dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. As a preliminary matter I do not agree with the district court’s finding that the confrontation between the police and appellant was an investigatory stop and not an arrest. The government has conceded that the police did not have probable cause at the time of the confrontation. I would therefore hold that appellant’s arrest was unlawful because it was not based upon probable cause. Assuming that the confrontation was an investigatory stop, I do not agree with the district court’s finding that Officer Chapman had a reasonable suspicion, based upon objective facts, that appellant was engaged in criminal activity. In my opinion the record shows that Officer Chapman’s suspicion was based almost entirely upon her observation of black persons in a predominantly white area and the inference that the presence of black persons in a predominantly white area was in itself suspicious. I would also suppress appellant’s confession because the record shows no intervening or attenuating circumstances of any significance that broke the causal relationship between the investigatory stop and the confession. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216-19, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2258-60, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). Accordingly, I would reverse appellant’s conviction.
Before discussing the reasons why I disagree with the district court’s finding of reasonable suspicion, it should be clearly understood that I agree that Officer Chapman was acting in good faith. However, Officer Chapman’s good faith and the fact that her suspicions ultimately proved to be correct are not relevant to the question whether Officer Chapman had a reasonable suspicion based upon objective facts at the time of the investigatory stop.
It is difficult to determine the exact sequence of events from the record. As further explained below, the critical informa*783tion which arguably connects the occupants of the Buick with the bank robbery was the police radio report that two black males, armed and dressed in blue sweatsuits, had stolen a red Ford stationwagon in a park about five miles away from the bank and supermarket. This stolen car report was broadcast at about 5:04 p.m. About half an hour later, at about 5:31 p.m., Officer Chapman was on patrol in the supermarket parking lot. She noticed a young black man, dressed in dark blue clothing with what looked like a pair of gloves in his pants pocket, talking to two black women sitting in an old gold and white Buick parked in the supermarket parking lot. At the plenary hearing Officer Chapman testified that she became suspicious because the car and its occupants “did not appear to belong” in the predominantly white area, because the young man’s clothing was too warm for the hot summer weather and because the occupants “stared” at her as she drove past them in the patrol car. She watched the young man walk toward the supermarket and the Buick drive off the parking lot.
Several minutes later, at about 5:34 p.m., the police radio reported the bank alarm and the address of the bank. The police radio directed the police to be on the lookout for the red Ford stationwagon. However, the report did not identify the red Ford stationwagon as the bank robbery getaway car. Officer Chapman was driving toward the bank when she saw the Buick for the second time (at about 5:36 p.m.). The Buick was in the general vicinity of the bank and was leaving a white residential neighborhood. Officer Chapman testified that she thought this was suspicious because “it is very rare that a black family would live there or be there very often.” Officer Chapman immediately radioed (at about 5:37 p.m.) that she was going to follow the Buick and stop it when she received backup assistance. While she was following the Buick, she noticed that the Buick repeatedly signalled for a turn without turning. About five minutes later, at about 5:41 p.m., the police radio reported that the bank had been robbed by five black males and the getaway car was the red Ford stationwagon. It is not clear when Officer Chapman actually stopped the Buick, but she must have stopped the car before 5:48 p.m. because she radioed for a wagon and towtruck at that time.
It appears that Officer Chapman decided to stop the Buick before she knew the racial identity of the bank robbers or that the bank robbers used the red Ford stationwagon as the getaway car. As an initial matter I question the reasonableness of the inference that the red Ford stationwagon, which was stolen thirty minutes earlier five miles away and was last seen driving away from the general vicinity of the bank, was the getaway car. The first police radio report did not state that the red Ford was the getaway car; the description of the bank robbers and the getaway car was not broadcast until after Officer Chapman decided to stop the Buick. However, assuming that the red Ford stationwagon was the getaway car and that at least two of the bank robbers were black males dressed in blue sweatsuits, any connection between the two cars was extremely tenuous. The only objective fact connecting the two cars was the fact that the young man in the parking lot generally matched the description of the car thieves, that is, he was a black male dressed in blue.
In my opinion this “general match” was not sufficient. Officer Chapman did not describe the young man as wearing a blue sweatsuit. She described the young man’s clothing as a dark blue long-sleeved shirt or jacket and matching pants that were too warm for summer weather. She testified that she thought he was dressed like a burglar (presumably because of the dark clothes). Officer Chapman did not state that she considered the young man as a possible car theft suspect or think that he was concealing a weapon. Cf. United States v. Bull, 565 F.2d 869 (4th Cir.1977) (jacket on warm summer night suggests possibility of concealed weapon), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 946, 98 S.Ct. 1531, 55 L.Ed.2d *784545 (1978). Moreover, Officer Chapman did not report seeing in the parking lot another black male dressed in blue or the red Ford stationwagon. All she saw was a young black man dressed in dark blue clothes, not described as a sweatsuit, talking to two black women sitting in a gold and white Buick parked in the supermarket parking lot.
I attach little weight to Officer Chapman’s statement that the occupants of the Buick “stared” at her as she drove past them in the patrol car. Not only is the “stare” a subjective assessment, it is of ambiguous significance. See United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 861 & n. 4 (9th Cir.1973) (describing cases in which whether suspects stared or did not stare at passing police officers was considered suspicious).
What remains is Officer Chapman’s observation of black persons in a predominantly white area and the inference that the presence of black persons in a predominantly white area was in itself suspicious. Race alone cannot support an investigatory stop; race may, however, be an identifying factor. See United States v. Clay, 640 F.2d 157, 159-60 (8th Cir.1981), citing United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Palmer, 603 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir.1979). I do not agree that Officer Chapman only considered appellant’s race as an identifying factor. Compare United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir.1982) (investigatory stop upheld where police already knew racial or ethnic identity of bank robbers and other objective factors). Even assuming that it was reasonable to infer that the stolen red Ford stationwagon would be used as the getaway car and that the bank robbers were black, that fact alone would not support an investigatory stop of black persons in the general vicinity of the bank within minutes of the robbery. The only additional factor connecting the two women in the Buick with the bank robbery was the young man in the blue clothing, and his connection with the bank robbery was premised only upon his matching the general description of the car thieves. I have already discussed why I think the young man in blue clothing is a very weak link between the Buick and the red Ford stationwagon. I think the weakness of the connection is further demonstrated by the fact that Officer Chapman became suspicious of the Buick and its occupants before the bank robbery and apparently independently of the car theft. At that time Officer Chapman did not use race as an identifying factor; she considered appellant’s race, or more accurately the racial difference between appellant and the surrounding area, as suspicious in itself. Officer Chapman testified that she first became suspicious in part because it was very rare for blacks to be in the area and that her suspicions increased when she saw the Buick leaving a white residential area. Officer Chapman’s use of race as a suspicion factor rather than an identifying factor becomes more apparent when one considers the time of the events (about 5:30 p.m. on Friday, June 25, 1982), the nature of the area (a commercial or business district in a metropolitan area), and the actions observed (sitting in a parking lot, driving down a street apparently not in violation of any traffic ordinances).
In sum, I cannot agree with the district court that Officer Chapman only considered appellant’s race as an identifying factor. In my opinion Officer Chapman’s suspicion was based almost entirely upon her observation of black persons in a predominantly white area.