dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The majority has reversed this conviction and ordered a new trial on the basis of three errors, two involving the admission of prior convictions of the defendant and one involving a jury instruction regarding flight by the defendant. I would affirm.
I
The principal question involves the elicitation during cross examination of the defendant that he had an eleven year old conviction for sodomy and a nine year old conviction for unnatural sexual practices.1 The majority has found that the elicitation should not have been allowed because the district court failed to make an explicit finding, pursuant to Rule 609(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, that the probative value of the convictions for impeachment purposes outweighed their prejudicial effect. The opinion considers the propriety of introducing the convictions only in the con*421text of impeachment of the defendant’s credibility as a witness. The court says:
At the outset it should be stressed that the government offered the evidence of prior convictions solely for impeachment under Rule 609(b). It makes no claim that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) ...
(At 417).
The court reiterates:
It is important to distinguish the determination of admissibility of a prior crime for purposes of impeachment under Rule 609 from the determination of admissibility for purposes of proving motive, intent, knowledge and the like under Rule 404(b). Prior conviction of a similar offense can be highly probative of intent. (At 418, n. 6).
The majority thus declines to consider whether these convictions were admissible to prove intent, even though it admits that a prior conviction can be highly probative in considering intent. The basis for the decision is the government’s offering proof of the convictions for impeachment rather than intent. I see no reason for limiting our review to impeachment. It is well established in the law of evidence that evidence which cannot be introduced for one purpose may be introduced for another. The majority here has turned that maxim around and held that evidence which cannot be introduced for a given reason — here, impeachment — cannot be introduced at all even though admissible for another reason. Obviously, the latter proposition contradicts the former.
The majority’s reliance on the government’s failure, both at trial and here, to assert that the prior conviction would be admissible to show intent is hardly reason to excuse our consideration of the question. It is a fundamental principle of judicial review that trial court decisions should not be reversed if the court reached the right decision but for the wrong reasons. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 459, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1942); Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 157-58, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937). Here, the majority’s refusal to consider whether the conviction would be admissible as evidence of intent means the court has failed to consider whether the Chenery principle applies.
I believe that, regardless of whether the convictions should have been admitted for impeachment, they were admissible to demonstrate motive and intent under Rule 404(b) and thus there was no reversible error.1A It is well recognized that, in prosecution for sex crimes, evidence of prior like sexual misconduct with other persons is admissible if there is an issue of whether the accused acted with requisite intent.2 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has stated the rule from the better reasoned decisions:
The theory of this exception [to the general rule against prior acts evidence] is that as the mental disposition of the accused, at the time of the act charged, is relevant, evidence that at some prior time he was similarly disposed is also relevant. Evidence of prior acts between the same parties is admissible, therefore, as showing a disposition to commit the act charged; the probabilities being that the emotional predisposition or passion will continue. The question has not been decided in the District of Columbia whether this exception to the general rule should include sex offenses committed by the accused upon other victims than the one named in the indictment. Logically the exception would seem to include such other offenses. The emotional predisposition or passion involved in raping one little girl would seem to be the same as that involved in raping another. Evidence of such a crime committed upon one little girl shows a disposition to commit the *422same crime upon another, and the probability that the emotional predisposition or passion will continue is as great in one case as the other.
Bracey v. United States, 142 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C.Cir.), cert, denied, 322 U.S. 762, 64 S.Ct. 1274, 88 L.Ed. 1589 (1944); see 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, § 250 (13th ed. 1972); 2 Wigmore on Evidence §§ 357-60 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). See also United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973). There is no doubt that this policy still holds under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 404(b) allows introduction of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts if that evidence is proof of motive or intent.3
The majority even recognized the probative value of evidence of prior acts under the facts of this case when it found no error in admitting the testimony of two boys who claimed to have had similar experiences with the defendant. (P. 416 — 417). In neither instance had the defendant been convicted or even charged with sexual misconduct. Nevertheless, the majority found the evidence probative and reliable. By contrast, the evidence with which we are concerned at this point is that of prior convictions, rendered in courts of law, for similar sex crimes. It is anomolous that the court would allow the uncorroborated testimony of two boys as to prior acts and yet not admit evidence of convictions for similar crimes. Certainly the latter is far more reliable than the former. The majority thus admits the less probative evidence and excludes the more probative. I do not think the Federal Rules of Evidence were intended to be applied in that manner.
II
Finally, the majority finds reversible error in the court’s instruction regarding flight following commission of a crime. It bases its ruling on its finding that there was:
“. . . no evidence that he [Beahm] was aware that he was the subject of a criminal investigation.” (P. 420).
and reiterates the reason for its finding in the last sentence of the opinion:
“The government’s failure to substantiate adequately the inference that defendant was aware he was wanted for the crime renders the instruction given the jury in this case irretrievably erroneous.” (P. 420).
Six days after the incident, Beahm was accosted by the father of one of the victims and was told by the father that he (the father) was looking for the man who had made the assault on his son, and that the man he was looking for rode a motorcycle like the one Beahm was riding. Only a short time after that, 13 days later, Beahm was left the note by the F.B.I. agent to call that agent. Beahm found the note, partially tore it up, and threw it in the trash. He immediately left his girlfriend’s home, where he had been living for more than three years, and without a word to anyone, including the girlfriend, withdrew $200 from their joint bank account and went to Florida, with little or no baggage, on the girlfriend’s motorcycle. He had an obviously responsible job as Production Manager of a lithograph company, yet he did not even notify his employer of his leaving, and simply walked out on his job.
If these facts are not sufficient to support an inference by a jury “that defendant was aware he was wanted for the crime,” I find it hard to easily imagine a set of facts which would support such an inference.
. No abstract of the conviction for unnatural sexual practices is in'the record, yet it is plain from the transcript that it was a crime similar to that with which the defendant was charged, and that everybody connected with the trial knew all about that conviction. Both previous convictions were described by the defense attorney in arguing for their inadmissibility as “[t]hey’re sex related offenses, men on men, and they would be related to this,” referring to the charges being tried.
. The majority found error in admission of the eleven year old sodomy conviction because Rule 60905) greatly restricts introduction of convictions older than 10 years. The 10 year time limit, however, does not apply to evidence introduced under Rule 404(b).
. As the majority sets out in its opinion, “intent was a key issue” in this case. (P. 417)
. There is no indication in the legislative history or the various committee reports that Congress meant to change, or even considered changing, the policy on use of prior acts evidence in sex crimes. Rather, it appears that Rule 404(b) is a codification without change of longstanding evidence principles. See S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, 129-34 (2d ed. 1977); 2 Weinstein’s Evidence, 1)1) 404[08], 404[12] (1981).