(concurring specially).
I concur in Part V of the court’s opinion and in many of the statements elsewhere, but because of my disagreement with some of its underlying rationale that might unduly complicate the application of the Rule, I set forth some of my comments thereon.
I
The Plain Meaning of the Rule
The court’s opinion deals extensively with legislative history and appears to have considerable difficulty interpreting Rule 609(a). (Op. at 1056-1059). However, by resorting to the plain meaning of the words the problem of interpretation becomes considerably less difficult. The court’s difficulty in interpretation stems from an apparent reluctance to accept fully the fact that the Rule recognizes the relevance of convictions for all capital crimes and felonies on the issue of the credibility of witnesses. In the last analysis, Part V of the court’s opinion reaches this recognition but the reasoning and rationale expressed throughout the opinion may lead to considerable difficulty for the court and counsel in performing the required balancing. While the opinion for the court recognizes that major crimes have “some” probative value on the issue of credibility, the body of the opinion contains a number of statements that tend to play-down the probative value of capital crimes and felonies.
The Rule plainly provides that all felonies and misdemeanors1 involving dishonesty and false statement are automatically admitted without balancing. Example: The felony of perjury, false statement to 'the government, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq., need not be balanced. In my view, other convictions for timely capital offenses and felonies are all made admissible if the probative effect of the defect in character of the witness, as represented by the elements of the crime for which he was convicted, outweighs the prejudicial effect to the defendant. In this connection, the Advisory Committee’s Notes to the Rules of Evidence, as submitted by the Supreme Court to the Congress on Rule 609, recognize that:
The weight of traditional authority has been to allow use of felonies generally without regard to the nature of the particular offense and of crimen falsi without regard to the grade of the offense.
House Document No. 93-46, 93d Congress, 1st Session, February 5, 1973 (emphasis added). This was the approved view of its Rule as submitted to Congress by the Supreme Court. And the rule that finally emerged from Congress is substantially the *1074rule as presented by the Supreme Court, with only balancing added. See discussion, infra. So I would interpret the Rule to “allow [the balancing] of felonies generally . ...” Id. (emphasis added).
Because of the plain language of the Rule and the Advisory Committee’s Notes, I am forced to disagree with the statement in the court’s opinion that “the language of the Rule also weakly suggests that all felony convictions less than ten years old have at least some probative value.” (Op. at 1056) (emphasis added). My disagreement is with the characterization of the Rule as a weak suggestion. Rule 609 plainly states that “evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted ... but only if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant ... . ” This is a plain direct statement by Congress that all capital crimes and felonies “shall be admitted” if the balancing test is met. I see no weakness in that expression of congressional intent — rather, the statement in the court’s opinion is an unsupported attempt to weaken the express direction of Congress.
II
Legislative History
After years of consideration by the Advisory Committee, the Chief Justice of the United States, by direction of the Supreme Court, transmitted to the Congress the Rules of Evidence of the United States Courts and Magistrates which had been adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to law.
Despite the lengthy legislative history that is recounted in the court’s opinion, the end result in Congress was that the language of Rule 609(a), with which we are here primarily concerned, was not materially altered from that presented by the Supreme Court. To illustrate this, the Rule as presented, and as finally adopted, is set forth below. The only two words that were deleted from the Supreme Court draft are enclosed in brackets [], and new matter added by Congress is set forth in italics.
Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime
(a) General rule. — For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime [is admissible] shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
Before Congress amended Rule 609(a) the balancing provided in Rule 4032 could always be invoked by a defendant’s objection to the introduction of a conviction.3 As transmitted by the Chief Justice Rule 609 provided that prior convictions were “admissible,” whereas amended Rule 609(a) states such evidence “shall be admitted.” Rule 609(a) as enacted provides when admission is mandatory and Rule 403 continues to provide when exclusion is discretionary. Thus, given the intangible nature of the elements of the crimes to be weighed, the nuances inherent in the inverse standards to be applied, the mandatory direction of Rule 609(a)4 and the highly dis*1075cretionary standard of Rule 403, the two rules (as proposed by the Supreme Court and as enacted) in practical application are essentially functional equivalents. Congress thus ended up requiring the admission of prior convictions by a standard that did not vary materially from the combination of Rules 609 and 403 as transmitted by the Chief Justice. And since the only amendments to the Rule that survived were those made by the Conference Committee the rest of the extensive legislative history is irrelevant. As to Rule 609(a) the Advisory Committee’s Notes in most respects are more relevant. See extract therefrom quoted at p. 1051, supra. The Conference Committee Report as quoted at p. 1077, infra, is even stronger.
The persuasive argument for admitting all “felonies generally,” and not just crimes with veracity related elements, was made by Senator McClellan:
[A] person who has committed a serious crime — a felony — will just as readily lie under oath as someone who has committed a misdemeanor involving lying. Would a convicted rapist, cold-blooded murderer or armed robber really hesitate to lie under oath any more than a person who has previously [only] lied? Would a convicted murderer or robber be more truthful than such a person?5
120 Cong.Rec. 37076-77. A negative answer is indicated by the mere posing of the question. This was the common sense logic from which the Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court proceeded and that ultimately prevailed in Congress.
The court’s opinion also states that the legislative history is “not wholly satisfying” because “Congress never focused on the narrow question whether all felonies have at least some probative value on the issue of credibility.” (Op. at 1061) (emphasis added). This statement is an implicit admission that Congress never restricted the general language of the Rule, i.e., all convictions of crimes “punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year,” “shall be admitted ” if they survive balancing. By including capital offenses and felonies without limitation, none of which include any element of “dishonesty or false statement” because of the operation of (a)(2), Congress indicated by the scheme of the Rule that veracity related elements were not required for such crimes to be balanced. Thus, the probative value to be balanced flows from the elements of the crime and the magnitude of the defect of individual character, the disrespect for law, that flows from the conviction of any such major crime. The scheme of the Rule therefore implicitly assumes that convictions for all such capital offenses and felonies bear on credibility.
The court’s opinion, under the guise of deferring to a “compromise” which occurred in the Conference Committee, fails to fully recognize the plain meaning of the Rule as unanimously adopted by the Conference Committee and enacted by Congress. As shown above, Congress did a complete circle returning to its starting point; the “compromise” was nothing more than a reversion to the Rule as transmitted from the Supreme Court, with a minor modification of Rule 403 balancing added. Moreover, there is nothing in the so-called “compromise” that constitutes a valid basis, for altering the ordinary meaning of the plain words of the Rule.6 Hence, the dis*1076cussion of legislative history while interesting is largely inapplicable.
Ill
The Application of the Rule — Balancing
As to the procedure to be followed in balancing, it is my view that the court can request any information it considers it needs to exercise its discretion. While ordinarily the name of the crime, the date of the conviction, and the date the witness was released from confinement would be sufficient to perform the necessary balancing, the court has wide discretion to request any information that it considers would be helpful.
Therefore, recognizing the breadth of the court’s discretion, I would not fetter that discretion by specifying or inferring that the trial judge should consider any particular factors because to do so unnecessarily narrows his discretion. Trial judges should not be placed in straight jackets in the exercise of their discretionary authority. It must also be remembered that in many trials no transcript is prepared and that review by a subsequent court of the proof at trial of a prior conviction could be a very time consuming adventure. In the majority of cases the elements of the statutory offense indicated by the indictment and the jury verdict and the relevant dates, together with such representations as defense counsel might make, should normally be sufficient for the court to perform all the balancing that is fairly required.
The balancing process to be carried out by the judge must of necessity have some practical limitations. In United States v. Boyer, 150 F.2d 595, 596 (D.C.Cir.1945), Judge Edgerton wrote with respect to the evidence needed by a jury in considering the effect of a prior conviction on a witness’ credibility.
It is generally agreed that in order to save time and avoid confusion of issues, inquiry into a previous crime must be stopped before its logical possibilities are exhausted; the witness cannot call other witnesses to corroborate his story and the opposing party cannot call other witnesses to refute it. The disputed question is whether inquiry into a previous crime should stop (1) with proof of the conviction of the witness or (2) with any reasonably brief “protestations on his own behalf” which he may wish to make. The second alternative will seldom be materially more confusing or time-consuming than the first, if the trial judge duly exercises his “considerable discretion in admitting or rejecting evidence.” [Bracey v. United States, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 23, 142 F.2d 85, 89]
Many of the same considerations that are applicable to the impeachment of witnesses before a jury also apply to a considerable extent to the procedure by which the judge will balance under the Rule. The considerations expressed by Judge Edgerton are as applicable today as when they were written when it was recognized that the trial judge had “considerable discretion in admitting or rejecting evidence.” Id.
It can also be concluded from the plain language of the Rule that while there is no legal presumption that all capital offenses or felonies are automatically admissible the Rule states directly that timely convictions of such crimes shail be admitted subject to balancing.7 This language operates to create an initial burden supporting admission that the party opposing admission must overcome or evidence of the conviction will be admitted. The strong inference in the Rule favoring the admission of convictions of such crimes is further supported by the Conference Committee Report:
Such evidence [of convictions of capital crimes and felonies] should only be excluded where it presents a danger of improperly influencing the outcome of the trial by persuading the trier of fact to convict the defendant on the basis of his prior criminal record.
*1077Notes of Conference Committee, House Report No. 93-1597 (emphasis added).
Finally, I strongly object to the statement in the court’s opinion that “the district court [should obtain] ... perhaps the witness’ case jacket or presentence report .... ” (Op. at 1068). With respect to defendants both of these items would raise serious due process considerations. Judges trying cases, whether in a bench trial or with a jury, should not have access to the extensive details of a defendant’s prior criminal record unless absolutely necessary. Courts generally are not allowed to have that information until after a verdict has been rendered. Trial judges can be influenced in their rulings by prior knowledge of extensive criminal records. It is submitted that a defendant’s rights are generally better protected when the evidence surrounding prior convictions that is presented to the court is limited to the bare essentials.
The D.C. statute, originally enacted in 1901 (31 Stat. 1357), which provided for the manner of proving a prior conviction, and which is still applicable to D.C. offenses, could well be sufficient in most cases under Rule 609:
[T]o prove conviction of crime, it is not necessary to produce the whole record of the proceedings containing the conviction, but the certificate, under seal, of the clerk of the court wherein the proceedings were had, stating the fact of the conviction and for what cause, shall be sufficient.
D.C.Code § 14-305(c) (1981).
IV
Limiting Instructions
The statements by Judge Hand and Justice Jackson which are quoted in the opinion for the court are frequently referred to but seldom analyzed. The court’s opinion follows that practice. (Op. at 1062). This leaves the inference that it is unfair to admit prior convictions of defendants. However, what is significant about those statements is that the judges did not advocate eliminating the practice of introducing such evidence followed by limiting instructions to juries directing them to confine their consideration of evidence of prior conviction to the witness’ credibility and not to guilt. The reason that such judges did not advocate eliminating such rule is because the high purpose of a trial is that it constitutes a search for truth and the rule of admissibility of prior convictions serves that purpose. Judge Hand in Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.1932) expressed this opinion when he commented that “the Rule probably furthers, rather than impedes, the search for truth ... and this perhaps excuses the device which satisfies form while it violates substance.” (Emphasis added).
Every court in this nation, except in Montana and Hawaii, admits prior convictions to some extent to impeach the credibility of witnesses, IIIA, J. Wigmore (Chadbourn), Evidence, § 987 (1970 and Supp.1982), and all presumably give routine limiting instructions. Thus, contrary to the desires of those who quote the statements in an effort to discourage admission of prior felony convictions, such efforts have not been successful; convicted felons are not generally permitted to stand pristine before a jury with the same credibility as that of a Mother Superior. Fairness is not a one-way street and in the search for truth it is a legitimate concern that one who testifies should not be allowed to appear as credible when his criminal record of major crimes suggests that he is not.
Moreover, such evidence is not as prejudicial as some think. Those who try criminal cases generally recognize that attacking a witness before a jury because of a prior conviction may be a two-edged sword:
unless you can break down his evidence; you will not do that by hammering away at his character....
There cannot be a greater mistake than to suppose that a man who is suffering punishment for a crime, and who comes into the box to give evidence, will not be believed because of his character. You will generally find that he is regarded with sympathy to begin with. The jury *1078will weigh his evidence scrupulously; and their attention will be naturally drawn towards the probabilities of his story. If yoii cannot touch these, you will make little effect by constantly referring to his misdeeds....
IIIA, J. Wigmore (Chadbourn), Evidence, § 980 (1970) (quoting R. Harris, Hints on Advocacy) (emphasis added). Harris was referring to a convict testifying for a criminal defendant, but the same observation applies to a previously convicted felon testifying in his own behalf if he has a reasonable defense on the facts. If a defendant has a reasonable factual defense, he will find that juries are conscientious and he can prevail despite prior convictions of crimes. It is an everyday occurrence for juries to accept the testimony of convicted felons, accomplices and those guilty of major crimes, many of whom are compelled to testify under our immunity statutes or under agreements with prosecutors that resulted in lesser punishment.
Some citizens, lawyers, legislators and judges focus upon what they consider to be the question of fair play for the criminal from a purely technical viewpoint. They lose sight entirely of society’s right to have major criminals convicted and of the necessity that witnesses, both for the prosecution and defendant, not be permitted to appear as credible when in fact they may not be. They also completely lose sight of the fact that our criminal law, when viewed as a whole, already affords the accused far more rights than do the laws of any other nation. In fact, there is widespread respectable opinion that our system of criminal justice is unfairly weighted in favor of the criminal in many respects. The present controversy, focusing entirely upon the admissibility of prior convictions of defendants who are witnesses, grew out of a myopic view and incomplete knowledge of English trial practices that, in some instances, restrict the admission of prior convictions of defendants. Yet, when an English criminal trial is viewed in its entirety it is far less favorable to defendants than criminal trials are in the United States.8 Those who suggest the adoption of isolated “improvements” of criminal procedures from foreign jurisdictions should look to the complete criminal procedure to see to what extent “improvement’^?) is necessary or justified when the rights of society and defendants are considered.
*1079Conclusion
The primary purpose of a criminal trial is to search for truth, and the jury’s determination of a witness’ credibility is one of its most essential duties. Rule 609 is directed to this task, and juries should not be denied critical evidence that bears on this determination by the failure, when balancing, to recognize the full probative force of convictions of capital crimes and felonies. In this respect I find the Rule on its face to be clearer and more forceful than the court’s opinion is willing to recognize. No so-called “compromise” in the legislative history in any way restricts the probative force of all the major crimes which are to be considered in the balancing process under Rule 609(a)(1). Convictions of major crimes, even those that do not include veracity-related elements, represent a defect of character in the individual that bears strongly on his credibility as a witness. I would also point out that the Rule vests the trial judge with a wide discretion in weighing the probative value and prejudice of pripr convictions. However, because of due process considerations and to avoid unnecessary trial delay, evidence of prior criminal activity of the defendant offered in the balancing process should be limited to the minimum the judge considers necessary.
. On misdemeanors see United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121 (D.C.Cir.1976).
. Rule 403 was not altered from the Supreme Court' draft. It provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
. In non-federal offenses D.C.Code § 14-305 specifically provided for the admission of felony convictions. (84 Stat. 550-51).
. The initial wording of Rule 609(a) only recog- • nized the relevance of convictions, whereas, *1075while the amended Rule did also, it additionally directed admission of evidence of convictions subject to balancing. This direction is one indication that Congress strongly favored the admission of prior convictions.
. This defect of human character was argued last week to the jury in the District Court trial in United States v. Wilson, D.C.D.C. No. 80-200, conspiracy to murder. Defense counsel challenged the testimony of the government’s principal witness who had admitted he was hired and paid to commit a murder. Defense counsel is quoted as having argued: “He’d kill on orders. I suggest to you, if he’d kill, he’d lie.” Washington Post, March 5, 1983, page A5. After the trial defense counsel was quoted as admitting that the government had a “trya-ble case,” but the defendant was acquitted. Id.
. The Conference Committee adopted the Senate Amendment to include capital crimes and felonies and added balancing. This would lead to a preference for the Senate intent as to the nature of the admissible crimes, capital of*1076fenses and felonies. Notes of Conference Committee, House Report No. 93-1597.
. In Rule 609(b) the initial burden is reversed since the Rule provides as an initial premise that convictions are “not admissible” unless the court balances in favor of admission.
. While Great Britain might be more restrictive in the use of prior convictions to impeach a defendant in some cases, when a criminal trial in Britain is compared to one in America our procedures provide a trial that is much more favorable to the defendant. For example, a few comparisons: In criminal trials in England the judge in “summing up” may comment to the jury on the failure of the defendant to testify, Rex v. Rhodes (1898) 1 Q.B. 77; Rex v. Voisin (1918) 1 K.B. 531. The judge in a proper case may direct a jury to convict, Rex v. Ferguson (1970) 54 Cr.App.R. 410; and that they should not acquit, but should decide whether the defendant is guilty of murder or manslaughter, Rex v. Larkin, K.B. 174;’ 29 Cr.App.R. 18; Rex v. Black (1964) 48 Cr.App.R. 52. The bad character of the defendant may be admitted for the jury to consider the likelihood that a person with such character would commit the offense. Criminal Evidence Act 1898, s. l(f)(i). The court can charge the jury for conviction and after a reasonable period of deliberation the jury is not required to be unanimous. Practice Direction issued by Lord Parker, C.J., 51 Cr. App.R. 454. Two hours may be considered as a reasonable period. Juries Act, 1974; Practice Direction (1970) 1 W.L.R. 916; 54 Cr.App.R. 373. After a certain time it is also possible to accept a “majority verdict,” Lord Parker, C.J. (1967) 51 Cr.App.R. 454. The burden of proof is not guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (that phrase is outlawed) but only that the jury “feel sure of guilt,” Rex v. Rees (1930) 21 Cr.App.R. 35; Rex v. Summers (1953) 36 Cr.App.R. 14; Walters v. Queen (1969) 2 A.C. 26, 30. If the attack by the defense involves imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution, then prior convictions of the defendant are admissible. Criminal Evidence Act 1898, s. l(b)(ii). Whether the prosecutor will argue the case to the jury depends on the case. It depends on the extent that the accused has put in an affirmative defense. Rex v. Bryant and Oxley (1978) Crim.L.R. 307 C.A. In any event, the judge more or less performs that function in “summing up” the case when he has the wide authority, discussed above, to comment on the evidence and to charge for conviction in an appropriate case. These are just a few of the differences from our practice, but they are sufficient to illustrate that it is wrong to argue that we should adopt a procedure somewhat related to one isolated feature of British practice and ignore the context in which it exists and is used in England.