dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Hollins’ employment was terminated during the first ninety (90) days for “inappro*826priate and unprofessional conduct with a patient.” (Appellee’s Brief, p. 3). Subsection 210.A of section 7 of the collective bargaining agreement provides that: “Discipline shall be administered only for just cause.” Thus, under the express provisions of the agreement, Hollins’ employment could not be terminated as a disciplinary measure except for just cause.
The agreement also provides, in section 196 that employees within the first ninety (90) days of employment may be discharged without recourse to the grievance procedure. Thus, the agreement gives all employees the right to be free from being disciplined except for just cause. Employees with more than ninety (90) days employment are limited by the express terms of the agreement to seek resolution of any grievance, including disciplinary action, through the grievance procedure. Under section 196, probationary employees, such as Hollins, are not covered by the grievance procedure. Hence, the agreement does not preclude the bringing of an action by a probationary employee under 29 U.S.C. § 185, to enforce the right granted to him under section 7 210.A.
Accordingly, I would reverse.