doing?
A I called him and just asked him if he minded if I came over.
Q What did you tell him you were coming over there for?
A Well, I just asked him if I could stay over at his house, and he said sure.
Q All four of you?
Q Why didn’t you tell them at the time that he accidentally fell down on your knife?
A Well, I didn’t—
MR. OSBORNE:
Judge, again, I am going to object. He had no reason to tell them anything at the time.
THE COURT: All right.
BY MR. BRYANT:
Q Go ahead and tell us.
A I didn’t feel I ought to tell them anything.
Q Okay. That’s after your knife disappeared and after you fled all over Ballard County, Barlow, and Wickliffe; and 17 hours later you were picked up. You don’t want to *1129tell us about anything? Of course, you don’t have to.
MR. OSBORNE:
Again, I’m going to object to that and move this Court to discharge this Jury in this case because of the conduct on cross-examination.
THE COURT: Overruled.
. Q Now, Weir, after this happened, your defense intrigues me, really. It’s very interesting to me. After it happened, if this is the way it happened, why didn’t you go to the Police Department?
A I didn’t know, really, how bad he was hurt, or if he was hurt very bad at all. I didn’t really know.
Q All right, so he wasn’t hurt very badly, why didn’t you go to the Police Department?
A Why didn’t anybody else go to the Police Department? Why didn’t everybody out there go to the Police Department?
Q They did go to the Police Department, but you didn’t go.
A No.
Q Now, you headed towards Paducah. Why were you going towards Paducah?
A Well, I was going home, I guess. I was just going home.
. The knife was apparently never found. The defendant said he left it in back of his truck, See n.4, supra.
. See n.4, supra.
. The Commonwealth argues on appeal that because the record is so unclear, we should remand for an evidentiary hearing as to when Miranda warnings were given. Because we conclude that it makes no difference whether warnings were given or not, there is no need to remand.
. With the exception of a cryptic dictum in United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1981), no post-Jenkins court has suggested that the propriety of impeachment by use of post-arrest silence turns on whether Miranda warnings were given. In United States v. Harrington, 636 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1980), the court found Doyle v. Ohio error, albeit harmless, where the prosecutor impeached with post-arrest silence. There was no indication in that case that Miranda warnings had been given. Accord United States v. Curtis, 644 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1981). (Doyle v. Ohio error, no evidence Miranda warnings were read.) See also Alo v. Olim, 639 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1980) (Doyle v. Ohio error, post-arrest silence; Miranda warnings given, but no suggestion in opinion that this was controlling); Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1980) (same).
In addition, a number of pre-Jenkins but post-Doyle decisions are in accord with our position. United States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1980); United States ex rel. Allen v. Rowe, 591 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Jenkins, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980); Bradford v. Stone, 594 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979); Douglas v. Cupp, 578 F.2d 266, 267 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1081, 99 S.Ct. 865, 59 L.Ed.2d 52 (1979); People v. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d 174, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402, 400 N.E.2d 342 (1980), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Jenkins, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980). Unlike the dissent, we would accord no significance to a summary order of the Supreme Court vacating and remanding a case for reconsideration in light of an intervening precedent.
We finally note that our holding is in agreement with Minor v. Black, 527 F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. *11323189, 49 L.Ed.2d 1198 (1976) and United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1969).
. See Beckweth v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968).
. The Court thus overstated Miranda’s requirements in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 617, 96 S.Ct. at 2244:
Despite the importance of cross-examination, we have concluded that the Miranda decision compels rejection of the State’s position. The warnings mandated by that case, as a prophylactic means of safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights, see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-444 [94 S.Ct. 2357, 2363-64, 41 L.Ed.2d 182] (1974), require that a person taken into custody be advised immediately that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says might be used against him, and that he has a right to a retained or appointed counsel before submitting to interrogation. Silence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee’s exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the state is required to advise the person arrested.