dissenting.
The unusual nature of the occurrences set out in the majority opinion and the fact that several police officers were injured during the affray have required us all to scrutinize the record of the trial proceedings with exceptional care. Under the recited circumstances the potential for an excessive response by the police is all too real, even in the best regulated law enforcement agencies. While I therefore have great respect for the views expressed by the majority, I must nevertheless dissent.
I would affirm the decision of United States District Judge William K. Thomas because both he and the state trial court have in my judgment complied with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). With those conditions met, it was necessary for Judge Thomas, as it is for us, to respect the finality of the state court factual determinations in a criminal case over which the state court possessed original jurisdiction.
On May 29, 1974, petitioners were involved in a violent altercation with the police in which several policemen and two other citizens were injured by gunfire. Following their arrest, petitioners were taken to the police station where each confessed. Prior to trial, the state court held an evidentiary hearing regarding the admissibility of petitioners’ confessions. This hearing lasted three days, included the testimony of eighteen witnesses (the three petitioners, the wives of petitioners Johnson and Jordan, and thirteen policemen), and generated over 600 pages of transcript and a number of photographic exhibits. These witnesses presented conflicting testimony. The petitioners testified that they had been subjected to physical abuse and threats by the police. The officers testified basically that any injuries which occurred were a result of force needed to arrest petitioners, that petitioners were not abused or threatened at the station, and that petitioners’ statements were voluntary.
At the conclusion of the lengthy suppression hearing, the trial court ruled:
I find the statements were voluntarily given and were not given because of threats, coercion and abuse.
Transcript at 662. The state trial judge did suppress a written statement made by petitioner Fowler because he found that statement, although otherwise voluntary, had been made after Fowler requested counsel. With the other confessions admitted, petitioners were convicted by a jury of six counts involving charges of aggravated burglary and attempted aggravated murder.
On appeal in the state system, the Eighth District of the Ohio Court of Appeals af*993firmed the trial court judgment. That court found petitioners’ claim that their confessions were involuntary to be without merit. In so holding it observed that it had examined pictures taken of petitioners following interrogation and that “[t]he photographs of the [petitioners] do not demonstrate they had been beaten as the injuries were minor and insignificant.” Ohio v. Fowler, No. 34287, slip op. at 4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1975). Petitioners’ motions for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio were denied.
Petitioners filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in district court. Judge Thomas, after noting that he had read the entire record, observed:
The testimony of the police witnesses was diametrically opposed to that of petitioners with respect to the issues of “deception and physical and mental coercion.”
Whether petitioners in this case were subjected to verbal and physical abuse and whether their confessions were the product of any such abuse, are factual issues that were fully and fairly litigated in the trial court at the hearing in which petitioners were represented by counsel. Therefore, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the finding of the state court that the petitioners’ confessions were not the product of abuse or coercion is presumed to be correct unless that “factual determination is not supported by the record.” . . . This court having considered as a whole that part of the record pertinent to the issue of coercion, finds that the state court’s determination is fairly supported by the record.
Fowler v. Jago, Nos. C79-64, C79-65, C7966, mem. op. at 7-8 (N.D.Ohio June 16, 1980). The petitions were accordingly denied.
Now, more than eight years after the events which gave rise to petitioners’ convictions, the majority ruling orders a remand to the district court for a second evidentiary hearing to determine the voluntariness of certain statements made by petitioners after they were arrested on the night of the crimes. That hearing must necessarily be held after the memories of the witnesses have become faded and probably jaded by time, assuming they can be located. The majority so holds although there is not the slightest suggestion in the comprehensive record before us, to paraphrase 28 U.S.C. § 2254, that the fact-finding procedures employed by the state court, which spread over many days and covered more than 600 pages of trial transcript, were inadequate to afford a full and fair hearing; nor that the material facts were not adequately developed at the state court hearing, as shown so clearly by the extended statement of facts in the majority opinion; nor that the state court lacked jurisdiction in the state criminal proceedings; nor that the petitioners were denied counsel, when it is clear that both the state and the petitioners were fully and ably represented by competent, aggressive, well-prepared counsel; nor that the applicants received anything short of a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceedings; nor that the petitioners were otherwise deprived of due process in the state court proceedings; nor, finally, that the factual determinations by the state trial judge were not fairly supported by the record in the state court proceedings.
None of the foregoing observations, based upon 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and upon the language of Townsend v. Sain, is seriously disputed by the majority. Instead, it predicates its remand to the district court for a new and supposedly improved evidentiary hearing solely upon its conclusion that, in the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing.” It so holds because it finds inadequate the determination of the state trial judge that the statements which were allowed into evidence at the trial “were voluntarily given and were not given because of threats, coercion or abuse.” (emphasis added).
I read the majority opinion to hold that the district judge committed two errors. First, the majority concludes that it was improper to apply a presumption of correct*994ness to the state court findings on voluntariness. Second, it finds that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing instead of relying on an evaluation of the state court record.1 In so ruling, the majority concludes that the factual finding of the state trial judge on voluntariness was not entitled to the section 2254(d) presumption of correctness because of “the failure of the state trial judge to articulate the legal standard applied in making the determination of voluntariness, or the factual findings upon which it was based in light of the complex facts of this case.” Majority Op. at-(footnote omitted).
In my opinion, a proper respect for the teachings of LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690, 93 S.Ct. 1203, 35 L.Ed.2d 637 (1973), and Townsend v. Sain, and for the Congressional mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, justifiably requires us to uphold the decision of the district judge denying habeas relief.
Congress carefully provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)2 for a presumption of correctness of factual findings made after a hearing by a state court of competent jurisdiction. Section 2254(d) commands that these factual findings “shall” be presumed correct unless any one of eight specific circumstances should exist. Clearly, the statute admonishes federal courts to be respectful of the integrity of their sister courts in the states and of the coequal ability of state courts to protect the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime.
In LaVallee v. Delle Rose, the Supreme Court considered and rejected arguments nearly identical to those relied upon by the majority here. Delle Rose had been con*995victed in New York state court of the premeditated murder of his wife. Two confessions were admitted into evidence after having been found voluntary. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals directed the trial court to hold a special hearing on voluntariness, after which the trial court summarized the evidence and concluded:
On all the evidence both at the trial and at the hearing, and after considering the totality of the circumstances, including the omission to warn defendant of his right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination, I find and decide that the respective confessions to the police and district attorney were, in all respects, voluntary and legally admissible in evidence at the trial....
(emphasis added). The trial court made no further findings. In subsequent habeas corpus proceedings, the district court held that because the state trial judge had failed to explain precisely how far he credited the defendant’s testimony as well as other evidence before him, there was no “adequate” factual determination within the meaning of section 2254(d). The district court then held its own hearing and thereafter found the confessions to be involuntary.
In affirming, the Second Circuit stated that while New York’s state judges were competent and willing to apply the rules on the admissibility of confessions,
we cannot tell in this instance whether the New York courts credited Delle Rose’s story of the circumstances surrounding his confessions but still held these to have been voluntary, a conclusion to which we could not agree, or based their holding of voluntariness on a partial or complete rejection of his testimony. .. .
United States ex rel. Delle Rose v. LaVallee, 468 F.2d 1288, 1290 (2d Cir. 1972), rev’d, 410 U.S. 690, 93 S.Ct. 1203, 35 L.Ed.2d 637 (1973).
The Supreme Court reversed. A majority of the Court concluded that the opinion of the trial court met the requirements for the presumption of correctness of section 2254(d). The Court relied on language from Townsend v. Sain to hold that where a trial judge refuses to exclude a confession in the face of allegations of “third-degree” methods of interrogation by the police in a habeas proceeding “ ‘the district judge may assume that the state trier found the facts against the petitioner. .. .’” LaVallee v. Delle Rose, supra, 410 U.S. at 694, 93 S.Ct. at 1205. The Court also stated there was “no evidence that the state trier utilized the wrong standard... . ” 410 U.S. at 695, 93 S.Ct. at 1205. Therefore, the finding of the state trial court on voluntariness was entitled to the presumption of correctness from 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and Delle Rose had the burden “to establish in the District Court by convincing evidence that the state court’s determination was erroneous.” Id.
Similarly, in the present case, the trial judge had to decide whether to believe the petitioners or the police. As Judge Thomas stated: “there was conflicting testimony about whether petitioners were subjected to physical and verbal abuse. Resolution of this issue was largely a matter of credibility.” Fowler v. Jago, Nos. C79-64, C79-65, C79-77, supra at 8. After an extensive hearing, which the majority has not challenged as to its fairness or completeness, the trial judge resolved the factual questions against petitioners. Not only did he find the confessions to be voluntary, as did the state judge in LaVallee, but he also found that they were not made “because of threats, coercion and abuse.” This is more precise than the finding made in LaVallee.
Significant to me is the absence in the majority opinion, or in the record upon which it is based, of any suggestion that the state trial judge was not fully aware and respectful of the federal constitutional requirements concerning the voluntariness of confessions under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Indeed, not mentioned in the majority opinion is the fact that the state trial judge suppressed one proffered statement because he found it to violate Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. at 1613 (1966). It is, therefore, even more reasonable for us, here, to assume that the state trial *996judge would have granted relief had he believed the evidence supportive of the petitioners’ claim at the suppression hearing. I respectfully suggest that what is characterized by the majority as uncertainty regarding the legal standard employed in state court is simply an honest disagreement with the conclusions which the state trial judge so clearly reached respecting voluntariness. This is not and should not be, in our constitutional system of joint federal-state responsibility, a valid basis for the interposition of the differing views of federal judges.
Although it acknowledges that the “police officers’ versions of the events dispute most of the petitioner’s claims,” Majority Op. at 986, the majority is troubled by inconsistencies found in some testimony of the police. After reading the record, I do not have the same problems. I agree with Judge Thomas that the findings of the state trial judge, though succinct to the point of being terse, are fairly supported by the entire record, judged as a whole.
The inherently intimidating nature of custodial interrogation has been fully catalogued in Miranda v. Arizona, supra. While perhaps the frequency of abuse may have diminished in the sixteen intervening years, my own judicial experience confirms the observation of Chief Justice Warren that “[t]he use of physical brutality and violence is not, unfortunately, relegated to the past or to any part of the country.” Id. at 446, 86 S.Ct. at 1613. Thus the burden is cast upon the government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession before it may be used against him at trial. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972). As noted by Chief Justice Warren in Miranda, one of the particularly evil byproducts of coercive interrogation is its basic unreliability as evidence of guilt. See Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 455 n.24, 86 S.Ct. at 1618 n.24. Nevertheless, not all custodial interrogations are invariably coercive in fact, nor are confessions or statements gained during such interrogation invariably involuntary. If they were, they would probably be barred on the basis of unreliability alone.
Human motivation is complex, and the need to explain one’s actions may be overwhelming, even though later it may appear to have been unwise. “If it is true that confession is good for the soul, it must be acknowledged that a free and honest admission of guilt is perhaps the first and largest step toward ultimate rehabilitation.” U.S. v. Derrick, 519 F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir. 1975).3
While I suppose the trial judge could have credited petitioners’ story that they were on a peaceful religious mission to “convert” their victim, he could certainly with equal plausibility have concluded that it was patently incredible. They had to be aware that the evidence of their own violent conduct on the evening in question was overwhelming. I believe that the state trial judge was fully entitled to discredit not only their testimony concerning the night’s events altogether, but also was entitled to discount the petitioners’ description of the causes and extent of their alleged injuries and any impact those events might have had on the voluntariness of their state*997ments. Obviously that is exactly what he did. While the majority points to discrepancies in the evidence on behalf of the state, common sense suggests that such discrepancies are typical of the truth-seeking process and may be more supportive of the ultimate finding than unfailing consistency.4
To avoid the rule of LaVallee, the majority argues that this case is too “complex” for a federal district court to defer to terse state court findings. Essentially, the majority would require specific resolution of credibility conflicts in testimony by a state court before the presumption of correctness of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) would arise. This precise argument was made by Justice Marshall when he dissented in LaVallee. 410 U.S. at 700, 93 S.Ct. at 1208.5 That argument, however, failed to persuade a majority of the Court in LaVallee. Nothing indicates that the Supreme Court would be more receptive to it today.
The majority suggests that a finding that no coercion was used by the police against the petitioners would be “clearly erroneous.” To support this conclusion, the majority points to photographs taken of the petitioners at the time of arrest and to those taken by the police at the station for identification. There is no mention, however, of a finding by the Ohio Court of Appeals that “[t]he photographs of the appellants do not demonstrate they had been beaten as the injuries were minor and insignificant.” Under Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. *998539, 546, 101 S.Ct. 764, 768-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981) (Sumner I), the deference to state factual determinations applies to findings both by state trial and appellate courts. Sumner I and Sumner v. Mata, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982) (Sumner II), emphasize that a federal court must articulate which factor from section 2254(d) was found if the court refuses to defer to the state court. In disregarding the Ohio appellate court’s evaluation of the photographs, the majority here does not indicate that section of 2254(d) upon which it relies.6
While I personally do not entertain such a view, it must be observed that on this record a more probative issue could be raised whether any statements or confessions, coming in the immediate aftermath of admittedly violent circumstances, could ever be voluntary, as a matter of law, no matter how that violence came about or how it may have or have not affected the petitioners when they made their statements. Such a view might arguably hold that upon this record the findings of the state trial judge that the statements were “voluntary, and not given because of threats, coercion or abuse” were “not fairly supported by the record,” as provided in section 2254(d)(8). Nevertheless the majority has carefully avoided this conclusion. It implies that somehow if, after a new hearing, the federal district judge reaches the same conclusions but buttresses it with more complete findings concerning credibility and resolution of apparent conflicts in the testimony, the denial of the writ will then be upheld.
The specificity which the majority would impose upon the state judge, as a condition to acceptance of his factual findings, while undoubtedly desirable, far exceeds that held fully adequate in LaVallee v. Delle Rose and, I submit, that usually required of trial judges in both state and federal systems. Upon the strength of the majority’s opinion, if it stands, it will not hereafter be difficult to disregard the findings of state trial judges by merely pointing to some conflict in the testimony and holding that it should have been specifically resolved by written findings. We shall then be back where we were before Chief Justice Warren’s admonitions of Townsend v. Sain were incorporated into section 2254.
I also respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion here that Judge Thomas erred in not holding a separate evidentiary hearing on the question of voluntariness. In my opinion this result is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Townsend v. Sain. There the Court emphasized that express findings by a state court judge are not always necessary: “it may ... be possible for the District Court to reconstruct the findings of the state trier of fact, either because his view of the facts is plain from his opinion or because of other indicia.” 372 U.S. at 314, 83 S.Ct. at 758. While the Court in Townsend did in fact remand for an evidentiary hearing, it also was careful to observe:
[T]he coequal responsibilities of state and federal judges in the administration of federal constitutional law are such that we think the district judge may, in the ordinary case in which there has been no articulation, properly assume that the state trier of fact applied correct standards of federal law to the facts... . Thus, if third degree methods of obtaining a confession are alleged and the state court refused to exclude the confession from evidence, the district court may assume that the state trier found the facts against the petitioner, the law being, of course, that third-degree methods necessarily produce a coerced confession.
372 U.S. at 314-15, 83 S.Ct. at 757-58. That is precisely the situation here.
There is no suggestion in the majority opinion that the state trial judge who pre*999sided over the case was biased, or not competent to hear the defendants’ motions to suppress or to rule upon them intelligently and fairly. While during the evidentiary hearing, the trial judge occasionally expressed some frustration with the aggressive conduct of defendants’ counsel, in my judgment, he presided over the hearing in as fair and intelligent a manner as one could reasonably expect in either the federal or the state system. The majority opinion does not suggest otherwise or provide any reason why another hearing, presided over by a federal instead of a state judge, could produce a more just or objective result.7
These petitioners have had their day in court. They have been accorded due process in those proceedings and have been found guilty after a fair trial. This litigation should be at rest.
. Significantly, petitioners’ brief in this court does not assign as error any failure of the district court to hold a new hearing. Instead, the brief states that “the district court erred in relying upon the ‘findings’ of the state court with respect to the voluntariness of [petitioners’] alleged statements and failing to make an independent determination upon those issues.” Appellants’ Brief at p. 11. Petitioners argue that the district court had a duty to make an independent evaluation of the state court record, but there is no mention of a need for a new hearing or for additional evidence.
. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit—
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair,- and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous.
. If we are to credit the testimony of Officer Horval, petitioner Johnson’s statements could present just such an example. From Horval’s testimony, it appears that Johnson was read the Miranda warnings upon being placed in the police cruiser and that Johnson stated he understood his rights. Transcript at 195. The officer then told Johnson that two policemen had been shot and asked him why. According to Officer Horval, Johnson responded that “he was after Schoolboy, and there was nothing meant against the police.” Transcript at 204. Obviously, Johnson could have been terrified of the police, offering an explanation which he hoped might protect him from a dreaded “third degree” interrogation back at the station. On the other hand, as a purported member of a religious sect, Johnson may have been genuinely surprised at the unusual twist of events. He may even have been regretful that a robbery of someone who he believed was selling drugs had escalated into an invasion of the rights of others toward whom he bore no personal malice whatever. I do not suggest which, if either, explanation is the correct one. I do suggest that the quality of the record and the accuracy of findings based upon it is not likely at this time to be significantly improved, even taking into account the consummate skill and refined judgment which Judge Thomas could be expected to contribute.
. Although the accounts of the police witnesses varied somewhat as to the time of questioning, the exact questions asked, and petitioners’ responses, there was unanimous agreement among the police that petitioners had not been physically abused or threatened at the police station. See Transcript at 35, 43, 47 (Officer Copeland testifying that petitioners “didn’t get beaten,” were not threatened, and were not harmed at the police station); Transcript at 76-77 (Officer Look testifying that petitioner Johnson was not threatened at the station); Transcript at 432 (Officer McIntosh testifying that he did not strike petitioner Johnson with a flashlight while arresting him); Transcript at 512 (Officer Rose testifying that no acts of violence occurred against Fowler or Jordan in the jail); Transcript at 573 (Officer Staimpel testifying that there was no indication that petitioner Jordan had been beaten or suffered facial lacerations); and Transcript at 607 (Officer Bayerl testifying that he did not strike petitioner Jordan and that he saw no one beaten). As the majority notes, the testimony of the police indicated that petitioner Johnson suffered a slight cut and bruise around his right eye as a result of altercations and scuffles during arrest and transportation to the station. The testifying officers differed slightly as to when Johnson suffered the injury, which the Ohio appeals court found to be “minor and insignificant,” but their testimony showed no use of unreasonable force such as might cause petitioners’ confessions to be involuntary. In no sense did the police substantiate or lend credence to petitioners’ versions of events that police beat them with gun butts, pistols and flashlights and threatened them and their families. Had the state judge credited petitioners’ allegations, I believe, as the Supreme Court stated in LaVallee, “the District Court could have been reasonably certain that the state court would have granted relief.” 410 U.S. at 695, 93 S.Ct. at 1206.
Also, I believe that the police testimony regarding the nature of events surrounding petitioners’ arrest is adequate explanation of Fowler’s minor injuries that are shown in his identification photo. Even if the facts surrounding Fowler’s arrest were not sufficiently developed on the record, this would not justify a remand for petitioners Johnson and Jordan as well.
. In his dissent Justice Marshall stated:
It is possible, of course, that the state court rejected all of respondent’s testimony as incredible and therefore properly held the confessions voluntary. On the other hand, if the state court had believed all of respondent’s contentions, it would undoubtedly have found the confessions involuntary. There remains, however, the third possibility that the state court believed some of respondent’s contentions and rejected others. It is this last possibility that makes for substantial uncertainty in a factually complex case such as this as to whether the state court correctly applied the abstract legal standard and did not, instead, commit constitutional error. Due to the unrevealing nature of the state court’s decision, it is impossible to -say that that court may not have credited a sufficient portion of respondent’s story to establish, under the controlling standard, the involuntariness of his confessions and nevertheless have reached an erroneous conclusion of voluntariness because the question may have been a close one on the facts that it accepted. It is this inherent uncertainty as to what the state court may have believed or disbelieved that justified the action of the District Court and the Court of Appeals in this case.
LaVallee, supra, 410 U.S. at 700, 93 S.Ct. at 1208.
. In Sumner II, the Supreme Court said that the presumption of § 2254(d) does not apply to the ultimate question of the constitutionality of pretrial identification procedures because that is a “mixed question of fact and law.” - U.S. at-, 102 S.Ct. at 1306. In my opinion, Sumner II does not require reversal of Judge Thomas. In the instant case, the trial court’s determination included factual findings as well as the ultimate determination that the statements were “voluntary.” Also, the Court in Sumner II gave no signal that the validity of LaVallee was in doubt.
. Because I would not remand this case to the district court for a new hearing, I would reach the other issues presented by petitioners in their appeal. Upon consideration of these issues, I do not believe they provide grounds for reversal of the district court judgment.