concurring in the judgment:
In earlier condemning the search of the heroin-filled paper bag giving birth to this litigation, we adhered faithfully to this court’s en banc decision in Ross.1 The Supreme Court has now awarded a writ of certiorari in Ross2 to deal further with the problem of warrantless searches of containers found in vehicles, an area in which its recent rulings in Robbins3 and Belton4 frequently crisscross in operation. The statement of questions upon which the writ was granted focused on that very problem, and the Court made known the possibility that Robbins will be reexamined.5 Since Belton involved a warrantless search of the pocket of a jacket lying on the rear seat of an automobile — a search of a container of sorts — it is not inconceivable that the Court may clarify this area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in a way that impacts upon Belton as well.6
This is but one reason for caution against an expansive declaration of the current status of the law governing searches of con*328tainers within vehicles. In Belton, the Court has admittedly gone a long way toward establishing a clear and simple test by which the constitutionality of such searches may be measured, but even now fundamental questions in this troublesome area remain unanswered. How far does Belton’s new variation of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine extend? Is it grounded in assumptions about distinctive features of automobiles to such extent that the rule is limited to searches of automobiles? 7 Does it permit a defendant ever to argue that these generalized assumptions are inapplicable to his case because, for example, of the nature of a container searched, unorthodox physical characteristics of the vehicle— or, for that matter, of the defendant himself — or the time elapsing between arrest and search? Does the presence or absence of probable cause to search the vehicle affect the permissible scope of a search of containers within it?8 I pose these questions only to emphasize that even Belton’s boundaries are not yet well-defined, and that the rationale necessary to discern those outer perimeters has not yet been fully articulated.
It has been our wont to proceed gingerly in explicating newly-announced constitutional principles. This circumspection is especially appropriate when we may anticipate enlightenment by the High Court at an early date. I question the wisdom of any attempt at this juncture to lay down open-ended legal principles regarding container-within-vehicle searches. I therefore limit my concurrence to the judgment today announced by the court.
In so doing, I underscore several factual elements of this case that lead me to the conclusion that the search of the paper bag should be upheld. The bag was not, according to the record, fastened or transported in any way that rendered it even briefly impenetrable by occupants of the vehicle. It was not insulated, by partition or other stationary obstacle, from access by the passengers. The police officers had probable cause to believe that the car contained contraband, and they conducted the search immediately after the four occupants were ordered to get out. Given these facts I am satisfied that the instant search was undertaken in circumstances sufficiently close to those in Belton to be adjudged constitutional under even the narrowest reading of that decision.
. United States v. Ross, 210 U.S.App.D.C. 342, 655 F.2d 1159 (1981).
. United States v. Ross, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 386, 70 L.Ed.2d 205 (1981).
. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981).
. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981).
. See - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 386, 70 L.Ed.2d 205 (1981).
. See Robbins v. California, supra note 3, 453 U.S. at 434, 101 S.Ct. at 2850-2851, 69 L.Ed.2d at 756 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 444, 101 S.Ct. at 2855, 69 L.Ed.2d at 762 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
. See New York v. Belton, supra note 4, 453 U.S. at 469, 101 S.Ct. at 2869, 69 L.Ed.2d at 781 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
. Several Justices have suggested that the “automobile exception” should be extended to cover examination of all objects within a vehicle that police have probable cause to search. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, supra note 3, 453 U.S. at 436, 101 S.Ct. at 2851, 69 L.Ed.2d at 756-757 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id at 444-53, 101 S.Ct. at 2855-2859, 69 L.Ed.2d at 762-767 (Stevens, J., dissenting); New York v. Belton, supra note 3, 453 U.S. at 463, 101 S.Ct. at 2865, 69 L.Ed.2d at 775-776 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).