dissenting.
I dissent. Malone and Bassett have certain minimum contacts with Minnesota such that maintenance of this suit does not offend “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 343, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940); see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 564-65, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). The facts of this ease are directly on point with those in B & J Manufacturing Co. v. Solar Industries, Inc., 483 F.2d 594 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S.Ct. 1417, 39 L.Ed.2d 473 (1973). In Solar Industries, the defendant, B & J Manufacturing, had never sold in Minnesota the product over which Solar Industries brought the lawsuit. However, B & J Manufacturing had other substantial business contacts with Minnesota, including sales totalling $107,739.97. We held that
[t]he fact that the defendant has, itself, not directly or indirectly sold the “tire bead seater” in the state because it did not wish the plaintiff to be able to obtain jurisdiction over it in this action hardly defeats jurisdiction here. Rather, the extensive contacts, taken together with the admonition of the Minnesota court in Hunt v. [Nevada State Bank [285 Minn. 77], 172 N.W.2d 292 (Minn.1969) ] compel the conclusion that service of process was properly made and jurisdiction over the defendant was obtained pursuant to M.S.A. § 543.19, subd. 1(b).
We are also satisfied that the District Court’s assumption of personal jursdietion [sic] over the defendant did not violate the defendant’s right to due process. [483 F.2d at 598 (footnote omitted).]
In the case before us, none of the allegedly infringing “chiropractic” mattresses have been sold in Minnesota. However, Bassett and Malone’s other contacts are substantial. For example, Malone reported $151,871 in annual sales in Minnesota for 1981 and $42,-637 in sales for the first six months of 1982. In addition, the district court found that (1) Malone has been selling bedding products in Minnesota since at least 1972 and Malone sales representatives call on retailers in Minnesota regarding the sales of mattresses and other bedding products, (2) Malone advertised the allegedly infringing mattresses in a national trade magazine circulated in Minnesota, (3) a Bassett representative contracted, at a Dallas, Texas trade show, with a dealer from Windom, Minnesota, to supply that dealer with two of the allegedly infringing mattresses (these beds, however, were never delivered to Minnesota pursuant to the contract), and (4) the Bassett sales representative at the Dallas trade show sent descriptive materials of the allegedly infringing product into Minnesota with the Minnesota dealer.
Moreover, this case is distinguishable from Toro Co. v. Ballas Liquidating Co., 572 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir.1978), in two important respects. First, in Toro, the defendant, In*1344ternational Marketing Associates, terminated its promotion of Weedeater products in Minnesota eight months before Toro initiated the lawsuit. In our case, Malone continued to sell its products through retailers in Minnesota after the initiation of the lawsuit. Second, in the case before us, the district court held that jurisdiction existed, while in Toro, the district court found it lacking.
I therefore conclude that jurisdiction existed in this case, and would affirm the district court on that issue. See generally 2 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 4.25[5] (2d ed. 1982).
I would further hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Land-O-Nod’s motion for a preliminary injunction. However, the terms of that injunction are overly-broad.
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is “to preserve the status quo until the merits are determined.” Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 & n. 5 (8th Cir.1981). The preliminary injunction, as entered by the district court, prohibits Malone and Bassett from employing the word “chiropractic” in connection with their mattresses outside Florida except where that word is used as part of the formal name of an association of chiropractors who have endorsed or approved the mattresses. Malone alleges, however, that at the time Land-O-Nod filed its complaint in this action, Malone was marketing its “chiropractic” mattresses to approximately seventy-five dealers in twelve states outside Florida. If this contention is correct, the district court’s preliminary injunction, as currently constituted, alters rather than preserves the status quo as it existed at the beginning of this case.
Accordingly, I would remand to the district court to determine through which dealers and in which states Malone and Bassett marketed their “chiropractic” mattresses as of the date Land-O-Nod filed its complaint in this case. I would instruct the district court to enter an order prohibiting Malone and Bassett from employing the word “chiropractic” in connection with their mattresses outside those states except where that word is used as part of the formal name of a chiropractors’ association which has endorsed the mattresses. Further, I would instruct the district court to enjoin Malone and Bassett from increasing the number of dealers selling “chiropractic” mattresses in those states where Malone and Bassett are already marketing the allegedly infringing mattresses.