dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
This school teacher has been deprived of her job solely because she let it be known to some colleagues and, through them, to her administrative superiors that her sexual preference was for another woman. She filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging violations of federal constitutional rights, particularly as set forth in the first and fourteenth amendments. A southwestern Ohio jury has now found in her favor on all relevant counts and has awarded substantial money damages. The Magistrate before whom the case was tried and the District Judge have entered judgment in her favor. I would affirm.
This record presents a clear cut issue as to whether a citizen’s mere statement of a homosexual preference may be punished by job loss by the joint decision of a school superintendent, a public school principal and assistant principal, and the school board, as a matter of institutional policy. I find no language in the Constitution of the United States which excludes citizens who are bisexual or homosexual from its protection, and particularly of the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments thereto. The Constitution protects all citizens of the United States; no language therein excludes the homosexual minority. Like all citizens, homosexuals are protected in these great rights, certainly to the extent of being homosexual and stating their sexual preference in a factual manner where there is no invasion of any other person’s rights.
While the Supreme Court of the United States has not, to this date, decided this specific issue, it has also decided no case to the contrary of the view expressed above.
I. The First Amendment
In particular I cannot agree with the majority that Justice White’s opinion in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) supports the plaintiff’s termination in this case. I do not view this discharge (or failure to rehire) as based upon this employee’s “behavior.” There is neither charge nor proof of anything plaintiff did which led to the termination, other than being bisexual and expressing the fact. If we recognize her right to a jury trial, we must also accept the jury’s conclusion that if plaintiff “had not been bisexual and if she had not told Mrs. Monell, the secretary, of her sexual preference,” she would not have been suspended or transferred and the Board of Education would not have failed to renew her contract “anyway for other reasons.” Special Verdict VIII, Appendix A. Clearly under this jury finding it was “speech” which occasioned her termination.
The detailed findings of the jury, set forth in Appendix A to this dissent, make equally clear that it was not the fact that plaintiff told a secretary in her office that two students she was counseling were homosexual that caused her to not be rehired. Id.
Like the majority, I recognize that under the Connick case, appellant cannot prevail on her first amendment claim if the speech is “not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest ____” 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690 (1983). While, for all this record shows, her first disclosure to the secretary may have been intended to be confidential, plaintiff’s later statements were clearly a part of an effort to establish her right to her job while admitting being bisexual. Long before her nonrenewal/discharge, plaintiff became a center of public controversy in the Mad *453River School community involving the same issue of homosexual rights which has swirled nationwide for many years. This record leaves no doubt but that her statements about her status resulted in “public concern” — both pro and con. As the Supreme Court has consistently held:
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years.
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1968).
To summarize the first amendment aspect of this case, the speech may not have had its origin in an overt attempt to exer-' cise freedom of speech. But speech it was. It revealed plaintiffs status as a homosexual in what at the outset she may have presumed to be a confidential relationship. When, however, that speech was spread to school authorities and the community, plaintiffs adherence to her right both to be what she was and to state the fact brought down on her head the wrath of some parents and termination of her job by the ruling authorities of her school. There is evidence in this record that organized parental pressures were involved in the ultimate nonrenewal/discharge. ^ Clearly at the point of discharge, there was a controversy in process over an important public issue.
While this incident did not generate national attention, in southern Ohio it was an important matter of public concern. It thus became a part of the nationwide debate on homosexuality and the rights or lack thereof of homosexuals — a debate of far greater significance than the majority opinion recognizes. See People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987, 101 S.Ct. 2323, 68 L.Ed.2d 845 (1981). See also New York v. Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d 936, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514, 447 N.E.2d 62 (1983), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 64, 78 L.Ed.2d 80. (1983).
II. Equal Protection
Turning now to the fourteenth amendment aspect of this case, I perceive no reason to deny plaintiff her rights under the equal protection clause of that amendment. Assume for a moment that all the same facts applicable to this case were before us in a case where the first disclosure to the secretary had been by a teacher whose appearance was consistent with majority race status, but who revealed she had a black parent. If community protests in this rural southwest Ohio county had convinced the principal and school board to non-renew that teacher, would there be any doubt about whether or not this was “policy” and a case for a federal constitutional remedy. I find no logical equal protection distinction between these two minority discrimination situations, both of which evoke deeply felt prejudices and fears on the part of many people.1 I believe that all of the many federal cases which have held on equal protection grounds that school authorities could not discharge teachers for racially discriminatory reasons without offending the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and which have invoked a federal court remedy are equally applicable to this case. McFerren, Jr., et al. v. County Board of Education, 455 F.2d 199 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934, 92 S.Ct. 2461, 32 L.Ed.2d 817 (1972); Hatton v. County Board of Education, 422 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.1970); Rolfe v. County Board of Education, 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir.1968).
I would also hold that there is no need for a Mt. Healthy remand before affirming the judgment of the district court. Mt. *454Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). She was bisexual by preference. She said so. She was fired because she was a homosexual who revealed her sexual preference — and, as the jury found, for no other reason. See Special Verdict VIII(5), Appendix A.
The majority also would remand the case because of inadequate evidence of disparate treatment, despite a jury finding that Rowland was treated differently than other employees because of her sexual preference. See Special Verdict, Appendix A. The jury had heard ample evidence to find that, but for the fact that she revealed her sexual preference, she would not have been either transferred, or suspended by Superintendent Hopper and Principal DiNino, or “non-renewed” by the Board. The School District has not challenged these findings. The jury clearly did not believe that the above actions would have been taken against Rowland if she had not admitted a sexual preference which Superintendent Hopper, Principal DiNino and, ultimately, the School Board disapproved of. The question was one of credibility and logical inference which the jury was uniquely positioned to resolve.
III. Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
As we have seen earlier, there is no obstacle to imposing § 1983 liability on the school district. The individuals who acted in this case, the superintendent of schools, and the school board, are school district policymakers who, beyond a doubt, formulated and executed school district policy in the discharge/nonrenewal of this teacher because of her sexual preference. Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1977). See Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 656, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1418, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). The Sixth Circuit cases cited by the majority are distinguishable, and do not immunize the school district.
IV. The Reality of This Case
My colleague’s opinion seems to me to treat this- case, sub silentio, as if it involved only a single person and a sick one at that — in short, that plaintiff’s admission of homosexual status was sufficient in itself to justify her termination. To the contrary, this record does not disclose that she is subject to mental illness; nor is she alone.
Careful studies of homosexuality have now established two facts of which the courts should be aware and should take judicial notice. The first is that homosexuality is not a mental disease, like insanity or a psychopathic personality. The second is the extent of homosexuality in the United States.
In 1979, the Surgeon General issued a memorandum as follows:
PHS policy regarding certification of mental defect or disease under Title 8, section 1224 United States Code
The public Health Service policy regarding the physical and mental examination of aliens pursuant to Title 8, section 1224 of the United States Code has been revised. According to this revision homosexuality per se will no longer be considered a “mental disease or defect.” This revision has been made for two reasons: First, the change will reflect current and generally accepted canons of medical practice with respect to homosexuality. Specifically, according to the 1974 edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual II (DSM II) of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association homosexuality is not considered to be a mental disorder. (Note: The DSM is one of the most authoritative diagnostic manuals for the conduct of psychiatric examinations in the United States, and constitutes the complete listing of currently recognized psychiatric diagnoses.) This manual states that “homosexuality per se is one form of sexual behavior, and with other forms of sexual behavior which are not by themselves psychiatric disorders are not listed in this nomenclature.”
The newest edition of the DSM (DSM III) has been approved by the Board of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Association and will be released in November *4551979. In the DSM III a decision not to include homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder has been sustained.
The American Psychiatric Association’s actions have been endorsed by official resolutions adopted by the American Psychological Association, the American Public Health Association, the American Nurses’ Association and the Council of Advanced Practitioners in Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing of the American Nurses’ Association.
The Public Health Service has traditionally relied upon the professional expertise of associations such as these for advice and information on a wide variety of physical and mental health issues. Accordingly, this change in the policy of the PHS with respect to the physical and mental examination of aliens has been made to reflect the most current judgments of health professionals on this subject.
The second reason for this change is that the determination of homosexuality is not made through a medical diagnostic procedure.
Effective this date, PHS medical officers, civil surgeons, and panel physicians will no longer certify that homosexuality per se is a mental disease or defect. Quarantine inspectors will no longer issue medical holds on aliens suspected solely of being homosexual.
The Immigration and Naturalization officials and Department of State Consular officers will be advised of this change and will be advised that in accord with this change they should no longer refer aliens suspected only of being homosexual to the PHS for certification of a mental disease or defect under 8 USC 1224. Please notify all relevant Public Health Service personnel that, for the foregoing reasons, PHS medical officers shall not issue certificates or notifications relating to mental defects or diseases under 42 CFR 34.7 solely because an alien is suspected of being a homosexual.
56 Interpreter Releases 398-99 (August 17, 1979).
While this statement directly related to exclusion from the United States of aliens seeking admission either as visitors or permanent residents, and the Attorney General, in a subsequent memorandum, disavowed its impact, the Surgeon General’s memorandum is nonetheless an authoritative statement of modern medical opinion concerning homosexuality.
In dealing with this type of case, this court (and others) should be aware and take judicial notice of the monumental works concerning the incidence of homosexuality in males and females in the United States. See A. Kinsey, W. Pomeroy & C. Martin, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (1948); A. Kinsey, W. Pomeroy, C. Martin & P. Gebhard, Sexual Behavior in the Human Female (1953); A. Bell & M. Weinberg, Homosexualities: A Study of Diversity Among Men and Women (1978). The following sentences represent cumulative summaries of Kinsey’s authoritative works on homosexual incidence in males and females:
In these terms (of physical contact to the point of orgasm), the data in the present study indicate that at least 37 per cent of the male population has some homosexual experience between the beginning of adolescence and old age (U.S. Corrections. See Table 139, Figure 156).
Kinsey et al., Sexual Behavior in the Human Male 623 (1948).
:¡: :|: t * -|:
[T]he accumulative incidences of overt contact to the point of orgasm among the females had reached 13 per cent (Table 131, Figure 82); among the males they had reached 37 per cent.
Kinsey et al, Sexual Behavior in the Human Female 474-75 (1953).
Perhaps the quickest summary of Kinsey’s work is found in Marmor, Homosexual Behavior: A Modern Reappraisal (1980):
The Kinsey reports represent the most thorough and extensive surveys done to date. A number of smaller studies have been made in Europe, and all are in ap*456proximate agreement with the Kinsey findings (Romer, 1906; Hirschfeld, 1920; Friedeberg, 1953; and Schofield, 1965). On the basis of these various studies it is fair to conclude, conservatively, that the incidence of more or less exclusively homosexual behavior in Western culture ranges from 5 to 10 percent for adult males and from 3 to 5 percent for adult females. If bisexual behavior is included, the incidence may well be twice these figures. It is clear, therefore, that the propensity for homosexual reactivity is a widespread one even in societies such as ours which strongly discourage it.
On the facts and circumstances presented here, I would affirm the jury’s verdict and the judgment entered by the Magistrate and the District Judge.
APPENDIX A
SPECIAL VERDICT I
During the fall of 1974, Mrs. Rowland told Elaine Monell, the secretary, that she, Mrs. Rowland, was in love with a woman.
1. Did Mrs. Rowland’s statement to Elaine Monell regarding Mrs. Rowland’s love for a woman in any way interfere with the proper performance of either Mrs. Rowland’s or Elaine Monell’s duties or with the regular operation of the school generally? (In order to answer “NO”, you must be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that it did not.)
YES / NO
2. If your answer to question 1 was “YES”, state in the notebook provided how the statement in question interfered with the performance of duties and/or how it interfered with the regular operation of the school.
3. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino’s participation in the decision to suspend Mrs. Rowland was motivated at least in part by her statement to Elaine Monell regarding her bisexuality?
/ YES NO
4. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hopper’s suspension of Mrs. Rowland was motivated at least in part by her statement to Elaine Monell regarding her bisexuality?
/ YES NO
5. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino’s participation in the decision to transfer Mrs. Rowland to a position with no student contact was motivated at least in part by her statement to Elaine Monell regarding her bisexuality?
/ YES NO
6. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hopper’s transfer of Mrs. Rowland to a position with no student contact was motivated at least in part by her statement to Elaine Monell regarding her bisexuality?
/ YES NO
7. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino’s participation in the recommendation to the Board of Education that Mrs. Rowland’s contract not be renewed was motivated at least in part by her statement to Elaine Monell regarding her bisexuality?
/ YES NO
8. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hopper’s recommendation that Mrs. Rowland’s contract not be renewed was motivated at least in part by her statement to Elaine Monell regarding her bisexuality?
/ YES NO
SPECIAL VERDICT II
Mrs. Rowland counseled a student who was homosexual and the student’s mother was present. The mother was very upset with Mrs. Rowland and accused her of being homosexual also. Mrs. Rowland was concerned that the mother would complain to Mr. DiNino or Mr. Goheen, the assistant *457principal, so she went to Mr. Goheen, and told him she was concerned about her job because she was bisexual. Mr. Goheen told her that she should not be concerned and that he would keep the matter confidential.
1. Did Mrs. Rowland’s statement to Mr. Goheen regarding her bisexuality in any way interfere with the proper performance of either Mrs. Rowland’s or Mr. Goheen’s duties or with the regular operation of the school generally? (In order to answer “NO”, you must be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that it did not).
YES / NO
2. If your answer to question 1 was “YES”, state in the notebook provided how the statement in question interfered with the performance of duties and/or how it interfered with the regular operation of the school.
3. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino’s participation in the decision to suspend Mrs. Rowland was motivated at least in part by her statement to Mr. Goheen regarding her bisexuality?
/ YES NO
4. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hopper’s suspension of Mrs. Rowland was motivated at least in part by her statement to Mr. Goheen regarding her bisexuality?
/ YES NO
5. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino's participation in the decision to transfer Mrs. Rowland to a position with no student contact was motivated at least in part by her statement to Mr. Goheen regarding her bisexuality?
/ YES NO
6. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hopper’s transfer of Mrs. Rowland to a position with no student contact was motivated at least in part by her statement to Mr. Goheen regarding her bisexuality?
/ YES NO
7. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino’s participation in the recommendation to the Board of Education that Mrs. Rowland’s contract not be renewed was motivated at least in part by her statement to Mr. Goheen regarding her bisexuality?
/ YES NO
8. Are you satisfied by a preponderance . of the evidence that Defendant Hopper’s recommendation to the Board of Education that Mrs. Rowland’s contract not be renewed was motivated at least in part by her statement to Mr. Goheen regarding her bisexuality?
/ YES NO
SPECIAL VERDICT III
In the fall of 1974 Mrs. Rowland made statements to fellow teachers at Stebbins High School regarding her bisexuality.
1. Did Mrs. Rowland’s statements to the teachers regarding her bisexuality in any way interfere with the proper performance of either Mrs. Rowland’s or the teachers’ duties or with the regular operation of the school generally? (In order to answer “NO”, you must be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that they did not.)
YES / NO
2. If your answer to question 1 was “YES”, state in the notebook provided how the statements in question interfered with the performance of duties and/or how they interfered with the regular operation of the school.
3. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino’s participation in the decision to suspend Mrs. Rowland was motivated at least in part by her statements to the teachers regarding her bisexuality?
/ YES NO
*4584. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hopper’s suspension of Mrs. Rowland was motivated at least in part by her statements to the teachers regarding her bisexualitv?
/ YES NO
5. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino’s participation in the decision to transfer Mrs. Rowland to a position with no student contact was motivated at least in part by her statements to the teachers regarding her bisexualitv?
V YES NO
6. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hopper’s transfer of Mrs. Rowland to a position with no student contact was motivated at least in part by her statements to the teachers regarding her bisexuality?
V YES NO
7. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino’s participation in the recommendation to the Board of Education that Mrs. Rowland’s contract not be renewed was motivated at least in part by her statements to the teachers re-
. garding her bisexuality?
/ YES NO
8. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hopper’s recommendation to the Board of Education that Mrs. Rowland’s contract not be renewed was motivated at least in part by her statements to the teachers regarding her bisexuality?
V YES NO
SPECIAL VERDICT IV
1. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino’s participation in the decision to transfer Mrs. Rowland to a position with no student contact was motivated at least in part because she had filed a lawsuit regarding her suspension?
YES / NO
2. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino’s participation in the recommendation that Mrs. Rowland’s contract not be renewed was motivated at least in part because she had filed a lawsuit regarding her suspension?
YES / NO
3. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hopper’s transfer of Mrs. Rowland to a position with no student contact was motivated at least in part because she had filed a lawsuit regarding her suspension?
YES / NO
4. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hopper’s recommendation that Mrs. Rowland’s contract not be renewed was motivated at least in part because she had filed a lawsuit regarding her suspension?
YES / NO
5. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Education voted not to renew Mrs. Rowland’s contract at least partly because she had filed a lawsuit regarding her suspension?
YES V NO
SPECIAL VERDICT V
1. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino, in participating in the decision to suspend Mrs. Rowland, treated her any differently than similarly situated employees, because she was homosexual/bisexual?
/ YES NO
2. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hopper, in suspending Mrs. Rowland, treated her any differently than similarly situated employees, because she was homosexual/bisexual?
V YES NO
*4593. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino, in participating in the decision to transfer Mrs. Rowland to a position with no student contact, treated her any differently than similarly situated employees, because she was homosexual/bisexual?
/ YES NO
4. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hopper, in transferring Mrs. Rowland to a position with no student contact, treated her any differently than similarly situated employees, because she was homosexual/bisexual?
/ YES NO
5. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino, in participating in the recommendation that Mrs. Rowland’s contract not be renewed, treated her any differently than similarly situated employees, because she was homosexual/bisexual?
/ YES NO
6. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hopper, in recommending that Mrs. Rowland’s contract not be renewed, treated her any differently than similarly situated employees, because she was homosexual/bisexual?
/ YES NO
7. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Education, in voting not to renew Mrs. Rowland’s contract, treated her any differently than similarly situated employees, because she was homosexual/bisexual?
YES / NO
8. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of her suspension, Mrs. Rowland was not performing her position as vocational guidance counselor in a satisfactory manner?
/ YES NO
If your answer to question 8 is “YES”, state in the notebook provided in what way her performance was unsatisfactory. Please be specific. 9.
SPECIAL VERDICT VI
A school official acts in good faith if he acts sincerely and with a belief that he is doing right, and if his conduct is justified by an objectively reasonable belief that it was lawful. A school official does not act in good faith if he acts with malicious intention to deprive an employee, such as Mrs. Rowland, of her constitutional rights, or if he knew or reasonably should have known that his actions would violate her constitutional rights.
During the 1974-75 school year, there was no clearly established constitutional right to be homosexual or bisexual, or to have as one’s sexual orientation and preference homosexuality or bisexuality. The law was uncertain concerning whether or not statements regarding bisexuality made in a high school setting were constitutionally protected.
1. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino acted in good faith by participating in the decision to suspend Mrs. Rowland?
/ YES NO
2. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino acted in good faith by participating in the decision to transfer Mrs. Rowland to a position with no student contact?
/ YES NO
3. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant DiNino acted in good faith by participating in the decision to recommend nonrenewal of Mrs. Rowland’s contract?
/ YES NO
4. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hopper acted in good faith by suspending Mrs. Rowland?
/ YES NO
*4605. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hopper acted in good faith by transferring Mrs. Rowland to a position with no student contact?
/ YES NO
6. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hopper acted in good faith by recommending non-renewal of Mrs. Rowland’s contract?
/ YES NO
SPECIAL VERDICT VII
1. Are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Education knowingly and intentionally voted not to renew Mrs. Rowland’s contract?
/ YES NO
2. If your answer to question 1 is “YES”, do you find that the Board of Education acted for any reason other than the recommendation of the superintendent, Dr. Hopper, when it voted not to renew Mrs. Rowland’s contract?
YES / NO
3. If your answer to question 2 is “YES”, state the reason for the Board’s action in the notebook provided.
SPECIAL VERDICT VIII
1. If Mrs. Rowland had not been bisexual and if she had not told teachers and Mrs. Monell, the secretary, of her sexual preference, are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that she would have been suspended anyway for other reasons?
YES / NO
2. If the answer to question 1 is “YES”, state the other reasons in the notebook provided.
3. If Mrs. Rowland had not been bisexual and if she had not told teachers and Mrs. Monell, the secretary, of her sexual preference, are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that she would have been transferred to a position with no student contact anyway for other reasons?
YES / NO
4. If the answer to question 3 is “YES”,' state the other reasons in the notebook provided.
5. If Mrs. Rowland had not been bisexual and if she had not told teachers and Mrs. Monell, the secretary, of her sexual preference, are you satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that her contract would not have been renewed anyway for other reasons?
YES / NO
6. If the answer to question 5 is “YES”, state the other reasons in the notebook provided.
9. In what way was Mrs. Rowland’s performance in her position as vocational guidance counselor unsatisfactory?
Her performance was unsatisfactory because she revealed to Mrs. Monell the sexual orientation of two students when it was not necessary to do so.
. It is, of course, historic fact that Congress’ dominant concern in adopting the fourteenth amendment was to protect the rights of the newly freed slaves. Nonetheless the amendment’s general language contains no restriction and has been applied generally to situations which were never discussed in the debate which preceded its adoption and ratification. See, for only one example, the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873).