dissenting.
In its original form, the ADEA required that an aggrieved party give the Secretary “notice of an intent to file” a civil action. When it became apparent that this prerequisite was depriving too many parties of the opportunity to litigate their cases on the merits, Congress amended the statute in 1978 to make the filing requirement less demanding. In place of the “intent to sue” requirement, that legislation substituted a directive that “[n]o civil action may be commenced ... until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Secretary.” 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). Because the majority gives too formalistic an application to the “charge” requirement, I dissent.
The main purpose of the charge provision is to give sufficient information to the EEOC so that it may notify prospective defendants and attempt to eliminate an unlawful practice through conciliation and persuasion. Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 283 (8th Cir. 1983). The written notice to the agency should (1) describe the alleged discriminatory action, and (2) identify the offending party. Id. (quoting H.Conf.Rep. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 528, 534). On receipt of this information, the agency is to notify the accused party of the charge and begin the conciliation process. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d).
The letter sent by the plaintiff in this case satisfied both the purpose and the informational requirements of a charge. In addition, the letter relieved the EEOC of one of its tasks — informing the employer that an age discrimination complaint had been made against him. Bearing the caption “Illegal Termination of Employment,” the letter sent to Singer and the EEOC stated that Bihler’s termination by Singer “constituted age discrimination in violation of the New Jersey and Federal statutes prohibiting such conduct.” The plaintiff asked that “remedial action be taken forthwith” and stated that he intended to “institute legal procedures” if. Singer did not take satisfactory action.
The district court found this notice inadequate because the “letter was not addressed to the EEOC ... and, from the way the letter was worded, the EEOC would not *101know whether to investigate immediately or await further communication .... ” The majority agrees and would require that the notice “be of a kind that would convince a reasonable person that the grievant has manifested an intent to activate the Act’s machinery.”
The Act, however, does not contain any such characterization but simply requires that the EEOC be advised of the conduct alleged to constitute a violation and the identity of the accused person. That was accomplished here. The EEOC did receive the communication. It did receive the information. Therefore, the plaintiff did meet his responsibility as specified by the Act.
The plaintiff’s action should not be barred because the EEOC did not act from either a lack of resources or a misunderstanding as to the import of the letter. If there was any ambiguity about the letter— and I find none going to the heart of the charge requirement — the EEOC was free to acknowledge the communication and ask for clarification.
Even under the EEOC’s interpretation of the statute, the charge here was adequate. In June 1979, soon after it assumed responsibility for enforcement of the ADEA, the EEOC published a notice stating, “To be sufficient, a charge shall be in writing and need only name the prospective defendant and generally allege the discriminatory acts. However, in order to assist the Commission, a charge should also contain the name, address and telephone number of both the person making the charge and the prospective defendant as well as the approximate number of employees of the prospective defendant, and whether proceedings have been commenced under a state fair employment practice law.” 44 Fed. Reg. 37974, 37975 (June 29, 1979) (emphasis added).
The EEOC interpretation does not suggest that the charging party must indicate a desire to “activate” the ADEA’s grievance machinery. Indeed, such a requirement would be superfluous to some extent since the EEOC possesses independent enforcement authority, and at least in its view “may continue any investigation and may secure relief for all affected persons notwithstanding a request by a charging party to withdraw a charge,” 48 Fed.Reg. 138,141 (January 3, 1983) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1626.13). The additional information about such matters as the number of employees or telephone numbers are not statutory or regulatory requisites for making out a charge; they are but aids in expeditious processing. The absence of such data would not be grounds for invalidation of the notice.1
As the majority concedes, the statute is remedial and is to be liberally construed. The notice requirement is, after all, a practical one. It does not call for ritualistic incantation, and should not be subjected to the searching scrutiny once accorded common law pleadings. See Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d at 283. Nor should the requirement be viewed as it might be from behind the desk of an overburdened agency official reluctant to docket another claim under anything less than inescapable compulsion.
The notice provision must be read through the eyes of a potential claimant who on looking at the statute learns that his only responsibility is to provide information about two factual matters. I dissent from the decision to impose on a claimant the burden of anticipating what might move the EEOC to action. Highly sophisticated organizations have struggled for years to unravel the workings of the collective bureaucratic mind. Surely Congress in its efforts to simplify the ADEA did not *102intend to foist resolution of that enigma on an unwary claimant.
I dissent.
. Both the proposed and adopted regulations incorporate language similar to that quoted from the June 1979 notice. See 48 Fed.Reg. 138, 140, 141 (January 3, 1983) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1626.6, 1626.8(a)); 46 Fed.Reg. 9970, 9971 (January 30, 1981). Each also provides that the absence of the detailed information would not make the charge insufficient as long as the charge names the prospective respondent and generally alleges the discriminatory acts. See 48 Fed.Reg. at 141 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1626.8(b)); 46 Fed.Reg. at 141; cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1982) (regulations to Title VII, adopted in 1977).