Marlon Louis FOWLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BLUE BELL, INC., a Corporation, Defendant-Appellee

' HATCHETT, Circuit Judge,

dissenting:

I dissent from the majority’s opinion on two grounds. First, I disagree with the majority’s holding that Blue Bell has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for rejecting Fowler’s application; and second, assuming Blue Bell’s justifications for rejecting Fowler were properly presented, Fowler proved that the reasons were pretextual.

Subjective justifications cannot satisfy the employer’s burden of producing legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for an applicant’s rejection. See Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.1983); Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education, 712 F.2d 1377, 1384 (11th Cir.1983). The majority holds that the reasons Blue Bell proffered for rejecting Fowler were subjective; nevertheless, it then determines that the subjective reasons were capable of objective evaluation and, therefore, were sufficient to fulfill the employer’s burden of rebuttal. This analysis is wrong. Subjective criteria are always capable of objective evaluation, and the majority’s decision, therefore, allows an employer in any case to use subjective reasons to fulfill the burden of production pursuant to Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The majority’s decision is contrary to Eleventh Circuit precedent. See Bell, 715 F.2d at 1557; Harris, 712 F.2d at 1384.

Assuming, however, that Blue Bell’s criteria for rejecting Fowler fulfilled its burden of rebuttal, Fowler proved that the criteria were pretextual. After an employer has satisfied the burden of rebuttal, one may still demonstrate discrimination by proving that the employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the rejection are not the true reasons behind the rejection. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. The Court stated “that [the applicant] may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1825-26, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

The instant, case exemplifies an indirect showing of pretext. To explain its criteria in rejecting Fowler, Blue Bell proffered the testimony of Eldon Pierce, a quality control manager at the Blue Bell plant for thirty years. Pierce was temporarily in charge of hiring when Fowler applied for a position at the plant. Pierce did not remember talking to Fowler, did not remember questioning Fowler about his alleged erratic work history, and did not remember asking Fowler about his starting salary. In total, Pierce did not remember Fowler or anything about his job application. No records showed the reason for Fowler’s rejection. Pierce also testified that written qualifications for vacancies at the plant did not exist. Yet, Pierce remembered the hiring criteria that Blue Bell allegedly utilized in 1970 and speculated as to the reason Fowler was not hired.

Pierce testified that an erratic work history and a demand for pay which the company could not guarantee were sufficient reasons for Fowler’s rejection. He, however, had never interviewed Fowler concerning his erratic work history or his sala*1015ry demands. Even today, this court does not know why Fowler was not hired. We only know that a person employed by the company testified that if some unknown facts were considered in accordance with some unknown subjective criteria, these unknowns probably resulted in Fowler’s rejection.1 Moreover, the record reveals that Blue Bell hired individuals with erratic work histories and paid workers an amount greater than Fowler’s application indicated he requested.2 Pierce’s testimony lacks credibility and is a pretext for the true reasons behind Fowler’s rejection.

. This testimony must be considered in light of the company's representation to our sister court that all records, including Fowler’s application, had been destroyed. Only after the Fifth Circuit held that any prejudice resulting from the destruction of the records had to be borne by Blue Bell, did the records reconstruct themselves.

. Fowler testified that he never talked to Pierce, . that he explained to the interviewer why he had changed jobs, and that he told the interviewer he would accept less salary than he noted on the application.