I would not address the issue of whether an attorney in a case may wait until final judgment to appeal sanctions imposed during the earlier course of proceedings. We *346have permitted attorneys to file appeals within thirty days from the entry of orders imposing such sanctions, Reygo Pacific Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co., 680 F.2d 647, 648 (9th Cir. 1982); Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 1981); until now, we have never ruled on whether the attorney’s appeal may also be joined with that of the party at the conclusion of the case. There are strong policy reasons against piecemeal appeals which weigh in favor of encouraging the joinder of the attorney’s appeal with that of his client.1 I believe, however, that we have no jurisdiction to resolve the issue at this time.
There were multiple claims and counterclaims filed in this case. On September 4, 1981, the trial judge ruled only on plaintiff’s antitrust claims and entered judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. § 54(b) as to those claims alone. Moreover, the notice of appeal refers only to “the judgment entered pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. § 54(b) ... on September 4, 1981.” Thus, our jurisdiction is limited to review of those antitrust claims and we have no authority to consider the appeal from imposition of sanctions.
. Eastern Maico Distributors, Inc. v. Maico-Fahrezeugfabrick, 658 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1981). See also C. Wright, A. Miller, C. Cooper 15 Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3911, 498-99 (1976).