dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree with the majority that the first seizure took place only after Holmes and Reyes had afforded the agents probable cause to arrest by admitting to carrying controlled substances. In my view a seizure occurred well before there were any articulable grounds for suspicion of criminal conduct.
This court’s most recent pronouncements regarding airport drug courier searches and seizures accept Justice Stewart’s “reasonable person” test for determining whether a seizure has occurred. United States v. $73,-277, 710 F.2d 283 at 288 (7th Cir.1983). The “reasonable person” test provides that a person has been seized within the purview of the fourth amendment if, in light of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Id.
Applying this test I find that a seizure occurred in the airport prior to the consent to search the luggage. The agents took the petitioners’ airline tickets and driver’s licenses. This occurred after the petitioners had checked in for their connecting flight and the last boarding call for the flight had been announced. Their identification was in order. Instead of returning the tickets to the petitioners at that point the officers retained the tickets except for a brief interval when, as the agents testified, Reyes requested permission to return to the gate to attempt to remedy the lack of a baggage claim stub and, accompanied by the agents, was “permitted” to do so. (Testimony of Agent Streicher, Tr. 9, 41.)1 Petitioners, deprived of their travel documents and perceiving that they could move about the airport only with permission, could reasonably conclude that they were no longer at *1103liberty to be on their way. At the very least, the district court’s implicit finding that no seizure occurred at this point is clearly erroneous. See United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 134-35 (7th Cir.1982) (“[T]he question [of seizure] is a highly factual one.. .. Our standard of review is accordingly limited to inquiry into whether the decision of the district court is clearly erroneous.... The determination of precisely when an officer’s polite request for an interview rises to the level of a show of authority sufficient to constitute an investigative stop ... may be ‘extremely close,’ [.Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 560 n. 1, 100 S.Ct. at 1880 n. 1 (Powell, J., concurring) ].... We are not persuaded that the findings of the district judge on this close question of fact are clearly erroneous.”). But see id. at 138-39 (Swygert, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority is incorrect in using the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review. The majority employs this standard of review because it believes that whether the encounter between the police and Black amounted to a seizure is a factual matter.... The factual findings, however, are not in dispute. The only issue is whether these facts constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. This is a question of law and the standard of review, therefore, is not clearly erroneous. The issue is a legal one and so ... deference is inappropriate.”).2
My conclusion that the seizure occurred prior to the consent to search the luggage is supported by the fact that the consent was not voluntary. The agents testified that they obtained consent to search petitioners’ bags by assurances that Holmes and Reyes would not be arrested or charged if the luggage contained only small quantities of contraband.3 The only inference to be drawn from that assurance is that the agents would have to inspect the luggage to determine whether the petitioners could be released. The petitioners could reasonably conclude that their freedom to leave was contingent upon their consent to the search. The district court’s determination that this consent was freely given when it was premised on a promise of release from detention is, at the very least, clearly erroneous.
Because, under the totality of the circumstances, Holmes and Reyes were seized pri- or to their admission to carrying drugs, it must be determined if this invasion of petitioners’ personal security was justified. A temporary seizure is lawful only if the police have “a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized [was] engaged in criminal activity.” Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 2754, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980). See also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (The fourth amendment “assure[s] that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.”). The reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment requires that the “scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.” Florida v. Royer, — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion). The court’s duty is to “evaluate the reasonableness of a particular .. . seizure in light of the particular circumstances.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure commentary at 276-77 (1975).
Among the circumstances that can give rise to reasonable suspicion are the officer’s knowledge of the methods used in drug courier activity, characteristics of persons engaged in such illegal practices, the behavior of a suspect who appears to be evading police contact, and the suspect’s efforts to *1104conceal the truth during a police/citizen encounter. See United States v. Moya, 704 F.2d 337, 343 (7th Cir.1983) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 563, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1882, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)). Holmes and Reyes initially drew the officers’ attention because they had arrived from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, a city the Drug Enforcement Agency has designated as a source for drug couriers; they were casually dressed and one was untanned— typical elements of a “drug courier profile.” However, as the majority recognizes, the mere fact that an individual matches some elements of a drug courier profile is insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion for fourth amendment purposes. Maj. op. at 1098-1099, n. 7. Only when the characteristics are combined in a suspicious manner, or lead the agents to observe independently suspicious conduct, is official intrusion warranted. See United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 600-01 (5th Cir.1982). See also Florida v. Royer, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 1326 (the additional fact that Royer was travel-ling under an assumed name combined with the facts of paying cash for one-way ticket, checking bags with incomplete identification tags, and nervous conduct, formed the basis for reasonable suspicion).
The record does not support the district court’s finding that the circumstances arousing suspicion on the part of the officers here were stronger than in Mendenhall. Mendenhall’s airline ticket and driver’s license bore different names, and Menden-hall explained the discrepancy evasively when agents identified themselves; Mendenhall was so shaken that she had a hard time speaking. Id. 446 U.S. at 548, 100 S.Ct. at 1873-74. In contrast, petitioners here were not travelling under assumed names. Their responses to initial questioning showed no evasiveness or attempt to conceal. Their identification documents were all in order. There was no additional basis for suspicion other than a display of anxiety after the officers detained them. Considering that their flight had been called and Reyes had just discovered that his luggage claim check was missing, I find this anxiety unexceptional. It does not supply, without more, the requisite basis for suspecting petitioners of criminal conduct.
Indeed, this case is more like Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980), than Mendenhall. In Reid the petitioner appeared to fit the “drug courier profile.” The only additional fact which particularized his conduct was that he preceded his traveling companion from the plane and occasionally looked backward at him as they walked through the airport. The Court held that the agents could not have reasonably suspected the petitioner of criminal activity on the basis of these observed circumstances. Id. 448 U.S. at 441, 100 S.Ct. at 2754.
In order to be lawful a stop must be proportional to the degree of suspicion prompting the intrusion. When little or no suspicion exists, very little intrusion is tolerable. See United States v. Berryman, 706 F.2d 1241 at 1247 (1st Cir.1983). Brown v. Texas states this principle of proportionality in the following terms:
In the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the balance between the public interest and appellant’s right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference.... [E]ven assuming that [a strong social] purpose is served to some degree by stopping and demanding identification from an individual without any specific basis for believing he is involved in criminal activity, the guarantees of the fourth amendment do not allow it. When such a stop is not based on objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits.
443 U.S. at 52, 99 S.Ct. at 2641.
When the officers stopped Holmes and Reyes, questioned them and took and kept their travel documents, Holmes and Reyes were seized. At that point, the police lacked the knowledge of specific and articulable facts to justify the seizure. Because the search of the petitioners’ persons and suitcases that yielded the forfeited money was a direct consequence of the illegal sei*1105zure, I would reverse the judgment of the district court.
. The agents testified that they then reclaimed Reyes’ ticket. Tr. at 40. Petitioners’ undisputed testimony was that, except for this brief interval, the agents retained both petitioners’ tickets throughout the entire encounter. Streicher testified that he did not recall returning the tickets after he and the other officer first viewed them. Tr. at 41.
. I adhere to the view that the questions concerning seizure and consent are questions of law. See United States v. Black, id. at 138-39 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
. Although the agents testified that a consent to search the luggage was given prior to the consent obtained by the agents’ promise not to arrest for small quantities of drugs, the district court made no findings concerning this first “consent.” Even this alleged first consent was given after the seizure occurred.