dissenting.
Once again the trumpet of free speech has been sounded. Most unfortunately, the blare has muted the cries of those with equally precious constitutional rights. For the following reasons, I am compelled to dissent.
Less than four years ago, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had occasion to determine the constitutionality of an ordinance identical1 to Doylestown Ordinance No. 117. The ordinance was upheld as constitutional. Commonwealth v. Sterlace, 481 Pa. 6, 391 A.2d 1066 (1978). The majority of this court makes only casual reference to the Sterlace decision, without explication. I cannot so lightly disregard a decision of Pennsylvania’s highest tribunal. Fundamental tenets of federalism and comity demand much more. At the very least, this court is bound by the construction given to a state statute by the state courts. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 1885, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 507, 91 S.Ct. 490, 491, 27 L.Ed.2d 571 (1971); Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242, 244, 73 S.Ct. 600, 601, 97 L.Ed. 983 (1952). In our federal system, the state courts are regarded as the principal expositors of state law. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 429, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 2380, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979). Indeed, the state court’s interpretation of an ordinance is “as though written into the ordinance itself.” Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402, 73 S.Ct. 760, 764, 97 L.Ed. 1105 (1952). In Moore v. Sims, supra, Justice Rehnquist observed:
Almost every constitutional challenge ... offers the opportunity for narrowing constructions that might obviate the constitutional problem and intelligently mediate federal constitutional concerns and state interests.
442 U.S. at 429, 430, 99 S.Ct. at 2380.
Essentially, Ordinance No. 117 prohibits the distribution of advertising material by placing such material at the residence, on the property or on the residential mailbox unless the affirmative request or consent of the occupant has been obtained. According to the testimony of William Andrew Smith, President of Ad World, Inc., the publication Piggy Back has been distributed by attaching it to the post of a mailbox by means of a nylon strap, by placing it on the porch or on the front steps, or by placing it on the garage doors or on the door knobs of premises in Doylestown.2 Diane Herring, Doylestown Township Supervisor, testified that complaints were received by the Township Office to the effect that Piggy Back *1143was “being thrown over the roads and the lawns.”3 Ad World apparently seeks to employ the same method of distribution in which it engaged prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 117. To this end, Ad World challenges the constitutionality of the ordinance, primarily on first amendment grounds.
It has long been held that the right of freedom of speech and press embraces the right to distribute literature as well as the right to receive it. Martin v. Struthers, 318 U.S. 141, 143, 63 S.Ct. 862, 863, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1942). However, first amendment rights have never been regarded as absolutes. In Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642, 71 S.Ct. 920, 932, 95 L.Ed. 1233 (1950), it was stated:
Freedom of speech or press does not mean that one can talk or distribute where, when and how one chooses. Rights other than those of the advocates are involved. By adjustment of rights, we can have both full liberty of expression and an orderly life.
See also Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, —, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2563, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981). The Martin v. Struthers Court recognized that “the peace, good order and comfort of the community may imperatively require regulation of the time, place and manner of distribution.” 318 U.S. at 143, 63 S.Ct. at 863.
The type of analysis to be employed in determining the constitutionality of the ordinance depends upon whether the publication is classified as commercial or noncommercial speech. The district court concluded that Piggy Back was commercial speech and, consequently, engaged in the four-step analysis4 for commercial speech cases enunciated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). I concur with the majority that Ad World’s publication cannot be classified as purely commercial speech, i.e., “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” Id. at 561, 100 S.Ct. at 2349. Although Piggy Back is comprised predominately of commercial advertisements, it also contains certain items of community interest. Actually, Ad World’s publication is a hybrid of both commercial and noncommercial speech. Nevertheless, it is entitled to full first amendment protection as it does not relate solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.
I am convinced that Ordinance No. 117 is constitutionally valid as a reasonable place and manner regulation. Accord, Commonwealth v. Sterlace, supra. The United States Supreme Court has upheld “time, place and manner” regulations, provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. at 647, 101 S.Ct. at 2563, citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1830, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). The majority concedes that the ordinance is not content based. Accord, Commonwealth v. Sterlace, supra. The Sterlace court construed the ordinance as applicable to all advertising, both commercial and noncommercial. Here, as in Sterlace, the preamble to the ordinance indicates that the concern was with the place and manner of distribution rather than with the content of any speech.
The primary justification proffered by Doylestown for the enactment of Ordinance *1144No. 117 is that the accumulation of advertising material on private property would be a clear indication that the residence was unoccupied. Thus, the possibility of burglary and/or vandalism was thought to be increased. Additionally, the Township was concerned with the invasion of privacy and the unsightliness of such materials when deposited on private property.5 A municipality’s interest in protecting its citizens from crime and undue annoyance is well recognized. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616, 96 S.Ct. 1755, 1758, 48 L.Ed.2d 243 (1976); Martin v. Struthers, supra, 319 U.S. at 144, 63 S.Ct. at 863. Doylestown’s interest in crime prevention certainly is substantial. Surprisingly, the majority characterizes the Township’s concern as an “undifferentiated fear,”6 and finds no evidence of a strong connection between the accumulation of advertising materials and the incidence of burglary. The record indicates otherwise. Lieutenant Stephen White of the Doylestown Police Department testified that, based on his experience, there was a correlation between the occurrence of burglaries and indications that residences were unoccupied. He testified that “[s]ome of the perpetrators [of the burglaries] said they looked at several signs that let them know that there is no one there, and one of the signs is advertising in the driveway of the home.”7 Lieutenant White stated that the number of burglaries in Doylestown had doubled from 32 in 1979 to 64 in 1980. He added that about one-third of the burglaries involved residences where the house was unoccupied or the citizen was on vacation.8 The police officer further testified that in many instances of investigation of burglaries of unoccupied homes, he found indications that the residence was unoccupied, including the presence of advertising materials.9
In Commonwealth v. Sterlace, supra, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania observed:
There can be no question that an accumulation of advertising materials at the entry of a residence, whether at a door or a mailbox, poses significant risks in a residential area. Such an accumulation would be a clear invitation to burglars and vandals to enter apparently unoccupied premises.
481 Pa. at 12, 391 A.2d at 1069.
Time, place and manner regulations must also leave open adequate alternative means of communication. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. at 647-648, 101 S.Ct. at 2563-2564. The majority concludes that “[i]n the face of plaintiff’s unrebutted evidence that alternatives to courier delivery are in terms of both time and money prohibitively expensive,10 Doylestown has made no such *1145showing.” Anomalously, the majority notes that Ad World has been using the U.S. mails to distribute its publication. Does not this fact, alone, belie plaintiff’s “unrebutted evidence”? The use of the U.S. mails for distribution explicitly falls outside the purview of the ordinance.
The ordinance contains no restrictions on the use of public forums for distribution of Piggy Back. Nor does the ordinance contain an absolute prohibition on residential distribution; it affects only the manner of distribution on private property. Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that alternatives to courier delivery are prohibitively expensive, Ad World may continue courier delivery by altering its present manner of distribution. Significantly, Ad World’s president admitted on cross-examination that the carrier could knock on the door and hand the publication to someone in the home.11 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Sterlace construed an identical ordinance to permit door-to-door, face-to-face solicitation and distribution, as well as mail distribution and leafletting in public places. 481 Pa. at 13, 391 A.2d at 1070. Also, Ad World may continue its present manner of distribution if the request or consent of the occupant is obtained. Commonwealth v. Sterlace, id. The conclusion is inescapable that ample alternative avenues of distribution are available to plaintiff.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to affirm.
. Except for the insertion of the word “Doylestown” in Section 1 of Doylestown Ordinance No. 117 and the substitution of the word “justice” for “magistrate” in Section 2, Ordinance No. 117 is identical to McCandless Township Ordinance No. 662 which was reviewed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Sterlace, 481 Pa. 6, 391 A.2d 1066 (1978).
. Transcript of Temporary Restraining Order hearing, February 19, 1981, at 4, 10 (hereinafter “Transcript”).
. Transcript at 27.
. For commercial speech to be afforded first amendment protection, it must concern lawful activity and not be misleading, and the asserted governmental interest in regulation must be substantial. If so, it must be determined whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted and whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980).
. The majority concludes That no justification in terms of unsightliness and invasion of privacy was offered by the Township in the district court or here. But the preamble to the ordinance, which was apparently part of the record, plainly recites such justifications for the enactment of the ordinance. Furthermore, Doylestown offered evidence at the February 19, 1981 hearing which is supportive of the unsightliness and privacy justifications. For example, there was testimony that advertising material was “being thrown over the roads and lawns.” Transcript at 27. There also was testimony that requests to cease distribution were not honored. Transcript at 14, 27.
. We are referred to Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). In the Tinker case, the record failed to establish that the school authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students. Id. at 508, 89 S.Ct. at 737. Here, both the record and a common sense approach support the conclusion that the accumulation of advertising outside a place of residence is a signal to would-be burglars or vandals that the residence is unoccupied.
. Transcript at 34.
. Id.
. Transcript at 35.
. In this respect, the record is disturbingly deficient. The entire record contains only two references to the “cost” of alternative means of distribution. First, Smith, Ad World’s president, testified on cross-examination that the U.S. Post Office is an alternative method of distribution “which is very, very expensive. For the small advertiser in our case it’s something he can’t afford to do.” Transcript at 20. Second, Smith admitted on cross-examination *1145that Ad World’s manner of distribution is less expensive than distribution by knocking on the door. Transcript at 17, 18. What is apparent is that, other than the conclusory statement of Smith with respect to the use of the U.S. Post Office, there is no evidence that alternatives are prohibitively expensive.
. Transcript at 11.