concurring.
I concur with the majority’s decision to remand this case to the Commission for a hearing to determine whether the facts justify a reopening to permit the district to apply for a temporary permit. In reaching that conclusion, however, I disagree with much of the majority’s analysis — primarily its apparent eagerness to decide several substantial issues in the complete absence *1525of any factual record. I agree that the Conservancy District’s allegations must be accepted as true for purposes of this appeal, but I cannot agree with the majority’s apparent determination to decide some of the underlying substantial issues as if the facts asserted by the Conservancy District in its brief were facts developed on a record after a hearing. It is elementary that “[n]o court should decide an issue that has not been properly clarified and no court should decide any question without needed facts.” 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 25:11 (2d ed. 1983). This restraint is designed to “prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) (emphasis added). Accepting allegations as true for purposes of deciding this appeal and remanding the case is one thing, but accepting them as true for purposes of deciding how the Commission should decide the case on remand after hearing is something else entirely. We have no authority to do the latter.
I.
I concur generally that for purposes of this appeal the Conservancy District can now be considered a “municipality likely to be interested ... or affected” (emphasis added) by the Energenics project. But I cannot agree that this necessarily can be transformed into a decision that on May 6, 1981, when the Commission sent out the notices, the District was “likely to be interested” in a project the size and character of Energenics’ proposal. May 6, 1981, was before the Colorado statute was amended to permit Conservancy Districts to wholesale power, and there is strong circumstantial evidence that the passage of the amendment may have been the only event that placed the District in the “likely” status. When the Commission sent out the notices the District did not have authority to wholesale power, and this is a fact from which it might be inferred that the District was not a municipality likely to be interested. Insofar as it might be likely to be “affected,” the published notice, by designating the “St. Vrain Canal,” might be considered as giving all the notice that was necessary to alert the District that operated the St. Vrain Canal.
It is not clear that the Conservancy District was, in fact, a “municipality likely to be interested” in Energenics’ petition on the date that the Commission’s notices were sent out to municipalities. As of that date, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 37 — 45—118(j) provided that the District had the authority to “construct, operate, and maintain ... power plants.” But § 37 — 45—118(k) specifically provided that this was a power limited to its own “works and facilities”:
Nothing provided in this article shall be construed to grant to the district or board the power to generate, distribute, or sell electric energy, except for the operations of the works and facilities of the district.
(Emphasis added.) The Conservancy District did not receive “authority to generate electricity for wholesale sales” until May 18, 1981 — just after FERC had mailed its notices of Energenics’ permit application.1 Majority at 1516. The majority and the parties agree that the Conservancy District had authority before that date to “generate, distribute, and sell electricity for operation of its own works and facilities,” Majority at 1516, but there is nothing in this record to support a conclusion one way or *1526the other that with such limited authority it was “likely to be interested” in constructing, for its own purposes, a project of the character or size proposed by Energenics. In fact, the present application, which seeks to wholesale the power developed, may be some indication that it was not interested in producing power within the limitations of the prior statute.
Assuming that it had some limited authority before the May 18 legislative amendment, it does not follow inexorably that the Conservancy District was therefore a municipality “likely to be interested” in building a 2.1 MW power plant, the only apparent purpose of which would be the generation of electricity for wholesale. The majority points out that the Conservancy District has been treated as a municipality in two other proceedings, but does so without admitting that both of these permits were granted after the May 18 legislative amendment, which was passed after the notices were sent to municipalities in this case.
In fact, the first recorded instance of the Conservancy District’s interest in building facilities of this magnitude came on May 5, 1981, the day before notice of Energenics’ application was issued. Perhaps aware of the likely passage of the pending amendment by the Legislature, the Conservancy District applied on that date for a permit to “utilize an existing dam” to build a generating unit at another location for wholesale use. Mitchell Energy Co., 16 FERC ¶62,180 (Aug. 5,1981). The proposed facility was a 2 MW generating plant with an annual output of 4,000,000 kWh, but the “plan [was not] based on detailed studies.” Id. The Conservancy District announced that it planned to sell the power to Public Service Company of Colorado or another retail utility.
The next year, the Conservancy District filed for another permit in Energenics Systems, 19 FERC 11 62,573 (1982). The permit in that case involved a 5.2 MW facility, with an annual capacity of 7,000,000 kWh. The Conservancy District stated that it would sell the power to Public Service Company of Colorado. Both permits were eventually awarded to the Conservancy District well after the effective date of the 1981 amendment of the Colorado statute.
The Conservancy District’s sudden interest in developing facilities for the outside sale of power — after having apparently applied for no such permits in the first 40 years of its existence — might be considered as implicit proof that it had neither the authority nor the interest to build such facilities prior to May 18, 1981. But it is impossible, on the record before us, to reach that determination.
On remand, it is my view that the Commission, which now has the benefit of this court’s construction of the notice provision, should decide whether or not the Conservancy District was a “municipality likely to be interested” in competing for Energenics’ permit at the time the notices were sent out.2 If not, the Commission’s failure to give notice would be harmless, unless it had an affirmative duty to sent notice after learning of the 1981 amendment by the Colorado Legislature.3
*1527II.
The majority dismisses out of hand the argument that the Conservancy District’s admitted actual knowledge of the contents of the published notice on June 9 was sufficient to satisfy the statute’s notice requirement: “We can thus conclude that the reading of the June 9 notice did not make harmless FERC’s failure to fulfill its statutory obligation.” Majority at 1522. The majority is willing to concede that at some point actual knowledge renders the provision of written notice superfluous.4 *The question then becomes when did the Conservancy District’s board have sufficient knowledge of the Energenics’ application that it should have begun taking steps to protect its interest? Did it have sufficient knowledge—
1. When the board became aware of the published notice on June 9?
2. When the board received a letter from Energenics in late August pinpointing the exact location of the proposed facility at a specific station on the 9-mile canal?5
3. When the board met with Energenics on September 29 and was told again the exact location of the proposed facility?
Or was it on some other date? The majority, without the necessary facts before it, apparently makes the substantive holding that notice was plainly insufficient as of the first date. That, however, is a fact that must be the subject of determination at the hearing. (The minutes of the meetings of the District’s board of directors might cast some light on this issue and others.) The majority ignores the second date, which should not be done. It selects September 29 as the date on which the Conservancy District received the actual notice required by the statute, holding that the failure to specify exactly where on a 9-mile canal the project would be located rendered the published notice fatally defective, at least as applied to the Conservancy District. Majority at 1522.
*1528The majority relies on the fact that the Commission did send maps to other municipalities; from this, the majority extracts an “implicit[ ] ... determination” that a map was necessary to properly advise governmental units of the project’s location. Majority at 1522. The majority offers no support for the proposition that notice to A is defective if notice to B contains extra information not included in the notice to A. On the contrary, A is entitled to such notice as will reasonably apprise it of the nature and location of the project in question, regardless of what information B gets.
By incorporating this implicit determination — which the Commission strenuously denies making — the majority rather neatly avoids a problem that simply cannot be resolved on this deficient record: how much information was it necessary to include in the notice to inform the Conservancy District of its rights? That question is the key to whether or not the board’s actual knowledge of the published notice was sufficient. It requires a hearing and determination of relevant facts. It cannot be evaded by reliance on an entirely unsupported proposition such as that A’s notice is defective because A did not get the map that B received.6
The statute in question requires that the Commission “at once give notice of such application in writing” to interested municipalities that qualify. It does not specify how specific the notice must be. Ordinarily, in administrative procedures where personal notice is necessary, administrative agencies “are governed by the same basic requirements of fairness and notice,” including “specificity of notice and opportunity to respond,” as are courts. Hess & Clark v. FDA, 495 F.2d 975, 984 (D.C.Cir. 1974). “The basic principle [is] that a party is entitled to such notice as will provide reasonable opportunity to prepare .... ” 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 14:11 (2d ed. 1980). “The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).7
The notice received by the Conservancy District was either sufficient to apprise it of the necessary facts, or it was not. Notice sent to other interested parties is irrelevant. Under Mullane, the adequacy of notice requires a factual inquiry. On remand, the Commission should be permitted to determine at what point the Conservancy District had sufficient notice of the Energenics application. Contrary to the implication discerned by the majority, the Commission has not done so. In that investigation the August letter should not be ignored.
III.
Finally, with regard to the Conservancy District’s admitted 72-day delay, even after it had all possible knowledge, I agree with the majority that the absence of factual findings makes it impossible to tell “whether the 72-day delay was reasonably excusable.” Judging by the District’s knowledge of Commission procedure demonstrated in its Mitchell Energy application prior to May 5, 1981, it may be doubted that the District has any justifiable excuse for the delay here. See note 5 supra. As for the majority’s discussion of the delay issue, it is simply gratuitous advice to the agency that exceeds our appellate authority.
*1529In sum, I would remand to the Commission for a hearing to determine:
1. Whether or not the Conservancy District, in view of its statutory inability to wholesale power and in light of this court’s construction of the notice provision, was entitled to personal notice at the time the notice was sent out.
2. At what point the Conservancy District had sufficient actual knowledge of all the information to which it was entitled.
3. Whether the Conservancy District’s delay after it received all of the knowledge to which it was entitled was reasonable.
4. The proper remedy to be applied.
5. If the District’s application is to be considered timely, whether it is to be required to recompense Energenics for such loss as it suffered through the delay of the District.
In my opinion, this court should not issue substantive rulings on these issues until after the Commission has developed a factual record sufficient to provide a reasoned basis for our decision. At present, the court has ruled substantively on several issues on the basis of mere allegations by the Conservancy District. To rule substantively thereon is improper judicial procedure for an appellate court.
. This statute, as amended by the act approved on May 18, 1981, provides:
Nothing provided in this article shall be construed to grant to the district or board the power to generate, distribute, or sell, OR CONTRACT TO SELL electric energy except for the operation of the works and facilities of the district AND EXCEPT FOR WHOLESALE SALES OF ELECTRIC ENERGY WHICH MAY BE MADE BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE BOUNDARIES OF THE DISTRICT OR SUBDISTRICT.
Colo.Rev.Stat. § 37-45-118 (as amended, May 18, 1981). The capitalized language was added to the section by the amendment.
. The majority states that the Conservancy District might be an "interested" municipality merely because it operates the canal in question. Majority at 1516. The purpose of the municipal preference, however, is not to provide notice to municipalities which may generally be interested in keeping informed, but to alert municipalities which may wish to compete for the permit in question. I fail to see how Congress’s avowed purpose — to encourage municipal power development — would be furthered by requiring the sending of notices to municipalities which lack authority or desire to develop power, on the sole ground that they might like to know. The notice provision was expressly designed to give notice to municipalities so that they would have "an opportunity to present their application if they desire public or municipal ownership.” 56 Cong.Rec. 9762 (Aug. 30, 1918) (statement of Rep. Sinnott). I believe that the statute requires notice only to those local entities with the actual authority at the time to compete for the permits in question. The Conservancy District's authority as of the time the Commission sent out notices of the Energenics application thus is critical to this case.
. If the Commission were to find that the Conservancy District was not a municipality likely to be interested as of May 6, 1981, it would have to decide whether the district's changed status *1527as of May 18, 1981, required the Commission to take affirmative action to send additional notice after that date. I agree with the majority that this question need not be addressed at this time and that we have not decided that issue.
. “Of course, this recognition by Congress [that municipalities are not mindful of their rights] cannot mean that once notice is deficient a municipality can learn the relevant information and then freely sleep on its rights.” Majority at 1523. This is in line with what I understand to be the general rule in administrative cases: actual notice to the affected party is sufficient, even if the statute mandates personal service. See Converse v. Udall, 262 F.Supp. 583, 592 (D.Or.1966) (Surface Resources Act requires copy of notice to be personally served on mine claimants, but plaintiffs could not contest lack of personal service since they “were completely informed of the notice of publication”), aff’d, 399 F.2d 616 (9th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1025, 89 S.Ct. 635, 21 L.Ed.2d 569 (1969). See also Hunter v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 188 F.2d 294, 301 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 819, 72 S.Ct. 36, 96 L.Ed. 619 (1951) (plaintiffs could not complain of lack of formal notice, since “[a]ctual notice for a sufficient period ... is all that is required”); 73A C.J.S. Public Administrative Law & Procedure § 135 (1983) ("one having actual knowledge is not prejudiced by, and may not complain of, a failure to receive formal notice”). The Commission, more than 30 years ago, came to the same conclusion. See Warrior River Elec. Coop. Ass’n, 11 F.P.C. 693, 702 (1952).
. The Conservancy District admits that in late August it received a letter from Energenics detailing the exact location of the project, but explains that it did not look at the location carefully because it previously had been misled by the Bureau of Land Reclamation. Brief of Petitioner at 8 n. 8. The majority ignores this statement, but further development of this point seems necessary in order to judge the reasonableness of the Conservancy District’s delay. Is the applicant to be held responsible not only for the Commission’s failure to give the District notice with a map, but also for the possible negligence of the District in not examining a complete notice that was placed before its very eyes by the applicant? That might be considered as placing a premium on compounding negligence. The Conservancy District in August, 1981, cannot be considered as a novice in such matters, as the record indicates it had filed an application for a preliminary permit, under identical circumstances to the present case, on May 5, 1981, following the application by Mitchell Energy Co. on November 17, 1980. Piggybacking on applications of others and presenting plans after considerable delay was not a new tactic for the District. See Mitchell Energy Co., 16 FERC ¶62,180 (Aug. 5, 1981).
. Relying on the reasoning of the majority, it could be pointed out that the Commission also "implicitly ... detcrmin[ed]” that notice to the general public, which also is demanded by the statute, did not require greater specificity than that provided by the published notice. The statute can be searched in vain for any indication that municipalities are entitled to more exact or more detailed notice than the general public. I believe the statute provides that municipalities and the rest of the public are entitled to the same information — but that municipalities are entitled to have it sent to them while the public must read it in the papers.
. I would reject any suggestion that the notice required by this particular statute must somehow be more exact or more detailed than the notice required by any other statute in which Congress has provided for personal service on interested parties. The statutory notice requirement at issue in this case is no more specific than the notice requirements that govern adjudications under the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (1982).