with whom
J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge, joins, concurring in denial of rehearing:Interpol, which now appears in this litigation for the first time, complains that we accepted as true Steinberg’s factual allegations relating to jurisdictional contacts. That indeed we did so is something for which Interpol bears full responsibility. Interpol could readily have utilized the mechanisms provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enabling participation in the case without jeopardizing its arguments that personal jurisdiction was lacking;1 instead, it chose simply to ignore Steinberg’s complaint. It filed neither motion nor answer within the time specified by the Rules, and in such circumstances Rule 8(d) authorized treatment of material allegations of the complaint as admitted.2
*934Interpol seeks to extricate itself from this self-imposed predicament through a remand “for the purpose of allowing it to prove that the factual allegations set forth in [Stein-berg’s] complaint that are the basis of this Court’s finding of jurisdiction are untrue.” 3 When earlier we resolved Steinberg’s appeal, we were not, of course, presented with a need to rule on the current status of defending parties who fail timely to tender any motion or responsive pleading, and we were careful not to obstruct any path the District Court might properly travel on remand.4 Accordingly, as my colleagues state, our disposition does not, by its own force, preclude Interpol from now presenting whatever evidence on the jurisdictional point it has belatedly decided to proffer. In my view however, the question whether Interpol may do so rests, in the first instance with the District Court, which has at least two considerations to address in regard to such a request. As already noted, the effect of Rule 8(d) must be assessed. Additionally, the District Court’s docket reveals that Steinberg has moved, pursuant to Rule 55,5 for a default judgment; apparently that motion has not been ruled on.
In essence, our prior decision put the case in the posture it would have assumed had the District Court itself determined the jurisdictional point in Steinberg’s favor. As the case thus remains, Interpol stands before the court an unresponsive defendant, and Rules 8 and 55 may affect its freedom now to contest the allegations of the complaint. Having decided to sit out the game rather than challenge Steinberg’s hand compliably with the rules, Interpol must deal as best it can with the consequences of its gamble.
Interpol also vigorously argues various issues of immunity. As my colleagues have noted, this action has yet to proceed to the point where these may become relevant, and no question of official or sovereign immunity was tendered on appeal. We ruled simply on the question of personal jurisdiction, and it is generally accepted that immunity is not a facet of that issue.6
Finally, I address briefly points raised in a motion by Steinberg to strike Interpol’s petition for rehearing. One can readily sympathize with Steinberg’s frustrations over the exceedingly peculiar manner in which this case is being “defended.” Interpol, perhaps wishing to dramatize the argument that it has no existence in or palpable contact with this jurisdiction, has, until the instant petition, refused to materialize in court; instead, its thoughts and desires have been imparted through the United States acting as medium. Yet, no one has revealed to us any special dispensation relieving Interpol of an obligation to abide by the Civil Rules just as any other mortal. It therefore seems safe to presume that the District Court on remand will ensure that this case either proceeds in accordance with established procedures or is terminated in conformity with them; with denial of the petition it is unnecessary to consider further Steinberg’s motion to strike. As for his request for attorney’s fees, I believe that any question of sanctions against Interpol is more appropriately for the District Court as part of its determination of the current status of the action. That court is better able to grapple with the problems *935bred by the anomalous procedural route that Interpol has pursued, and it is not for us to predetermine the course of the case on remand.
. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); 2A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Federal Practice ¶ 12.12 at 2324-2325 (2d ed. 1981).
. Campbell v. Campbell, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 237, 170 F.2d 809 (1948); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F.Supp. 382, 391 (N.D.Ill.1979); 2A J. Moore & J. Lucas, supra note 1, ¶ 8.29 at *9348-276; 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice § 1279 at 352-356 & n.59 (1969). Cf. Peters & Russell, Inc. v. Dorfman, 188 F.2d 711, 712-713 (7th Cir. 1951) (applying Rule 8(d) where plaintiff failed to reply to counterclaim denominated as such). See also the following cases, which cite Rule 8(d) as support for the principle that, on default for failure to answer or otherwise defend, well-pleaded factual allegations of the pleading that relate to liability, as opposed to damages, will be taken as true. Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1974) (answer filed but subsequently stricken); Fehlhaber v. Indian Trails, Inc., 425 F.2d 715, 717 (3d Cir. 1970); Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977).
. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 2.
. Steinberg v. International Criminal Police Org., 672 F.2d 927, at 932 and n.13. (D.C.Cir.1981).
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55.
. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 1351 at 561.