dissenting in part and concurring in part:
In my view the strong governmental interest in preserving the order and decorum necessary to assure due process of law and the appearance of justice at the Supreme Court justifies the limits placed by section 13k on expressive conduct.1
I
Section 13k provides:
It shall be unlawful to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds, or to display therein any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.
40 U.S.C. § 13k. This provision is separable into two discrete parts. The first part prohibits parading, standing, and moving in processions and assemblages. The second part prohibits the display of any flag, banner, or device that is designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization or movement.
*1207The inapplicability of the first part to the three occurrences here in issue 2 is plain. It applies to group activity only, and each incident upon which appellants base their complaint involved solitary conduct alone. The meaning of the second part of the section requires closer scrutiny of the statutory language. Although “flag” and “banner” may describe a readily identifiable group of objects, the inclusion of the word “device” makes difficult the task of limiting these three terms to a particular class of objects. It would appear that the reach of “device” would include any object that is capable of display, including Grace’s sign and Zywicki’s various handbills or leaflets. A search for a reasonable limit on the second part of section 13k, then, leads to the final clause of the section^ — “designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.”
I would interpret this portion of the statute to prohibit the promotion of political parties and of organizations and movements for various causes. In my opinion this part of the statute prohibits publicizing or propagandizing political parties and causal movements in the Supreme Court building and grounds. If permitted, such activity would create the impression to some extent in the public’s mind that the Supreme Court is embroiled in or affected by such street pressures and picketing. Our tripartite government has a strong interest in sheltering its judicial branch from the appearance of influence by political forces and all outside pressures. The government’s interest in order and decorum surrounding its public buildings takes, on a completely different tenor when those buildings house the courts and more so with respect to the Supreme Court Building that is devoted solely to the business of that court. Pleas to judges from members of the public are properly confined to the avenues of due process. Due process does not permit public pressure or the appearance of public pressure on the judiciary.
When Congress enacted the disqualification statute for federal judges, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), it provided in effect that even the appearance of outside pressures was to be eliminated from the judicial process. This followed earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, requiring that “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954) (emphasis added). This principle has been applied in numerous cases. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465, 91 S.Ct. 499, 504, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971); In re International Business Machines Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1980); Bercheny v. Johnson, 633 F.2d 473, 477 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507, 510 (10th Cir. 1979) (“if a judge’s conduct or appearance in the trial of a case does not comport with the appearance of justice, the conviction must be reversed”); Watson v. United States, 575 F.2d 808, 809 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (sought preservation of the general appearance of fairness); SCA Services, Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 116 (7th Cir. 1977) (28 U.S.C. § 455(a) “enunciates the appearance of partiality as the general standard for judicial recusal”); United States v. Brown, 539 F.2d 467, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1976) (conviction reversed because judge’s conduct cast a serious shadow on the appearance of justice); United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827, 845 (D.C.Cir.1972); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 812 (3d Cir. 1965).
It would be antithetical to require justices in their judicial role to adhere to the appearance of justice by due process and then permit picketing, bannering and other activity on the Supreme Court grounds that *1208would create the impression in the public mind that justice can be obtained by street pressures outside the courtroom. While public urging, beseeching, and even cajoling are part and parcel of legislative and executive activities, wholly different considerations weigh heavily against the propriety of such importunings in the judicial arena.
With the second part of section 13k so construed the question then becomes whether it covers any or all of the conduct now before the court. Zywicki’s leaflet that contained an open invitation to attend several religious meetings concerning “the political and human rights problems” of Central America, i.e., Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, was designed to bring into notice a movement essentially political in nature, seeking to involve our citizens in alleged governmental affairs in Central America. The meetings were billed as a “Religious Reflection in Solidarity with the Oppressed Peoples of Central America.” Given the political turmoil that existed in Central America during the time, this pamphlet can only be described as a political leaflet. What one person may view as relieving oppression, others may consider as a communist-inspired attempt at a totalitarian takeover of a nation.
The letter to the editor that appeared in Zywicki’s first handbill, which called attention to the necessity for “Removing Unfit Judges,” urged public support for the then-pending Judicial Tenure Act, and was designed to attract political support to the substantial movement behind that proposed legislation. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over cases that seek the removal of unfit judges. See generally Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 90 S.Ct. 1648, 26 L.Ed.2d 100 (1970).
Grace’s display of her “free speech” banner also was designed to attract support for the very substantial but amorphous movement in the nation that is constantly agitating for expanded rights under the First Amendment.3
After construing section 13k to prohibit all expressive conduct, the majority finds it facially unconstitutional in toto.4 In my *1209opinion even such a broad ban on expressive conduct at the Supreme Court may be valid. I believe, however, that section 13k should be given a reasonable construction that puts it on solid constitutional footing. The second part of the section should be limited, as the statute provides, to prevent expressive conduct aimed at promoting and propagandizing political parties and the various causes that are supported by the many movements extant in our pluralistic society. So limited, I believe that the weighty interest in maintaining the order and decorum of the Supreme Court and the appearance of justice easily suffices to permit Congress to disallow such activity within the Supreme Court Building and grounds.
II
My disagreement also extends to the majority’s apparent view that, in light of section 1507, section 13k is superfluous. In my judgment the two provisions are complementary.5 Section 1507 applies to any building housing a court of the United States and prevents picketing and parading “with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice, or with the intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness, or court officer, in the discharge of his duty.” Section 13k prevents other kinds of activity and applies only to the small area within the Supreme Court Building and grounds. It prevents processions and assemblages on the Supreme Court Building and grounds, unless the Marshal has suspended the law “to permit the observance of authorized ceremonies” pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 13o. In addition, as I would interpret the second part of section 13k, it precludes the display of objects that are designed to publicize or. propagandize political parties, or organizations or movements advocating various causes. It is reasonable to permit greater limitations on expression at the Supreme Court than at buildings housing courts generally since the Supreme Court Building houses only the Supreme Court and is perhaps the only building housing a federal court that does not also contain offices of either the executive or legislative branches of the federal government. Its building and grounds are dedicated solely to the work of the Supreme Court. In enacting sections 13k. and 1507 it appears that Congress sought to create an immunized area within the Supreme Court Building and grounds. In tandem, sections 13k and 1507 prohibit (1) parading or picketing that attempts to influence the court, (2) assemblages and processions, and (3) the display of signs involving political parties or other organizations or movements. Two statutes prohibiting closely related conduct with varying penalties may' stand together. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979).6
Ill
Sections 13k and 1507 implement the valid congressional purpose of ensuring that *1210the “order and decorum” 7 that is an essential element of due process of law is preserved at the Supreme Court.
In upholding a Louisiana statute prohibiting picketing, “in or near a courthouse,” designed to influence the court, Justice Goldberg in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (“Cox IF) enunciated some of the considerations that distinguish areas around courts from other public areas:
It is, of course, true that most judges will be influenced only by what they see and hear in court. However, judges are human; and the legislature has the right to recognize the danger that some judges, jurors, and other court officials, will be consciously or unconsciously influenced by demonstrations in or near their courtrooms both prior to and at the time of the trial. A State may also properly protect the judicial process from being misjudged in the minds of the public. Suppose demonstrators paraded and picketed for weeks with signs asking that indictments be dismissed, and that a judge, completely uninfluenced by these demonstrations, dismissed the indictments. A State may protect against the possibility of a conclusion by the public under these circumstances that the judge’s action was in part a product of intimidation and did not flow only from the fair and orderly working of the judicial process. See S.Rep.No. 732, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 4.
379 U.S. at 565, 85 S.Ct. at 481.
Cox II describes some of the subtle pressures against which courts should be protected. In the public mind picketing at a public building will be seen as intended to influence the performance of a governmental function carried on within the building by some public officer. With respect to the Supreme Court Building and grounds, a single purpose area, there is one principal target — the members of the Supreme Court.
In the earlier case of Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 85 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965) (“Cox I”), while the Court set aside overbroad statutes relating to peace disturbance and obstructing public traffic that were being discriminatorily enforced, it recognized that:
The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at any time. The constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized society maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy. The control of travel on the streets is a clear example of governmental responsibility to insure this necessary order. A restriction in that relation, designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, and not susceptible to abuses of discriminatory application, cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which, in other circumstances, would be entitled to protection.
379 U.S. 554, 85 S.Ct. 464. The present statute is not being abused because it is uniformly applied to all.
Later, Justice Black, one of the great defenders of First Amendment freedoms, in upholding a Florida statute that provided trespass on the grounds of a jail, remarked:
The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. For this reason there is no merit to the petitioners’ argument that they had a constitutional right to stay on the property, over the jail custodian’s objections, because this “area chosen for the peaceful civil rights demonstration was not only ‘reasonable’ but also particularly appropriate .... ” Such an argument has as its major unarticulat-ed premise the assumption that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever *1211they please. That concept of constitutional law was vigorously and forthrightly rejected in two of the cases petitioners rely on, Cox v. Louisiana, [379 U.S. 536] at 554-555 and 563-564, 85 S.Ct. at 464 and 480. We reject it again. The United States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose.
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48, 87 S.Ct. 242, 247-248, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
The same basic rationale found expression in an opinion by Justice Stewart sustaining the prohibition of all demonstrations and political activity on the Fort Dix Military Reservation, including the public thoroughfares within the post that traditionally were open to all:
The Court of Appeals was mistaken ... in thinking . . . that whenever members of the public are permitted freely to visit a place owned or operated by the Government, then that place becomes a “public forum” for purposes of the First Amendment. Such a principle of constitutional law has never existed, and does not exist now. The guarantees of the First Amendment have never meant “that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please.” Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48, 87 S.Ct. 242, 247, 17 L.Ed.2d 149, 156. “The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.” Id., at 47, 87 S.Ct., at 247,17 L.Ed.2d, at 156. See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 560-564, 85 S.Ct. 476, 478—481, 13 L.Ed.2d 487, 489-492. Cf. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495.
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836-37, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 1216-17, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976) (emphasis added).
In my judgment the Supreme Court was clearly indicating in these decisions that the government may preserve property under its control, including the Supreme Court Building and grounds, for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. Congress has done just that in sections 1507 and 13k for the Supreme Court Building and the narrow fringe of grounds that surround it. The principles announced in the Cox decisions, and particularly in Adderley and Greer v. Spock, sustain the constitutional validity of such statutes when uniformly applied.
Plaintiffs argue that the decision in Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of Capitol Police, 342 F.Supp. 575 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court) (“Jeannette Rankin II”), aff’d mem., 409 U.S. 972, 93 S.Ct. 311, 34 L.Ed.2d 236 (1972), is contrary authority. Not so. The court in that case held a statute similar to section 13k that applied to the Capitol Building and grounds to be facially unconstitutional. But Congress occupies the Capitol, and its function, the extent of its “grounds” and their historical use differ substantially from the purpose to which the Supreme Court Building and its narrow grounds are dedicated and used. Congress and the Supreme Court also differ substantially in structure, operation and purpose.
In the first place the comparative areas of the respective “grounds” of the Capitol and the Supreme Court are greatly disproportionate. The Supreme Court grounds comprise slightly less than two and one-half normal city blocks, most of which are occupied by the Supreme Court Building.8 The Capitol grounds, on the other hand, extend from the Union Station approximately ten blocks South to D Street, S.W. (about a mile), and, at its widest point, from Second Street, S.E., seven blocks to Third Street, S.W., comprising an irregular area of at least 60 square blocks.9 This immense area *1212covers the environs of the Capitol, the Senate Office Buildings, the House Office Buildings, the congressional garages, and extends to all the surrounding streets and the very extensive park-like grounds and walks. The area even includes the detached area surrounding the Capitol Power Plant, several blocks to the south of the Capitol.
Judge McGowan’s decision in Jeannette Rankin II recognized that “[w]hether the Capitol Grounds is an area to which access cannot be denied broadly or absolutely depends ... on whether it has been ordinarily open to the public ... or whether ... the uses for which it has traditionally been put are inconsistent with demonstrations and mass assemblies.” 342 F.Supp. at 583-84. In referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Cox II the Rankin II court stated:
In Cox II ... the Supreme Court upheld a state statute which banned parades and picketing “in or near courthouses” which have the “intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice, or ... the intent of influencing any judge [or] juror.... ” The Court felt that the integrity of the judicial process could not survive in an atmosphere of mob excitement. But while, as Judge Bazelon said (dissenting in Jeannette Rankin [I], [421 F.2d 1090 (D.C.Cir. 1969)]), “traditionally, the judiciary does not decide cases by reference to popular opinion,” the fundamental function of a legislature in a democratic society assumes accessibility to such opinion. Moreover, the Capitol Grounds defined in this statute are so extensive that demonstrations which may take place upon them might not be “near” or “in the immediate vicinity of” the Capitol itself.
342 F.Supp. at 584 (emphasis added).10
The area of the Supreme Court thus differs from the Capitol grounds in three particulars: (1) the traditional use of the Supreme Court grounds has been inconsistent with demonstrations, mass assemblies, and picketing — and it has never become a public forum; (2) the fundamental function of the Supreme Court does not assume accessibility to street opinion conveyed by parading mass assemblages and individual picketing; and (3) the Supreme Court grounds are so small that demonstrations and picketing upon them would be “near” and “in the immediate vicinity of” the Supreme Court Building itself.
IV
The applicable statutes serve the important and substantial governmental interest of maintaining “order and decorum” for the entire Court area and preserving the “appearance of justice.” Judges, lawyers, litigants and the general public are able to enter and leave the Court and go about their business or activity free from the importuning that necessarily follows having pamphlets pressed upon them and signs and banners confront them for every conceivable political, judicial and personal cause. The statutes are necessary to preserve the ideal of “Equal Justice Under Law” and to *1213avoid the existence or appearance of outside pressure or influence.
In contrast to the purpose of the Capitol, the declared purpose of the Supreme Court Building is to furnish the citizens of this nation a due process environment in which the nation’s most important judicial issues may be presented, heard and decided without even the semblance of influence by street pressures. Order and decorum within the building and its surroundings are required if this necessary objective is to be guaranteed. The Supreme Court is the center of an area where the rule of law is intended to prevail and extraneous pressures are not permitted. The Supreme Court decides cases based upon the rule of law, not upon the level of public pressure that might be generated by mass assemblages and other public activities within the Supreme Court Building or on the adjacent grounds and walkways. The Court should not be subjected even to the subtle pressures of allegedly innocuous picketing and leafleting.
The governmental interest in the order and decorum surrounding the Supreme Court, as reflected in the questioned statute, is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. The proper application of this statute is demonstrated by the fact that the Supreme Court Marshal follows a uniform rule of prohibiting activity without reference to expressive content. The Marshal thus does not suppress any particular views or just views that he or the court does not wish to hear. There is no prior restraint of any particular viewpoint. All are treated equally.
Appellants’ real objective here is to establish a public forum on the narrow grounds surrounding the Supreme Court. It appears that their plan was carefully devised and followed legal advice. Complaint H 16. But the areas within the Supreme Court Building and grounds have never been dedicated to that purpose. To permit such conduct now would subvert the Supreme Court in its effort to provide due process and “Equal Justice Under Law.” What would start as two lonely peaceful pickets today would eventually lead to the hordes of tomorrow,11 bannering and distributing leaflets (in a peaceful manner) on abortion, school busing, prayers in public schools, civil rights, greater rights for the press and media* free speech, Miranda, the exclusionary rule, search and seizure, obscenity, and a host of other issues. That appellants seek to establish a public forum to picket, etc., on past decisions and possible future cases is apparent from their suggestion for limiting the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 1507. They argue that it should only apply to cases currently pending in the Supreme Court There are so many potential judicial issues that are the subject of on-going public campaigns and movements that even though a specific case involving the precise issue may not at a particular moment be sub judice in the Supreme Court, there is a strong likelihood that the issue will sometime come before the Court. In view of such fact and the wide range that would be open for seeking reversal of past decisions, it would be unreasonable and unrealistic to limit the statute only to pending cases.
For all of the above reasons, I dissent from the majority’s effort to establish a public forum within the Supreme Court Building and grounds.
. The Marshal stated he was acting under “Title 40, United States Code,” and that includes *1207authority to apply 18 U.S.C. § 1507. See note 5 infra.
. Although Zywicki went to the Supreme Court three different times, the purpose on his February 4, 1980 visit is not clear. The record indicates only that he sought “to distribute leaflets concerning political and human oppression in Guatemala.” For purposes of adjudging the constitutional question presented, 1 will not distinguish this incident from the one that occurred on January 8, 1980, when Zywicki distributed pamphlets containing an invitation to religious meetings concerning political and human rights problems in Central America.
. Grace’s conduct also appears to fall within the prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. § 1507, the constitutionality of which is not here challenged. It provides:
Whoever, with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice, or with the intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness, or court officer, in the discharge of his duty, pickets or parades in or near a building housing a court of the United States, or in or near a building or residence occupied or used by such judge, juror, witness, or court officer, or with such intent uses any sound-truck or similar device or resorts to any other demonstration in or near any such building or residence, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1507 (emphasis added). Grace alleged that, after learning that some expressive conduct was not permitted at the Supreme Court, she carried her sign containing the First Amendment at the Court because she was “alarmed that a statute could prohibit peaceful freedom of expression on the grounds of the Supreme Court.” Complaint j[ 9. A reasonable inference could be drawn from Grace’s behavior that she came to the Court intending to influence a “judge ... or court officer” to rule that the law concerning public demonstrations at the Court was in violation of the First Amendment.
The majority finds it unnecessary to determine whether appellants’ conduct was related to the business of the court, and hence a possible violation of § 1507. See Maj. op. at 1205.
This is anomalous since appellants sought to enjoin defendants, their agents, employees or persons acting on their behalf from enforcing in any manner against any person the provisions of 40 U.S.C. § 13(k) or any other law or regulation which is applied to prohibit activity akin to that involved in the instant case.
Complaint 1J 31C (emphasis added). Since the majority has treated this case as raising the issue only of the facial construction of § 13k, I will limit my remarks similarly. It would appear, however, that in determining what relief should be granted it might be concluded that appellants are not entitled to an injunction to prohibit the Supreme Court police from prohibiting “activity akin to that involved in the instant case” since it is arguably prohibited by § 1507. It should be added that further inquiry might show that Zywicki intended to influence the court on either or both of the occasions when he distributed handbills at the Court.
. The majority states that it is not “suggesting] that any individual may picket or leaflet in the Supreme Court building itself.” Maj. op. at 1205. It is unusual that the majority would make such a statement, since it today *1209holds unconstitutional the only statute that would prohibit such conduct not aimed at influencing the court. The statement is apparently a recognition of the strong governmental interest in order and decorum within the Supreme Court Building. I do not think this strong interest in order and decorum diminishes materially when the conduct takes place on the narrow grounds that surround the building, rather than in the building itself.
. They are both enforceable by the Marshal under 40 U.S.C. § 13n.
. In my view the statute should be construed in line with Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957) to insure that innocent people who did not have knowledge of the statute would not be arrested. From appellants’ complaint it appears that the statute has been applied in such manner. In Lambert the court reversed a conviction under a Los Ange-les ordinance that prohibited a convicted felon from remaining in the city for more than 5 days without registering with the Chief of Police because there was no evidence that the defendant knew of the registration requirement. The Court explained:
[T]his appellant on first becoming aware of her duty to register was given no opportunity to comply with the law and avoid its penalty, even though her default was entirely innocent. . .. We believe that actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of such knowledge and subsequent failure to comply are necessary before a conviction under the ordinance can stand.
355 U.S. at 229, 78 S.Ct. at 243.
. This is the congressionaliy stated purpose of the law. S.Rep.No.719, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949).
. 40 U.S.C. § 13p provides that the “Supreme Court grounds” are limited to the area within the curblines of First Street, N.E.; Maryland Avenue, N.E.; East Capitol Street; and Second Street, N.E.
. This description is based on the map referred to in the statute that defines the Capitol grounds:
*1212The United States Capitol Grounds shall comprise all squares, reservations, streets, roadways, walks, and other areas as defined on a map entitled “Map showing areas comprising United States Capitol Grounds”, dated June 25, 1946, approved by the Architect of the Capitol and recorded in the Office of the Surveyor of the District of Columbia in book 127, page 8, including all additions added thereto by law subsequent to June 25, 1946, and the jurisdiction and control over the United States Capitol Grounds, vested prior to July 31,1946, by law in the Architect of the Capitol, is extended to the entire area of the United States Capitol Grounds, and the Architect of the Capitol shall be responsible for the maintenance and improvement thereof ....
40 U.S.C. § 193a.
. The Rankin II court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has held that there are some areas in which the Government may absolutely prohibit the exercise of First Amendment rights, especially the right to assemble. Jails, for instance, may be put off limits to parades and other political demonstrations. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966). The area surrounding a courthouse may be similarly immunized. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (“Cox II")-
342 F.Supp. at 583 (footnote omitted).
. In Quaker Action Group v. Andrus, 559 F.2d 716 (D.C.Cir.1977) this court indicated that an Interior Department regulation that limited demonstrations to a maximum of 750 persons on the White House sidewalk and 3000 in adjacent Lafayette Park was reasonable only when coupled with a provision for waiving the máxi-mums upon a showing of good cause. To avoid just such a melee the congressional statute in effect declares that the area within the Supreme Court arid grounds is not a public forum. 40 U.S.C. § 13k.