concurring.
I join Judge Nichols’ opinion, but his laconic disposition of the cross-appeal leads me to add a statement of my own view of why the district court’s refusal to award the defendants, as the winning parties, their costs of suit under Rule 54(d) should be reversed.
Under the rule, “costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the [district] court otherwise directs.” As an original matter this language could be interpreted to give the district judge an essentially unreviewable discretion to award or not to award costs to the winning party as the judge pleased. But this court has not interpreted the rule thus. We have said it establishes a “ ‘principle of preference’ ” (quoting Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory L.J. 747, 768 (1982)) that in all but exceptional cases requires the judge to award costs to the winning party, whether plaintiff or defendant. See Coyne-Delany Co. v. Capital Development Bd., 717 F.2d 385, 392 (7th Cir.1983); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Colbert, 692 F.2d 489, 490 (7th Cir.1982); Popeil Bros., Inc. v. Schick Elec., Inc., 516 F.2d 772, 774-76 (7th Cir.1975). Since “the ingredients of a proper decision [to withhold costs] are objective factors ... accessible to the judgment of a reviewing court,” Coyne-Delany Co. v. Capital Development Bd., supra, 717 F.2d at 392, we must determine whether such factors are present here.
*1538The plaintiffs argue only two factors. The first, that they are persons of limited monetary means, is entitled to little weight in a case such as this where the defendants are (with the exception of a broker hired by HUD to manage the property in question) public officials whose expenses of suit were borne by the United States, which is to say by the federal taxpayer. Most taxpayers are persons of limited means; most government revenue is raised from such persons, and not from the wealthy few. The denial of costs to the defendants in this case will not contribute, however slightly, to a more egalitarian distribution of the nation’s wealth.
The second factor that the plaintiffs ask us to consider is whether, if they had won the case, it would have been a “landmark” decision; they argue that the efforts of litigants who press for fundamental changes in the law should be subsidized, lest the high risk of losing deter such litigants. I question the validity of this argument in today’s legal climate. The federal courts are choking with litigation, much of it completely meritless; fear of losing seems not to be much of a deterrent. And to reward the loser of what would have been a landmark case if he had won creates the following paradox: the more frivolous the suit, the greater the landmark it would establish in the unlikely event that it succeeded, and hence the stronger the argument for denying the winner his costs. A successful suit to overrule Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), and thus make racial segregation in public schools once again lawful, would be one of the all-time legal landmarks. No one takes the landmark argument for forgiving the loser’s costs that seriously; no one argues for interpreting Rule 54(d) to encourage the bringing of lawsuits that have no reasonable chance of succeeding, merely because if they did succeed they would work a legal revolution. The present lawsuit had no reasonable chance of succeeding, and in fact borders on the frivolous.
As part of its program for subsidizing the housing needs of veterans, the poor, and others, HUD guarantees mortgage loans on houses in which members of these groups live. It is said that the high rate of default on its loans to owners of housing for poor people has made HUD, through foreclosure, the biggest owner of slum property in the United States. After foreclosure, with the property standing tenant-less, deterioration often is rapid and complete, and was in this case, where HUD lost its entire investment in the property and the neighbors got a blight, an eyesore, and maybe even a menace, to contend with. Such are the unintended effects of public benevolence. They are very unfortunate; but to think, as these plaintiffs did, that the federal courts are authorized to provide a remedy is wishful thinking. They would be authorized only if there had been an invasion of the plaintiffs’ federal legal rights; but as Judge Nichols explains, there is nothing in 42 U.S.C. § 1441a, the statute on which this suit is founded, to suggest that Congress meant to provide legal protection to neighbors of subsidized housing from the side effects — foreclosure, abandonment, deterioration — of federal housing subsidies. When the statute speaks of “ ‘a suitable living environment,’ ” “the preservation of existing housing and neighborhoods,” and “neighborhood disintegration” and “deterioration,” it is referring not to the neighbors of the subsidized homeowners but to the subsidized homeowners themselves. It is their living conditions, not those of their neighbors, that the subsidy programs seek to protect and improve. To give the neighbors rights of action against HUD and its officials — whether equitable, to force HUD to spend whatever money is necessary to prevent a building that it has taken over by foreclosure from deteriorating, or legal, to compensate the neighbors for the nuisance created by HUD’s neglect — will only compound the cost to HUD of having to foreclose on its loans. Instead of just having to write off a loan, which is bad enough, HUD would, under the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the statute, have to pay out additional money to the mortgagor’s neighbors — money that *1539would otherwise be available to improve the stock of housing. The program would be made more expensive, and the intended beneficiaries would obtain no net benefit from the additional expenses. The plaintiffs ask us to bring about this result by playing a purely verbal trick: defining “neighborhood” to mean the set of neighbors of subsidized housing, though in the statute the word simply means the area where the inhabitants of subsidized housing live. Compare Neighborhood Development Programs Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1469 et seq.
In tracing out the likely consequences of the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the statute, I have assumed that they are seeking damages just from HUD. The idea that Carla Hills, who was President Ford’s Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, might be personally liable for the untoward consequences of HUD’s programs during her tenure — a liability that might run into the hundreds of millions of dollars — is almost too silly for words, especially when one considers that there is no indemnification of federal officers against whom a judgment is levied. But public liability would be bad enough. It would as I have said increase the costs of the government’s housing programs and do so for the benefit of those frequently implacable opponents of the programs, the neighbors of the subsidy recipients. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Pierce, 707 F.2d 265 (7th Cir.1983). To seek a warrant for such liability in the housing law itself requires the exercise of an inflamed rather than merely creative legal imagination and should not be encouraged by giving the Don Quixotes who brought this suit the moral victory (slight as it is) of being excused from paying the defendants’ costs.
It does not matter in this case which approach we take to the question of deciding whether a statute that does not expressly create a private remedy for its violation is nevertheless enforceable by private persons. As Judge Nichols explains, the plaintiffs flunk the multi-factored test laid down in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). Although Cort is still cited often enough, there is some doubt whether its test remains authoritative. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 302-03, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1783-84, 68 L.Ed.2d 101 (1981) (concurring opinion). The more recent cases suggest a simpler test, whether Congress intended the courts to create a private remedy. See, e.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 831, 839, 78 L.Ed.2d 645 (1984). The plaintiffs flunk this test too. And even under the most liberal test (no longer in vogue) — that of Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39, 36 S.Ct. 482, 484, 60 L.Ed. 874 (1916) — whereby if a violation of the statute “results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied,” the plaintiffs could not win this case. They are not among the statute’s intended beneficiaries.
I have said that the suit had no fair chance of succeeding. This is evident even if we consider the plaintiffs’ pendent claims, whose dismissal by the district judge the plaintiffs have not appealed. Because the federal claim was dismissed on motion for summary judgment, it was not proper for the district judge even to reach the merits of any of the pendent claims; he should have relinquished jurisdiction over them. When the federal claims in a case are dismissed before trial, the considerations of judicial economy that underlie the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction are diminished and are outweighed- by the inroads that the doctrine makes into the autonomy of state courts in matters of state law. It is therefore the rule that, unless there are special circumstances, dismissal of the federal claim before trial requires the district judge to decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over any state-law claims. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 278 (1966); Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d 179, 187 (7th Cir.1984). There were no special circumstances here. Although the suit had been going on for a long time, and the district *1540judge was concerned that the plaintiffs would have a statute of limitations problem if they started over in state court, they would not have. See Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 110, 1113-217. The district court also noted that the defendants would be entitled by 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) to remove a state court action brought against them. See Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 89 S.Ct. 1813, 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969). But the district court should not have made the decision to remove for the defendants by retaining the pendent claims.
Finally, personal sympathy is not a proper basis for withholding an award of costs under Rule 54(d). The district judge, reacting as a citizen, did not like the way in which a federal program was administered in this case, and so he punished the government by denying the defendants their costs. If I thought it relevant to my judicial duty I would attempt to evaluate the program in this light and in the end might agree with his assessment. But it is no business of mine as a judge whether government programs work well or badly, fairly or unfairly, provided they do not violate anyone’s legal rights; and it seems to me clear beyond argument that nothing the defendants did or failed to do in this case violated any legal right of these plaintiffs that was within the district court’s power to enforce.
FLAUM, Circuit Judge, concurring in result.
I agree with my brethren that we should affirm the district court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s claims, and that the district court abused its discretion in denying the defendants their costs under rule 54(d).
As a line of recent Supreme Court cases makes clear, the ultimate issue in a case such as this is whether Congress intended to create a private right of action at the time it enacted the statute in question. See, e.g., Daily Income Fund v. Fox, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 831, 838, 78 L.Ed.2d 645 (1984); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377-78, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 1838-39, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982); Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 2066, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 (1981); Trans-america Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16, 100 S.Ct. 242, 245-246, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979). Thus, “[t]he question is not simply who would benefit from the Act, but whether Congress intended to confer federal rights upon those beneficiaries.” California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1779, 68 L.Ed.2d 101 (1981). Congressional intent may be discerned by examining a number of factors, including the statute’s legislative history, the statute’s purpose, the overall legislative scheme, the identity of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was passed, the existence of express statutory remedies adequate to serve the legislative purpose, and the traditional role of the states in affording the relief claimed. See Daily Income Fund v. Fox, 104 S.Ct. at 839; Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. at 639,101 S.Ct. at 2066.
The ultimate goal of our national housing policy, including that policy embodied in the National Housing Act, is “a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family____” 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982). The plaintiffs have argued that an important part of this national housing policy is the maintenance and preservation of urban neighborhoods. While I do not question this proposition, see 42 U.S.C. § 1441a & b (1982), there is no legislative history or other evidence indicating that Congress intended to address the problem of neighborhood disintegration by conferring on neighbors of HUD-owned property the right to sue HUD for damages suffered as a result of the deterioration of that property. In fact, it is not clear that providing neighbors of HUD-owned property with such a right is even consistent with the ultimate goal of national housing policy, the provision of decent housing for all Americans. The plaintiffs argue that providing them with a damage remedy will serve the purpose of “deterring defendants’ policy of neglect in the future.’ Appellants’ Brief at 14. It may be, however, that the problems associated with HUD’s property disposition program are of such complex origin that they do not *1541lend themselves to a simple solution. I would not find an implied private right of action here on the basis of such a speculative deterrence theory. The plaintiffs also argue that the Housing Act gives them a right to a decent neighborhood, which entitles them to damages in this case. However, even assuming that the Housing Act did give them some rights as neighbors, these rights certainly are not as important in the legislative scheme as the rights of persons to whom HUD actually provides housing. This is significant because, as the court below observed, “[t]o grant neighborhood residents a damage remedy for injuries resulting from their proximity to hazardous housing would just divert funds from the provision of adequate housing.” Burroughs v. Hills, 564 F.Supp. 1007,1017 (N.D.Ill.1983). Thus, there is no reason to find an implied private right of action for damages in this case.
Because the plaintiffs’ claim for injunc-tive relief became moot in the court below, there is an argument that the issue of whether they would have had a private right of action for injunctive relief under the Housing Act is not before us. Neither party has made this argument, however. In fact, the defendants have argued that the plaintiffs have no private right of action at all, and the plaintiffs have argued that the district court erred because it found that the plaintiffs did have rights as neighbors under the Housing Act, but it failed to give them an effective means for vindicating those rights (a damage remedy) in this case. I agree with the parties that the injunctive relief and damages issues are intertwined, and, since the district court’s opinion might be interpreted as suggesting that the plaintiffs would have had a cause of action for injunctive relief, I believe it is appropriate that we decide whether the Housing Act provides the plaintiffs with any private right of action to force HUD to maintain its property.
I can find no evidence that, in enacting the Housing Act, Congress intended to create a private right of action for injunctive relief for persons such as the plaintiffs in this case. There is no legislative history suggesting such an intention, and my view that neighbors of HUD-owned property are not the primary beneficiaries of the Housing Act further militates against our finding a private right of action in this case. In addition, this is a case in which we should consider “the traditional role of the states in affording the relief claimed.” Daily Income Fund v. Fox, 104 S.Ct. at 839. Persons harmed unreasonably by conditions on neighboring property traditionally have been able to enjoin those conditions through suits based on state common law theories or state or local statutes. In this case, for example, the plaintiffs originally sought injunctive relief in part based on an Illinois statute, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 24, § 11— 13-15, which provides that owners or tenants who are adversely affected by their neighbor’s violation of certain municipal ordinances may sue to restrain, correct, or abate the violation. Even assuming it considered the matter at all, Congress undoubtedly would have been aware of the traditional role played by state and local law in providing injunctive relief for persons injured by conditions on their neighbor’s property. This consideration lends further support to the conclusion that Congress did not intend that there be any private right of action for the plaintiffs in this case.1
Turning to the question of costs under rule 54(d), I find that the district court’s refusal to award the defendants their costs was an abuse of discretion. In *1542this circuit, there is a presumption that costs should be awarded to the prevailing party, and the losing party must overcome this presumption to avoid liability for costs. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Colbert, 692 F.2d 489, 490 (7th Cir.1982). Historically, this court has found the presumption to be overcome only where there has been some fault, misconduct, default, or other action worthy of penalty on the part of the prevailing side. Id. Recently, this court held that a losing party also may overcome the presumption by a showing of indigency. Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1165 (7th Cir.1983).
The plaintiffs have not argued, and the court below did not find, that the defendants deserve to be penalized for their conduct in this litigation. Although the district court did state that the plaintiffs are “of limited means,” I do not interpret this as a finding of indigency. Thus, none of the previously recognized grounds for refusing costs to the prevailing party are present in this case. Moreover, there is no need to expand existing law in this area. While this case may have presented novel questions of public interest and importance, as the district court found, this is an insufficient reason to depart from the normal rule of awarding costs to the prevailing party. The District of Columbia Circuit has explained: “Unlike attorneys’ fees, whose magnitude and unpredictability have discouraged parties with otherwise meritorious claims from litigation, the small and predictable costs of court fees, printing, and court reporters’ fees have customarily been viewed as necessary 'and reasonable incidents of litigation, properly reimbursable to the winning party.” Baez v. United States Department of Justice, 684 F.2d 999, 1003 (D.C.Cir.1982). Thus, in the absence of a finding that the plaintiffs are indigent, there is no realistic concern that awarding costs to the defendants here will discourage persons from attempting to vindicate their rights in federal court. In short, there is no compelling reason in this case to alter the normal rule of awarding costs to the prevailing party.
Finally, with regard to the plaintiffs’ state law claims, the denial of those claims by the district court was not appealed to this court. Thus, I find it not only unnecessary but also inappropriate for this court to decide whether those claims should have been entertained by the district court.