dissenting:
I interpret the majority opinions as commanding the district court, without balancing the equities, to impose an injunction upon appellee Lowe and his affiliates which, at best, will be illusory and unenforceable, and at worst, constitutes a prior judicial restraint upon the publication of regularly issued journals of fact and opinion, “investment newsletters,” therein described. Because I regard this prior restraint on publication as inappropriate; neither constitutional in light of the First Amendment; nor required by the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“the Act”); nor justified by our prior decisions; I respectfully dissent.
I
I agree that Lowe may not practice as, nor hold himself out to be, a registered investment adviser under the Act, nor may he engage in any fraudulent activity in connection with his publications. Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 84 S.Ct. 275, 11 L.Ed.2d 237 (1963); Courtland v. Walston & Co., 340 F.Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y.1972).
Lowe’s investment newsletters, fairly described by the majority, are publications of the sort issued on a schedule, rather than timed for release attuned to specific market events. Delivered by mail, they are several days old when read, and convey the same facts and opinion to all readers. Typically such newsletters accept any subscriber who wishes to become such and is willing to pay the standard annual subscriber’s fee. The expression of opinion by that means is poles apart from the traditional giving of investment advice; just as remote as a health care publication (e.g., “Prevention Magazine”) is from the practice of medicine, or a book advising how to avoid probate is remote from the practice of law. The latter require a medical or law degree and a license, while the former are protected First Amendment expression. See New York County Lawyers Association v. Dacey, 21 N.Y.2d 694, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422, 234 N.E.2d 459 rev'g., 28 A.D.2d 161, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1967); Elman, Commr., dissenting in Rodale Press, Inc., et a1. v. Federal Trade Comm., 71 F.T.C. 1184, 1247-1253 (1967), quoted with approval by Robinson, III, J., concurring in Rodale Press, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 407 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C.Cir.1968).
An investor counseling with an adviser, directly, or by means of a telephone hotline, receives timely non-public advice, usually individualized, by which he hopes to gain an “edge” on others in the market. By reason *904of its clandestine or .confidential character, such advice is particularly susceptible to fraud or manipulation. However, the contents of a newspaper are public when published, and the counsel so given is immediately known to all, including the watchful eyes of the SEC.
II
Discussion of the issue of so-called “commercial speech” by the majority is of great interest, but little assistance to the resolution of this case. In my view these newsletters are not “commercial speech,” any more than our most respected daily newspaper is “commercial speech.” Lowe is not selling securities or advertising investment advice; he is selling his publications themselves, and his editorial expression of the facts and opinions therein set forth. Like all publishers, Lowe charges subscription fees for his publications. I concede that the readers (subscribers) are seeking opinion and information to aid in their investment decisions, and Lowe intends this result.
When readers seek health information, they subscribe to health oriented publications, for spiritual advice they read religious tracts, and for astrology they read sidereal almanacs. Freedom of the press is not limited to the pamphleteer who hands out his tracts free of charge, nor is the right to write, and publish about investments without license limited to “bona fide publications of general and regular circulation,” if those words found in the Act are to be read restrictively so as to exclude any paper eligible to be entered at the post office as second class mail matter. See H. W. Wilson Co. v. United States Postal Service, 438 F.Supp. 326 (S.D.N.Y.1977), affd. 580 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.1978) (construing prior statute).
With characteristic understatement, the court below termed “questionable” the SEC’s contention that these publications constituted “commercial speech,” 556 F.Supp. at 1366, and suggested that commercial speech is confined properly to instances of service or product advertising. On appeal, the SEC takes issue with this view, and the majority now rejects it as well, holding that commercial speech is sufficiently broad in scope to encompass the sale of a journal of fact and opinion to paid subscribers.
Our attention is directed to the several recent articulations of what constitutes “commercial speech,” which are said to establish that “commercial speech” is not confined to advertising, but extends to all “expression related solely to the economic interest of the speaker and its audience.” Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 561, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2349, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). Consideration of the Supreme Court’s attempts at redefinition since Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) convinces me that the concept of commercial speech has now been confined to naked advertising and closely related methods of commercial solicitation. A fair consideration of recent Supreme Court learning suggests that SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958, 90 S.Ct. 2170, 26 L.Ed.2d 542 (1970), relied on by the majority, is now as dead as Marley, and if not dead, readily distinguished.1 Each *905recent Supreme Court commercial speech case has arisen in the context of service or product advertising. Thus, in addition to the ban on advertising by pharmacists, considered in Virginia Pharmacy, supra, the Court has addressed restrictions on attorney advertising and solicitation [Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 1893, 56 L.Ed.2d 417 (1978); Matter of R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 102 S.Ct. 929, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982)]; a ban on the use of “For Sale” signs by sellers of residential property [Linmark Associates Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977)]; restrictions on the use of trade names by optometrists [Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 887, 59 L.Ed.2d 100 (1979) ]; a ban on advertising by a public utility [Central Hudson Gas, supra]; and, most recently, a federal statutory restriction on advertising mixed with expressions of opinion by manufacturers of prophylactics [Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983)]. See also Metromedia Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981) (restrictions on commercial and non-commercial billboard advertising).
That each of the cases in which the Court has sought to clarify the “commercial speech” doctrine has arisen in the context of attempts to regulate or prohibit advertising, while significant, does not, standing alone, demonstrate conclusively that commercial speech is restricted to advertising and equivalent economic promotional activities. However, examination of the characteristics of commercial speech which have caused the Supreme Court to accord to it a lesser degree of First Amendment protection demonstrate that since 1976 all speech so considered has been inextricably intertwined with advertising. Thus, in Virginia Pharmacy Board, supra, reference to commercial speech is in the context of a discussion of advertising, and the interests of both the advertiser and the consumer in the flow of commercial information. Support for the argument that commercial speech essentially comprises some sort of advertising or equivalent economic promotional activity is also found in Central Hudson Gas, supra, in which the Court invalidated a New York State regulation prohibiting the promotion of electricity consumption through advertising. The Court in that case addressed the interests served by commercial expression: “In applying the First Amendment to this area, we have rejected the ‘highly paternalistic’ view that government has the complete power to suppress or regulate commercial speech .... Even when advertising communicates only an incomplete version of the relevant facts, the First Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better than no information at all.” 447 U.S. at 562, 100 S.Ct. at 2350 (citations omitted). Significantly, the Court in Central Hudson Gas states that the very basis of the First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is the “informational function of advertising.” Id. at 563, 100 S.Ct. at 2350, emphasis added.
Of greatest interest, probably because it is most recent, is Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., supra, where the Court unanimously invalidated a Postal Service prohibition of unsolicited mailings, one of which conveyed “truthful information relevant to important social issues such as family planning and the prevention of venereal disease.” (Marshall, J. —U.S. at —, 103 S.Ct. at 2882). The Court noted that some content-based restrictions on commercial speech are justified in light of the “greater potential for deception or confusion in the context of certain advertising messages” (at —, 103 S.Ct. at 2879), but also held that “the mere fact that these pamphlets are conceded to be advertise*906ments clearly does not compel the conclusion that they are commercial speech,” citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66, 84 S.Ct. 710, 718-719, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), id. — U.S. at —, 103 S.Ct. at 2880.2
I conclude that in the wake of Bolger, commercial speech which goes beyond mere advertising, so as to include expression of fact and opinion implicating (as does an investment newsletter or a health newsletter, or even a racetrack tout sheet), “substantial individual and societal interests” (id. at —, 103 S.Ct. at 2881), now enjoys full First Amendment protection, at least insofar as prior restraint is concerned. In short, even if these newsletters were commercial speech, which they are not, I believe they would be entitled to full First Amendment protection from prior restraint. As Justice Rehnquist, concurring in Bolger observed, “the First Amendment, which was designed to prevent the government from suppressing information, requires us ‘to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them,’ [citation omitted].” Id. at —, 103 S.Ct. at 2887.
In explaining why commercial speech should be entitled to a lesser degree of First Amendment protection than other communication, the Court, both in Virginia Pharmacy Board and Central Hudson Gas, supra, relied on two aspects of commercial speech which set it apart:
“First, commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the market and their products. Thus, they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their ■ messages and the unlawfulness of the underlying activity. In addition, commercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression that is not particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.” Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 564, n. 6, 100 S.Ct. at 2350, n. 6, citations omitted, emphasis added. See also Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72, n. 24, 96 S.Ct. at 1830, n. 24.
The difference between such “commercial speakers” mentioned in Central Hudson Gas and Lowe are readily apparent. The publishers here are not selling their own investments, nor are they urging their subscribers to invest in a business in which the defendants have a financial stake. Lowe’s publications do not comment about his own products; they analyze and evaluate the securities offered by third parties. In this respect, the investment newsletters do not differ in principle from well-known periodicals such as Barron’s, Forbes, or Consumer Reports. Presumably, the majority would not contend that insofar as these publications of general circulation perform a similar function, they would become subject to similar licensure or prior restraint.
In addition to linking advertising to commercial speech, the Court in Virginia Pharmacy reiterated an earlier definition of commercial speech as expression which does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” Id. at 762, 96 S.Ct. at 1825, quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission, 413 U.S. 376, 385, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 2558-2559, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973) (emphasis added). Enough has been said concerning the contents of the Lowe newsletters to demonstrate that they do more than “propose commercial transactions.”
Finding commercial speech to be “squarely” presented in Virginia Pharmacy Board, the Court stated that this was because the pharmacist challenging the Commonwealth’s restrictions on his advertising:
*907“does not wish to editorialize on any subject, cultural, philosophical or political. He does not wish to report any particularly newsworthy fact, or to make generalized observations even about commercial matters. The ‘idea’ he wishes to communicate is simply this: T will sell you X prescription drug at the Y price.’ ” 425 U.S. at 761, 96 S.Ct. at 1825.
Here, in contrast, the appellees do seek to report “newsworthy facts” and make “generalized observations” about economic and financial conditions as well as recommending stocks and issuers, the latter inextricably entwined with the former.
We address here not the power to regulate, or punish fraud after publication, but the power to impose prior restraint. Investment opinion, in my opinion, is as much speech protected from prior restraint as is political opinion, philosophy or gibberish. Not only for the Zengers, the Patrick Hen-rys and the Ellsbergs was this basic freedom secured, but also for an ex-convict whom the majority assumes to be motivated towards recidivism.
A judicial system which will not enjoin a libel [Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 24 (N.Y.1839) ], and will not enjoin publication of the Pentagon Papers [New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d. 822 (1971)], should not countenance a prior restraint on publication of a regularly issued newsletter containing fact and investment opinion. Even if Lowe’s publications constitute commercial speech, the prior restraint sought to be imposed is unconstitutional. In Central Hudson Gas, supra, the Court held that restraints will be upheld only if “the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,” and “it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S.Ct. at 2351. These restraints do not qualify. See infra, p. 909.
Any prior restraint comes to Court with a “heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 639, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963). This results from the devastating impact prior restraints have on the exercise of First Amendment rights, far exceeding a mere “chill”:
“Prior restraints fall on speech with a brutality and a finality all their own. Even if they are ultimately lifted they cause irremediable loss — a loss in the immediacy, the impact, of speech. They differ from the imposition of criminal liability in significant procedural respects as well, which in turn have their substantive consequences. The violator of a pri- or restraint may be assured of being held in contempt; the violator of a statute punishing speech criminally knows that he will go before a jury, and may be willing to take his chance, counting on a possible acquittal. A prior restraint, therefore, stops more speech more effectively. A criminal statute chills, prior restraint freezes. Indeed it is the hypothesis of the First Amendment that injury is inflicted on our society when we stifle the immediacy of speech.” Bickel, The Morality of Consent, 61 (1975), quoted with approval in Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2802-2803, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976).
Because of this devastating effect on freedom of speech, previous restraints will be upheld only in “exceptional” cases, e.g., the “threat of a grave and immediate danger to the security of the United States,” United States v. New York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.1971), rev’d on other grounds, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822; see also Brennan, J. concurring in New York Times, supra, 403 U.S. at 726, 91 S.Ct. at 2147.3
Ill
To affirm the trial court here, it is not necessary, in my view, to hold that the Act is facially unconstitutional as a press licensing scheme. Certainly it was not so intended; Congress understood about the First *908Amendment. Its legislative product should not lightly be construed as intended to effect an unconstitutional result nor to impose an undue or useless degree of regulation upon a constitutionally protected activity. However, if the provision of the Act which exempts a “bona fide [publication] of general and regular circulation,” found at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1976), is to be read as literally and narrowly as the majority would have it, this means to me that some judge, at the instance of the SEC, will be called upon to adjudicate the bona fide vei male fide of a newspaper, to determine if it is to be subject to prior restraint should it contain investment opinion or “recommend” a security. This leaves a dangerous editorial evaluation in hands not to be trusted with such a decision, and requires a determination for which no satisfactory objective standard is provided. We have held “Courts should be chary of deciding what is and what is not news” [Meskill, J. dissenting in Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d 195, at 215 (2d Cir.1983), a view adopted by majority op. at 194]. I suggest we must be even more chary in undertaking to determine when or whether a publication is “bona fide,” unless such words are regarded as broad enough to comprise all regularly issued publications containing fact and opinion and available to all who would subscribe, as Lowe’s newsletters are.
The Act, as construed by the majority seems both under and over inclusive. In theory, Lowe’s entire expression of views could appear in our favorite local newspaper without official hindrance. Suppose following remand, Lowe should transfer stock ownership of his corporations to a friend and add to his newsletters a tideta-ble, a list of ship arrivals, Ann Landers, a crossword puzzle and selections reprinted from Areopagitical Would his newsletters now be bona fide newspapers, in the eyes of the majority? I submit that on First Amendment and prudential grounds a decision that they would not be is beyond the power of any court to make. In short, I do not question the power of government to license lawyers, doctors, accountants, registered representatives employed by stockbrokers and those giving individualized investment advice or holding themselves out as investment advisers, and similar professionals. However, the right to licensure, and the concomitant power to restrict entry into the licensed occupation, does not in America extend to writers or publishers.
Licensing of the press was abandoned in England in 1694, but the memories of this imposition upon the natural rights of man lingered sufficiently to lead to the enactment of the First Amendment almost a century later. An intention to disregard this vital Constitutional imperative should not lightly be imputed to Congress.
I would construe the Act essentially as did the court below. In this connection, I am puzzled by the provision in the majority opinion (At 902), which provides that Lowe is “not prohibited from publishing a newspaper of general interest and circulation, nor is he prohibited from publishing [investment] recommendations in somebody else’s bona fide newspaper as an employee, editor or writer.” (Emphasis added).
I fail to see how it can be adjudged that Lowe can exercise his First Amendment protected expressions as to investments, but only so long as he is not himself the owner or proprietor of the publication in which his views appear. Such a distinction must assume that the owner or proprietor of a bona fide newspaper will exercise some control over Lowe’s writings so as to prevent fraud. There is no assurance that this would be so. And I am appalled by the thought that in order to enforce the injunction to be granted on remand, the trial court may be required to snoop into the corporate records of a publication to find out whether it is directly or indirectly owned by Lowe, in order to make the adjudication as to whether or not it is “somebody else’s bona fide newspaper.” A court of equity should not utter an injunction which might give rise to such intrusions in a First Amendment protected area such as a newspaper office.
IV
There are prudential reasons apart from the Constitutional issues heretofore discussed, which militate against the granting *909of injunctive relief in the form directed by the majority.
I cannot express a better description of a typical investment newsletter than that found in the majority opinion; whether in recommending specific stocks or predicting near and long term market trends, Lowe, and the typical investment newsletter writer is in effect “publishing or stating his views as to any matter of current interest, economic or otherwise, such as the likelihood of war, the trend in interest rates, whether the next election will affect market conditions, or whether future enforcement of the Anti-Dumping Act to protect basic American smokestack industry from foreign competition is likely.” (Majority at 902). Yet that is what the majority says Lowe is not, on remand, to be prohibited from doing. He will become a criminal contemnor if, but only if, he writes and publishes “as to the value of specific securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing or selling or holding specific securities.” (At 902). While footnote 7 of the opinion purports to reserve decision (i.e., “leave to another day”) as to whether Lowe may publish “dealing with market indicators generally,” and “making recommendations only as to groups of securities,” (at 902, n. 7), no logical basis is presented for the court on remand to allow the recommendation of groups of securities but not individual stocks. Faced with the necessity of framing an injunction which preserves Lowe’s conceded right to express his views as to the effect of current events on market conditions, and yet prevents any “recommendation” of specific securities, the district judge will be confronted with extreme difficulty. The injunctive decree of a court of equity must be intelligible and practical; it must draw a bright line, and should produce benefits at least equal to its social burdens. Equity requires that those enjoined receive “explicit notice of precisely what conduct is allowed.” Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 94 S.Ct. 713, 38 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974). In Diapulse Corp. of America v. Carba Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1980) we held, per Judge Van Graafeiland:
“A court is required to frame its orders so that those who must obey them will know what the Court intends to forbid .... It is for this reason that Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d), like its predecessor, provides that every order granting an injunction shall be specific in terms and describe in reasonable detail the acts sought to be restrained. An order which does not satisfy the requirement of specificity and definiteness will not withstand appellate scrutiny.”
See also, United States v. Charmer Industries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir.1983) (Charmer II) Schurr v. Austin Galleries of Illinois, Inc., 719 F.2d 571 (2d Cir.1983) (Van Graafeiland, J. concurring).
This requirement is especially important where First Amendment freedoms are implicated. Organization For a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). The injunction which the majority commands cannot be framed in compliance with the directions given, so as to insure that constitutionally protected expression will not be stifled, along with the investment advice on specific issues which the Court finds Lowe may no longer express.
In a ease involving an attempt to enjoin the showing of motion pictures, the Fifth Circuit noted the difficulty inherent in attempting to enjoin future expression on the basis of unprotected past conduct, where a statute permitted the closing for one year of any theatre which had exhibited an obscene film:
“Thus, [under the statute] future conduct that may fall within the purview of the first amendment is absolutely prohibited after a finding of unprotected present conduct. It was precisely this practice that was condemned by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Near v. Minnesota.” Universal Amusement Co., Inc. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 165 (5th Cir. 1978).
While stated in the context of an attempt to prevent obscenity, the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning is applicable to this case as well. In light of the difficulty of framing an injunction which would prevent Lowe from recommending specific securities, while at the same time preserving his right to comment *910on “any matter of current interest,” any injunction issued will have the effect of stifling constitutionally protected expression, thus amounting to an impermissible prior restraint on publications which have not yet been found to constitute “investment advice.” Cf. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., supra at 169. Lowe’s difficulty in knowing what will violate the terms of an injunction formulated according to this Court’s directive will result in “self-censorship, a particularly subtle and most insidious form of the malady” of prior restraint. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., supra at 166.
Probably, following remand, this articulate litigant will demonstrate what a panel of this Court has previously described as an “ability to improvise and [a] flair for the creative” and bring about the same difficulty encountered when, in response to an overly broad injunction, oenologist Walter S. Taylor began to refer to himself as “Walter S. Xxxxxx,” and depict himself on his wine bottles in a “Lone Ranger” type mask. See Taylor Wine Co., Inc. v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc., 590 F.2d 701, 702-03 (2d Cir.1978).
Injunctions which are unclear or easily set at naught should not be issued in the first place. There exists already more than adequate statutory protection, both penal and civil, against mail fraud, wire fraud, securities fraud and breach of fiduciary duty in writing about investments. An injunction of this sort, particularly because of its illusory character, will add little to the protection of the public. This is especially true in this case because the majority will apparently allow Lowe to express his opinions freely and without limitation “in somebody else’s bona fide newspaper as an employee, editor, or writer” (At 902).
Any balancing of the equities, essential before any injunction is granted, should weigh the benefit to the public (nil in this case because of the injunction’s vague, subjective and illusory nature) against the burdens on those enjoined, severe in this case because free expression may be enjoyed only at great personal risk to Lowe, or his potential news publishing employers who might have to prove they are bona fide and not indirectly owned by Lowe.
This is not to mention the impossible burden of enforcement imposed on the district court.4
And for what is all this great effort? I agree with Chief Judge Weinstein below that “the censorship that the SEC would impose on Lowe is more extreme than necessary to effectuate the congressional goal of a confident and informed investing public,” (556 F.Supp. at 1366) and therefore a balancing of the equities requires that no injunction issue.
Essentially for the foregoing reasons, as well as those expressed by Chief Judge Weinstein in his opinion below, I believe that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
. It must be noted that Wall Street Transcript was a “chilling” case, not a prior restraint case. When a contention is advanced that First Amendment rights are being chilled by official action, a Court is required only to balance the interest being served by the governmental action against the degree of chill. See Waterfront Commission v. Local 1814, Longshoremen, etc., 667 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.1981).
Similarly, Savage v. Commodities Futures Trading Commission, 548 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1977) relied on by the majority, is distinguishable. In Savage, Judge Moore was concerned only with the question of whether the Commission’s order refusing petitioner’s registration as a commodity trading adviser should be reversed. Although petitioner so argued, prior restraint of the press was not an issue in that case. The gist of Savage may be found in the comment by the Court that:
“[I]t has long been recognized that the [First] Amendment does not remove a business engaged in the communication of information from general laws regulating business practices.” Citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, *905388 U.S. 130, 150, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 1989, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967).
I agree so long as prior restraint on publication is not involved. But see, SEC v. Blavin, 557 F.Supp. 1304, 1310 (E.D.Mich.1983) in which, in addition to protecting the right to publish, the Court required the SEC to grant defendant registration as an investment adviser.
. One of the pamphlets in Bolger purported to be an expression of fact and opinion rather than an advertisement. In an inconspicuous place, it bore the self-serving statement that it was “contributed as a public service” by Youngs Drug Products Corp. See n. 4, Bolger, supra, at —, 103 S.Ct. at 2879. There is no bright line by which an advertisement can be distinguished on its face from a statement of fact and opinion actually presented as a public service by a commercial enterprise. Nor is there any reason to believe that a corporation has less First Amendment rights than an individual.
. There is no clear and present danger shown to the national security which would justify such an injunction. The majority apparently assumes that because of his criminal record and allegedly bad character, Lowe is more likely to publish false ideas than are others, but not if he is working for somebody else’s paper. This is illusion, and threatens disaster.
. There are probably a thousand and one ways to recommend a specific stock without using the word “recommend.” Any puff piece published to investors about a business or an industry in effect “recommends” the stock thereof. The court below following remand would seem to be at a loss to determine whether a contempt has been committed, or not, so long as the evil word “recommend” is not used.