dissenting.
Because the net effect of the majority’s holding is the imposition of absolute and/or *1198vicarious liability on the defendant manufacturer in this case, I respectfully dissent.
Plaintiff herein pursued his claim on the alternative theories of negligence in the design of the roll form machine and breach of implied warranty. It is axiomatic that the initial step in establishing liability for negligent design of a product requires definition of the “duty” imposed by law on the manufacturer. See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilley and Co., 94 Mich.App. 59, 70, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979), modified and aff'd, 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164 (1984) (under negligence theory, plaintiff must establish the traditional common-law elements of duty, breach, damage and causation). To prevail on the implied warranty claim, the plaintiff must prove that a defect in the product, attributable to the manufacturer, caused his injury. Id. (emphasis added). In the instant case, the facts simply do not support recovery for the plaintiff on either theory.
The duty which Michigan law imposes upon a manufacturer is “to design products that are safe for their intended or reasonably contemplated use, guarding against all unreasonable, foreseeable risks to users.” Gootee v. Colt Industries, Inc., 712 F.2d 1057, 1064 (6th Cir.1983) (emphasis added). See also, Hartford Fire Ins. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 120 Mich.App. 283, 328 N.W.2d 29, 33 (1982). As the majority correctly observes, “a manufacturer has a duty to produce a reasonably fit product ...,” at 1193 (emphasis added), citing Hartford Fire, supra; Elsasser v. American Motors Corp., 81 Mich.App. 379, 265 N.W.2d 339 (1978).
In the instant case, the majority acknowledges that the plaintiffs injury could not have resulted from plaintiffs operation of the machine as originally designed.1 In making this concession, the majority concedes that, as originally manufactured, the roll former was reasonably safe for use in the manner in which the employee was operating it. Stated differently, the danger presented by the machine was clearly not a result of defective design, but rather a result of the negligence of plaintiffs employer in making major modifications to the machine without regard for the hazardous consequences to employees. Thus, the majority vicariously imposed the employer’s negligence on the defendant in this case, an approach which has been expressly rejected in this circuit. Adams v. Union Carbide, 737 F.2d 1453 at 1457 (6th Cir.1984).
The proof adduced at trial regarding the safety devices which the defendant could have added in 1957 to guard against the injuries complained of herein are, to my perspective, irrelevant. See, e.g., Gootee, supra, 712 F.2d at 1064 (feasibility of a design change, standing alone, does not establish negligence on the part of the manufacturer). The necessity for adding these safety devices was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant manufacturer in 1957 only if the modifications eventually made by plaintiff’s employer were equally foreseeable. In other words, the majority is ruling that not only should the manufacturer have foreseen the need for safety devices, but rather that it should have anticipated every conceivable modification which would or could have been made by the plaintiff’s employer (or other purchasers of the machine) into perpetuity from the date of the machine’s delivery to the employer.2 The majority then imposes a duty on the manufacturer to counter any hazards resulting from the anticipated modifications to the machine by installing additional safeguards. Carried to its logical extreme, the majority’s opinion places an absolute duty on a manufacturer not only to produce a machine reasonably safe as delivered, but also to employ clairvoy-*1199anee to.determine how the machine might be modified in perpetuity, and to further protect against hazards resulting therefrom. Such a requirement effectively imposes absolute liability on the manufacturer in this case.
In sum, I would hold that as a matter of law, the modifications made by Modern Materials were not reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, and further, that the modifications, not the original design of the machine, were the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Thus, plaintiff was not entitled to recovery on either a negligence or implied warranty theory, and the trial court’s grant of defendant’s jnov motion should be affirmed.
. The majority concedes that "it seems clear enough that if the jog buttons had not been added anyone performing the task being performed by plaintiff would have shut off the power or the motor or disengaged the clutch before putting his hands in proximity to the rolls. The rolls could not then have started to turn unless some other person intervened.” At 1195.
. In this case 20 years had elapsed from the date of initial delivery.