concurring.
Although I accept the unexceptionable analysis and result of the majority opinion, I am not persuaded that justice has been well served by our efforts here. I cannot help but believe that errors of law have occurred which competent counsel could have avoided, or caused to be corrected on appeal. In Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), we decided that an order denying a motion for appointment of counsel was not immediately appealable. The majority there concluded that, “the postponement of review .. . does not result in the effective denial of the right at issue.” Id. at 1066. In the present case, it may well be that the postponement of review has contributed to *339the effective extinguishment of the right. See id., at 1067 n. 6. Hopefully, faithful adherence by the district courts to the standards for appointment of counsel in Title VII cases set forth in Jones v. WFYR Radio/RKO General, 626 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), will tend to minimize any problems of this sort.