dissenting:
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s reversal and granting of benefits, thus reversing the Secretary’s adoption of the ALJ’s decision.
Under the majority opinion, the only reason upon which reversal instead of remand can be based is its conclusion that Lester cannot work an eight hour day. The evidence in the record on this point, however, is conflicting. Dr. Preston concluded that Lester could sit six hours, walk one hour, and stand one hour. While other doctors concluded that he could not sit, stand, and walk for that length of time, their conclusions were drawn upon consideration of the same muscular and skeletal problems Dr. Preston relied upon. Because there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Secretary’s conclusion, reversal on this ground is inappropriate.
I would, however, remand to the Secretary because the vocational expert did not have before him all of the physical impairments of the claimant. He was not advised of Lester’s dizziness and headaches, double vision, osteoarthritis, chronic pulmonary disease, asthma, and mild dragfoot.1
Although the vocational expert’s testimony was taken at Lester’s first hearing, it was relied upon by the ALJ in his second *845decision, which is the one appealed from. The government contends that even if the AU’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert was incomplete the regulations had changed following the second hearing so that reliance upon the vocational expert was no longer required. The trouble with that argument is that the ALT did in fact rely upon the vocational expert’s previous testimony in his second decision. We must review an administrative decision on the grounds upon which the record discloses the action was based. Securities Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87, 63 S.Ct. 454, 459, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943).
Because the vocational expert did not have all the facts before him regarding Lester’s physical impairments, I would remand.
. This listing is not meant to be an exclusive one.