dissenting:
The critical question in this case is whether Congress intended to suspend § 786(c)’s formula for allocating grants to family medicine and general practice dentistry residency programs when it passed the Supplemental Appropriations and Rescission Act, 1981, Pub.L.No.97-12, 95 Stat. 14 (June 5, 1981) (the “Act”). See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 221-22, 101 S.Ct. 471, 483-84, 66 L.Ed.2d 392 (1981); Roe v. Casey, 623 F.2d 829, 836 (3d Cir. 1980).1 Since the plain language of the Act is consistent with any formula for dividing funds between the two programs, it is both appropriate and necessary to examine the Act’s legislative history to determine congressional intent.2 In this case, the overwhelming weight of that history supports the conclusion that Congress sought to suspend operation of the set aside. I therefore dissent.
The legislative history of the Appropriations Act3 is replete with statements that the dentistry residency program should be funded at a level short of that prescribed by § 786(c)’s ten percent set aside formula. The report accompanying President Reagan’s recommended budget rescissions, for example, explained that the decision to cut the entire funding of the dentistry program “specifically reflect[s] the Administration’s assessment that the current supply of dental health professionals is adequate.” 46 Fed.Reg. 18513 (1981). The Senate Report explained its decision to totally eliminate funding for the dentistry program in similar terms: “The Committee believes this is a low-priority program that, if needed, would be better funded at the State level or through private sources, and has terminated it.” S.Rep.No.67, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 227 (1981). Even the House Report, which recommended continuation of the dentistry *515program, cut its funding in half, thereby allocating considerably less than would be required under the ten percent set aside. H.R.Rep.No.29, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 211, 212-13 (1981).4 Thus while only the President’s proposed bill and its accompanying report specifically mentioned an express suspension of the ten percent formula,5 both Houses of Congress explained their rescission actions as affecting specific programs in a way that was totally inconsistent with the continued application of the set aside.
As a counterweight to these unequivocal statements of how the House and Senate wanted funds divided between the family medicine and dentistry programs, Judge MacKinnon’s opinion relies on an ambiguous table contained in the Conference Report. See H.R.Rep.No.124, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1981). Noting that this table has a single undifferentiated line item for family medicine and general dentistry programs, it concludes that the Conference Committee must have intended to go back to the ten percent formula and thus to repudiate the actions previously taken by both House and Senate.
Considering the congressional actions that preceded the Conference Committee’s deliberations, I do not see how such an inference can reasonably be drawn from the barebones listing of a single dollar figure for dentistry and family medicine residency programs in the Conference Report. The mandate of conference committees is, after all, to resolve differences between the two Houses, not to reach out and re-decide questions on which both Houses are in agreement (here, the nonapplication of the set aside) or to decide differences in a way that is inconsistent with the thrust of both Houses’ actions (here to raise dentistry funds to $3.7 million when the House had voted $2 million and the Senate nothing). See Jefferson’s Manual & Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R.Doc.No. 403, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 595-96 (1979) (Rule XXVIII); Senate Manual, S.Doc. No.l, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55 (1979) (Rule XXVIII). Although as a court we have no responsibility for enforcing Congress’ rules, we can look to them as evidence of what a conference committee meant to do. Here there is no reason to believe that the Committee chose to act outside the customary bounds of its authority; certainly it gave no sign that it was doing so.® Indeed, with regard to every other health resources program included in the same amendment as the programs in dispute here, the conferees either reached a compromise between the House and Senate bills or else agreed to the recommendations of one House.6 7 Yet by acceding to appel*516lees’ interpretation that the conferees considered the two residency programs as a single budget item, Judge MacKinnon’s opinion assumes that when the conferees reached those particular programs, they departed from their standard routine and settled their disagreement over a total rescission for the two programs between $4,050,-000 and $10,025,000 by agreeing on a $3,050,000 rescission. This in itself makes little sense. But Judge MacKinnon’s assumption yields even more astonishing results when the ten percent formula is applied to the single appropriation of $37 million and the dentistry program — which the Senate sought to terminate and the House sought to cut by 50 percent ($2,025,000)— ends up with its original $4 million almost intact, minus a mere $305,000,8 while the physicians program — which the Senate left at 100 percent funding and the House cut by only 22 percent — now shoulders 90 percent of the total rescission. I believe a far more plausible interpretation is that the conferees in fact considered the two programs separately just as the Houses had done, yielded to the Senate on the family medicine program by restoring the $8 million the House had deleted, and compromised on the dentistry program at $1 million, a figure midway between the $0 and $2 million figures voted by the Senate and House.9 They then reported the agreements under a single line item, perhaps because the two programs are treated together for budget authority purposes.10
This interpretation is supported by the only piece of legislative history we have about the meaning of the Conference Report. In explaining the Conference Committee’s actions after the fact, Senator Schmitt, the chairman of the Labor-HHS-Education Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee and a Senate conferee, stated: “We made no rescission in the primary care areas of family medicine residencies. . . . ” 127 Cong.Rec. S5801 (daily ed. June 4, 1981) (emphasis supplied), thereby indicating his understanding that *517the $3.05 million rescission would come wholly from the dentistry program. As chairman of the Labor-HHS-Education Subcommittee, Senator Schmitt had a special concern with the compromise struck by the conferees, and his remarks offered a comprehensive account of the health resources programs that the Senate conferees had saved from the budget axe. Obviously, his statement is not conclusive evidence of congressional intent, but neither can it be totally ignored as the contemporaneous expression of the Senate Conference Committee member most involved with and knowledgeable about the program items involved in this case.11 Indeed, Senator Schmitt’s reading of Congress’ priorities was confirmed just two and a half months later when the same Congress explicitly repealed § 786(c) and added a statutory directive to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to give highest priority to family medicine programs. See Pub.L. No. 35, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2742, 95 Stat. 923 (Aug. 13,1981).12
Finally, I do not find any impediment to reaching this result in the canon of statutory construction cautioning against repeals by implication, especially in appropriations bills. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 2299, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978); United States v. Will, 449 U.S. at 221-22, 101 S.Ct. at 483-84. The concern reflected in TV A — that Members will not ordinarily expect an appropriations act to alter substantive law— does not apply here. In TVA, the Court refused to find that Congress’ action in approving funding for a specific dam project created by implication an exception to a comprehensive legislative scheme for protecting endangered species. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 191, 98 S.Ct. at 2300. Here, however, Congress knew full well that the Appropriations Act dealt with funding revisions and priorities, the very same subject matter addressed by § 786(c)’s set aside formula.
The President’s recommendations proposed “a dramatic and significant shift in Federal spending priorities.” S.Rep.No. 67, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981). Throughout the House and Senate Reports, this shift in priorities, and the resulting need to evaluate comparatively the importance of programs within each department and division, was the focus of considerable attention. See, e.g., id. at 265 (no rescission warranted in preschool incentive grant program for the handicapped); id. at 276-77 (supplemental appropriation for Pell grant program not warranted in the light of substantial reductions in other educational programs); H.Rep.No.29, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 190 (1981) (funding for engineering feasibility studies in alternative fuels production no longer necessary). Indeed, the low priority status of the dentistry program was specifically addressed in the report accompanying the President’s recommendations, see 46 Fed.Reg. 18513 (1981), and in the Senate report. See S.Rep.No.67, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 226-27 (1981). And although the House Report does not contain similar language, it does itemize the specific amounts to be subtracted from each program. In the context of a rescission bill that explicitly sought to sharply alter spending priorities, these reports gave Congress fair notice that the Appropriations Act would indeed affect prior measures in other authorizing legislation which ordinarily governed the relative funding priority of specific programs.
*518I therefore dissent from the panel’s judgment overruling the Secretary’s interpretation of the Act as applied to these programs.
. Under the canon of construction disfavoring repeals by implication, of course, courts are •reluctant to read one congressional enactment as implicitly repealing or suspending an earlier one. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 221-22, 101 S.Ct. 471, 483-84, 66 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980); Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 2299, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2482, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974); Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503, 56 S.Ct. 349, 352, 80 L.Ed. 351 (1936). But this does not mean that courts should ignore clear evidence of Congress’ intent to override prior law. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. at 223-24, 101 S.Ct. at 484-85. The question of legislative intent is ultimately one to be resolved by applying “the accepted rules for ascertaining that intention.” Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. at 504, 56 S.Ct. at 352. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 547-50, 94 S.Ct. at 2481-82.
. If the language of the Act were clear, there would be no need to look to its legislative history. See McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 614-15 (D.C.Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983, 101 S.Ct. 2314, 68 L.Ed.2d 839 (1981); Albright v. United States, 631 F.2d 915, 918 (D.C.Cir.1980); Zerilli v. Evening News Ass’n, 628 F.2d 217, 220 (D.C.Cir.1980). But the Act itself could hardly be less clear as to the continued operation of § 786(c). The Act merely provides:
HEALTH RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION HEALTH RESOURCES (RESCISSION)
Of the funds provided for “Health resources” for fiscal year 1981 in Public Law 96-536, as amended, $158,189,000 are rescinded.
Pub.L.No.97-12, 95 Stat. 14, 53 (June 5, 1981).
It is therefore appropriate to consider Congress’ intent, as expressed in committee reports and other legislative history.
. I see no reason to artificially restrict this inquiry into legislative history to the Conference Report. Indeed, Judge MacKinnon’s unwillingness, to review all relevant legislative history, maj. op. at 510-511, contravenes the Court’s most recent pronouncement on determining whether Congress has repealed prior law by implication. In United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), the Court looked at the full range of traditional sources of legislative history before concluding that Congress had implicitly suspended a statute providing automatic pay raises for judges. The attempt to distinguish Will as a case in which “ ‘the plain words of the_ statute reveal an intention to repeal ...,’” at maj. op. 511 n.2 (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. at 222, 101 S.Ct. at 484 (emphasis supplied)), fails to acknowledge that Will involved four statutes, only one of which included plain language indicating an intent to repeal automatic pay raises. With regard to the other three statutes, the Will Court looked to committee reports and statements by legislators to discern Congress’ intent.
. Under the House Report’s recommendations, the dentistry program would have received $2,025,000 of the total $30,475,000 allocated to family medicine and dentistry residency and training. See H.R.Rep.No.29, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1981). Thus, the program would have received 6.6 percent of the total funding, considerably less than the 10 percent required under § 786(c).
. The President’s proposed legislation specifically provided that the funds for health resources “shall be available notwithstanding the limitations of sections 786(c) and 1516(c) of the Public Health Service Act.” 46 Fed.Reg. 18514(1981).
. By way of contrast, the specific directives contained in the House and Senate Reports on how to allocate funds between the dentistry and family medicine programs serve to overcome any presumption that the appropriation committees observed the internal rules of the House and Senate, under which § 786(c) is technically “substantive” law that lies outside their jurisdiction. See Jefferson’s Manual & Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. Doc.No.403, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 525 (1979) (Rule XXI, cl. 2); Senate Manual, S.Doc. No. 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1979) (Rule XVI, cl. 4).
. The explanatory table in the Conference Report sets forth the conferees’ understanding as to how $22,745,000 of the $26,080,000 gap between the House and Senate’s recommended rescissions should be resolved. The language of the report suggests that the remaining $3,335,000 was allocated according to the provisions of the House bill.
The following table expands on the Conference Committee’s presentation, showing that, in adding back funds that the House would have rescinded, the conferees stayed within the range of the two Houses’ differences.
*516House Senate Conference
Local health planning agencies —24,000,000 —15,000,000 —21,000,000
Dental health team grants —1,000,000 —500,000 —750.000
Public health capitation grants —0 —4,225,000 —2,125,000
Health administration —3,000,000 —1,500,000 —2,250,000
Public health traineeships —0 —500,000 —250,000
Health administration traineeships —1,500,000 —1,000,000 —1,250,000
Family medicine/ General dentistry and training —Family medicine —3,000,000 —0
—General dentistry —2,025,000 4.050.000
—10,025,000 4.050.000 —3,050,000
General internal medicine and pediatrics —1,500,000
Nursing Advanced training —3,000,000 —0
Nurse practitioners —3,000,000 —0
Traineeships —3,000,000 —0
Program support —750,000 -370,000
. Under the set aside formula, the dentistry program would shoulder 10 percent of the $3,050,000 reduction.
. Of course, the Committee could have kept within the bounds of its mandate to resolve differences by funding the dentistry program at the $2 million recommended by the House, while shaving $1 million off the total funding for the family medicine program. Such fine tuning of budget cuts, however, is not apparent in the Committee’s resolution of other differences between the House and Senate versions of the Act. See note 7 supra. On the contrary, the Committee’s agreements follow a pattern of yielding to the House or Senate recommendations, or splitting the difference. In any event, Senator Schmitt’s remarks offer a strong basis for choosing among the combinations of rescissions that are consistent with the view that the Conference Committee stayed within the scope of the two Houses’ differences.
. Most of the programs listed in the Conference Report’s table have their own “line items” for budget authority. See 42 U.S.C. § 295f(e)(4) (public health capitation grants); 42 U.S.C. § 295h-2 (health administration grants); 42 U.S.C. § 295r(c) (public health traineeships); 42 U.S.C. § 294s(c) (health administration traineeships); 42 U.S.C. § 295g-4 (general internal medicine and pediatrics); 42 U.S.C. § 2961 (advanced nursing training); 42 U.S.C. § 296m (nursing practitioners); 42 U.S.C. § 297(c) (nursing traineeships). (The fiscal year 1980 authorizations listed in the Code were carried forward to fiscal year 1981 under Pub.L.No.96-536, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).) The family medicine and general dentistry residency programs are the only programs listed in the table that are treated together for budget authority purposes.
. I disagree with Judge MacKinnon’s suggestion that Senator Schmitt’s comments should not be accepted as any evidence of Congress’ intent. Judge MacKinnon’s unwillingness to consider Senator Schmitt’s account of the Conference Committee’s proceedings is especially puzzling in the light of his reliance on an ambiguous table in that report to rebut the clearly expressed views of the two Appropriations Committees.
. I note too that the Secretary of Health & Human Services (HHS) interpreted the Conference Committee action as I do, and, until enjoined by the district court, obligated all of the appropriations except for $1 million to the physicians program, even though he had previously written the Senate Committee chairman that an express repeal of the set aside would be necessary to do so.