dissenting.
On remand from the United States Supreme Court this case presents a legal and factual situation that leads me now, just as it did when we first heard this appeal, to conclude that the order of the district court denying habeas corpus relief should be affirmed.
For the reasons set out in my dissenting opinion to the original panel decision, 638 F.2d 1115, 1119-20 (1981), I do not believe that the appellant here has demonstrated the necessary nexus between the allegedly ineffective assistance of counsel he received and his ultimate decision to plead guilty. Although the asserted defect in his attorney’s conduct is the attorney’s failure to *236investigate a rumor that the prosecutrix was pregnant, the appellant did not introduce at the district court hearing any evidence to show that his decision to plead guilty rested in whole or in part on any belief that the prosecutrix was pregnant. Indeed, the appellant testified that he was motivated not by such a belief but by an understanding that he would receive a lighter sentence. And while the majority suggests that the appellant’s attorney was “using the rumor as a tool to force the defendant to plead guilty,” there is no finding that supports this assertion. Indeed, it appears clear from the testimony that the attorney carefully identified the pregnancy rumor as just that — a rumor — and stated that the rumor would have to be investigated before the case went to trial. I must, therefore, agree with the district court that even if, arguendo, Ford’s attorney was under some duty to investigate the rumor of pregnancy, there has been no showing here that the appellant has in any way been prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to investigate. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s holding that the appellant has failed to satisfy the requisites for habeas corpus relief. See Morrow v. Parratt, 574 F.2d 411, 412-13 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C.Cir.1979) (en banc); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974, 99 S.Ct. 1542, 59 L.Ed.2d 793 (1979).
The Supreme Court has directed this Court, upon remand, to consider the opinion in Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). In Sumner, the Supreme Court emphasized that, in reviewing habeas corpus petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court is bound by the factual findings made by state courts unless one of the circumstances enumerated in section 2254(d) applies. The Court went on to hold that if a district court believes that one of those enumerated circumstances is present — if, for example, “the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing,” or if “the appellant was * * * denied due process of law in the State court proceeding,” or if the district court has reviewed the state court record and concluded that the state’s factual deter-. mination “is not fairly supported by the record” — then the court must state explicitly its rationale for concluding that such a circumstance is present and cite the statutory provision upon which it relies. The Supreme Court stressed that such a statement was necessary to minimize “friction” between state and federal courts by ensuring that state court factual determinations are overturned only when those findings were clearly deficient. 449 U.S. at 543-52, 101 S.Ct. at 767-771.
In the present case, the majority’s original opinion — filed on the same day as the Supreme Court filed Sumner — did not make explicit reference to any of the exceptions listed in section 2254(d). On remand, the majority now invokes section 2254(d)(1) and states that “the merits of the factual dispute with respect to incompetency of counsel were not resolved in the state court hearing.” At 235. Because the Nebraska courts were not confronted with the explicit claim that the attorney’s failure to investigate the pregnancy had constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, those courts did not make any specific finding with respect to that claim.1 See State v. Ford, 200 Neb. 779, 265 N.W.2d 456 (1978). Accordingly, I cannot disagree with the majority’s statement that section 2254(d)(1) applies.
*237I would note, however, that the Nebraska courts did consider factual issues quite similar to those raised in the district court. Specifically, the Nebraska courts rejected the contention that Ford’s guilty plea was involuntary because it rested on a belief that the prosecutrix might have been pregnant, and at the same time concluded that Ford had been represented by competent counsel “throughout the original proceeding.” Id. 265 S.W.2d at 457. Although the court did not make any specific finding with respect to the claim that defendant’s counsel had failed to investigate the pregnancy rumor, one might reasonably infer from the Nebraska courts’ conclusions that they had reviewed the record for evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel and had failed to uncover any such evidence, even though the rumor of pregnancy had been brought to the court’s attention. In such a case, even where no definitive finding within the sense of section 2254(d) has been made by a state court, a federal court reviewing the same events for evidence of the same alleged violation — in this case ineffective assistance of counsel — might properly keep the state court’s action in mind and conclude only hesitantly that the state court had overlooked an alleged violation that had been squarely within its field of vision.
For the reasons articulated in the opinion of the district court, and with due regard to the Nebraska courts’ review of appellant’s claims, and above all because the record is bereft of any evidence showing a connection between counsel’s alleged failure • to look into the rumor of the prosecutrix’s pregnancy and the guilty plea, I respectfully dissent.
. Ordinarily, such a situation would indicate that the habeas petitioner had failed to exhaust available state remedies, and would require dismissal of the petition for that reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). However, as the majority notes, under Nebraska law a person may not file more than one post-trial motion challenging his conviction. Ford has already completed such a challenge, and therefore would appear to be barred from any further state relief. Under the majority’s order the Nebraska courts will be provided with an opportunity to hear Ford’s petition if in fact they are willing to do so. If they refuse, then the exhaustion requirement for a federal habeas petition may be deemed to have been satisfied. See Witham v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 293, 299 n.7 (8th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Wolff, 506 F.2d 556, 558-60 (8th Cir. 1974).